
249

00142049

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
TOWN HALL, BOMBAY.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 15 June, 2016

HISTORY

OF

THE OTTOMAN TURKS:

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THEIR EMPIRE TO THE PRESENT TIME.

CHIEFLY FOUNDED ON VON HAMMER.

BY E. S. CREASY, M.A.

Professor of History in University College, London; Late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge,
Author of "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World,"
"Rise and Progress of the English Constitution," &c.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET,
Publisher in Ordinary to Her Majesty.
1856.

The Author reserves to himself the right of Translation.

BESSARABIA
TURKEY
IN
EUROPE
BLACK SEA
SEA OF AZOF

LONDON:
BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.

PREFACE.

I SINCERELY express my regret for the long delay in the appearance of this volume. I should be egotistically tedious if I were to narrate here the causes of that delay; but I hope that my readers will do me the justice of believing that they were chiefly causes beyond my control.

E. S. CREASY.

2, MITRE COURT CHAMBERS, TEMPLE,
April 4, 1856.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

Character of the latter portion of Turkish history—Accession of Sultan Ibrahim—Folly and wickedness of his government—Revolution—Ibrahim deposed and put to death—Foreign events during Ibrahim's reign—War with the Cossacks—Beginning of the war of Candia—Mahomet IV., at the age of seven raised to the throne—Continued tumult and misery—The first Kiuprili made Vizier 1

CHAPTER II.

Mohammed Kiuprili—Rigour and success of his ministry—His son Ahmed Kiuprili succeeds him in the Vizierate—Great Qualities of Ahmed Kiuprili—Weakness of Sultan Mahomet IV.—War with Austria—Great defeat of the Turks by Montecuculi at St. Gothard—Truce with Austria—Ahmed Kiuprili takes Candia—War with Russia and Poland—Sobieski defeats the Turks at Khoczim and Lemberg—Peace of Zurana—Death and character of Ahmed Kiuprili . . 27

CHAPTER III.

Kara Mustapha Vizier—Unsuccessful war with Russia—War with Austria—Siege of Vienna—Rescue of the City and complete overthrow of the Turks by Sobieski—Heavy losses of the Ottomans—Mahomet IV. deposed—His character—Change of the Janissary force—The Barbaresque regencies—The pretended Messiah Sabbathai—Mahomet IV.'s patronage of literature. 54

CHAPTER IV.

Solyman II.—Insurrections and defeats—Successes against Russia—Kiuprili-Zade Mustapha made Grand Vizier—His character and measures—Wise policy to the Rayas—Successful campaign—Death of Solyman II.—Ahmed II. Sultan—Kiuprili defeated and killed at Salankamen—Disastrous reign of Ahmed II.—Mustapha II. succeeds and heads the armies—Victorious at first, but defeated by Eugene at Zenta—Husein Kiuprili Grand Vizier—Conquests of Peter the Great of Russia over the Turks—Azof taken—Negociations for peace—Treaty of Carlowitz 71

CHAPTER V.

PAGE

Death of Kiuprili Housein—Abdication of Mustapha II.—Accession of Achmet III.—Charles XII. in Turkey—War with Russia—Success of the Turks and treaty of the Pruth—War with Venice—The Morea recovered—War with Austria—Disasters of the Turks—Peace of Passarowitz—League with Russia against Persia—Deposition of Achmet III.—The Hospodars—The Fanariots 106

CHAPTER VI.

Mahmoud I.—Topal Osman—Peace with Persia—Russia and Austria attack Turkey—Russian invasions of the Crimea—Successes of the Turks against the Austrians—Belgrade recovered—Treaty of Belgrade—Pacific policy of Turkey—Death of Sultan Mahmoud—Short pacific reign of Othman III. 158

CHAPTER VII.

Russian attack on Poland—Turkish remonstrances—War with Russia—Opinions of Europe—Defeats of the Turkish armies—Russian fleet in the Mediterranean—Battle of Tchesme—Exploits of Hassan of Algiers—Loss of the Crimea—Negociations—War renewed—Silistria and Shumla defended—Death of Mustapha III.—Abdul Hamid Sultan—Treaty of Kainardji 207

CHAPTER VIII.

Attempts of Gazi Hassan to restore the Empire—Fresh encroachments of Russia—Convention of 1779—Russia annexes the Crimea—Vain attempts of France to induce England to act with her against Russia—Convention of 1783—Schemes of Austria and Russia for the dismemberment of Turkey—War—Resistance of the Turks to Austria—Austria makes peace—Disasters sustained by the Turks in the war with Russia—Accession of Sultan Selim III.—Intervention of England and Prussia—Treaty of Jassy 264

CHAPTER IX.

View of the Turkish Empire before the commencement of Selim III.'s Reforms—Territorial divisions; Eyalets, Livas, Kazas—Appointments of the Pachas—The Ayans—Extent of the Empire—Its misrule and misery—Feebleness of the Sultan's authority—The Wahabites, Druses, Mamelukes, and Suliotes—Revolts of the Pachas—Abuses of the Feudal System—Tyranny of the Farmers of the Revenue—Military weakness of the Empire—The Janissaries and other troops—The House of Othman at its Nadir 314

CHAPTER X.

PAGE

Selim's reforms — The new troops — Napoleon attacks Egypt — War between Turkey and France—Alliance with Russia and England — Defence of Acre—French evacuate Egypt—General Peace—Troubles in Servia—The Dahis—Kara George—War with Russia and England —The passage of the Dardanelles—Truce with Russia—Selim III. deposed by the Janissaries—Mustapha IV. Sultan—Deposed by Mustapha Bairactar—Mahmoud II.—Death of Bairactar—Triumph of the Janissaries, and apparent end of reforms—Russian war continued—Treaty of Bucharest 331

CHAPTER XI.

Character of Mahmoud II.—Mehemet Ali—Overthrow of the Mamelukes and the Wahabites—Fresh troubles in Servia—Milosch Obrenowitch —General excitement among the Rayas—The Hetæria—The Greek Revolution — Mahmoud destroys the Janissaries — Russia under Nicholas I. forces the treaty of Akkerman on Turkey—France, England, and Russia, interfere on behalf of the Greeks—Battle of Navarino — War with Russia—Treaty of Adrianople — Revolt of Mehemet Ali—Battle of Konieh—Russian troops protect the Sultan —Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi—Fresh War with Mehemet Ali—Death of Mahmoud—The Turks defeated—Sultan Abdul Mejdid aided by England against Mehemet Ali—Settlement of disputes with Egypt . 390

CHAPTER XII.

Reforms of Sultans Mahmoud II. and Abdul Mejdid—Abolition of the Court of Confiscations—Power of life and death taken from the Pachas—The Vakoufs—The Timars and the Ziamets abolished—The Dereh-Beys put down—Financial reforms—Edicts in favour of the Rayas—Reform of the Central Administration—Costume—The Tanzimat—The constitutional Firman of the present year—Educational reforms—Anti-slavery measures—The new military system—Omar Pacha—Increased prosperity of Turkey—Attitude of Russia—The disturbances of 1848 in the Principalities—The Sultan protects the Hungarian refugees—Attempts of the Czar to make England join him against Turkey—The Emperor Nicholas and Sir Hamilton Seymour—The Holy Places—Russia's demand of Protectorate—The War—The Peace—What will be the future history of the Ottoman Empire? 446

APPENDIX 479

ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOLUME II.

PAGE

MAP OF CRIMEA AND NORTHERN COAST OF BLACK SEA, AND SEA OF AZOF . . . . . *To face Frontispiece*

PLAN OF BATTLE OF ST. GOTHARD 39

MAP OF ASIA MINOR . . . . . *End of Volume*

CORRIGENDA.

VOL. I.

Page	38	line	10	*for*	"eldest,"	*read*	"second."
,,	141	,,	29	,,	"1763,"	,,	"1774."
,,	211	,,	4	,,	"like the followers,"	,,	"and most of the followers."
,,	244	,,	23	,,	"father,"	,,	"grandfather."
,,	290	,,	11	,,	"stem,"	,,	"stern."
,,	325	,,	30	,,	"is,"	,,	"was."
,,	335	,,	6	,,	"three,"	,,	"ten."
,,	367	,,	24	,,	"1693," "1694,"	,,	"1598," "1594."
,,	389	,,	1	,,	"1521,"	,,	"1621."

VOL. II.

Page	1	line	8	*for*	"reign,"	*read*	"reigns."
,,	47	,,	17	,,	"were,"	,,	"was."
,,	56	,,	4	,,	"both horse, foot,"	,,	"both horse and foot."
,,	64	,,	32	,,	"Sultan's,"	,,	"Sultans."
,,	71		*note*	,,	"58,"	,,	"58—60."
,,	76	,,	14	,,	"first,"	,,	"first time."
,,	79	,,	22	,,	"the beleaguering,"	,,	"beleaguering."
,,	115	,,	26	,,	"Mœotis,"	,,	"the Mœotis."
,,	118	,,	13	,,	"Russias,"	,,	"Russians."
,,	150	,,	18	,,	"or,"	,,	"and."
,,	185	,,	24	,,	"congress,"	,,	"the congress."
,,	223	,,	7	,,	"Ottoman,"	,,	"Othman."
,,	247	,,	14	,,	"Bulgaria,"	,,	"Bulgarian."
,,	247	,,	18	,,	"towns,"	,,	"town."
,,	308	,,	24	,,	"where,"	,,	"were."
,,	313	,,	16	,,	"Djinid,"	,,	"Djedid."
,,	350	,,	9	,,	"Tartary,"	,,	"Turkey."
,,	405		*note*	,,	"number,"	,,	"murder."

HISTORY

OF

THE OTTOMAN TURKS.

VOLUME II.

CHAPTER I.

CHARACTER OF THE LATTER PORTION OF TURKISH HISTORY—ACCESSION OF SULTAN IBRAHIM—FOLLY AND WICKEDNESS OF HIS GOVERNMENT—REVOLUTION—IBRAHIM DEPOSED AND PUT TO DEATH—FOREIGN EVENTS DURING IBRAHIM'S REIGN—WAR WITH THE COSSACKS—BEGINNING OF THE WAR OF CANDIA—MAHOMET IV., AT THE AGE OF SEVEN RAISED TO THE THRONE—CONTINUED TUMULT AND MISERY—THE FIRST KIUPRILI MADE VIZIER.*

In the preceding portion of this history we have traced the fortunes of the House of Othman during a period of nearly four hundred years. A further space of rather more than two centuries remains to be examined, before we connect the narrative of the exploits of the early Sultans with a sketch of the great contest, of which their empire is now the occasion and the scene.

This final volume will comprise the reign of thirteen

* See Von Hammer, books 49 to 51.

princes, from Ibrahim, who succeeded Amurath IV., in A.D. 1640, to Mahmoud II., who died in 1839. It will include also the sixteen eventful years, during which the present sovereign, Abdul Mejnid, has striven to uphold the honour, and to retrieve the fallen prosperity of his race. Such a character, and such a position as his, must ever command sympathy and admiration. But, with the exceptions of the now reigning Sultan, and of the great though unsuccessful man, who was his immediate predecessor on the throne of Constantinople;—perhaps with the exceptions also of Mustapha II. and Selim III., the Turkish princes whom we are proceeding to contemplate, form figures of but languid interest on the historic page. The decay of the State accords with the degeneracy of its rulers: and minute descriptions of the troubles and calamities of declining empire are generally monotonous and unattractive. We shall indeed still have our attention drawn to fierce and eventful wars; and we shall still meet with names, that must ever live high in martial renown; but they are wars, in which the Crescent has generally, though not invariably, gone back; they are principally the names of commanders, who have grown great, not in the advancement, but at the expense of the House of Othman: such names as Montecuculi, Sobieski, Eugène, and Suwarrow. Yet, gleams of glory and success on the Turkish side will not be found altogether wanting; and, besides the individual Sultans, who have been already specified as honourable exceptions to the general character of the Royal House since the fourth Amurath, there have been

truly great men in the councils and the armies of Turkey. She has had her Kiuprilis, and others, whose names have long deserved and commanded more than merely Oriental celebrity. We may remark also, that these last two centuries of Ottoman history, though less picturesque and spirit-stirring than its earlier periods, are more practically instructive and valuable for us to study, with reference to the great problems which the states of Central and Western Europe are now called on to solve,—how to redress the international balance of power, and how to provide securities against the aggressive ambition of Russia. It is also from comparatively recent scenes in the Turkish annals, that we gain the best materials for judging what probability there is of such reforms and reorganisations being effected in the Ottoman empire, as may enable it hereafter to hold its own in the conflicts of the great powers of the world, instead of depending on the jealousies which those powers entertain of each other, for protection, almost as perilous to its recipient as the subjugation which for a time it averts. And even those politicians, who neither expect nor desire the maintenance of the Ottoman dominion, but who hope for the rise and growth of independent Christian states from among the European populations now subject to the Moslem, must look with interest on the historical events of the last century, by which the authority of the Sultan has been so materially affected, especially in the Trans-Danubian principalities, in Servia and in Greece.

When Sultan Amurath IV. expired, his brother Ibrahim, whom he had vainly doomed with his own

dying breath, to die, was the sole surviving representative in male descent of the House of Othman. Ibrahim had during Amurath's reign been a prisoner in the royal palace; and for the last eight years had trembled in the daily expectation of death. When the grandees of the empire hastened to his apartment with the tidings that Sultan Amurath was no more, and with congratulations to their new sovereign, Ibrahim in his terror thought that the executioners were approaching, and barred the door against them. He long refused to believe their assurances of Amurath's decease;* and was only convinced, when the Sultana-mother ordered the body of her dead son to be carried within sight of the living one. Then Ibrahim came forth, and mounted the Turkish throne; which received in him a selfish voluptuary, in whom long imprisonment and protracted terror had debased whatever spirit nature might have originally bestowed, and who was as rapacious and bloodthirsty, as he was cowardly and mean. Under Ibrahim the worst evils that had prevailed in the time of Amurath's weakest predecessors were speedily revived; while the spirit of cruelty, in which Amurath had governed, continued to rage with even greater enormity.

For a short period Ibrahim's first Grand Vizier, Kara-Moustafa, laboured to check the excesses and supply the deficiencies of his sovereign. The Christian subjects of the Porte received from Kara-Moustafa

* Compare in Suetonius, Vit. Claud. cxi., the account of the terror of Claudius when saluted as Emperor after Caligula's death. "Rumore cædis exterritus prorepsit ad solarium proximum, interque prætenta foribus vela se abdidit. Latentem forte discurrens gregarius miles animadversis pedibus e studio sciscitandi quisnam esset, agnovit, et pro metu ad genua sibi adcidentem, Imperatorem salutavit," &c. &c.

impartial justice; and he attempted with some degree of temporary success to keep down the growth of abuses in the financial administration of the empire. He had the perilous honesty to speak with frankness to the dissolute tyrant whom he served, to oppose Ibrahim's mad caprices, and to strive against the pernicious influence of the favourite sultanas and buffoons, who trafficked in the sale of posts and dignities. The offence which the Vizier thus gave, and the reputation of having amassed much wealth, were sure causes of ruin to one who served a moody and avaricious master like Ibrahim. At the same time the Vizier's character was far from faultless; and his errors and his merits co-operated to effect his destruction. Moustafa was violent and implacable in his enmity towards all who rivalled or seemed likely to rival him in power; and he was unscrupulous as to the means which he employed in order to overthrow an adversary. But his deadliest foes were those whose inferiority of sex and station screened them from reprisals; and the immediate cause of the Grand Vizier's fall, was an affront which he gave to the lady who held the office of governess of the Harem. This female functionary of Ibrahim's State, the Kiaya-Khatoum, had sent a requisition to the Grand Vizier for an instant supply of 500 carts of wood for the use of the Harem. At this very time grave tidings of troubles in the provinces and on the frontiers had reached Constantinople. Intent on these matters, Kara-Moustafa neglected to send the faggots for the ladies. A few days afterwards, while he was presiding in the Divan, he received, two hours before

the usual time of the council's rising, a message from Ibrahim commanding him immediately to dismiss the Divan and appear before the Sultan. The Vizier obeyed, and hastened before his royal master. Ibrahim instantly demanded of him, "Why have not the 500 loads of wood for the Harem been supplied?" "They shall be sent," replied the Vizier. Then, with more courage than prudence, he added, "My Padischah, is it wise or proper for thee to call on me to break up the Divan, and to confuse and delay the weightiest affairs of state, for the sake of attending to 500 loads of wood, the whole value of which does not amount to 500 aspres? Why, when I am before thee, dost thou question me about firewood, but sayest not a word about the petitions of thy subjects, the state of the frontier, and of the finances?" The Mufti Yahya, who was informed of this conversation by Husein Effendi, who was present, advised the Grand Vizier to be more guarded in his words, and to treat nothing as of trifling importance in which the Sultan took an interest. Kara-Moustafa replied, "Is it not doing the Sultan good service to tell him the truth? Am I to turn flatterer? I had rather speak freely and die, than live in servile falsehood."*

Resolved, however, not to die without an effort to overthrow his enemies, Kara-Moustafa formed a device to ruin Youssouf Pacha, who had lately risen rapidly in favour with the Sultan, and who was the Vizier's mortal foe. Kara-Moustafa caused money to be

* The Turkish historian, Naima, who narrates this speech, states that he heard it related by Husein Effendi. Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 234, n.

distributed among the Janissaries of the capital, to induce them to refuse their rations, and to allege the undue influence of Youssouf Pacha as the cause of their discontent. But the scheme was soon disclosed to the Sultan, who summoned Kara-Moustafa before him, and ordered his instant execution. Kara-Moustafa escaped from the royal presence to his own house; and, when pursued thither by the executioners, instead of exhibiting the passive submission which Oriental statesmen have generally shown in such circumstances, he drew his sabre and fought desperately, till he was overpowered by numbers, disarmed, and strangled.*

The successor of Kara-Moustafa in the Grand Vizierate was Sultanzadé Pacha. He was determined not to incur his predecesssor's fate by uncourtly frankness towards his sovereign. He flattered every caprice, and was the ready instrument of every passion of the Sultan, whose immoderate appetite for sensual pleasures, and savage fondness of ordering and of witnessing acts of cruelty, now raged without stint or shame. Ibrahim, who remembered the check which Kara-Moustafa used to impose on him, could not

* When Kara Moustafa's palace was searched by the Sultan's officers, five pictures, being portraits of Kara Moustafa and four other ministers of state, were found in a place of concealment. It was supposed that the late Vizier had used them in magical rites; and a Moor, who was said to have been his tutor in sorcery, was burnt alive. Von Hammer remarks that probably Kara Moustafa was fond of paintings, but kept them as forbidden treasures in a secret part of his house. The strict followers of the Mahometan law consider all representations of the human form, either in statuary or painting, to be impious: both as encouragements to idolatry and as profanations of God's chief workmanship. They say, that at the Last Day pictures and statues will rise round the artists who produced them, and call on the unhappy makers to supply their creatures with souls.

help feeling some degree of surprise at the universal obsequiousness of his new Grand Vizier; and asked one day of Sultanzadé, "How is it that thou art able always to approve of my actions, whether good or evil?" "My Padischah," replied the shameless minister of despotism, "thou art Caliph; thou art God's shadow upon earth. Every idea, which thy spirit entertains, is a revelation from Heaven. Thy orders, even when they appear unreasonable, have an innate reasonableness, which thy slave ever reveres, though he may not always understand." Ibrahim accepted these assurances of infallibility and impeccability; and thenceforth spoke of himself as a divinely inspired agent in the midst of the most disgraceful scenes of folly, vice, and crime.* So gross were these, that the very inmates of his harem sometimes murmured; and the Sultan's mother remonstrated with him against the corruption and frivolity of his conduct; but

* ——— Nihil est quod credere de se
Non possit, quum laudatur Dis æqua potestas.—Juv. Sat. iv. 70.
Another observation of the same great moralist, that
"Et qui nolunt occidere quenquam
Posse volunt." Sat x. 96.
Is remarkably illustrated by an anecdote, which Daru (Histoire de Venise, tome v. p. 40, note) relates respecting the effect produced on Louis the XIV. of France, when he heard of the summary assertions of absolute right over his subjects's lives which Sultan Ibrahim used to practise. The Count de Cezy had been French ambassador at Constantinople, and had seen Ibrahim stab with his own hand, without the slightest form of trial, a minister, who was accused of misconduct. Some years afterwards, when the Count had returned to Paris, he narrated, in the presence of King Louis, this trait of the power of the Turkish Sultans, and other similar scenes which he had witnessed. "Il échappa au roi de dire, 'Voilà cependant régner.' Le duc de Montausier, qui était present, se retourna vivement vers l'ambassadeur, en lui disant tout haut, 'Ajoutez donc qu'on les étrangle.' Louis XIV. répara noblement ce moment d'oubli, en nommant gouverneur du dauphin celui qui avait osé dire un mot si severe."

in vain. Ibrahim replied by quoting the words of his Grand Vizier; and let loose his absolute power in the gratification of every frivolous vanity and caprice, of every depraved appetite, of every feverish fit of irritable passion, and every gloomy desire of suspicious malignity.

The treasures, which the stern prudence of Amurath had accumulated, were soon squandered by the effeminate prodigality of his successor. In order to obtain fresh supplies of gold for his worthless favourites, and for the realisation of his wild fancies, Ibrahim sold every office of state, and every step in the honours both of Pen and Sword, to the highest bidder. The burdens of the old taxes were inordinately increased, and new imposts were added; the very names of which showed the frivolous causes for which the Sultan drained the resources of his subjects, thus adding the sense of insult to that of oppression. One of Ibrahim's passions was a morbid craving for perfumes, especially for amber. Another was an excessive fondness, not only of wearing, but of seeing around him, furs of the most rare and costly description. To meet these desires, Ibrahim created two new taxes; one called the Fur Tax, and the other called the Amber Tax. The madness of the Sultan's love for furs was worked up to the utmost by hearing a legend told by an old woman, who used to amuse the ladies of the Harem by narrating stories to them at night. This legend described a certain king of the olden time, who was dressed in sable-skins, whose sofas and couches were covered, and whose palace was carpeted and tapestried also with the fur of the sable. Ibrahim

instantly set his heart on being similarly arrayed, and on decking the Serail in like manner. He dreamed all night of sables; and in the morning he commanded in the Divan that letters should be sent to all the governors and great men of the empire, enjoining each of them to collect and forward to Constantinople a certain number of sable-skins. A similar requisition was made on all the Ulema, and all the civil and military officers in the capital. Some of them were driven to desperation by this mad tyranny, and openly gave vent to the indignation which it inspired. Mohammed Tchelibi, the judge of Galata, appeared before the Grand Vizier clad in the gown of a common dervise, and reproached him bitterly for the folly and wickedness of the government. He demanded an audience of the Sultan, and added, "There can but happen to me one of three things. You may kill me; and, in that case, I shall think myself fortunate in being made a martyr. Or, you may banish me from Constantinople; which will not be unpleasant, as there have been several shocks of earthquake here lately. Or, perhaps, you will deprive me of my employments. But in that I have saved you the trouble. I have appointed my deputy, and have changed my judge's robe and turban for the dervise's gown and cap." The Vizier, alarmed at such boldness, heard him in silence, and concealed his resentment. A colonel of the Janissaries, named Black Mourad, to whom the five hundred men of his regiment were devotedly attached, at this time returned from the Candian wars, and was met on landing by a treasury officer, who, in conformity

with the resolution of the Divan, demanded of him so many sable-skins, so many ounces of amber, and a certain sum of money. Rolling his eyes, bloodshot with wrath, on the tax-gatherer, Black Mourad growled and thundered out, "I have brought nothing back from Candia but gunpowder and lead. Sables and amber are things that I know only by name. Money I have none; and, if I am to give it you, I must first beg or borrow it." Not satisfied with the produce of these exactions, the Sultan arbitrarily confiscated and sold a large mass of heritable property. The capricious fancies of his favourite ladies were as costly to the empire as his own. Ibrahim permitted them to take what they pleased from the shops and bazaars without payment. One of these fair plunderers complained to the Sovereign that she disliked shopping by daylight; and forthwith appeared a mandate from the Sultan requiring all the merchants and shop-keepers of the capital to keep their establishments open all night, and to provide sufficient torchlight for their wares to be seen clearly. Another lady told Ibrahim that she wished to see him with his beard adorned with jewels. Ibrahim decked himself accordingly, and appeared in public thus bedizened. The Turks looked on this as an evil omen; because, according to Oriental traditions, the only sovereign who had adopted such embellishment was King Pharaoh of the Red Sea. Enormous treasures were squandered on the construction of a chariot, incrusted with precious stones, for the use of another Celœno of the Harem; and 25,000 piastres were expended, that an equally splendid skiff should bear the Sultan along

the Bosphorus. The disasters of the Venetian wars during the year 1648 irritated more and more the Ottoman nation against their imbecile but oppressive ruler; and a formidable conspiracy was organised to deprive him of the power which he abused.

Foremost among the conspirators were the chief officers of the Janissaries; and the most active of these was Black Mourad, the colonel who had spoken with such rough frankness of the royal requisition for amber and sable. He knew that his head was in hourly peril; and it was indeed only by a timely warning from a private friend in the seraglio that he escaped death. The Sultan and his Vizier celebrated with great splendour, on the 6th of August, 1648, the marriage of one of Ibrahim's daughters, a child of eight years old, with the Vizier's son. Mourad and three other Janissary colonels, named Mousliheddin, Begtasch, and Kara-Tschaoush, were bidden to the royal marriage feast, at which it was intended to secure and slay them. But the doomed men avoided their sovereign's snare, and summoned, the same night, their comrades to the mosque of the Janissaries. It was there resolved to depose the Grand Vizier. This was the first avowed object of the conspirators, but they were fully prepared to strike further. The birth of several princes since Ibrahim's accession, the eldest of whom, named Mahomet, was now seven years old, had deprived the Sultan of the protection which, in the early part of his reign, he derived from being the sole representative of the House of Othman. The whole body of the Ulema co-operated with the soldiery; and no one was more

active or determined in promoting the revolution than the chief Mufti, whose deadly enmity Ibrahim had earned by a gross insult offered to his daughter. Ibrahim heard the demand of the insurgents respecting his Vizier, and took away from him the seals of office; but with a gleam of friendship and humanity, feelings, of which at other times he seemed destitute, he strove to protect his fallen favourite's life. The soldiery and the Ulema made Sofi Mohammed Grand Vizier, and sent him to the Sultan to make known their will that the evil minister should be given up to them for punishment. Ibrahim had the imprudence to strike the chosen Vizier of the army and the people, and to threaten him that his own turn for punishment would soon come. The insurgents now surrounded the palace, and their words grew more and more menacing. The Sultan sent his master of the horse to bid them disperse. The veteran Moussilheddin harangued him in the hearing of Janissaries, the Spahis, and the civil officers, who were now all joined in the revolt, saying, "The Padischah has ruined the Ottoman world by pillage and tyranny. Women wield the sovereignty. The treasury cannot satiate their caprices. The subjects are ruined. The armies of the infidels are winning towns on the frontiers: their fleets blockade the Dardanelles. Hast thou not been an eye-witness of the state of affairs? and why hast thou not told the Padischah the truth?" "The Padischah," answered the envoy, "knows nought of this. The guilt is mine: for I feared to speak the truth to the Padischah in the presence of the late Vizier. But now tell me what ye desire, and I will

faithfully repeat your words before the throne." Mousslibeddin, in the name of the assembly, demanded three things—first, the abolition of the sale of offices; secondly, the banishment of the favourite Sultanas from the court; thirdly, the death of the Grand Vizier. The master of the horse took back this message to the Sultan, who made feeble preparations for resistance by arming the gardeners and pages of the palace. It was now night, and the chiefs of the Ulema among the insurgents wished to retire to their homes. But the men of the sword were wiser than the men of the law; and the colonels of the Janissaries said to their judicial comrades, "If we separate to night, we may be unable to assemble again in the morning. Let us keep together till we have re-established order in the world; and let us in a mass pass this night in the mosque." The Ulemas obeyed, and in the morning the united revolutionists began their work of vengeance. The obnoxious Vizier was discovered in his hiding-place and slain, as was the grand judge of Roumelia, who was hated by the people for his debauchery and venality. A message was now sent into the Serail, requiring the Sultan to come forth to the troops. As Ibrahim complied not with this desire, two of the chief Ulemas were commissioned to wait upon Ibrahim's mother, the Sultana Validé, and to inform her that it was resolved to depose the Sultan, and to enthrone her grandson Mahomet in his stead. It has been mentioned that this princess had vainly expostulated with Ibrahim respecting his career of insane profligacy and tyranny. The only effect of her remonstrances had been to draw on her

the Sultan's hatred; and Ibrahim had treated her and the princesses, his sisters, with gross indignity, and was justly suspected of meditating their destruction. But the aged Sultana now strove hard to avert the wrath of the people from her unworthy son. It was known that the force of armed attendants in the Serail was utterly inadequate to protect Ibrahim against an assault by the insurgents; and even this slight guard was evidently indisposed to peril their lives for an odious and despised master. The Sultana Validé consented to receive a deputation from the army and people, consisting of the Mufti, the Cadiaskers, and of Mousslihéddin, Begtascth, and Black Mourad, the Janissary colonels. They found her apparelled in the deepest mourning, and only a negro eunuch attended to fan her. They stood before her in respectful silence, and she said to them, "Is it a just thing thus to raise revolts? Are ye not all slaves, whom the bounty of this House has fed?" The old veteran, Moussilihéddin, moved to tears by these words, replied, "Gracious mistress, thou art right. We have all known the benefactions of this House; no one more than myself, for these eighty years. It is because we are not thankless men, that we can no longer stand idly by, and witness the ruin of this illustrious House and of this realm. Oh, would that I had not lived on to see these days! What is there that I can covet further for myself? Neither gold nor rank could profit me. But oh, most gracious lady, the foolishness and the wickedness of the Padischah are bringing irreparable ruin upon the land.

"The unbelievers have captured forty strong places on the Bosnian frontier; and eighty of their ships cruise before the Dardanelles; while the Padischah thinks of nothing but of his lusts and his sports, of squandering and of corruption. Your wise men, learned in the law, have met together, and have issued a Fetva for a change in the occupation of the throne. Until this be accomplished, ruin cannot be averted. Be gracious, oh lady! oppose this not. You would not strive against us, but against the holy law." The Sultana begged hard that they would leave her son in possession of the sovereignty, under the guardianship of the Ulema and the Grand Vizier. Some of the deputies seemed disposed to yield; but the aged grand judge of Anatolia, Hanefizade, took up the discourse, and said—"Oh, royal lady, we have come hither, fully relying on your grace, and on your compassionate solicitude for the servants of God. You are not only the mother of the Sultan; you are the mother also of all true Believers. Put an end to this state of trouble; the sooner the better. The enemy has the upper hand in battle. At home, the traffic in places and ranks has no bounds. The Padischah, absorbed in satisfying his passions, removes himself farther and farther from the path of the laws. The call to prayers from the minarets of the Mosque of Aya Sofia is drowned in the noise of fifes, and flutes, and cymbals from the palace. No one can speak counsel without peril to the speaker: you have yourself proved it. The markets are plundered. The innocent are put to death. Favourite slaves govern the world."

The Validé made one more effort, and said, "All this is the doing of wicked ministers. They shall be removed; and only good and wise men shall be set in their stead." "What will that avail?" replied Hanefizadé, "Has not the Sultan put to death good and gallant men who served him, such as were Kara-Moustafa Pacha, and Youssuf Pacha, the conqueror of Canea?" "But how," urged the Sultana, "is it possible to place a child of seven years upon the throne?" Hanefizadé answered: "In the opinion of our wise men of the law a madman ought not to reign, whatever be his age; but rather let a child, that is gifted with reason, be upon the throne. If the sovereign be a rational being, though an infant, a wise Vizier may restore order to the world; but a grown-up Sultan, who is without sense, ruins all things by murder, by abomination, by corruption, and prodigality." "So be it, then," said the Sultana; "I will fetch my grandson, Mahomet, and place the turban on his head." The litttle prince was led forth amid the enthusiastic acclamations of the military and legal chiefs. All the attendants of Ibrahim had now abandoned him. A throne was raised near the Gate of Happiness of the Serail; and three hours before sunset, on the 8th of August, 1648, the principal dignitaries of the empire paid homage to Sultan Mahomet IV. Only a few were admitted at a time, lest a crowd should frighten the child. The Sultana Validé placed her grandson in charge of a trusty guard; and the Viziers and the Ulema proceeded to announce to Ibrahim the sentence of deposition. "My Padischah,' said Abdul-

zaziz-Effendi, "according to the judgment of the Ulema, and the chief dignitaries of the Empire, you must retire from the throne"— "Traitor," cried Ibrahim, "Am I not your Padischah? What means this?" "No;" answered Abdul-zaziz Effendi, "Thou art not Padischah, for as much as thou hast set justice and holiness at nought, and hast ruined the world. Thou hast squandered thy years in folly and debauchery; the treasures of the realm in vanities: and corruption and cruelty have governed the world in thy place." Ibrahim still remonstrated with the Mufti, saying repeatedly, "Am I not Padischah?"—"What means all this?" A Janissary colonel said to him, "Yes, you are Padischah; you are only required to repose yourself for a few days." "But why then," said Ibrahim, "must I descend from the throne?" "Because," answered Aziz Effendi, "you have made yourself unworthy of it, by leaving the path in which your ancestors walked." Ibrahim reviled them bitterly as traitors; and then, lowering his hand towards the ground, he said, "Is it a child so high, that you are going to make Padischah? How can such a child reign? And is it not my child, my own son?" At last the fallen Sultan yielded to his destiny, and suffered them to lead him to prison, repeating, as he went, "This was written on my forehead; God has ordered it." He was kept in sure, but not rigorous captivity for ten days, when a tumult among the Spahis—some of whom raised a cry in his favour, decided his fate. The chiefs of the late revolution resolved to secure themselves against a reaction in behalf of Ibrahim, by

putting him to death. They laid a formal case before the Mufti, and demanded his opinion on the following question: "Is it lawful to depose and to put to death a Sovereign, who confers the dignities of the Pen and of the Sword not on those who are worthy of them, but on those who buy them for money?" The laconic answer of the Mufti was, "Yes." The ministers of death were accordingly sent to Ibrahim's prison, whither the Mufti, the new Grand Vizier Sofi Mohammed, and their principal colleagues also repaired, to witness and to ensure the fulfilment of the sentence. Ibrahim was reading the Koran when they entered. Seeing them accompanied by the executioners, whom he himself had so often employed to do their deadly work in his presence, he knew his hour was come; and he exclaimed, "Is there no one of all those who have eaten my bread, who will pity and protect me? These men of blood have come to kill me!—Oh, mercy! mercy!" The trembling executioners were sternly commanded by the Mufti and the Vizier to do their duty. Seized in their fatal grasp, the wretched Ibrahim broke out into blasphemies and curses; and died, invoking the vengeance of God upon the Turkish nation for their disloyalty to their sovereigns.

The Mufti justified his regicidal Fetva by the authority of the sentence in the law, which says: "If there are two caliphs, let one of them be put to death."* A sentence which Von Hammer terms "a

* Compare Virgil's precept in the case of a double royalty of bees:—

"Deterior qui visus, eum ne prodigus obsit,
Dede neci; melior vacuâ sine regnet in aulâ."—*Georg.* iv. 80.

proposition to shudder at in the law of Islam. A proposition, which, arbitrarily applied and extended, sanctions the execution not only of all deposed sovereigns, but also of all princes whose existence seems to menace the master of the throne with rivalry. It is the bloody authorisation of the state-maxim of the Ottomans for the murder of kings' brothers, sons, and fathers."*

The principal foreign events of the reign of Ibrahim, were the siege of Azof, and the commencement of the long war with the Venetians, called the war of Candia. The important city of Azof, which commands the navigation of the sea of that name, and gives to its occupiers great advantages for warlike operations in the Crimea, and along all the coasts of the Euxine, had at the time of Ibrahim's accession, been for four years in the possession of the Cossacks of the vicinity, who were nominal subjects of the Russian Czar. Ibrahim's first Vizier, Kara-Moustafa, was well aware of the necessity of maintaining the Turkish power northward of the Black sea; and in 1641, a strong army and fleet left Constantinople for the recovery of Azof. This expedition was aided by a Tartar force, under the Khan of the Crimea. The Cossacks defended the place bravely; and after a siege of three months, the Turks were obliged to retire with a loss of 7000 Janissaries, and of a multitude of auxiliary Wallachians, Moldavians, and Tartars, whom the Ottoman historians do not enumerate. A fresh expedition was sent in the next year; and on this occasion Mohammed Ghirai,

* Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 321.

the Crimean Khan, led no less than 100,000 Tartars to Azof, to cooperate with the regular Turkish troops. The Cossacks found themselves unable to resist such a force. The Czar refused to aid them; and sent an embassy from Moscow to Ibrahim, renouncing all concern with Azof, and desiring to renew the old amity between Russia and the Porte.* In this emergency the Cossack garrison, with the same ferocious energy which their race has often displayed, set fire to the city which they could no longer defend, and left a heap of ruins for the Turks and Tartars to occupy. The Ottoman general rebuilt the city and fortified it anew with care commensurate with the importance of the post. A garrison of 26,000 men, including twenty companies of Janissaries, with a numerous train of artillery, was left under Islam Pacha, to protect the Turkish interest in these regions.

The incessant attacks of the Cossacks on the Turkish, and of the Tartars on the Russian territories, were the subjects of frequent complaints between the courts of Moscow and Constantinople, during Ibrahim's reign. Each sovereign required the other to keep his lawless vassals in check. The Czar Alexis Michaelowicz protested against being held responsible for the acts of the Cossacks, whom, in a letter to the Sultan, he termed "a horde of malefactors who had withdrawn as far as possible from the reach of their sovereign's power, in order to escape the punishment due to their crimes."†

* Rycaut, book ii. p. 52.

† See his letter in the Appendix to Von Hammer's 48th book. Pesth Edition.

The Sultan and his Vizier,* on the other hand, required that no one on the side of Russia should do the least damage to aught that belonged to a subject of the Sublime Porte, either on the Sea of Azof or the Black Sea. The pretext of shifting the blame on the Cossacks, and, in general, all excuses were to be inadmissible. On condition of this being done, and of the Czar paying the ancient tribute to the Khan of the Crimea, the Sultan promised not to aid the Tartars against Moscow. But, whatever the sovereigns might write or desire, still the system of border war between Cossack and Tartar was carried on; and the Turkish and Russian troops more than once came into collision north of the Euxine, in Ibrahim's time, while protecting their irregular confederates, or seeking redress for themselves. In 1646 the Tartars pursued the Cossacks into the southern provinces of Russia; and brought away thence 3000 prisoners, whom they sold for slaves at Perekop. A Russian army advanced against Azof, to avenge that affront, but was beaten in several actions by Mousa Pacha and the Turkish garrison, who sent 400 prisoners, and 800 Muscovites' heads to Constantinople, as trophies of their success.

The Crimean Khan, Islam Ghirai, was more bitter against the Russians than was his master the Sultan, and boldly refused to obey orders from Constantinople not to molest those whom he regarded as the natural enemies of the Turkish empire. He had early in 1648 made an incursion into Poland and Russia, and carried off 40,000 subjects of those realms into slavery. The

* See their letters, *ibid.*

Polish and Russian sovereigns sent ambassadors to the Sublime Porte to beg for redress: and Ibrahim despatched two of his officers to the Crimea with a letter to the Khan, in which he was commanded to collect the Christian prisoners whom he had seized in violation of all treaties, and to send them to Constantinople, that they might be given up to the representatives of their governments. Khan Ghirai read the letter, and coldly replied—"I and all here are the Sultan's servants. But the Russians only desire peace in appearance; they only ask for it while they feel the weight of our victorious arms. If we give them breathing time, they ravage the coasts of Anatolia with their squadrons. I have more than once represented to the Divan that there were two neglected strong places in this neighbourhood, which it would be prudent for us to occupy. Now, the Russians have made themselves masters of them; and they have raised more than twenty little fortified posts. If we are to remain inactive this year, they will seize Akkermann, and conquer all Moldavia." With this answer the Sultan's messengers were obliged to return to Constantinople.

The immediate occasion of the war of Candia was the offence given in 1644 to the Sultan by the capture of a rich fleet of merchant vessels, which was voyaging from Constantinople to Egypt. The captors were Maltese, not Venetian galleys: but they anchored with their prizes in the roads of Kalisméne on the south coast of Candia, which had now been in the possession of the Venetians since the time of the fourth crusade, when, on partitioning the conquered Greek empire,

they purchased that important island from their fellow crusader the Marquis of Montserrat, to whom it had first been allotted as his portion of the sacred spoil. Sultan Ibrahim was maddened with rage, when he heard of the capture of the Turkish ships, some of which were the property of one of the chief eunuchs of the imperial household. He threatened destruction to the whole Christian name, and ordered armaments to be instantly despatched against the Maltese knights; but his officers persuaded him not to renew the enterprise, in which the great Solyman had failed so signally, against the barren and strongly fortified rock of Malta; and rather to turn his arms to the acquisition of the rich and valuable Isle of Candia. They pointed out to him that Candia was most advantageously situated for incorporation with the Ottoman dominions, and that it might be easily wrested by surprise from its Venetian masters, who had given just cause for hostilities by allowing the piratical Maltese to secure their booty on the Cretan coasts. It was resolved accordingly by the Porte to attack Candia. There was at that time peace between Turkey and Venice. Ibrahim and his ministers determined to aid force by fraud; and they pretended to receive most graciously the excuses which the republic of St. Mark offered for the accidental reception of the Maltese galleys at Kalisméne. A large fleet and army left the Dardanelles, on the 30th April, 1645, with the declared object of assailing Malta; but, after the expedition had paused for a time on the south coast of the Morea, the generalissimo Youssuf Pacha put to sea again, read to his assembled

captains the Sultan's orders, which had previously been kept secret; and instead of sailing westward for Malta, stood to the south with a favourable wind, which brought the Turkish squadron to Canea, at the western extremity of the Isle of Candia, on the 24th of June. The suspicions of the Venetian government as to the real object of the expedition, had not been wholly quieted by the protestations of the Sultan's ministers. Orders had been sent from Venice to put the fortresses of the island in a state of defence, and to collect the militia; and reinforcements had been sent to the garrison. But the native population hated the rule of the Venetian oligarchy; and the troops and galleys under the governor's command were inadequate for the defence of so long a line of sea-board as Crete presents to an invader. The Turks landed without opposition; and Canea, the principal city of the western part of the island, was besieged and captured by them before the end of August. In the following year they took Retino, and in the spring of 1648 they began the siege of Candia, the capital of the island. This memorable siege was prolonged for twenty years, by the desperate exertions of the Venetians, who strained their utmost resources to rescue Candia. They frequently inflicted severe and humiliating defeats on the Turkish squadrons; they even captured the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos from the Ottomans, and more than once ravaged the coasts near Constantinople; but they were never able to drive away the besieging army from before Candia; though the operations of the Turks were retarded and often paralysed by

the imbecility and corruption of the Sublime Porte throughout the reign of Ibrahim, and the first part of that of his son Mahomet IV., whose elevation to the throne at the age of seven years, when his father was deposed and murdered, has been already narrated. It would be useless to dwell on the internal history of Turkey during Mahomet IV.'s minority, and to recapitulate the ever-recurring incidents of court intrigue, military insubordination and violence, judicial venality, local oppression and provincial revolt. The strife of factions was aggravated by the deadly rivalry that sprang up between the old Sultana Validé, the Sultan's grandmother, and his mother the young Sultana Validé, whose name was Tarkhan :—a rivalry which led to the murder of the elder Princess. As no stronger foe than Venice attacked the Ottoman empire, it lingered on through this period of renewed misery and weakness, until at length, in 1656, through the influence of the Sultana Tarkhan, the Grand Vizierate was given to an aged statesman named Mohammed Kiuprili, who deserves to be honoured as the founder of a dynasty of ministers, that raised Turkey, in spite of the deficiency of her princes, once more to comparative power, and prosperity, and glory, and who long retarded, if they could not avert, the ultimate decline of the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER II.

MOHAMMED KIUPRILI—RIGOUR AND SUCCESS OF HIS MINISTRY—HIS SON AHMED KIUPRILI SUCCEEDS HIM IN THE VIZIERATE—GREAT QUALITIES OF AHMED KIUPRILI—WEAKNESS OF SULTAN MAHOMET IV.—WAR WITH AUSTRIA—GREAT DEFEAT OF THE TURKS BY MONTECUCULI AT ST. GOTHARD—TRUCE WITH AUSTRIA—AHMED KIUPRILI TAKES CANDIA—WAR WITH RUSSIA AND POLAND—SOBIESKI DEFEATS THE TURKS AT KHOCZIM AND LEMBERG—PEACE OF ZURANA—DEATH AND CHARACTER OF AHMED KIUPRILI.*

THE court astronomer at Constantinople, on September 15th, 1656, determined that the most favourable time for the investiture of Mohammed Kiuprili with the Grand Vizierate, was the hour of the midday prayer, at the instant when the cry of "God is Great" resounds from the heights of the minarets.

According to a prescribed rule of Islamism, the noon-tide prayer is repeated, not at the exact moment when the sun is on the meridian, but a few seconds afterwards; because the tradition of the prophets teaches that, at the astronomical noon, the devil is wont to take the sun between his two horns, so that he may wear it as the crown of the world's dominion; and the fiend then rears himself as Lord of the Earth, but he lets the sun go directly he hears the words, "God is

* See Von Hammer, books 52—56.

Great," repeated on high in the summons of the true believers to prayer. "Thus," says the Turkish historian, "the demons of cruelty, debauchery, and sedition, who had reached the meridian in the reigns of Amurath and Ibrahim, and during the minority of Mahomet, were obliged to yield up their crown of domination, when the voice was heard, that proclaimed Kiuprili Grand Vizier of the empire."*

Mohammed Kiuprili was the grandson of an Albanian, who had migrated to Asia Minor, and settled in the town of Kiupri, near the mouth of the river Halys. The ruler of the councils of the Ottoman empire had been, in early youth, a kitchen-boy, from which situation he rose to that of a cook. After twenty-five years of service he became the steward of the Grand Vizier Khosrew; and under Khosrew's successor he was made master of the horse. That successor favoured Kiuprili, as being a native of the same province as himself; and by his influence Kiuprili was made Governor of Damascus, Tripoli, and Jerusalem, and one of the Viziers of state. Afterwards he accepted the inferior post of Sandjak Bey of Giuztendil in Albania, where he led an armed force against some of the numerous insurgents of that region, but was defeated and taken prisoner. After he was redeemed from captivity, he retired to his native town; but was persuaded by a Pachá, called Mohammed with the Wry Neck, to follow him to Constantinople. His new patron became Grand Vizier, but soon began to regard Kiuprili as a dangerous rival for court favour. It does not, however, appear that Kiuprili

* Von Hammer, vol. iii. 462.

used any unfair intrigues to obtain the Grand Vizierate. Friends, who knew the firmness of his character, his activity, and his keen common sense, recommended him to the Sultana Validé, as a man who might possibly restore some degree of tranquillity to the suffering empire; and the Grand Vizierate was offered to Kiuprili, then in the seventieth year of his age. He refused to accept it, save upon certain conditions. He required that all his measures should be ratified without examination or discussion; that he should have free hands in the distribution of all offices and preferments, and in dealing out rewards and punishments, without attending to recommendations from any quarter, and without any responsibility; that he should have authority superior to all influence of great men or favourites; that exclusive confidence should be placed in him, and all accusations and insinuations against him should be instantly rejected. The Sultana Validé, in behalf of her son, swore solemnly that all these conditions should be fulfilled, and Mohammed Kiuprili became Grand Vizier of the Ottoman empire.

His former patron, Mohammed the Wry-Necked, had been dismissed to make room for him; and the Court had ordered that the deposed minister should be put to death, and that his goods should be confiscated in the usual manner. Kiuprili interceded, and saved his life, and gave him the revenues of the government of Kanischa. This was the first, and it was almost the last act of humanity that marked Kiuprili's administration. A stern correction of abuses was required; and Kiuprili applied it, not indeed with the osten-

tatious cruelty of Sultan Amurath IV., but with the same searching and unsparing severity, which had marked that monarch's rule. Kiuprili took the precaution of compelling the Mufti to sign a Fetva, sanctioning by anticipation all the Grand Vizier's measures; and he then employed the most efficacious means for ridding the empire of all who disturbed or threatened public order. A number of fanatical Scheiks and Dervishes, who troubled Constantinople by their tumults, and their lawless violence against all who did not comply with their dogmas, were seized and banished. One of them, who murmured against the Vizier, and who had great influence with the populace, was strangled, and thrown into the Bosphorus. Kiuprili intercepted a letter from the Greek Patriarch to the Vaivode of Wallachia, containing a prediction very similar to those which are frequent in our own time. The Patriarch said, "The power of Islam is drawing to an end. The Christian faith will soon be supreme. All their lands will speedily be in the possession of the Christians; and the Lords of the Cross and the Church-bell will be the Lords of the empire." Kiuprili read in this an encouragement to revolt, and hanged the Greek Patriarch over one of the city gates. No delinquency past or present, no preparation for plot or mutiny, escaped the Vizier's vigilance. He planted his spies in every province and town, and secured the agency of trusty and unquestioning executioners of his commands. The impress of a resolute will was felt throughout the empire; and men obeyed without hesitation the man, whom they per-

ceived never to hesitate himself, never to neglect or abandon those who served him, and never to forgive those who thwarted or disobeyed him. Kiuprili dealt his blows against every race, class, profession, and station, where he saw or suspected offence. Turbulent Janissaries and Spahis, disaffected Pachas, corrupt judges, seditious Dervises, factious Ulemas, intriguing eunuchs and other court officials, perished alike beneath his avenging ministry. He never vented his wrath in threats. "His blows outsped his words;" and, while he was biding his time to strike, he was of unrivalled skill in disguising his preparations. The Turkish historian Naima relates, on the authority of Medschibi, who had been one of the Grand Vizier's confidential servants, that Mohammed Kiuprili had a maxim, that wrath and reproach are always superfluous, and frequently dangerous for the possessor of power; that it is silly for a statesman to fly out into a passion; and that lulling a victim to sleep is the safest way of killing him.

Thirty-six thousand persons are said to have been put to death by Mohammed Kiuprili's command, during the five years of his Grand Vizierate. The chief executioner of Constantinople, Soulfikar, confessed afterwards, that he himself had strangled more than 4000, and thrown them into the Bosphorus. Von Hammer, who repeats and accredits these numbers, states that the aged despot, who thus marked every month of his ministry by the sacrifice of more than 500 lives, had acquired a reputation for mildness and humanity when he was a provincial governor. It is fair to suppose

that he lavished human life when Grand Vizier, not out of any natural cruelty in his disposition, but from the belief that he could not otherwise suppress revolt and anarchy, and maintain complete obedience to his authority.* The price at which the restoration of order was bought under Mohammed Kiuprili, was indeed fearful; but, though excessive, it was not paid in vain. The revolts which had raged in Transylvania and Asia Minor were quelled; the naval strength of the empire was revived; the Dardanelles were fortified; the Ottoman power beyond the Black Sea was strengthened by the erection of castles on the Dnieper and the Don: and, though the war in Candia still lingered, the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos were recovered

* Our English traveller, Wheeler, who visited Turkey a few years after Mohammed Kiuprili's death, relates a legend which he heard respecting him, which proves how terrible his severities must have been, and the impression left by them on the public mind. Wheeler, in describing one of the streets of Constantinople, says of it: "This street is adorned with several of the monuments of the Viziers and Bashas, who have highly merited of the Emperor either in the wars or government. Among which we observed one with the Cuppalo covered only with a grate of wire; of which we had this account, 'That it was the monument of Mahomet Cupriuli, father to the present Vizier, who settled the government, which during the minority of the present Emperor was very near destruction through the discontents and faction of the principal Hagaes, and the mutinies of the Janizaries. Concerning whom, after his decease, being buried here and having this stately monument of white marble covered with lead erected over his body, the Grand Signior and the Grand Vizier had this dream both in the same night; to wit that Cupriuli came to them and earnestly begged a little water to refresh him, being in a burning heat. Of this the Grand Signior and the Vizier told each other in the morning, and thereupon thought fit to consult the Mufti what to do concerning it: who, according to their gross superstition, advised that he should have the roof of his Sepulchre uncovered that the rain might descend on his body, thereby to quench the flames tormenting his soul. And this remedy, the people who smarted under his oppression, think he had great need of, supposing him to be tormented in the other world for his tyrannies and cruelties committed by him in this." Wheeler's Travels, p. 133; see also *supra*, vol. i. p. 115, Knolles's account of the Sepulchre of Sultan Amurath I.

from the Venetians. His own authority in the empire was unshaken until the last hour of his life; and he obtained for his still more celebrated son, Ahmed Kiuprili, the succession to the Grand Vizierate. It is said that old Kiuprili, when on his death bed, (31st October, 1661,) after recommending his son as the future Vizier, gave the young Sultan four especial rules to follow. One was, never to listen to the advice of women: another was, never to let a subject grow over-rich: the third was, to keep the public treasury full by all possible means: and the last, to be continually on horseback, and keep his armies in constant action.

Sultan Mahomet IV., was now advancing towards manhood; but he was of far too weak a character to govern for himself. His great delight was the chace; and to this he devoted all his energies and all his time. Fortunately for his empire, he placed the most implicit confidence in Ahmed Kiuprili, the new Vizier, and maintained his favourite minister in power against all the numerous intrigues that were directed against him. Ahmed Kiuprili was the real ruler of Turkey from 1661 to his death in 1676; and he is justly eulogised both by Ottoman and Christian historians as the greatest statesman of his country. He was only twenty-six years of age when he was called on to govern the Empire; but his naturally high abilities had been improved by the best education that the Muderris of Constantinople could supply; and he had learned practical statesmanship as a provincial governor and general, during the ministry

of his father. Ahmed Kiuprili could be as stern as his sire, when duty to the state required severity; and he was equally tenacious in not permitting the least encroachment on his authority. But he was usually humane and generous; and his most earnest endeavours were directed to mitigate the burdens of imperial taxation, and to protect the people from the feudal exactions of the Spahis, and from the arbitrary violence of the pachas and other local functionaries.

Like his father, Ahmed Kiuprili commenced his administration by securing himself against any cabals of the Ulema; and he gave at the same time a noble rebuke to the chief of that order, who spoke in the divan against the memory of the late Grand Vizier. Ahmed Kiuprili said to him, "Mufti, if my father sentenced men to death, he did so by the sanction of thy Fetva." The Mufti answered, "If I gave him my Fetva, it was because I feared lest I should myself suffer under his cruelty." "Effendi," rejoined the Grand Vizier, "is it for thee, who art a teacher of the law of the Prophet, to fear God less than his creature?" The Mufti was silent. In a few days afterwards he was deposed and banished to Rhodes; and his important station given to Sanizadé, a friend on whom Ahmed Kiuprili could rely.

It was in the civil administration of the Turkish empire that the genius of Ahmed Kiuprili found its best field of exercise; but he was soon called on to fulfil the military duties of the Grand Vizierate, and to head the Ottoman armies in the war with Austria,

which broke out in 1663. This, like most of the other wars between the two empires, originated in the troubles and dissensions, which were chronic for a century and a half in Hungary and Transylvania. After several conflicts of minor importance during 1661 and 1662, between the respective partisans of Austria and the Porte in these provinces, who were aided against each other by the neighbouring pachas and commandants, an Ottoman army was collected by the Grand Vizier on a scale of grandeur worthy of the victorious days of Solyman Kanounni: and Kiuprili resolved not only to complete the ascendancy of the Turks in Hungary and Transylvania, but to crush entirely and finally the power of Austria. Mahomet IV. marched with his troops from Constantinople to Adrianople; but there he remained behind to resume his favourite hunting while his Grand Vizier led the army against the enemy. The Sultan placed the sacred standard of the Prophet in Kiuprili's hands at parting; and on the 8th June, 1663, that formidable ensign of Turkish war was displayed at Belgrade. Kiuprili had under his command 121,000 men, 123 field-pieces, 12 heavy battering cannons, 60,000 camels, and 10,000 mules. With this imposing force, he overran the open country of Hungary and Transylvania, almost without opposition; and besieged and captured the strong city of Neuhausel in the September of that year, which was the most brilliant achievement that the Turks had effected in Europe, since the battle of Cerestes, more than fifty years before. The Vizier, after this siege, did not recommence active operations with his main

army until the spring of the following year, but his light troops spread devastation far and wide through Austria.* In May 1664, Kiuprili advanced and crossed the river Mur; and besieged and captured the fortress of Serivar, which the Turks dismantled and set fire to, on the 7th July, as a mark of contempt for the reigning emperor of Austria, by whom it had been founded. From the ruins of Serivar the Ottoman army marched northward, passing by the western extremity Lake Balaton. They captured Egervar, Kipornak, and other strong places; and on the 26th July, the Turks reached the right bank of the river Raab, near to the town of Kærmend. Could they cross that river the remainder of the march against Vienna seemed easy; the Imperialist army which opposed them in this campaign was inferior to them in numbers; but happily for Austria, that army was commanded by one of the ablest generals of the age, who was destined to gain the first great victory of Christendom in a pitched battle in open field against the full force of the Turkish arms.

Count Raymond de Montecuculi was, like many other of the greatest generals known in modern history, an Italian. He was born at Modena, of a noble family of that duchy in 1608. He entered into the Austrian service; and acquired distinction in the latter part of

* Sir Paul Rycaut says, "The Tartars, every one after the manner of his country leading one or more spare horses, made inroads within five miles of Vienna; destroying and laying waste all places before them. Things there resembling Doomsday, covered with fire; and not as much left as made an appearance of habitation."

the Thirty Years' War; and afterwards in hostilities against Poland. In 1664 he was named generalissimo of the Imperial forces, and sent to check the menacing progress of the Turks. The Austrian and Hungarian army, which was placed under Montecuculi's command, was weak in numbers; and at the opening of the campaign he was unable to prevent the Vizier Kiuprili from crossing the Mur, and reducing the Christian cities that lay between that river and the Raab. But, while the Turks were engaged in these operations, Montecuculi effected a junction with the auxiliary troops of the States of the Empire, and also with a valuable force of French troops, which had voluntarily marched under the Count of Coligny and other noblemen, to serve in the Hungarian war. With his army thus strengthened, Montecuculi took up a position near Kærmend on the Raab, covering the road to Vienna; and, from the breadth and rapidity of the river in that place, the attempts made by the Ottoman vanguard to force a passage were easily repulsed. Kiuprili now marched up the Raab, along the right bank towards Styria, closely followed along the left bank by Montecuculi, who thus turned the enemy farther away from the Austrian capital, and also from the Turkish reserves which were concentrating at Ofen and Stuhweissenburg. Several efforts of the Turks to cross the river were checked by the Imperialists; but at last the armies marched past the point where the Laufritz flows into the Raab, in the vicinity of the village of St. Gothard; and then, the single stream of the Raab wanted depth and breadth sufficient to present a serious obstacle to the Turks.

Both armies, therefore, halted and prepared for the battle, which appeared to be inevitable. Some overtures for negotiation first took place, in which the Turkish officers behaved with the utmost arrogance. When Reningen, the Austrian envoy, spoke of the restoration of Neuhausel to the Emperor, the Vizier and his pachas laughed at him, and asked whether any one had ever heard of the Ottomans voluntarily giving up a conquest to the Christians. They refused to admit the terms of the old treaty of Sitvatorok as a basis for a peace; and said that peace must be granted, if at all, on principles created by the recent successes of the Sublime Porte. Montecuculi continued his preparations for battle: he issued careful directions to his troops, particularising the order of their array, the relative positions of each corps, the depth of the lines, and the disposal of the baggage and stores. The 1st of August, 1664, saw the result of Montecuculi's sage dispositions, and the first great proof, that the balance of superiority between the Ottoman and Christian arms had at last been changed.

The convent of St. Gothard, which has given name to this memorable battle, is on the right bank of the Raab, at a little distance above its confluence with the Laufritz. A space of level ground extends along the right bank of the Raab westward from the convent and village of St. Gothard to the village of Windischdorf, also on the right bank of the river. These two villages formed the extreme wings of the Turkish position before the battle. Along the left bank of the river there is



A *Imperial Army under Montecuccoli* Z *Ottoman Army.*

Day & Son Lithrs. to the Queen.

an extent of level ground of equal length with that on the right side, but of much greater breadth; and it was here, on the left side, that the conflict took place In the centre of the plain on the left side (that is to say in the centre of the Imperialist position) stands the village of Moggersdorf; and it will be seen from the plan, that immediately opposite to Moggersdorf the river bends in and describes an arc towards the southern or Turkish side. This greatly facilitated the passage of the river by the Vizier, as he was enabled to place guns in battery on each side of the convex of the stream, and sweep away any troops that disputed the landing place on the other bank, in the centre of the bend of the river. Montecuculi placed the auxiliary German troops of the Empire in the centre of his line, in and near to the village of Moggersdorf. The Austrians and Hungarians were in his right wing; the French auxiliaries formed his left. The Turks had a large superiority in numbers, and in personal courage they were inferior to no possible antagonists. But the military discipline of the Turkish soldiers had become lamentably impaired since the days of Solyman, when it commanded the envious admiration of its Christian foes. It had even declined rapidly since the time when the last great battle between Turk and German was fought at Cerestes (1596). The deterioration in the intelligence and skill of the Ottoman officers was still more conspicuous. On the opposite side, the German and the other armies of Western Christendom, had acquired many improvements in their weapons, their tactics, and their general military organisation, during

the Thirty Years' War, which had called into action the genius of such commanders as Tilly, Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus, Bernhard, Torstenston, Turenne, and Montecuculi himself. The Turkish artillery, though numerous, was now cumbrous and ill-served, compared with the German. The Janissaries had given up the use of the pike (which seems to have been one of their weapons in Solyman's time *), and the Ottoman army was entirely deficient in foot brigades of steady spearmen, and also in heavily-armed regular cavalry. The German infantry was now formed of pikemen and of musqueteers; and part of their horse consisted of heavy cuirassier regiments, which, in Montecuculi's judgment, were sure, if a fair opportunity of charging were given them, to ride down Turkish infantry or cavalry, without it being possible for any serious resistance to be offered to them. In that great general's opinion, the want of the pike, which he calls "the queen of weapons," † was the fatal defect in the Turkish military system. We shall find the Chevalier Folard half a century afterwards, expressing a similar judgment with reference to the negligence of the Turks in not adopting the invention of the bayonet.

Montecuculi's criticisms on the defects in the Turkish armies were written by him after the battle of St. Gothard; but his military sagacity must have divined

* See Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 185.

† "Al Turco manca la picca, che è la regina delle armi a piedi."—Montecuculi Opere, vol ii. p. 124. I am not aware whether Montecuculi's Memoirs were much read westward of St. George's Channel, in 1848.

them, as soon as he observed the Vizier's troops, and made trial of their tactics and prowess in the early operations of the campaign. But the Turks themselves, before they fought at St. Gothard, knew not their own deficiencies; they were flushed with triumph at the advantages which they had hitherto gained under Ahmed Kiuprili; and with full confidence in their chief and themselves, they advanced, about nine in the morning of the 1st of August, 1664, to the Raab, and began the passage of the eventful stream. Kiuprili had placed his batteries along the sides of the arc of the stream, which has already been described; and his Janissaries, who were drawn up in the Turkish centre, crossed the river without much loss, and attacked and carried the village of Moggersdorf. The centre of the Christians was thus completely broken, and the Ottomans appeared to be certain of victory, when Montecuculi brought succour from the right wing. Prince Charles of Lorraine, who in this battle gave the prelude of his long and brilliant career, led his regiment of Austrian heavy cavalry to the charge in person, and killed with his own hand the commander of the Grand Vizier's guards. The advanced troops of the Turkish centre, thus taken in flank by the Austrian cavalry, were driven back to the Raab; Moggersdorf was then attacked by the Imperialists, and set on fire; but the Janissaries, who had intrenched themselves in the village, refused to retreat or surrender, and kept their post till they perished in the flames, with obstinacy (says Montecuculi) worthy to be reflected on and admired. Kiuprili brought large reinforcements over

from the right bank, and Montecuculi now sent word to the Count of Coligny and the French in his left wing, that it was time for them to aid him with all their might. Coligny sent him instantly 1000 infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, under the Duc de la Feuillade and Beauvezé. When Kiuprili saw the French coming forward with their shaven chins and cheeks, and powdered perruques, he asked scornfully of one of his attendants, "Who are these young girls?" But the young girls, as he termed them, without regarding the formidable Turkish battle-cry of "Allah!" rushed upon the Turks and cut them down, shouting out on their part, "Allons! Allons! Tue! Tue!" Those Janissaries who escaped that carnage remembered long afterwards the French cry of "Allons! Tue!" and the Duc de la Feuillade was for many years talked of in their barracks as "Fouladi," which means "The man of steel."

Kiuprili's first attack had failed, though he still retained some ground on the left bank of the Raab. He now (towards noon) prepared for a combined attack (such as he ought to have made in the first instance) upon both the Christian wings, while he, at the same time, assailed their centre with greater forces. Four large masses of irregular Ottoman cavalry dashed across the Raab at Montecuculi's right wing; three similar bodies attacked the French on the left; Kiuprili led a force of cavalry and infantry upon the centre; and, at the same time, detached squadrons were ordered to pass the river at points a little distant from the field of battle, and gain the flanks and rear

of the Imperialists. An obstinate conflict now took place all along the line. Some parts of the Christian army gave ground, and several of its generals advised a retreat; but Montecuculi told them that their only chance of safety, as well as of victory, was to take the offensive with a mass of the best troops, and make a desperate charge on the Ottoman centre. A strong force of the Christian cavalry was now concentrated for this purpose; and the word was passed along the ranks that they must break the Turks or perish. John Spork, the Imperialist general of cavalry, who was called the Austrian Ajax, prostrated himself bare-headed on the ground in front of his men, and prayed aloud. "Oh, mighty Generalissimo, who art on high, if thou wilt not this day help thy children the Christians, at least do not help these dogs the Turks, and thou shalt soon see something that will please thee."*

Having arranged his lines for the decisive charge, Montecuculi gave the word, and the Imperialists rushed forward with a loud shout, which disconcerted the Turks, who, accustomed themselves to terrify their enemy by their battle-cry, and to give the attack, recoiled before the unexpected assault of their opponents.

* This may remind some readers of the wish of Miltiades before Marathon, not for favour, but merely for fair play, from the gods. Θεῶν τὰ ἴσα νεμόντων, οἷοί τέ εἰμεν περιγένεσθαι τῇ συμβολῇ. Herodotus, lib. vi. sect. 116. The well-known prayer of the American backwoodsman when about to attack the bear, is still more like Spork's devotions. This Austrian Ajax could ill have comprehended the sublime spirit in which his assumed prototype the Homeric Ajax prayed in battle (Iliad, book xvii. verse 645). Most probably he had never heard of it. Spork was made a Count by the Austrian Emperor in reward for his services, but he always wrote his name (which he did with great difficulty) "Spork, Count," and not "Count Spork." He said he was a Spork, before he was a Count.

Thrown into utter confusion by the irresistible shock of Montecuculi's cuirassiers, which was supported vigorously by the Christian musqueteers and pikemen, the Ottomans were driven into the Raab ; Janissary, Spahi, Albanian, Tartar, going down alike beneath the impetuous rush of the Christian centre, or flying in panic rōut before it. The Ottoman cavalry in the wings lost courage at seeing the defeat of their centre, where the Vizier and all their best troops were stationed, and they rode off the field without an effort to retrieve the fortune of the day. More than 10,000 Turks perished in the battle ; and the triumph of Montecuculi was graced by the capture of fifteen pieces of cannon and forty standards. On the morrow, the victor caused a solemn service of thanksgiving to be celebrated on the field of battle. A chapel was founded there, and still attests the scene of this memorable battle, which commenced the compensation for the 300 years of defeat which Western Christendom had sustained from Turkey, ever since the day when the confederate forces of Servia and Hungary were crushed by Sultan Amurath I. at Kossova.

It is because the battle of St. Gothard presents thus to our notice a turning point in the military history of Turkey, that it has been described with a particularity of detail, such as can be given to none of the long list of battles, which yet will come before our notice, while tracing the declining fortunes of the Ottoman empire. The advantage also of possessing the comments of Montecuculi himself on this campaign, and on Turkish warfare generally, has been an additional reason for

giving prominence to his victory at St. Gothard. The defects which he points out in the Turkish military system, have continued to exist, or rather have existed with aggravation, until the reign of the late Sultan Mahmoud. They may be summed up as consisting in the neglect of the Turks to keep pace with the improvements made by other nations in the weapons and in the art of war; and in the appointment of incompetent officers through bribery and other corrupt influences. The pernicious effects of these vices of the Ottoman war department have been partly counteracted by the remarkable personal valour of the common soldiers among the Turks, their sobriety, and the vigour of their constitutions; and also by the care taken to provide them with good and sufficient provisions both when in barracks and when employed on active duty. These are favourable points in the Ottoman service, which every military critic from Count Montecuculi down to Marshal Marmont has observed; and the more important of them, those which regard the natural soldierly qualities of the Ottoman population, show that Turkey has never lost that element of military greatness, which no artificial means can create or revive, but to which the skill of great statesmen and great generals (if the Sultan's empire should now be blessed with them) may superadd all that has for nearly two centuries been deficient.

The immediate result of the battle of St. Gothard was a truce for twenty years on the footing of the treaty of Sitvatorok, which the Turks before their defeat had so arrogantly refused. But Neuhausel

remained in the possession of the Ottomans; so that Ahmed Kiuprili, notwithstanding his great overthrow by Montecuculi, was able to re-enter Constantinople as a conqueror. His influence over the Sultan was undiminished; and the next great military enterprise that Kiuprili undertook, was one of unchequered success and glory. This was the reduction of the city of Candia, which had now for nearly twenty years been vainly besieged or blockaded by the Turks. Mahomet IV. at first proposed to lead in person the great armament which Kiuprili collected at Adrianople for this expedition. The imperial tent was raised in the camp; and the Sultan caused those parts of the Turkish historians to be read before him, which narrate the capture of Constantinople by Mahomet II., the battle of Calderan under Selim I., and the sieges of Rhodes and Belgrade by Solyman. But Mahomet IV. appeased the martial ardour, which those recitals produced in him, by hunting with redoubled energy. It was only in the chace that he was enterprising and bold: he shrank from the battle-field; and he was not even a hero in his harem, where a Greek slave-girl of Retino tyrannised with capricious violence over the over-fond and over-constant Padischah. This favourite Sultana was zealously devoted to the interests of Kiuprili, who was thereby rendered so secure in his authority, that he ventured to remain in the island of Candia from the time of his landing there in 1666 to the surrender of the long-besieged capital in 1669. During these three last years of the siege, every possible effort of bravery and all the then available resources of the

military art were employed both by assailants and defenders. Morosini (afterwards renowned as the conqueror of the Morea, and surnamed the Peloponnesian) commanded in the city; ably seconded by the Duc de la Feuillade, the hero of St. Gothard, and many other high-born and high-spirited volunteers, who flocked from every country of Christendom to Candia, as the great theatre of military glory. On the Turkish side, Kiuprili and his generals and admirals urged on the operations of the besiegers by sea and by land with indomitable obstinacy, and with a degree of engineering skill, from which the Turks of more recent times have far degenerated.* It is computed that during the final thirty-four months of the siege, during which Kiuprili commanded, 30,000 Turks and 12,000 Venetians were killed. There were fifty-six assaults, and ninety-six sorties; and the number of mines exploded on both sides were 1364. Several attempts were made by the Venetians to purchase peace without ceding Candia. But to their offers of large sums of money, Kiuprili replied in the spirit of Pyrrhus: "We are not money-dealers; we make war to win Candia, and at no price will we abandon it:"—

Non cauponantes bellum, sed belligerentes.†

The Ottomans persevered in their enterprise, until Morosini, on the 6th September, 1669, surrendered on

* Juchereau says of the Turks of this century, "It is only since the establishment of the school for engineers at Sulitzi, that they have learned under Frank officers, in consulting their military archives and the plans of their ancient engineers, those ways and parallels of trenches, of which they were the inventors, and which so distinguished the siege of Candia."

† Ennius.

honourable terms the city which the incessant mining had converted into a confused mass of gigantic mole-heaps. A peace was made between Venice and the Porte, by which the city and island of Candia became the property of the Sultan. Kiuprili remained there several months after the conquest was completed, during which time he was well and wisely employed in organising the local government of Crete under its new sovereign.

The next scene of warlike operations on which Ahmed Kiuprili entered, deserves especial attention, because it brings us to the rival claims of Poland, Russia, and Turkey to dominion over the Cossacks, and is intimately connected with the long and still enduring chain of hostilities between the Russian and Turkish empires. The Cossacks of the Don had become subjects of Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Muscovy, in 1549; but the Cossacks of the Dnieper and the Ukraine were long independent; and their first connexion was with Poland. The Poles affected to consider them as vassals, but the wisest Polish rulers were cautious in the amount of authority which they attempted to exercise over these bold and hardy tribes. The imperious tyranny of other less prudent sovereigns of Poland was met by fierce opposition on the part of the Cossacks, who called in their former constant enemies, the Tartars, to aid them against their new Polish oppressors. Deserted, after some years of warfare, by the Tartars, the Cossacks of the Ukraine appealed to the Russian Czar Alexis. Many years of chequered and sanguinary hostilities followed, and at

last the Cossack territory was nominally divided between Russia and Poland at the truce of Androssan, in 1667. But the Cossacks who dwelt near the mouths of the rivers Boug and Dnieper, and who were called the Zaporofskian Cossacks, refused to be included in the Polish dominions by virtue of that arrangement, and placed themselves under the protection of the Czar. In 1670, the Cossacks of that part of the Ukraine which had been left under Poland, petitioned the Polish Diet for certain privileges, which were refused; and a Polish army under Sobieski was sent into the Ukraine to coerce the Cossack malcontents. The Cossacks, under their Hetman Dorescensko, resisted bravely; but at last they determined to seek the protection of the Sublime Porte; and Dorescensko, in 1672, presented himself at Constantinople, and received a banner with two horse-tails,* as Sandjak Bey of the Ukraine, which was immediately enrolled among the Ottoman provinces. At the same time, the Khan of the Crimea was ordered to support the Cossacks, and 6000 Turkish troops were marched to the Ukraine. The Poles protested loudly against these measures. The Czar added his remonstrances, and threatened to join Poland in a war against Turkey. The Grand Vizier haughtily replied that such threats were empty words and out of place, and that the Porte would preserve its determination with regard to Poland. A short time previously, another Turkish

* Since the time of Amurath III. the governors of the large provinces, or Eyalets, received the rank of Vizier, and were Pachas with three horse-tails. The Sandjak Beys, or governors of the smaller districts, were Pachas with two horse-tails. The term Pacha may be considered as nearly synonymous with "Commandor." See volume i., p. 159.

minister had answered similar warnings by boasting, "God be praised, such is the strength of Islamism, that the union of Russians and Poles matters not to us. Our empire has increased in might since its origin; nor have all the Christian kings, that have leagued against us, been able to pluck a hair from our beard. With God's grace it shall ever be so, and our empire shall endure to the day of judgment." Kiuprili himself, when the Polish ambassador reproached the Turks with injustice in aiding the revolted subjects of Poland, replied in a remarkable letter, written with his own hand; in which he states that "the Cossacks, a free people, placed themselves under the Poles, but being unable to endure Polish oppression any longer, they have sought protection elsewhere, and they are now under the Turkish banner and the Horse-tails. If the inhabitants of an oppressed country, in order to obtain deliverance, implore the aid of a mighty emperor, is it prudent to pursue them in such an asylum? When the most mighty and most glorious of all emperors is seen to deliver and succour from their enemies those who are oppressed, and who ask him for protection, a wise man will know on which side the blame of breaking peace ought to rest. If, in order to quench the fire of discord, negotiation is wished for, so let it be. But if the solution of differences is referred to that keen and decisive judge, called 'The Sword,' the issue of the strife must be pronounced by the God, who hath poised upon nothing heaven and earth, and by whose aid Islamism has for a thousand years triumphed over its foes." This avowal of the principle of intervention in

behalf of an oppressed people, was a bold measure for the prime minister of a nation, like the Turkish, which kept so many other nations in severe bondage; it was especially bold in Kiuprili, who at that very time was directing the construction of fortresses in the Morea, to curb the reviving spirit of independence, of which the Greeks had given some signs during the recent Venetian war.

In the Polish campaign of 1672, Sultan Mahomet IV. was persuaded to accompany the powerful army which Kiuprili led to the siege of the important city of Kaminiec, in Podolia. Kaminiec fell after nine days' siege (26th August, 1672), and Lemberg shared its fate on the 9th of September. The imbecile King of Poland, Michael, then made the peace of Bucsacs with the Turks, by which Poland was to cede Podolia and the Ukraine, and pay an annual tribute to the Porte of 220,000 ducats. The Sultan returned in triumph to Adrianople; but the congratulations which were lavished on him as conqueror of the Poles were premature. Sobieski and the other chiefs of the Polish nobility determined to break the treaty which their King had made. They refused to pay the stipulated tribute; and, in 1673, the Grand Vizier made preparations for renewing the war upon the Poles, and also for attacking the Czar of Russia, from whom they had received assistance. The Turks marched again into Podolia; but, on the 11th of November, 1673, Sobieski, who now led the Poles, surprised the Turkish camp near Khoczim, and routed Kiuprili with immense slaughter. The Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia

had deserted from the Turkish to the Polish side with all their contingents; a transfer of strength which aided materially in obtaining Sobieski's victory. But Kiuprili's administrative skill had so re-invigorated the resources of Turkey, that she readily sent fresh forces into the Ukraine in the following year. Sobieski with his Poles and the Russians (who now took an active part in the war) had the advantage in the campaign of 1674; and, in 1675, Sobieski gained one of the most brilliant victories of the age over the Turks at Lemberg. But the superior strength and steadiness of the Porte and Kiuprili in maintaining the war against the discordant government of Poland, were felt year after year; and, in 1676, the Turkish commander in Podolia, Ibrahim, surnamed Scheitan, that is, "Ibrahim the Devil," made himself completely master of Podolia, and attacked Galicia. Sobieski (who was now King of Poland) fought gallantly with far inferior forces against Ibrahim at Zurawna; but was glad to conclude a peace (27th October, 1676), by which the Turks were to retain Kaminiec and Podolia; and by which the Ukraine, with the exception of a few specified places, was to be under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

Three days after the peace of Zurawna, Ahmed Kiuprili died. Though his defeats at St. Gothard and Khoczim had fairly given rise to an opinion among the Ottoman ranks that their Vizier was not born to be a general, his military services to the empire, for which he won Candia, Neuhausel, and Kaminiec, were considerable; and no minister ever did more than he accomplished in repressing insurrection and disorder,

in maintaining justice and good government, and in restoring the financial and military strength of his country. He did all this without oppression or cruelty. He protected all ranks of the Sultan's subjects; he was a liberal patron of literature and art; he was a warm friend, and a not implacable enemy; he was honourably true to his plighted word towards friend or foe, towards small or great: and there is far less than the usual amount of Oriental exaggeration in the praises, which the Turkish historians bestow upon him, as "The light and splendour of the nation; the conservator and governor of good laws; the vicar of the shadow of God; the thrice learned and all accomplished Grand Vizier."

CHAPTER III.

KARA MUSTAPHA VIZIER—UNSUCCESSFUL WAR WITH RUSSIA—WAR WITH AUSTRIA—SIEGE OF VIENNA—RESCUE OF THE CITY AND COMPLETE OVERTHROW OF THE TURKS BY SOBIESKI—HEAVY LOSSES OF THE OTTOMANS—MAHOMET IV. DEPOSED—HIS CHARACTER—CHANGE OF THE JANISSARY FORCE—THE BARBARESQUE REGENCIES—THE PRETENDED MESSIAH SABBATHAI—MAHOMET IV.'S PATRONAGE OF LITERATURE.*

THE value of such a minister as Ahmed Kiuprili to Turkey was soon proved by the rapid deterioration in her fortunes under his successor in the Vizierate, Kara Mustapha, or Black Mustapha: a man whose character was in every respect the opposite of Kiuprili's; and who to slender abilities united the wildest ambition and almost boundless presumption. He was son-in-law to the Sultan; and by the influence which that marriage gave him, he obtained the high office, which he abused to the ruin of his master, and the deep disaster of his country. Kara Mustapha's favourite project was a new war against Austria, in which he hoped to capture Vienna, and to make himself the nominal viceroy, but real sovereign of ample provinces between the Danube and the Rhine. But the first years

* Von Hammer, books 57—58.

of his Vizierate were occupied in an inglorious war with Russia. That empire had been no party to the late peace of Zurawna, and it supported Dorescensko against the Porte, when that fickle Cossack grew discontented with the Sultan's authority. Kara Mustapha led a large army into the Ukraine, and besieged Cehzrym, but was beaten by the Russians, and fled with ignominy across the Danube. In the following year he resumed the war with fresh forces; and after several alternatives of fortune, he stormed Cehzrym on the 21st of August, 1678. But the losses which the Turks sustained, both from the Russian sword and the climate, were severe; and, it is said, that even at this early period of the wars between the two nations, the Turks entertained an instinctive apprehension of the power of the Muscovites.* A peace was made in 1681, by which the Porte gave up the disputed territory to Russia; and it was stipulated that neither power should raise fortifications between the rivers Boug and Dniester. Five years afterwards, a territorial arrangement was concluded between Poland and Russia, which recognised the sovereignty of the Czar over the whole of the Ukraine.

In 1682, Kara Mustapha commenced his fatal enterprise against Vienna. A revolt of the Hungarians under Count Tekeli, against Austria, which had been caused by the bigoted tyranny of the Emperor Leopold, now laid the heart of that empire open to attack; and a force was collected by the Grand

* Thornton, p. 73, citing Spon, whose travels were published in 1678. "Spon says, 'Of all the princes of Christendom, there was none whom the Turks so much feared as the Czar of Muscovy.'"

Vizier, which, if ably handled, might have given the House of Hapsburg its death blow. Throughout the autumn of 1682 and the spring of 1683, regular and irregular troops, both horse, foot, artillery, and all kinds of munitions of war, were collected in the camp at Adrianople on a scale of grandeur that attested and almost exhausted the copiousness, which the administration of Kiuprili had given to the Turkish resources. The strength of the regular force which Kara Mustapha led to Vienna, is known from the muster-roll which was found in his tent after the siege. It amounted to 275,000 men. The attendants and camp-followers cannot be reckoned; nor can any but an approximate speculation be made as to the number of the Tartar and other irregular troops that joined the Vizier. It is probable that not less than half a million of men were set in motion in this last great aggressive effort of the Ottomans against Christendom. The Emperor Leopold had neither men nor money sufficient to enable him to confront such a deluge of invasion; and, after many abject entreaties, he obtained a promise of help from King Sobieski of Poland, whom he had previously treated with contumely and neglect. Poland was at peace with Turkey, nor had the Porte in any way failed in observance of the recent treaty. But neither Sobieski nor other Christian adversaries of the Turks were very scrupulous as to such obligations, and the Polish king promised to aid the Austrian emperor with 58,000 men. The Turkish army proceeded along the western side of the Danube from Belgrade, and reached Vienna without experiencing any

serious check, though a gallant resistance was made by some of the strong places which it besieged during its advance. The city of Vienna was garrisoned by 11,000 men under Count Stahremberg, who proved himself a worthy successor of the Count Salm, who had fulfilled the same duty when the city was besieged by Sultan Solyman. The second siege of Vienna lasted from the 15th July to the 12th September, 1683, during which the most devoted heroism was displayed by both the garrison and the inhabitants. The numerous artillery of the Turks shattered the walls and bastions, and the indefatigable labours of their miners were still more effective. The garrison was gradually wasted by the numerous assaults which it was called on to repulse, and in the frequent sorties, by which the Austrian commander sought to impede the progress of the besiegers. Kara Mustapha, at the end of August, had it in his power to carry the city by storm, if he had thought fit to employ his vast forces in a general assault, and to continue it from day to day, as Amurath IV. had done when Bagdad fell. But the Vizier kept the Turkish troops back out of avarice, in the hope that the city would come into his power by capitulation; in which case he would himself be enriched by the wealth of Vienna, which, if the city were taken by storm, would become the booty of the soldiery. The Turkish army murmured loudly at the incompetency, the selfishness, and the vain confidence of their chief, who took no measures for checking the approach of the relieving army that was known to be on its march; though the passage of the Danube might easily have been guarded

against Sobieski by a detachment from the immense forces which were at the Grand Vizier's command.

Sobieski had been unable to assemble his troops before the end of August; and, even then, they only amounted to 20,000 men. But he was joined by the Duke of Lorraine and some of the German commanders, who were at the head of a considerable army, and the Polish King crossed the Danube at Tulm, above Vienna, with about 70,000 men. He then wheeled round behind the Kalemberg Mountains to the north-west of Vienna, with the design of taking the besiegers in the rear. The Vizier took no heed of him; nor was any opposition made to the progress of the relieving army through the difficult country which it was obliged to traverse. On the 11th of September the Poles were on the summit of the Mount Kalemberg; and "from this hill," says the biographer of Sobieski, "the Christians were presented with one of the finest and most dreadful prospects of the greatness of human power; an immense plain and all the islands of the Danube covered with pavilions, whose magnificence seemed rather calculated for an encampment of pleasure than the hardships of war; an innumerable multitude of horses, camels, and buffaloes; 2,000,000 men all in motion, swarms of Tartars dispersed along the foot of the mountain in their usual confusion; the fire of the besiegers incessant and terrible, and that of the besieged such as they could contrive to make; in fine, a great city, distinguishable only by the tops of the steeples and the fire and smoke that covered it."*

* Coyer, Memoir of Sobieski.

But Sobieski was well accustomed to the menacing aspect of Turkish armies; his eagle glance saw instantly the Vizier's want of military skill, and the exposure of the long lines of the Ottoman camp to a sudden and fatal attack. "This man," said he, "is badly encamped: he knows nothing of war; we shall certainly beat him." And in a letter, sent by him to the Queen of Poland on the night before the battle, he wrote these words: "We can easily see that the general of an army, who has neither thought of intrenching himself nor concentrating his forces, but lies encamped as if we were 100 miles from him, is predestined to be beaten."

The ground through which Sobieski had to move down from the Kalemberg, was broken by ravines; and was so difficult for the passage of the troops, that Kara Mustapha might, by an able disposition of part of his forces, have long kept the Poles in check, especially as Sobieski, in his hasty march, had brought but a small part of his artillery to the scene of action. But the Vizier displayed the same infatuation and imbecility, that had marked his conduct throughout the campaign. He at first refused to believe that Sobieski and any considerable number of Polish troops were on the Kalemberg; and, when at last convinced that an attack would be made upon his lines, he long delayed the necessary order for the occupation of the hollow ways, through which alone the Poles could debouch from the slopes of the high ground which they had gained. Unwilling to resign Vienna, Mustapha left the chief part of his Janissary force in the trenches before the city, and led the rest of his army towards the

hills, down which Sobieski and his troops were advancing. In some parts of the field, where the Turks had partially intrenched the roads, their resistance to the Christians was obstinate; but Sobieski led on his best troops in person in a direct line for the Ottoman centre, where the Vizier's tent was conspicuous; and the terrible presence of the victor of Khoczim was soon recognised. "By Allah! the King is really among us," exclaimed the Khan of the Crimea, Selim Ghirai; and turned his horse's head for flight. The mass of the Ottoman army broke and fled in hopeless rout, hurrying Kara Mustapha with them from the field. The Janissaries, who had been left in the trenches before the city, were now attacked both by the garrison and the Poles, and were cut to pieces. The camp, the whole artillery, and the military stores of the Ottomans became the spoil of the conquerors; and never was there a victory more complete, or signalised by more splendid trophies. The Turks continued their panic flight as far as Raab. There Kara Mustapha collected round him some of the wrecks of the magnificent army which had followed him to Vienna. He sought to vent his fury by executing some of the best Turkish officers, who had differed from him during the campaign. His own fate, when he was executed by the Sultan's orders a few weeks afterwards at Belgrade, excited neither surprise nor pity.

The great destruction of the Turks before Vienna was rapturously hailed throughout Christendom as the announcement of the approaching downfall of the Mahometan Empire in Europe. The Russians and the

Venetians declared war against the Porte ; and Turkey was now assailed on almost every point of her European frontiers. The new Grand Vizier Ibrahim strove hard to recruit the armies, and supply the deficiency in the magazines, which the fatal campaign of his predecessor had occasioned. But city after city was now rent rapidly away from Islam by the exulting and advancing Christians. The Imperialist armies, led by the Duke of Lorraine, captured Gran, Neuhausel, Ofen, Szegedin, and nearly all the strong places, except Belgrade, which the Turks had held in Hungary. The Venetians were almost equally successful on the Dalmatian frontier ; and the Republic of St. Mark now landed its troops in Greece, under Morosini, who rapidly made himself master of Coron, Navarino, Nauplia, Corinth, Athens, and other chief cities of that important part of the Turkish Empire. In Poland the war was waged less vigorously ; nor did the Turks yet relinquish their hold on Kaminiec. But a great defeat which the main Ottoman army sustained on the 12th August, 1687, at Mohacz (on the very scene of Solyman's ancient glory), excited the discontents of the soldiery into insurrection against the Sultan, and on the eighth day of November, in that year, Mahomet IV. was deposed, in the forty-sixth year of his age, and thirty-eighth of his reign.

It had been the good fortune of this prince to have able Grand Viziers during a considerable part of his reign ; but he chose his ministers from female influence or personal favouritism, not from discernment of merit, as was proved when he entrusted power to Kara

Mustapha, who did more to ruin the Ottoman Empire than any other individual that is mentioned in its history. Mahomet IV. reigned without ruling. His mind was entirely absorbed by his infatuation for the chase; and the common people believed that he was under a curse, laid on him by his father, Sultan Ibrahim, who had been put to death when Mahomet was placed on the throne, and who was said to have prayed in his last moments that his son might lead the wandering life of a beast of prey. Though not personally cruel, Mahomet IV. as soon as heirs were born to him sought anxiously to secure himself on the throne by the customary murder of his brothers. They were saved from him by the exertions of the Sultana Validé and his ministers; but he often resumed the unnatural design. His mother, the Sultana Validé Tarkhan, was determined at even the risk of her own life to shelter her two younger sons from being slaughtered for the further security of the elder; and she took at last the precaution of placing the two young princes in an inner room of the palace, which could only be reached by passing through her own apartments. Even there one night the Sultan himself entered with a dagger in his hand, and was gliding through to the chamber where his brothers lay. Two pages watched near the Sultana Validé; they dared not speak in the presence of the imperial man-slayer, but one of them touched her and awakened her. The mother sprang from sleep, and clinging round the Sultan, implored him to strike her dead before he raised his hand to shed his brothers' blood. Mahomet, accustomed to yield to the superior

spirit of the Validé, renounced for the time his scheme of fratricide, and retired to his apartment; but on the morrow he put to death the two slaves who had hindered him from effecting the murderous project which he wished to have accomplished, but which he wanted nerve to renew. Timidly vindictive, and selfishly rather than constitutionally cruel, Mahomet continued to long for the death of his brothers, though he hesitated to strike. And when he was at last deposed to make room for his brother Solyman on the throne, he may have regretted that his infirmity of purpose had spared the fatal rival, whom an adherence to the old fratricidal canon of the House of Othman would have removed for ever from his path.

In the reign of Mahomet IV. another innovation on the ancient stern institutions of the empire was completed, which also was probably caused as much by weakness as by humanity. It was in 1675, in the last year of the Vizierate of Ahmed Kiuprili, that the final levy of three thousand boys for the recruiting of the Turkish army was made on the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The old system of filling the ranks of the Janissaries exclusively with compulsory conscripts and converts from among the children of the Rayas, had been less and less rigidly enforced since the time of Amurath IV.* Admission into the corps of Janissaries, now conferred many civil as well as military advantages; so that it was eagerly sought by

* There is some difficulty in reconciling the various dates assigned to the discontinuance of the recruiting the Janissaries by enrolments of Christian children. The change was most probably gradual. See Von Hammer, vol. i., p. 88; vol. iii., p. 668, and p. 680.

men who were of Turkish origin, and born to the Mahometan faith. The first measure of relaxation of the old rule was to treat those who were the children of Janissaries, as eligible candidates for enrolment. Other Mussulman volunteers were soon received; and the levies of the tribute of children from the Christians grew less frequent and less severe; though they were still occasionally resorted to, in order to supply the thousands of pages, who were required to people the vast chambers of the Serail, and who were in case of emergency drafted into the army of the state. But ever since the year 1675, the Rayas of the Empire have been entirely free from the terrible tax of flesh and blood, by which the Ottoman military force was sustained during its early centuries of conquest. With this change in the constitution of the corps of Janissaries, the numbers of that force were greatly increased: large bodies of them were now settled with their families in the chief cities of the empire, where they engaged in different trades and occupations. The exclusively monastic and martial character of the "New Soldiery" of Hadji Begtash had long ago disappeared.

Though still able to contend at sea with such an enemy as Venice, the Sublime Porte had seen a still greater decline take place in its naval power than in its military, compared with the state of its fleets and armies in the days of the great Solyman. This was principally caused by the progress of carelessness and corruption in the navy-boards and arsenals at Constantinople; but much of it was due to the Sultan's

losing that firm hold on the resources of the Mahometan powers of North Africa, which their great ancestor possessed, when Barbarossa and Dragut executed his bidding with the fleets of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers.

The Barbaresque Regencies had in the middle of the 17th century become practically independent States. They sometimes sent naval succour to the Porte in its wars; but this was done rather in a spirit of voluntary good-will and recognition of community of creed and origin similar to that which formerly made Carthage give occasional aid to Tyre, than out of the obedient subordination of provincial governments to central authority. The strength and audacity of these piratical States, especially of Algiers, had so increased, that not only did their squadrons ravage the Christian coasts of the Mediterranean, but their cruisers carried on their depredations beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, both northward and southward in the Atlantic. They pillaged the island of Madeira; and the Algerine rovers more than once landed in Ireland, and sacked towns and villages, and carried off captives into slavery.* They even ventured as far as Iceland and Scandinavia, as if in retaliation for the exploits of the old Norse Sea-Kings in the Mediterranean seven centuries before. Algiers had a marine force comprising, besides light galleys, more than forty well-built and well-equipped ships, each manned by from 300 to 400 corsairs, and mounting from forty to fifty guns. The number of Christians who toiled in slavery in the dockyards and

* See the fine ballad in the "Songs of the Nation," of "Hackett of Dungarvan who steered the Algerine."

arsenals at Algiers or at the oar in her fleets, fluctuated from between 10,000 to 20,000. Tunis and Tripoli had their fleets and their slaves, though on a smaller scale. Our Admiral Blake tamed the savage pride of these barbarians in 1655. He awed the Dey of Algiers into the surrender of all his English prisoners; and when the Dey of Tunis refused to do the same, Blake burnt the pirate fleet under the guns of the town, destroyed the forts, and compelled obedience to his demands. The Dutch admiral De Ruyter, and the French admiral De Beaufort, also at different times punished the insolence of the Barbary corsairs; but their outrages and cruelties were never entirely quelled till Lord Exmouth's bombardment of Algiers in the present century. In 1663 England concluded a treaty with Algiers and the Porte, by which she was to be at liberty to chastise the Algerines, when they broke their engagements, without its being considered a breach of amity between England and Turkey. The rulers of the Barbaresque States styled themselves Dahis or Deys. According to some authorities, the Algerine chiefs termed themselves Deys as delegates of the Sultan. According to others, the title came from the old Asiatic word Dahi, which signified a superior, even at the time of the ancient republic of Mecca, and afterwards among the Ishmaelites. They were elected by the military body, consisting of the descendants of the Janissaries and others of Turkish race. They used to apply to the Sultan for his firman appointing them Pachas, and confirming their election; but this soon became a mere formality.

The contests between the Greeks and the Christians of the Latin Church in Jerusalem (a long enduring feud, to which, in connection with the claims of France to "protect the Holy Places," our attention will hereafter be directed), raged furiously during Mahomet IV.'s reign. But the Ottomans of that age watched with far stronger interest the agitation caused among the Jewish nation by the celebrated Sabbathai Levi, who in 1666 came forward at Jerusalem, and asserted that he was the Messiah. Under that title he sent circular letters to all the Jewish synagogues of the Ottoman empire; and such was his dexterous audacity in imposition, so eagerly were the legends respecting his miraculous powers received, that thousands of his countrymen flocked together at his bidding, not only from Constantinople, Smyrna, and other Turkish cities, but from Germany, Leghorn, Venice, and Amsterdam. Some of the Rabbis opposed him; and the most violent tumults were raised at Jerusalem, Cairo, Smyrna, and other cities of the East, where Sabbathai proclaimed his pretended mission. The Ottomans observed his progress with religious anxiety; not from any belief in his alleged character, but on the contrary, from the fear that he was the Dedjal or Antichrist, who, according to the Mahometan creed, is to appear among mankind in the last days of the world. They believe also that the speedy advent of the Day of Judgment is to be announced by the reappearance on earth of the prophet Mehdi. And as at the same time at which Sabbathai came forward in Palestine, another religious impostor arose in Kurdistan, who called himself the prophet

Mehdi, and excited thousands of Kurds to follow him, the alarm of many orthodox Moslems at these combined signs of the end of the world, was extreme. The Vizier Ahmed Kiuprili, in order to check the troubles caused by Sabbathai, seized and imprisoned him: but his fanatic followers only saw in this the certain prelude to their Messiah's triumph. They said that according to an ancient prophecy Messiah was to disappear for nine months, and was then to return mounted on a lioness, which he was to guide with a bridle made of seven-headed serpents; and then he was to be lord of the world. But one of Sabbathai's countrymen, who was jealous of his influence, denounced him before the Sultan's ministers as endeavouring to raise a revolt among the people. Sabbathai was brought before the Sultan for examination; and Mahomet then made him the characteristic offer of an opportunity of proving by a miracle his right to be acknowledged the Messiah. One of the Sultan's best archers was called forward, and Sabbathai was invited to stand steady as a mark for the arrows, which of course could do no harm to a personage gifted with miraculous powers; only the Sultan wished to see them bound back from off his body. At these words, and the sight of the bended bow, Sabbathai's courage failed him. He fell prostrate, and owned that he was nothing but a poor Rabbi, and no whit different from other men. The Sultan then offered to allow him to embrace the Mahometan faith, and so make some amends for the scandal which he had caused, and for the crime of high treason which he had committed by assuming the title of Messiah of

Palestine, which was one of the sandjaks of the Sublime Porte. Sabbathai eagerly accepted the proposal. He became a Moslem, and instead of being worshipped as Messiah or dreaded as Antichrist, he filled for ten years the respectable but prosaic station of a door-keeper in the Sultan's palace. He, however, still made himself conspicuous by his religious zeal; but that zeal was now directed to winning converts from Judaism to Mahometanism, in which he was singularly successful. He was ultimately banished to the Morea, where he died.* The Kurdish spiritual pretender, the self-styled Mehdi, was captured by the governor of Moussul and sent before the Sultan, a few months after Sabbathai had owned his imposture in the royal presence. The young Kurd abandoned the character of Precursor of the Last Judgment, as soon as he was led before his sovereign. He answered his interrogators with sense and spirit; and his life also was spared. The Jewish Antichrist was serving the Sultan as a door-keeper, and the Kurdish Mehdi was made his fellow-servant, in the capacity of one of the pages of the treasure-chamber of the palace.

Although his immoderate fondness for hunting made Mahomet IV. habitually neglect the duties of government, he was never indifferent to literary pursuits; and he showed an hereditary fondness for the society of learned men. His patronage of the chace and his patronage of letters were sometimes strangely blended.

* According to the graphic sketch of the career of Sabbathai, by the Dean of St. Paul's, some of the Jews continued to believe in him notwithstanding his apostacy and death, and "Sabbathaism still exists as a sect of Judaism."—Milman's History of the Jews, vol. iii. p. 395.

He was liberal in his encouragement of historical writers, especially of such as professed to record the current history of his own reign. He loved to see them at his court; he corrected their works with his own pen; but he expected that each royal hunting should be chronicled by them with sportsman-like minuteness, and that the death of each wild beast which was slain by the Sultan's hand, should be portrayed with poetic fervour. A despotic patron is dangerous to the life of an author, as well as to the vitality of his works. The Turkish historian Abdi was one whom Sultan Mahomet IV. delighted to honour. The Sultan kept him always near his person, and charged him with the special duty of writing the annals of his reign. One evening Mahomet asked of him, "What hast thou written to-day?" Abdi incautiously answered that nothing remarkable to write about had happened that day. The Sultan darted a hunting-spear at the unobservant companion of royalty, wounded him sharply, and exclaimed, "*Now* thou hast something to write about."*

* Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 571, cites this from Abdi's own book.

CHAPTER IV.

SOLYMAN II. — INSURRECTIONS AND DEFEATS — SUCCESSES AGAINST RUSSIA—KIUPRILI-ZADE MUSTAPHA MADE GRAND VIZIER—HIS CHARACTER AND MEASURES—WISE POLICY TO THE RAYAS—SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN—DEATH OF SOLYMAN II.—AHMED II. SULTAN—KIUPRILI DEFEATED AND KILLED AT SALANKAMEN—DISASTROUS REIGN OF AHMED II.—MUSTAPHA II. SUCCEEDS, AND HEADS THE ARMIES—VICTORIOUS AT FIRST, BUT DEFEATED BY EUGENE AT ZENTA—HUSEIN KIUPRILI GRAND VIZIER—CONQUESTS OF PETER THE GREAT OF RUSSIA OVER THE TURKS—AZOF TAKEN—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE—TREATY OF CARLOWITZ.*

SOLYMAN THE SECOND, when raised to the throne of the Ottoman empire in 1687, had lived for forty-five years in compulsory seclusion, and in almost daily peril of death. Yet, as sovereign, he showed more capacity and courage than the brother whom he succeeded; and, perhaps, if he had been made Sultan at an earlier period, Turkey might have escaped that shipwreck of her state, which came on her after the death of her great minister Ahmed Kiuprili, through the weakness of Sultan Mahomet IV. and the misconduct of his favourite Vizier Kara Mustapha, the originator of the fatal march upon Vienna. Solyman despised the idle sports and debasing sensuality of his predecessors, and

* See Von Hammer, books 58—.

earnestly devoted himself to the task of re-organising the military power of his empire, and of stemming, if possible, the progress of defeat and disaster. But he was unable to control the excesses of the mutinous Janissaries, who, throughout the winter which followed Solyman's accession, filled Constantinople with riot and slaughter, and compelled the appointment and displacement of ministers according to their lawless will. At length this savage soldiery resolved to pillage the palaces of the Grand Vizier and the other chief dignitaries. The Vizier, Siavoush Pacha, defended his house bravely against the brigands, who were joined by the worst rabble of the capital, Jewish and Christian, as well as Mahometan. On the second day of the insurrection they forced the gate of the house, and rushed in, slaying and spoiling all that they met with. Siavoush Pacha, with a few of his surviving servants round him, made a last attempt to defend the entrance to the harem, that sanctuary of Moslems, which the rebels now assailed, regardless alike of every restraint of law, of creed, of national and of private honour. More than a hundred of the wretches were slain before the resistance of the brave man of the house was overcome, and Siavoush fell dead on the threshhold of his harem, fighting bravely to the last gasp. The worst outrages and abominations were now practised by the rebels; and the sister of the slain Vizier, and his wife (the daughter of Mohammed Kiuprili), were cruelly mutilated and dragged naked through the streets of Constantinople. The horror and indignation which these atrocities inspired, and the instinct of self-preservation, roused the mass of the

inhabitants to resist the brigands, who were proceeding to the sack of other mansions, and to the plunder of the shops and bazaars. The chief Preacher of the Mosque of the Great Solyman, and other members of the Ulema, exerted themselves with energy and success to animate the well-affected citizens, and to raise a feeling of shame among the ranks of the Janissaries; many of whom had been led away by temporary excitement and the evil example of the ruffians, who had joined them from out of the very dregs of the populace. The Sacred Standard of the Prophet was displayed over the centre gate of the Sultan's palace, and the true believers hastened to rally round the holy symbol of loyalty to their Prophet's Vicar on earth. The chief pillagers and assassins in the late riot were seized and executed. The Mufti and three other principal Ulemas, who had shown a disposition to obey the mutinous Janissaries, were deposed; and men of more integrity and spirit were appointed in their places. Some degree of order was thus restored to the capital; but the spirit of insubordination and violence was ever ready to break out; and the provinces were convulsed with revolt and tumult. It was not until the end of June 1688 that the Sultan was able to complete the equipment of an army, which then marched towards the Hungarian frontier.

The Austrians and their allies had profited vigorously by the disorders of the Turkish state, and had continued to deal blow after blow with fatal effect. Three generals of the highest military renown, Charles of Lorraine, Louis of Baden, and Prince Eugene, now directed the Imperialist armies against the discouraged

and discordant Ottomans. The important city of Erlau in Hungary surrendered on the 14th of December 1687, and came again into the dominion of its ancient rulers, after having been for a century under Mahometan sway. Gradiska, on the Bosnian frontier, was captured by Prince Louis of Baden. Stuhweissenberg was invested; and, as the Turks had abandoned Illock and Peterwardein, the route to Belgrade lay open to the Austrian armies. A Turkish general named Yegen Osman was ordered to protect Belgrade; but he was cowardly or treacherous; and, as the Imperialists advanced, he retreated from Belgrade, after setting fire to the city. The Austrian troops, following close upon the retiring Turks, extinguished the flames, and laid siege to the citadel, which surrendered after a bombardment of twenty-one days, on the 20th of August 1688. Stuhweissenberg was stormed on the 6th of September; and Yegen Osman fired Semendra, and abandoned it to the advancing Christians. Prince Louis destroyed a Turkish army in Bosnia; and city after city yielded to the various Austrian generals who commanded in that province and in Transylvania, and to the Venetian leaders in Dalmatia. The campaign of the next year in these regions was almost equally disastrous to Turkey. The Sultan announced his intention of leading the Ottoman armies in person; and proceeded as far as the city of Sofia. Part of the Turkish forces were posted in advance at the city of Nissa, and were attacked there and utterly defeated by the Imperialists under Prince Louis of Baden. Nissa, evacuated by the Turks, was occupied by the

conquerors. On the tidings of this defeat reaching the Turkish head-quarters at Sofia, the Sultan, in alarm, retreated within the mountain range of the Balkan to the city of Philippopolis. Florentin, Fethislam, and Widdin, next fell into the power of the Imperialists; and before the close of the year 1689, Great Waradein and Temeswar were all that the Ottomans retained of their late extensive provinces north of the Danube; while even to the south of that river the best portions of Bosnia and Servia were occupied by the victorious Austrians.

In the southern parts of European Turkey, the fortune of the war was equally unfavourable to Sultan Solyman. Morosini, one of the greatest generals that the Republic of St. Mark ever produced, completed the conquest of the Morea, which he divided into four Venetian provinces. It was only against the Poles and the Russians that the Turks and their Tartar allies obtained any advantages. A large Tartar force from the Crimea, led by Azmet Ghirai, overran part of Poland in 1688; reinforced the Tartar garrison in Kaminiec, and defeated the Poles on the Sireth. The Russian general Galitzin attempted to invade the Crimea. He obtained some advantages over part of the Tartar forces, but when he advanced towards the Isthmus of Perekop, in the autumn of 1688, he found that the retreating Tartars had set fire to the dry grass of the steppes, and reduced the country to a desert, from which he was obliged to retire. And, in 1689, when the Russians again advanced to the Isthmus, they were completely defeated by the Ottoman

troops, that had taken post there to guard the Crimea. But these gleams of success could not dissipate the terror which the disasters in Hungary and Greece had spread among the Turkish nation. Only seven years had passed away since their magnificent host, under the fatal guidance of Kara Mustapha, had marched forth across the then far-extended north-western frontier, with the proud boast that it would sack Vienna and blot out Austria from among the kingdoms of the earth. Now, the Austrians, and their confederates the lately despised Venetians, the conquered of Candia, held victorious possession of half the European Empire of the House of Othman. For the first since the days of Hunyades, the Balkan was menaced by Christian invaders; and at sea the Turkish flag, the flag of Khaireddin, Pialè, and Kilidj Ali, was now swept from the Mediterannean. Seldom had there been a war, in which the effect that can be produced on the destinies of nations by the appearance or the absence of individual great men, was more signally proved. On the Christian side, Sobieski, Eugene, Louis of Baden, the Prince of Lorraine, and Morosini had commanded fortune; while among the Turks, no single man of mark had either headed armies, or directed councils. Yet, the Ottoman nation was not exhausted of brave and able spirits: and at length adversity cleared the path of dignity for merit.

In the November of 1689, the Sultan convened an extraordinary Divan at Adrianople, and besought his councillors to advise him as to what hands he should

intrust with the management of the State. In the hour of extreme peril the jealous spirit of intrigue and self-advancement was silent; and all around Solyman II. advised him to send for Kiuprili-Zadè-Mustapha, brother of the great Ahmed Kiuprili, and to give the seals of office to him as Grand Vizier of the Empire.

Kiuprili-Zadè-Mustapha, at the time when he assumed this high dignity, was 52 years of age. He had been trained in statesmanship during the vizierates of his father and brother, Mohammed and Ahmed Kiuprili: and it was expected and hoped, on the death of Ahmed in 1676, that Sultan Mahomet IV. would place the seals in the hands of Kiuprili-Zadè. Unhappily for the Ottoman nation, that Sultan's partiality for his own son-in-law prevailed; nor was it until after thirteen years of misgovernment and calamity had nearly destroyed the empire, that the third Kiuprili succeeded his father and brother, as director of the councils, and leader of the armies of Turkey.

His authority was greatly increased by the deserved reputation which he enjoyed of being a strict observer of the Mahometan law, and an uncompromising enemy to profligacy and corruption. After having paid homage to the Sultan on his appointment, he summoned to Divan all the great dignitaries of the empire, and addressed them on the state of the country. He reminded them in severe terms of their duties as Moslems, of their sins; and he told them that they were now undergoing the deserved chastisement of God. He described to them the extreme peril in which the empire was placed. "If we go on thus," said

he, "another campaign will see the enemy encamped beneath the walls of Constantinople." He then pointed out to them how they ought to act as true believers; and bade them take heart, and be courageous in the defence of their country, however hardly they might find themselves pressed. Kiuprili abolished some imposts introduced by his predecessor, which produced little to the state, while they were peculiarly vexatious to the subject; but he sought to fill the exhausted treasury by exacting heavy contributions from all the late officials who had enriched themselves at the public expense. All the superfluous gold and silver vessels of the Palace were sent to the Mint to be coined into money for the military chest. And Kiuprili set the example to the other chief men of the State, of aiding the public cause by similar contributions. He gave up the whole of his plate; and the Grand Vizier's table was served thenceforth with vessels of copper. Funds for the immediate prosecution of the war were thus obtained; and the belief of the Turks in the ability and in the holiness of the new Vizier brought recruits rapidly to the army, which was collected near the capital. Kiuprili called out all the veterans who had been discharged and pensioned, and he distributed them among the new levies. He placed governors on whom he could rely, in the most important pachalics. He sought also fit men and measures for the revival of the Turkish marine. Mizirli-Zadè-Ibrahim, who had distinguished himself in the defence of Negropont against the Venetians, was raised to the chief naval command in the Mediterranean; and another bold and skilful

officer, Mezzomorto, was commissioned to form and lead a flotilla on the Danube.

But the highest merit of Kiuprili-Zadè-Mustapha is, that he had the wisdom to recognise the necessity of the Sublime Porte strengthening itself by winning the loyal affections of its Christian subjects. Although he was so earnest a believer in Islamism, and so exemplary in his obedience to its precepts, that he was venerated by his contemporaries as a Saint, he did not suffer bigotry to blind him to the fact, that cruelty to the Rayas must hasten the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. He saw that the Christian invaders of Turkey found everywhere sympathy and recruits among the populations of the land. The Christian Albanians were enrolling themselves under the banner of Venice; the Servians were rising to aid the Emperor of Austria; and in Greece the victorious progress of Morosini had been aided by the readiness with which the village municipalities and the mountain tribes placed themselves under his authority, and by the strenuous support which bands of Christian volunteers gave him, in the beleaguering the fortresses held by the Turks.* Kiuprili-Zadè was not content with judging correctly: he took prompt practical measures to check the evils which he was swift to discern. One of the first acts of his vizierate was to despatch the most explicit and imperative orders to all the Pachas, that no Turkish officer should exercise or permit any kind of oppression towards the Rayas; and that no payment should be

* Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 841. Emerson Tennant's Greece, vol. i. p. 218 *et seq.*

required of them except the Capitation Tax. For the purposes of this tax, Kiuprili divided the Rayas into three classes, according to their incomes. The first or wealthiest paid four ducats, the middle class two ducats, and the lowest one ducat a head. This institution was called the Nizami Djidid (the New Order), a denomination which we shall see applied to more recent reforms. Kiuprili also took the bold and sagacious step of making a Mainote Greek Bey of Maina. This was Liberius Geratschari, who had passed seven years as a Turkish galley-slave. He was now set at liberty, and sent to the Morea to support the Turkish interest among his countrymen against that of the Venetians, who had begun to alienate the Greek Rayas from their side, by impolitic government. Von Hammer remarks that Kiuprili-Zadè showed himself in this measure to be superior as a politician, both to his brother Ahmed, who had sought, in the former Venetian war, to curb the rising disaffection in the Morea, by fortified posts and garrisons; and also to the subsequent Grand Viziers, who, when it was proposed to make the Morea a principality like Moldavia and Wallachia, and govern it by native Christians, rejected the scheme as derogatory to the dignity of the Sublime Porte.* Kiuprili had even the enlightened spirit to despise the old dogmas of Turkish Muftis and judges, according to which the Rayas were allowed only to repair such churches as they already possessed, but were strictly forbidden to enlarge them, or to build new places of worship. Kiuprili sanctioned the foundation of a Greek Church

* Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 841.

wherever it was desired; and thereby became the founder of thriving villages, which sprang up in districts, where there had been previously only scanty bands of suffering and disaffected outcasts. Once, in passing through part of Servia, Kiuprili halted for the night in a wretched hamlet of Rayas, who had neither edifice nor minister of religion. Kiuprili ordered that a church should be built there, and that a Christian priest should be sent for to serve it. In return for this boon, which filled the poor peasants with rapturous gratitude, Kiuprili required of them, that each head of a family should bring him a fowl, whenever he passed through the village. Fifty-three fowls were immediately brought to him; that being the number of families. In the next (and, unhappily for the Rayas, the last) year of his vizierate, Kiuprili passed through the same place. He received a hundred and twenty-five fowls from the heads of the happy population, which flocked together with their Greek priest at their head to welcome the benevolent Vizier. "Look," said Kiuprili to the staff of Turkish officers round him," "Look at the fruits of toleration. I have increased the Sultan's power; and I have brought blessings on his government from those who were wont to curse it."* The Greeks of the empire used to say that Kiuprili founded more churches than Justinian. Had subsequent Turkish ministers initiated Kiuprili-Zadé Mustafa in their policy towards the Christian population of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire would now command far ampler resources, than it can derive from the unaided valour

* Ubicini, ii. 55, citing Cantemir.

and loyalty of its Moslem inhabitants; and the most serious sources of its internal weakness would long ago have been removed.

Besides the glory of having, while sincerely religious, practised religious toleration, the third Kiuprili deserves honourable mention for his recognition of the great principle of political economy, that (with very few and very peculiar exceptions) trade between man and man ought to be free from all state interference. When pressed by one of his advisers to frame regulations for purchases and sales, Kiuprili-Zadé replied, "The Koran prescribes nothing on the subject. Purchase and sale ought to be left to the free will of the contracting parties." *

Kiuprili-Zadé Mustapha is termed by Ottoman historians Kiuprili Fazyl, which means "Kiuprili the Virtuous." They say of him, as his highest praise, that he never committed a crime, and that he never used an unnecessary word. They record as an instance of his eminence in taciturnity, that once, while Grand Vizier, he received a ceremonial visit from three Ulemas, who had formerly held the offices of army judges. Kiuprili let them depart without having addressed a syllable to them. His old Master of Requests, Nigahi Effendi, said to him, "My gracious lord, you should have spoken something to them." "I am not a hypocrite," answered Kiuprili. He was austerely simple in all his habits. In his campaigns he generally marched on foot, like the rank and file of the infantry. He disliked military music. He seldom

* Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 849.

moved his quarters before sunset. Amid the pomp and splendour of the Turkish court and camp the Grand Vizier was distinguishable by the plainness of his dress. He was an indefatigable student, and read diligently in his tent, when on active service, as well as in his palace when at Constantinople.

Such are some of the praises by which his country's historians signalise Kiuprili-Zadé Mustapha. The renown for statesmanship acquired by him, and which Christian writers have concurred with Mahometan in bestowing, is the more remarkable, by reason of the shortness of the period permitted to him for the display of his administrative genius. He was killed in battle within two years from the time when the seals of office were placed in his hands. His contemporaries judged of him, as of his brother Ahmed, that he shone more in the council than in the field. But the military career of Kiuprili-Zadé was highly honourable to his abilities as well as to his courage; and, though ultimately defeated, he gained a respite of infinite importance for the Ottoman Empire, by the successes which he at first obtained. When he was made Grand Vizier, one of the invading armies of the enemy had advanced as far as Ouskoup, in northern Macedonia, where it was actively aided by the Christian Albanians and their Patriarch. A chieftain of those regions, named Karpos, had accepted a diploma of investiture from the Austrian emperor, and, assuming the old title of Kral, had fortified himself in Egri-Palanka. It was indispensable to relieve Turkey at once from the foes, who thus struck at the very heart of

her power in Europe. Kiuprili held a council of war at Adrianople, at which Selim Ghirai, the Khan of the Crimea, and Tekeli, the Hungarian refugee, were present. Khodja Khalid Pacha, the Seraskier of the Morea, a native of Ouskoup, was sent with all the regular Turkish troops that could be collected, against that place. The Crimean Khan, at the head of a large Tartar force, co-operated with him. They gained two victories over the combined bodies of Germans, Hungarians, and Albanians, who had assumed the old mediæval badge of the cross. The chieftain Karpos was seized by the Tartars and executed on the bridge of Ouskoup. Nearly all the important posts which the invaders and their insurgent confederates had occupied in those districts, were recovered by the Sultan's troops, and the pressure on this vital part of the Empire was almost entirely removed. Encouraged by these successes, Kiuprili pushed forward with the greatest vigour his armaments for the next campaign. Louis XIV., who was at war with the German Empire, sent in the winter of 1680 a new ambassador, the Marquis de Chateunef, to Constantinople, to encourage the Turks to persevere in hostilities against Austria. Chateunef was also ordered to negociate, if possible, a peace between Turkey and Poland, to prevent the recognition of William of Orange as king of England by the Sublime Porte, and to regain for the Catholics in Palestine the custody of the Holy Sepulchre, which the Greek Patriarch had lately won from them. Chateunef obtained the last object, and he found in the new Vizier a zealous ally against Austria. But the Turks

refused to suspend hostilities with Poland; and with regard to the Prince of Orange and the English crown, Kiuprili answered that he should recognise the king whom the English people had proclaimed. He added that it would ill-become the Turks, who had so often dethroned their own sovereigns, to dispute the rights of other nations to change their masters.

In August 1690, Kiuprili-Zadé Mustapha took, in person, the command of the Ottoman armies that advanced from Bulgaria and Upper Albania through Servia, against the Imperialists. After a murderous fight of two days, Kiuprili drove the Austrian general, Schenkendorf, from his lines at Dragoman, between the cities of Sofia and Nissa. The Vizier then formed the siege of Nissa, which capitulated in three weeks. The Austrian generals were prevented from concentrating their forces for its relief, by a well-planned irruption into Transylvania, by the Hungarian refugee Tekeli at the head of a Turkish army. Tekeli defeated the Imperialists in that province, and proclaimed the Sultan as sovereign lord, and himself as Prince of Transylvania. After the capture of Nissa, the Grand Vizier marched upon Semendra, which was stormed after resisting desperately for four days. Widdin was also regained; and Kiuprili then undertook the recovery of Belgrade. On the twelfth day of the siege a shell from the Turkish batteries pierced the roof of the principal powder magazine of the city; and a destructive explosion ensued, which gave the Turks an easy conquest. Having placed a strong garrison in this important city, and completed the expulsion of the

Austrians from Servia, Kiuprili returned to Constantinople. He was received there with deserved honours after his short, but brilliant campaign, in which he had compelled the invading Giaours to recede from the banks of the Morava and the Nissa to those of the Danube and the Saave.

On the 10th of May, 1691, Kiuprili the Virtuous received a second time the Sacred Standard from the hands of his sovereign, Sultan Solyman, who died before the campaign was opened. Solyman II. was succeeded by his brother Achmet II., who was girt with the sabre of Othman on the 13th of July, 1691. The new Sultan confirmed Kiuprili in his dignity; and the Vizier proceeded to concentrate his forces at Belgrade, and to throw a bridge over the Saave. He then marched up the right bank of the Danube to encounter the Imperialists, who, under the command of Louis of Baden, descended from Peterwaradin. The two hosts approached each other on the 19th of August, near Salankeman. At the same time, the Christian and Mussulman flotillas, which accompanied their respective armies along the Danube, encountered on the river. The Turkish flotilla was victorious; but, on the land, the day proved a disastrous one for the house of Kiuprili and for the house of Othman. Contrary to the advice of the oldest Pachas in the army, the Vizier refused to await behind the lines the attack of the Imperialists. The veteran warrior Khodja Khalid, censured this impetuosity. Kiuprili said to him, "I invited thee to follow me that thou mightest show thyself like a man, and not like a

phantom." Khalid, touching the thin hairs of his grey beard, replied, "I have but a few days to live. It matters little whether I die to-day, or to-morrow; but I would fain not have been present at a scene in which the empire can meet with nought but calamity and shame." "Advance the cannon!" cried Kiuprili; and himself formed the Spahis for the fight. Kemankesh Pacha began the battle by rushing, with 6000 Kurdish and Turcoman irregular cavalry, upon the Christian lines. "Courage, my heroes," cried Kemankesh, "the Houris are waiting for you!" They galloped forward with shouts of "Allah!" but were received by the Christians with a steady fire, which drove them back in discomfited and diminished masses. Again they charged impetuously; again they broke, fell or fled. The Austrians now pressed forward to where the Sacred Standard was reared in the Mahometan ranks. Ismael, the Pacha of Caramania, dashed against them with the troops of Asia. His squadrons were entangled in an abattis of felled trees, by which the Prince of Baden had protected his right wing. The Asiatics wavered and were repulsed. Kiuprili saw his best men shot down round him by the superior musketry of the Imperialists. "What is to be done?" he cried to the officers of his guards. They answered, "Let us close, and fight sword in hand." Kiuprili, arrayed in a black vest, invoked the name of God, and threw himself, with drawn sabre, against the enemy. His guards rushed onward with him. An obstinate and sanguinary struggle followed, which was decided against Turkey by the bullet that struck Kiuprili, while cleaving his way

desperately through the Austrian ranks. His guards lost courage when they saw him fall; and the fatal tidings that their great Vizier was slain, soon spread disorder and panic throughout the Ottoman army. The Prince of Baden's triumph was complete; and the Turkish camp with 150 cannon fell into the conqueror's power. But the victory was dearly purchased, and the Austrian loss in men and officers was almost equal to that of the Turks. The battle of Salankeman drove the Ottomans again from Hungary; Tekeli was defeated by the Imperialists and expelled from Transylvania; and throughout the four years of the disastrous reign of Achmet II. the current of defeat was unabated. Besides the curse of the victorious sword of the foreigners, and the usual miseries of domestic insurrection, the fearful visitations of pestilence and famine came upon the devoted empire. A great earthquake threw down part of Smyrna; and a still more destructive conflagration ravaged Constantinople in September 1693. Heart-broken at the sufferings and shame of the State, and worn by disease, Achmet II. expired on the 6th February, 1695.

Mustapha II., the son of the deposed Mahomet IV., now came to the throne, and showed himself worthy of having reigned in happier times. On the third day after his accession, he issued a Hatti-Scherif, in which he threw the blame of the recent misfortunes upon the Sultans, and announced his intention of restoring the ancient usages, and of heading his armies in person. As the German historian observes,* this document is

* Von Hammer, vol. iii.

too remarkable not to deserve citation. Sultan Mustapha II. thus announced his royal will.

"God, the supreme distributor of all good, has granted unto us, miserable sinner, the Caliphate of the entire world. Under monarchs who are the slaves of pleasure, or who resign themselves to indolent slumber, never do the servants of God enjoy peace or repose. Henceforth, voluptuousness, idle pastime, and sloth, are banished from this court. While the Padischas, who have ruled since the death of our sublime father Mahomet, have heeded nought but their fondness for pleasure and for ease, the Unbelievers, the unclean beings, have invaded with their armies the four frontiers of Islamism. They have subdued our provinces. They have pillaged the goods of the people of Mahomet. They have dragged away into slavery the faithful, with their wives and little ones. This is known to all, as it is known to us. I therefore have resolved, with the help of the Lord, to take a signal revenge upon the Unbelievers, that brood of Hell; and I will myself begin the holy war against them. Our noble ancestor the Sultan Solyman (May his tomb exhale unceasingly the odour of incense!) during the forty-eight years of his reign, not only sent his Viziers against the unclean Christians, but placed himself at the head of the Champions of the Holy War, and so took upon the infidels the vengeance which God commands. I also, I, have resolved to combat them in person. Do thou, my Grand Vizier, and ye others, my Viziers, my Ulemas, my Lieutenants and Agas of my armies, do ye all of you assemble round my person, and meditate well on

this my imperial Hatti-Scherif. Take counsel; and inform me if I ought to open hostilities in person against the Emperor, or to remain at Adrianople. Of these two measures choose that which will be most profitable to the Faith, to the empire, and to the servants of God. Let your answer be the truth; and let it be submitted to me before the imperial stirrup. I wish you Health."

The deliberation of the Divan on this summons lasted for three days. Many thought that the presence of the Sultan in the camp was undesirable. Others feared that he had only addressed them with a view of learning their thoughts. Finally, they all resolved that the departure of the Padischah to assume the command-in-chief of the army, would not only expose the sacred person to too much risk and fatigue, but would involve excessive expense. Consequently, the Divan represented to the Sultan, that his Majesty ought not to commit his imperial person to the chances of a campaign, but ought to leave the care of war to the Grand Vizier. To this address the Sultan returned a laconic Hatti-Scherif, "I persist in marching." The most active measures then were taken to hasten the preparations for the campaign; and the gallantry of the young Sultan was at first rewarded by important success. He advanced in the summer of 1695, from Belgrade to Temesvar, and recaptured the important fortresses of Karansebes, Lipna, and Lugos. On the 22nd of September, he encountered near Lugos the Austrian army under General Veterani. Sultan Mustapha gained a complete victory,

and Veterani and half his troops were left dead on the field.

During the winter, which followed this victory, Mustapha and his councillors toiled unremittingly to repair the finances of the empire, and to increase the number and improve the discipline of the troops. Heavy taxes were laid on tobacco, on black eunuchs, and other articles of luxury. Many of the chief men of the empire seconded their sovereign's zeal; and raised bodies of troops at their own expense, of which they took the command. Mustapha had formed a corps of 3000 infantry from the royal gardeners, or Bostandjis, of Adrianople and Constantinople. He now divided those into three regiments, which were equipped in peculiar uniform, and trained with especial care. The Sultan opened the campaign of 1696 at the head of a numerous and well-appointed army. He defeated the Austrians under the Duke de Saxe near Temesvar, and raised the siege of that place. Mustapha strengthened the garrisons of the fortresses which the Turks still held in Hungary, and then returned to Adrianople, not unjustly proud of his achievements; though the great Solyman, whom he chose as his model, would probably have pushed his advantages further. The hopes and pride of Turkey now began to revive; but in 1697, Prince Eugene took the command of the Imperialist armies in Hungary; and the Crescent soon went down before him. Sultan Mustapha collected his army for this fatal campaign at Sofia, and marched thence to Belgrade, where he halted and held repeated councils of war. Some enterprises of minor importance,

the sending forward a detachment to reinforce the garrison of Temesvar, and the occupation of several posts along the Danube were successfully attempted: but there was discord among the Ottoman officers, and there was oscillation in the Sultan's will as to the main line of operations that ought to be followed. The Grand Vizier, Elwas Mohammed, was unpopular with the other Pachas, who leagued together to oppose his projects, and thwart his tactics. The Vizier himself was depressed by a dream, which he saddened his equally credulous comrades also by narrating. He dreamed that the late Grand Vizier, Kiuprili-Zadé Mustapha, the martyr of Salankeman, had entered his tent and given him a cup of sherbet, which the Apparition had first tasted. "God knows," cried the Grand Vizier when he told his dream, "that this was the cup of martyrdom, which I, too am destined to drink in this campaign." He wished to keep the army on the right bank of the Danube, and crossing the Saave to march upon Peterwaradin, and attempt the recovery of that important fortress. The other officers proposed to cross the Danube and the Theiss, and to endeavour to surprise Eugene's army, which was camped on the banks of the Bacska. After much angry discussion this last project was adopted. The army crossed the Danube and the Theiss: but it was found that all hope of surprising Eugene was idle, and the Austrians and Turks both endeavoured to gain the fort of Zitel, which is situate at the junction of the Theiss with the Danube. The Ottomans obtained some advantage over a detachment of Eugene's army, and sacked Zitel. They then reverted to the scheme of

besieging Peterwaradin, and marched to Valova; where they began to construct bridges to enable them to pass to the right bank of the Danube and attack Peterwaradin; the old bridges having been occupied or destroyed by the Austrians. Finding that Eugene had secured Peterwaradin against attack, they held another council of war, and resolved to march northwards up the right or eastern bank of the Theiss and attack Szegedin. The activity of Eugene disconcerted this project also. He threw a strong division into Szegedin; and with the rest of his army followed the Turks, watching for a favourable opportunity of attacking them. This was soon obtained. The Austrian hussars captured one of the Pachas, named Djafer; who, finding his life threatened, confessed to the Austrians that the Sultan had given up his project of attacking Szegedin, and now designed to cross the Theiss near Zenta, with the intention of marching upon Upper Hungary and Transylvania. Eugene instantly moved with all possible speed towards Zenta, in the hopes of assailing the Ottoman army while in the act of passing the river. It was on the 11th of September, about two in the afternoon, that the Sultan saw his great enemy approach. The Turks had formed a temporary bridge across the river; and the Sultan, the cavalry, and the greater part of the artillery of his army, had passed over to the left or eastern bank; but the infantry was still on the western side. The Sultan and his officers had taken the precaution of forming a strong entrenchment to protect their rear during the passage of the bridge, and seventy guns had been kept

in position on the right bank for that purpose. Undaunted by these preparations, Eugene formed his columns, as they came up, into line for the attack; and although at this critical time a courier arrived from Vienna with peremptory orders to Eugene not to risk a battle, he determined to disobey his Emperor's orders, and continued his preparations for a decisive engagement.* If the Ottomans had anticipated him by a resolute advance against the Austrian centre, before Eugene's troops had all arrived, and before his artillery had been brought into position, it is probable that they would have crushed the Imperialists. But discord and disorder were rife in the Sultan's camp. The Grand Vizier summoned the Pachas and Spahis, most of whom had passed over to the eastern bank, back to the menaced side; but he did not move beyond his entrenchments, and the Sultan himself did not recross the river to share in and conduct the conflict. Only two hours of daylight were left when Eugene had completed his dispositions for action. He formed his army into a half-moon, so as to assail the whole semi-circle of the Turkish entrenchments, and he posted his cannons where they commanded the bridge. He then made a simultaneous attack on every part of the Turkish lines, which was everywhere successful. The Turks fought without concert or confidence; and a large body of Janissaries mutinied, and began to massacre their own officers in the very heat of the action. The Christians gave no quarter; more than 20,000 Turks were slain, including the Grand Vizier and a large number of

* Coxe's History of the House of Austria, Vol. ii., p. 456.

Pachas; and more than 10,000 were drowned in endeavouring to pass the river. The battle was lost and won before the close of the day; and in the words of Eugene in his dispatch to Vienna. "The sun seemed to linger on the horizon to gild with his last rays the victorious standards of Austria."

The Sultan, from the eastern bank of the Theiss witnessed the destruction of his host, and fled with the remnants of his cavalry in dismay to Temesvar. Thence he retired to Constantinople and never appeared again at the head of an army. In the extreme distress to which the defeat at Zenta had once more reduced the Ottoman empire, resort was again had to the House of Kiuprili, and again that illustrious family supplied a minister who could prop, if he could not restore, the falling State.

Housein Kiuprili had in the time of the vizierate of Ahmed Kiuprili, received the name of Amoud-schah-zadé, which means "Son of the Uncle." He was so called because he was the son of Hassan, who was the younger brother of Mohammed Kiuprili, and the uncle of Ahmed Kiuprili. Amoud-schah-zadé Housein Kiuprili had in early life been an idle voluptuary; but the disasters which befell Turkey after the expedition against Vienna roused him to a sense of what he owed to the honour of his House and to his country. He filled many important offices with zeal and ability; and when raised to the Grand Vizierate in 1697, he gave proofs of his possesing in ample degree that genius for finance and for administrative reform, which was the eminent characteristic of his family. Every possible effort was

made by him to collect the means of opposing further resistance to the enemies of the empire. A tax was laid upon coffee: a contribution in the nature of an income tax was required from all the principal officers of the state: and Housein Kiuprili even ventured to appropriate to the urgent necessities of the country a large sum from the revenues of the religious foundations. He succeeded in collecting and equipping an army of 50,000 foot and 48,000 horse, for the defence of the European provinces. A Turkish fleet was sent into the Black Sea, and another into the Mediterranean.* But while the Vizier thus prepared war, it was with the wish for peace. He knew too well the exhaustion of the empire, and felt the impossibility of preventing further disasters if hostilities were continued. It was not only in the Danubian provinces that the war went hard with Turkey. The Venetians were making further progress in Dalmatia; and in Greece they were advancing beyond the isthmus of Corinth; though Negropont had been bravely and successfully defended against them, and seasonable relief had been obtained for the Ottoman forces that were employed along the coasts and in the islands of the Archipelago, through the gallantry of the Turkish Admiral Mezzomorto, who gained two victories over the Venetian fleets. Poland was an inactive antagonist; but Russia had become a truly formidable enemy. Peter the Great was now sovereign of that vast empire; and

* Von Hammer cites, in a note to his 60th book, an official list, which a Turkish writer gives of the Ottoman forces on land and sea, as augmented by Housein Kiuprili. It specifies the number of troops supplied by each province, and their character.

was teaching the lately rude and barbarous Muscovy to know her own gigantic strength, and also to use it like a giant. He had already drawn around him skilful officers and engineers from Western Europe ; and he had formed a body of troops on the models of the Imperialist and French armies. But ships, harbours, and maritime power were the dearest objects of his heart ; and one of the earliest marks of his ambition (never lost sight of by himself or any of his successors) was to obtain the mastery of the Black Sea. With this view he prosecuted the war against Turkey with a vigour and skill very different to the conduct of Galitzin and other former Russian commanders. Peter resolved first to conquer the strong city of Azof, which, as has been mentioned, had been fortified by the Turks with peculiar care, and was justly regarded as a position of the greatest importance. He led an army of 60,000 men (including his new-modelled regiments) against Azof, in 1695. He also formed a large flotilla of vessels, drawing but little water, which co-operated with his army in the siege. His first attempt was unsuccessful ; and he sustained a repulse, which was severe enough to discourage a spirit of ordinary firmness. The Russians were driven back from Azof, in 1695, with a loss of 30,000 men. But in the following spring the Czar renewed the siege with fresh forces. His flotilla defeated a squadron of light Turkish vessels, that attempted to relieve the city ; and he kept in check the Ottoman Pachas, who advanced from the Crimea with troops along the coast as far as the village of Akkoumin. Azof surrendered to the Czar on the

28th of July, 1696; and he immediately began to improve the fortifications and harbour, and to fit out vessels of war, on a scale, which showed for what important ulterior projects the possession of Azof had been sought by Russia.

Thus menaced from many quarters, the Ottoman court listened willingly to the English ambassador, Lord Paget, who urged on the Turkish statesmen the necessity of peace, and offered the mediation of England to obtain it. Similar proposals had been made by the representatives of Holland and England at earlier periods of the war, and negociations had once been opened at Vienna, but no salutary result had followed. But now both Turkey and her chief antagonist Austria were sincerely desirous of peace. The Emperor Leopold had indeed seen his armies obtain triumphs, which might have filled many monarchs with ambitious visions of ampler conquests, and might have led to a march upon Constantinople, as the fit retribution for the repeated siege of Vienna. But Leopold was of a wiser or a colder spirit. He was anxious for sure and peaceful possession of the valuable provinces that had already been re-conquered from the Turks in the war; and, though Austria had been generally victorious, she had suffered severely in men and in treasure. Above all, the prospect that the succession to the Spanish throne would soon become vacant, made the German emperor anxious to terminate hostilities in Eastern Europe, and prepare for the great struggle in the West, which was already foreseen as inevitable.

Lord Paget proposed to the Porte that England should intervene to effect a pacification on the footing of the "Uti Possidetis;" that is to say, on the principle that each of the contending parties should keep what it possessed at the time of commencing negociations. Sultan Mustapha could ill brook the cession of such broad and fair territories, as a treaty, framed on this rule, would assign to his adversaries; and he endeavoured to introduce some important modifications. He placed before Lord Paget a counter-project, written in his own hand (an unprecedented act for a Turkish Sultan), and which was accompanied by a letter from the Grand Vizier to the King of England. The mediation of England was requested, in order that a peace might be concluded generally on the foundation of the "Uti Possidetis," but with stipulations that the Austrians should abandon Transylvania, that the city of Peterwaradin should be razed, that the Austrians should evacuate all the fortified places on the Turkish side of the River Unna, and, with other exceptions of a similar nature. Lord Paget's secretary was sent by him with the Grand Vizier's letter to Vienna; and the Austrian government was informed of the readiness of England to mediate between the belligerents. In reply to this, a communication was made to the Porte that the Emperor Leopold was willing to treat for peace, but on condition that each party was to keep all that it then possessed, and on condition also that Russia was comprised in the treaty. Venice and Poland were added; and Holland co-operated with England as a mediating power. The Czar Peter, though not

desirous of continuing the war, single-handed, against Turkey, was disinclined for peace, and dissatisfied with the proposed principle for negociation. He passed through Vienna in 1698; and, while in that capital, he had an interview with the Emperor Leopold on the subject of the treaty with the Ottoman. Peter questioned the Austrian sovereign about the causes of his desire for peace with Turkey. Leopold replied that he had not sought for peace, but that England had, in the first instance, offered her mediation; and that each of the allied Christian sovereigns was to keep the conquests which he had made. But the Russian was anxious, not only to secure Azof, but to obtain the important city of Kertch in the Crimea; and he insisted that the cession of this place should be made a term of the treaty, and that in the event of Turkey declining to give it up, Russia and Austria should form a fresh league against her. He was answered by a promise to endeavour to obtain Kertch for him; but he was told that it was not fit to renew an offensive alliance on the eve of assembling a congress for pacification. In another conversation, which Peter had with the Austrian minister, Count Kinsky, he asked what power it was that insisted on a peace. The Austrian replied, "Our Holy Roman Empire insists on it; Spain insists on it; it is required by England and Holland; and, in a word, by all Christendom." "Beware!" replied the Czar, "how you trust to what the Dutch and the English say. They are looking only to the benefit of their commerce; they care nothing about the interests of their allies." The Polish sovereign also objected to

recognise the Uti Possidetis principle. He complained that a treaty on this footing would leave the Ottomans in possession of Kamienec, which was the key to Poland. At length, after many difficulties and delays, the five belligerent, and the two mediating powers sent their plenipotentiaries to the place appointed for that congress, which was the town of Carlowitz, on the right bank of the Danube, a little below Peterwaradin (24th October, 1698).

The German historian, Von Hammer, says truly of the Peace of Carlowitz,* that it is one of those treaties which ought to be considered with particular care, even as there are certain battles which demand and receive the special attention of the historical student. The treaty of Carlowitz is memorable, not only on account of the magnitude of the territorial change which it ratified; not only because it marks the period when men ceased to dread the Ottoman empire as an aggressive power; but, also, because it was then that the Porte and Russia took part, for the first time, in a general European Congress; and because, by admitting to that congress the representatives of England and Holland, neither of which states was a party to the war, both the Sultan and the Czar thus admitted the principle of intervention of the European powers, one with another, for the sake of the general good.

The negociations at Carlowitz were long; and the representatives of the mediating powers had, more than once, great difficulty in preventing an angry rupture. Besides disputes as to ceremonials and titles, the

* Vol. iii., p. 913.

congress was required to arrange many serious claims and objections, and each of the belligerents, except Austria and Venice, desired some deviations in its own favour from the general principle of "Uti Possidetis." The Russian envoy long and fiercely insisted on the cession of Kertch. The Ottomans wished Austria to give up Transylvania, or to pay an annual sum for retaining it. They also desired Venice to restore many of her conquests beyond the Morea, and that the Russians should evacuate Azof. The Poles asked for the restoration of Kamienec; and the Imperialists, though generally loyal to the fundamental principle of the congress, introduced new matters of dissension, by demanding that the custody of the Holy Sepulchre should be restored to the Franciscans, that the Jesuits should be confirmed in their possessions in the Isle of Chios, and that the Porte should grant certain privileges to the Trinitarians, a society instituted for the purpose of ransoming Christian captives from slavery. The Greek Mavrocordato, who was the principal diplomatist on behalf of the Sultan at the congress, replied to these claims of Austria, that the Sublime Porte knew nothing of Trinitarians, of Franciscans, or of Jesuits. It was, however, agreed, that certain articles should be drawn up, by which the Sultan promised to continue his protection to the Christians according to the ancient capitulations and Hatti-Scherifs. On another point the Ottomans were characteristically and honourably firm. Austria required that Count Tekeli, the Hungarian chief, who had taken shelter in Turkey, should be given up as a rebel to the Emperor. This

was refused; and nothing could be exacted, beyond a promise on the Sultan's part, that Tekeli and his partisans should be kept at such a distance from the frontier, as not to be able to foment disturbances in any part of the Emperor's dominions. Austria, on the other hand, consented that the confiscated dowry of Helen Zriny, Tekeli's wife, should be restored to her, and that she should be allowed to join her husband.*

At length, after many weeks of arguments, bickerings, threats and intrigues, the terms of pacification were arranged. Austria and Turkey concluded a treaty for twenty-five years; by which the Emperor was acknowledged sovereign of Transylvania, all Hungary north of the Marosch and west of the Theiss, and of Sclavonia, except a small part between the Danube and the Saave. With Venice and Poland treaties without limitation of time were effected. Poland recovered Podolia and Kamienec. Venice retained her conquests in Dalmatia and the Morea; but restored to the Turks those which she had made

* In a former negociation in 1689 between the Turkish and Imperialist envoys, under the mediation of the Dutch ambassador at Vienna (which proved abortive), the Austrians had peremptorily insisted on Tekeli being given up to them to be punished for his treasons. The Turkish envoy, Soulfikar, observed that he himself looked on Tekeli as an enemy to the Porte, and the author of the war. He said that Tekeli was no more than the Sultan's dog, and that it mattered little to the Padischah whether such a creature lived or died, but that he himself had not travelled so far on that embassy to become Tekeli's assassin. The Dutch ambassador observed on this, that the Turks could not make a serious matter about giving up Tekeli, now that they had themselves treated him as a mere dog. Soulfikar replied "Aye, Tekeli is indeed a dog; a dog, that lies down or rises, that barks or is quiet, according to the Sultan's bidding. But this dog is the dog of the Padischah of the Ottomans; and at a sign from him the dog may be metamorphosed into a terrible lion."

to the north of the Isthmus of Corinth. Russia refused to consent to anything more than an armistice for two years, which was afterwards enlarged into a peace for thirty years; as the Czar's attention was, in the commencement of the eighteenth century, principally directed to schemes of aggrandisement at the expense of Sweden. By this armistice the Russians kept possession of Azof, and of the districts which they had conquered to the north of the sea of that name.

It was on the 26th of January, 1699, that the pacification of Carlowitz was completed. It left the two feebler Christian powers, Venice and Poland, restored to temporary importance; the one by the acquisition of the Morea, the other by the recovery of Kamiencc. But it was in the altered state of the three greater belligerents, compared with what they had been in 1682, that men recognised the momentous effects of the seventeen years' war, which was terminated at Carlowitz. Russia had now stretched her arms southward, and grasped the coasts of the Mœotis and the Euxine. At the beginning of the war Austria trembled for the fate of her capital, and saw her very national existence seriously menaced: at the end of the conflict the empire of the House of Hapsburg was left not merely in security, but enlarged: not merely enlarged, but permanently strengthened and consolidated: while the House of Othman saw many of its fairest dominions rent away, and was indebted for the preservation of the remainder from conquest by the invading Christians, to the intervention of two other Christian states. From that time forth all serious dread of the military power

of Turkey has ceased in Europe. "Her importance has become diplomatic. Other nations have from time to time sought to use her as a political machine against Austria or the growing power of Russia; and this diplomatic importance of Turkey has grown proportionably greater as the sovereigns of Russia became desirous of possessing the Black Sea for the carrying out of their plans."* Another, and that a more general and enduring cause why the affairs of Turkey have continued to inspire interest and anxiety, has been the consideration of the formidable increase of aggressive power which must be acquired by the conquering state that makes the Ottoman territories integral portions of its own dominions. The empire, which, while possessed by the Turks, is effete for purposes of attack, might, under the lordship of others, supply the means for crushing the liberties of the world.

* See Schlosser's Introduction to the History of the 18th Century. I have modified some of his expressions.

CHAPTER V.

DEATH OF KIUPRILI HOUSEIN—ABDICATION OF MUSTAPHA II.—ACCESSION OF ACHMET III.—CHARLES XII. IN TURKEY—WAR WITH RUSSIA—SUCCESS OF THE TURKS AND TREATY OF THE PRUTH—WAR WITH VENICE—THE MOREA RECOVERED—WAR WITH AUSTRIA—DISASTERS OF THE TURKS—PEACE OF PASSAROWITZ—LEAGUE WITH RUSSIA AGAINST PERSIA—DEPOSITION OF ACHMET III.—THE HOSPODARS—THE FANARIOTS.*

THE Grand Vizier Kiuprili Housein availed himself of the return of peace to check the disorders which had arisen in many parts of the empire, especially in Egypt and the Crimea, during the last calamitous years of the war. He also endeavoured to effect a general reform in the administrative departments of the army and navy, in the finances, in the public schools and colleges, in the laws respecting religious and charitable foundations, and in the treatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte. It was particularly in this last respect,—in his humane and wise mitigation of the burdens of the Rayas, that Amoud-schah-zadé Housein showed himself a worthy successor of his relative Kiuprili the Virtuous. Unhappily for the empire, the influence of Kiuprili

* See Von Hammer, Books 61—65.

Housein was thwarted by that of other favourites of Sultan Mustapha; and the fourth great minister of the House of Kiuprili retired from office, worn out in body and in mind, within three years after the peace of Carlowitz. Kiuprili the Wise, as Kiuprili Housein was justly surnamed, died in the autumn of 1702. The Sultan did not retain the throne long after the loss of his able minister. Mustapha the Second appears to have been spirit-broken by the disastrous close of his military career; and the latter part of his reign shows no trace of the vigour, or of the conscientious zeal in the discharge of duty, which signalised him in the commencement of his sovereignty. The once resolute leader of his own armies sank into an effeminate sensualist, who forgot the boasted example of Solyman the Lawgiver, and appeared rather to follow that of Ibrahim. The general discontent of the nation produced the usual result. An insurrection broke out in Constantinople, in 1703, which raged for several weeks; until Mustapha, who showed no spark of his former courage, abdicated in favour of his brother Achmet III., who became Sultan at thirty years of age.

The position, which the successes of Russia in the late war had given her on the shores of the sea of Azof and the Euxine, continued to fill the Ottoman councils with anxiety. Although the armistice, which alone the Russians would agree to at Carlowitz, was not broken, there were six months of earnest and often angry negociations between the Czar and the Porte in 1700, before the final terms of peace between them were arranged. Eventually a treaty was signed, which

purported to assure amity between Russia and Turkey for thirty years. By the second article of that treaty, the fortifications of four of the places conquered by the Russians, Toghan, Ghazi-kerman, Schahim-kerman, and Nassret-kerman were to be demolished. The fifth article directed that in order to form a border land for the two empires, there should be a desert-space for twelve leagues between Perekop* and Azof. By the sixth article the Tartars and the Russians were to have equal rights of fishery, hunting, taking hives, cutting wood, and collecting salt in the district between Perekop and the fortress of Meyusch. The seventh assigned to the Russians, as appurtenant to the city of Azof, which they possessed, a territory of seven leagues in the direction of the river Kuban; and ordained that the Nogai Tartars and Circassians should give the Russians and Cossacks no annoyance in that domain. The eighth required that the Tartars of the Crimea should make no more incursions into the Russian territories. The ninth related to the exchange of prisoners; the tenth to the freedom of commerce; the twelfth stipulated protection for pilgrims to Jerusalem; the thirteenth concerned the privileges of agents and interpreters; and the fourteenth directed that each party should within two months send an embassy to ratify the articles.

A little time after the conclusion of the treaty with Russia, the Sublime Porte gave a public proof of how highly it valued the friendship of England, and of its sense of the gratitude due from Turkey to this country

* Called "Or" in the treaty.

for the mediation which terminated the late war. When Lord Paget was succeeded as ambassador at Constantinople by Sir Robert Sutton, the Sultan personally addressed the English envoy at his audience of reception, in these words. "The English are old and good friends to us; and we shall show, when there is an opportunity, that we are the same to them. Especially do we desire to prove to your king our remembrance of his friendly intervention at Carlowitz, and our confidence in his kindly feeling towards us."

This high esteem for the friendship of England was probably due in part to the troubled state of the Turkish relations with Russia, which did not cease when the treaty of 1700 was formally ratified. About the same time that the new English ambassador reached Constantinople, there was imminent risk of a collision between the Turkish and Russian forces north of the Euxine. The Crimean Khan, and other Moslem dignitaries wished for a renewal of the war; and sent exaggerated representations to Constantinople, respecting the naval preparations of the Russians in the sea of Azof, and the strength of the new fortresses, which it was alleged they were building. These reports were contradicted by the Russian ambassador; and the Crimean Khan was deposed by the Sultan for his false intelligence. But the Turks laboured hard to strengthen the defences of their empire against Russia. In order to confine the Czar's fleet to the sea of Azof, they built a strong fortress at the eastern extremity of the Crimea, with which to command the northern entrance of the straits of Kertch. This fortress was

called Yeni-Kale. It was finished in 1703; and its batteries were arranged on a level with the water, so that the bullets could sweep away any vessel that attempted to force the passage. On the other hand the Russians continued to strengthen Azof; and they built a new fortress at Taighan, since known as Taganrok. They also repaired the old works of Kamienska on the banks of the Dnieper.

One of the first acts of Sultan Achmet III., on his accession to the Turkish throne, was to write a letter to Peter in which he complained of the menacing preparations in the Czar's southern provinces, and declared that he could place no reliance on the Russian protestations of friendship. But Achmet was not of a warlike disposition; and the intestine commotions, by which his realm was troubled in the beginning of his reign, made him anxious to avoid hostilities with his powerful neighbour. Russia also was too much occupied at this time by her contest with Sweden, to make her desire a new war with Turkey; and another temporary settlement of the disputes between the two empires was effected in 1705. Still the Porte watched every movement of the Czar with jealous care. A fleet of Turkish gallies was sent every year to cruise in the Black Sea, and observe the new fortifications which the Russians formed on its coast. Kertch and Yenikale were strongly garrisoned with regular Ottoman troops, and a Turkish castle was built near Taman, on the Asiatic side of the straits of Kertch.

The gallant conflict, which Charles XII. maintained with Russia, was the object of the admiring attention

of all Europe during the first decade of the 18th century; and by none was the romantic career of that heroic king watched more earnestly than by the Ottomans, who felt deeply the value of the Swedish arms in averting from Turkey the ambitious attacks of the Muscovite sovereign. The Czar Peter was called by the Ottoman historians "White Moustache," while they speak of king Charles by the appropriate title of "Iron Head." It is known from these writers that the Turkish governor of Oczakow sent an envoy to Charles' camp at Thorn, to negociate an alliance against Russia. And, when the Swedish king was in the Ukraine, he received assurances from the same quarter, that the Khan of the Crimea should lead an army of Tartars to his aid. But these communications were without the sanction of Sultan Achmet; and when Charles after his disastrous overthrow at Pultowa * (8th July, 1709), took refuge in Turkey, he was received with dignified hospitality; but Achmet showed no desire to break the peace with Russia for the purpose of restoring the King of Sweden to power. But the Porte returned a noble refusal to the demands of the triumphant Czar, when he required that Charles should not be permitted to remain in the Ottoman dominions, and sought by every possible threat and promise to obtain the extradition of the Hetman Mazeppa, who had accompanied Charles into Turkey, and whom the Russians claimed for punishment as a traitor to their sovereign.

Charles XII. at first took shelter at Oczakow, but soon removed to Bender, where the Porte assembled a

* See Chapter XII. of the "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World."

small army for his protection. The necessity of such a precaution had been shown by an attack which the Russians made on a small body of Swedes, who were assembled in Moldavia. The Czar's forces suddenly crossed the frontier; surprised the Swedes near Czarnowicz, and carried nearly all of them away into Russia as prisoners. This violation of the Ottoman territory caused the greatest indignation at Constantinople; and it was with extreme difficulty that the Russian ambassador Tolskoi, prevented an immediate declaration of war. The Grand Vizier, Tschuli Ali, was in favour of maintaining peace with the Czar, and opposed vehemently the demands of Charles, who wished the Sultan to furnish him with 30,000 Spahis and 20,000 Janissaries to escort him across Poland towards his own dominions. To have sent such an army as this with Charles, would have necessarily involved the Porte in hostilities with both Poland and Russia; and Tschuli Ali bade the Divan remember the sufferings of Turkey in the last war, as decisive arguments against such a measure. On the other hand, the Sultana Validé, who admired the chivalrous courage of Charles, pleaded his cause warmly with the Sultan, and asked often of her son, "When would he aid her lion against the bear?" At the end of 1709, the pacific party in the Divan prevailed; and the treaty which had been signed between Russia and Turkey in the reign of Mustapha II., was renewed, but with an additional article, which stipulated that the King of Sweden should be at liberty to return to his states by such road as he should judge fitting. The Sultan

sent a letter to the King, informing him that by virtue of this clause he could return to his kingdom in full security; and the letter was accompanied by 10,000 ducats for the expense of the journey, and by presents of horses from the Sultan and the Vizier. Charles accepted the Sultan's gifts; but made no preparation for leaving Turkey; and the Sultan, irritated at the failure of the Vizier's plans for relieving him of the burden of Charles' presence in the empire, deprived Tschuli Ali of the seals of office, and made Nououman Kiuprili Grand Vizier, in June, 1710.

Nououman Kiuprili was the son of Kiuprili the Virtuous, the Grand Vizier who fell in battle at Salankaman. The accession to power of a fifth Grand Vizier of this illustrious family was hailed with joy by all the inhabitants of the Ottoman empire; and Nououman began his ministry amid the highest expectations of all ranks of his countrymen. These expectations were not fulfilled. Nououman Kiuprili showed the same toleration, the same wisdom and justice, which had marked his father in his treatment both of Rayas and Moslems. But he was one of those statesmen, who, partly out of vanity, partly out of nervousness, take upon themselves the personal discharge of more duties than they are equal to; and who give disgust and annoyance to their colleagues and subordinate officials, by needlessly and unseasonably interfering with the petty details of departmental business. Hence there speedily arose confusion and discord in the government, of which he was the chief: and the disappointment, which men felt at the failure of their exaggerated hopes and

predictions respecting him, brought on the last Kiuprili, by a natural reaction, an equally excessive amount of unpopularity. He was dismissed from the Grand Vizierate within fourteen months from the time when he had received that high office, and retired to his former subordinate, but honourable station of governor of the important island of Eubœa.

One measure of foreign policy, that marked Nououman Kiuprili's brief administration, was singularly unfortunate with regard to the effect which its author wished it to produce. Nououman Kiuprili was as desirous of maintaining peace as his predecessors in office had been; and he endeavoured earnestly, but in vain, to persuade the King of Sweden to retire quietly from the Sultan's dominions. But he thought that it would be politic at the same time to create a general impression that the resources and warlike spirit of the Turkish empire were undiminished; and he accordingly issued orders for the assembling a large army, and caused a resolution of the Divan to be circulated, that the Sublime Porte intended to conduct the Swedish king back to his own country with a host equal to that which Kara Mustafa had led against Vienna. The effect of this boast, and of the military display with which it was accompanied, was to excite to an irrepressible ardour the warlike spirit of the Ottoman troops, who were generally zealous in behalf of the King of Sweden against Russia, and who were also eager for an opportunity of effacing the dishonours of the last war.

The numerous aggressions of the Russians on the

Turkish territory caused frequent petitions for protection and redress to be sent to the Sultan by the inhabitants of his frontier provinces; and the agents of Charles XII. at the Turkish Court used all possible means to make these and similar inducements to war produce their full effect upon Sultan Achmet. The Khan of the Crimea, Dewlet Ghirai, was as anxious as the Swedish king for immediate hostilities between Turkey and Russia. No part of the Ottoman dominions was so seriously menaced by the ambitious preparations of the Czar, as the Crimean peninsula and the adjacent districts, which Dewlet Ghirai ruled as vassal to the Sublime Porte. The Russians had built fortified posts near Kamienska, at a short distance from Perekop; they had also erected a castle at Samandjik, at the point of the confluence of the Samara and the Dnieper. Another fortress had been built by them at Taighan; and the care with which Azof and the new port of Taganrok were fortified, and the strength of the flotilla which the Czar had formed there, were also causes of alarm to the Khan, which he succeeded in communicating to the Sultan. Poniatowski, Charles's chief agent in the Turkish court, pointed out these preparations of the Czar, as proofs that his design was, now that he was master of Azof and the coasts of Mœotis, to assail and conquer the Crimea, whence the victorious Russians would soon attack Constantinople.* Besides these causes of complaint against Russia, the partisans of Charles in the Divan referred to the growing ascendancy

* Levesque, Histoire de Russie. Vol. iv., p. 393.

of that power in Poland, where the troops of the Czar had now seized and garrisoned the important fortress of Kamienec. Other causes why Turkey should suspect Russia were also mentioned; such as the Czar's subjugation of the Cossacks Potkal and Bersbasch, and the Russian occupation of Stanileschti, a fortress over against Jassy. Moved by these representations of the anti-Russian party, the Sultan summoned the Crimean Khan to Constantinople, and in a solemn audience, which Achmet gave him, Dewlet Ghirai urged with vehemence the necessity of an immediate rupture with Russia. He warned the Porte that the Czar's agents were secretly intriguing with the Rayas of the empire; and that, if time were allowed for the completion of their machinations, the Russians would by these means win all the European dominions of the Porte. His reasonings finally prevailed with Sultan Achmet. The Khan was dismissed with rich presents of honour; and the Mufti was consulted as to the lawfulness of war with Russia, and returned a Fetva, which pronounced the war to be not only justifiable but necessary. Orders were issued to enrol 30,000 Janissaries, and large numbers of other troops; and a circular was sent to all the governors of the coasts, enjoining them to prepare and place at the disposition of the Capitan Pacha (whose fleet was ready for sea) a certain number of vessels, drawing but little water, and therefore fit for operations in the Sea of Azof. According to a barbarous usage which the Ottomans have only lately discontinued, the declaration of war with Russia (November 28, 1710),

was marked by the imprisonment of the Russian ambassador Tolskoi, in the Castle of the Seven Towers.*

It is probable that the Russian sovereign would willingly have deferred hostilities with Turkey. It was not till near the close of the year 1710, that Peter completed his conquest of Livonia and was at liberty to draw troops from the scene of his operations against the Swedes, and against the party among the Poles that was opposed to him, towards the Ottoman frontier. Had the war been delayed for another year, it is probable that the Russians would have entered upon the contest with much greater advantages than they possessed in 1711. But finding it impossible by negotiations to induce the Sultan to desist from his preparations for an immediate conflict, the Czar, on the 25th of February, 1711, directed war against the Turks to be solemnly proclaimed in the principal church of Moscow. In order to rouse the fanaticism, and increase the zeal of the Russian soldiery, (and probably also with a view of inducing the Christian populations of Turkey to join him,) Peter endeavoured to give the war all the appearances of a war of religion. Instead of the usual ensigns of the Russian troops they bore red standards, which on one side were inscribed with these words, "In the

* The state-answer of the ancient Sultans, when requested to receive an embassy, was "The Sublime Porte is open to all." This, according to the Turkish interpretation, implied a safe conduct in coming, but gave no guarantee about departing. "Vestigia nulla retrorsum." Levesque in his History of Russia, (vol. iv., p. 394), fairly remarks on this Turkish custom of imprisoning ambassadors when a war broke out: "On leur a justement reproché cet usage barbare. Mais Charles XII. retenait encore et laissa mourir dans la captivité le prince Khilkof, ambassadeur de Russie; et aucun historien ne lui a reproché cet attentat contre le droit des gens."

name of God, and for the cause of Christianity;" and on the other side was a Cross, and the well-known inscription of the Labarum of the former Greek Emperors of Constantinople, Ἐν τούτῳ νίκα.

The rapid development of the vast power of Græco-Christian and Slavonic Russia, and the approaching conflict between her and the House of Othman, excited in the highest degree the Greek and Slavonic nations, that were subject to the Turkish yoke. They looked upon the Czar as their coming liberator, and their enthusiasm was augmented by a rumour that an ancient prophecy had been discovered in the tomb of Constantine, which pointed to the Russias as the nation destined to chace the Turks from Constantinople.* Even the small and remote tribes of the Montenegrins sent messengers to Peter, offering to attack their Turkish rulers, and make a diversion in his favour. The Czar thanked them by a letter and by presents: but the primary aim of his negotiations with the Christian subjects of the Sultan, was to secure the co-operation of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. It was into these principalities that he designed first to lead his army; and he wished to make them a secure basis for his further operations in invading Turkey. Brancovan,

* Levesque, Histoire de Russie, vol. iv., p. 400. This rumour has often been revived, especially in the time of the victories of the Empress Catherine II. See the remarks of Gibbon as to its antiquity, vol. vi., p. 88, (Dr. Smith's edition) and notes. Human nature is the same in all ages, and the words of Thucydides respecting the currency of prophecies at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, are singularly applicable to the state of things at the beginning of any war between Russia and Turkey. Ἑλλὰς πᾶσα μετέωρος ἦν ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων· καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγετο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγοι ἤδον ἐν τε ταῖς μέλλουσι πολεμήσειν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. Lib. ii., sec. 8.

the Hospodar of Wallachia, had for a long time established an intelligence with Russia, which the Porte at last suspected, and directed Prince Cantemir, the Hospodar of Moldavia, to attack him and deprive him of his government. But Cantemir himself determined to aid the Russians, and obtained such favour with the Czar as raised the jealousy of Brancovan, who, by a double treachery, began to intrigue with the Turks, for the purpose of misleading Peter and bringing him and his army into a position, where the Turks could assail them with advantage.

The new Grand Vizier, Baltadji Mehemet Pacha, (who had originally been a wood-cutter in the Serail,) began his march from the neighbourhood of Constantinople towards the Moldavian frontier, in May 1711, at the head of a large and admirably equipped army. The Czar collected his forces in the south of Poland, and in June advanced into Moldavia. His troops suffered severely on their line of march; and great numbers perished by privations and disease before they reached Jassy, and before any actual hostilities had commenced. Peter halted at Jassy for a short time, and endeavoured to gain stores of provisions in that city; but the supplies which Cantemir obtained for him were but scanty; and the Wallachian Hospodar, Brancovan, was now acting in the interest of the Turks. In this emergency the Czar was advised to march southward towards some extensive magazines of provisions, which the Turks were said to have collected near the lower part of the river Sereth, and which he was assured that he might seize without difficulty. At

the same time he was misled by false reports that the Vizier's army had not yet passed the Danube. The Czar accordingly marched the main body of his army down the right (or western) bank of the river Pruth, which runs nearly southward from the vicinity of Jassy to the Danube, falling into that river near Galatz, a little below the confluence of the Sereth. But while the Russians were at Jassy, the Grand Vizier had crossed the Danube at Isakdji, below the junction of the Pruth, and had been joined in Bessarabia by the Khan of the Crimea, at the head of a large force of Tartar cavalry. The Ottoman commanders were informed of the march of the Czar down the western bank of the Pruth, and they forthwith led their combined troops to the eastern bank of the river, that they might cross it and attack the Russians in Moldavia. The Russian General Scheremitoff was posted with a detachment from the Czar's army near the part of the river which the Turks and Tartars approached. He endeavoured to prevent them from passing; but ten thousand Tartar horsemen swam the river, and four bridges were thrown over by night, which enabled the Vizier to place an overwhelming force on the western or Moldavian side. Scheremitoff fell back and rejoined the main Russian army near Faltasch. The intelligence which he brought was in the highest degree alarming to the Czar: whose force, weakened by disease and famine, was far inferior to that of the Ottomans, and was at this time still farther reduced, in consequence of two large detachments, under Generals Renne and Jonas, having been sent into the interior districts of Moldavia

and Wallachia. The Czar retreated a little distance up the right bank of the river in the vicinity of the village of Kousch, and he then entrenched himself in a seemingly strong position between the Pruth and a marsh, in imitation of the tactics of Sobieski at Zurawna. But the low ground, on which the Russians were encamped, was commanded by hills at a little distance, which the superior number of the Vizier's army enabled him to occupy. The Russians were thus completely blockaded in their camp: they were almost destitute of provisions, and suffered severely from thirst, as the Turks had planted batteries on the left bank of the Pruth, which swept the river and made it almost certain death for the Russians to approach the water. The Vizier prudently abstained from attacking them; and all the efforts which the Russians made in two days of severe fighting to force the Turkish lines were completely repulsed. In this emergency the Czar and his men must either have perished with famine and thirst, or have surrendered at discretion, if it had not been for the dexterity of Catherine, the Czar's wife, who had accompanied Peter in this expedition, and was truly the saving angel of Russia. Catherine collected her own jewels and trinkets, and all the gold that was in the possession of the chief Russian officers in the camp. She sent these by the Chancellor Schaffiroff, to the quarters of the Turkish Vizier; and together with the presents of Catherine, the Chancellor carried a letter written by the General Scheremitoff, in the name of the Czar, asking for peace. The Kiaya of the Grand Vizier had great influence with Mehemet Baltadji,

and to him Catherine's envoy. addressed himself. The Kiaya received the presents, and advised the Vizier to be favourable to the Russian petitioners. Mehemet Baltadji assented; and negotiations for a treaty were accordingly commenced. The agent of the King of Sweden, Count Poniatowski, who was in the Vizier's camp, protested against any terms being granted to the Russians; and the Khan of the Crimea joined warmly in Poniatowski's remonstrance. But the Grand Vizier paid no regard to their opposition; and his secretary, Omar Effendi, drew up the celebrated treaty which liberated the Czar and his army from their extreme peril on the 21st July, 1711.

The treaty * commenced with a recital that "By the grace of God, the victorious Mussulman army had closely hemmed in the Czar of Muscovy with all his troops in the neighbourhood of the River Pruth, and that the Czar had asked for peace, and that it was at his request that the following articles were drawn up and granted:—

By the first article the Czar was to surrender the fortress of Azof and its territories, and dependencies, in the same condition as they were in when the Czar took possession of them.

By the second article the Czar consented that his new city of Taganrok, in the sea of Azof, his fortifications at Kamienski, and his new castle on the river

* See Appendix A. for a copy of this treaty, and also for a copy of the garbled version of it, which the Russian Court circulated in Europe.

Taman should be destroyed, and that they should never be rebuilt. The cannons and all the military stores of the Czar at Kamienski were to be given up to the Sublime Porte.

The third article stipulated that the Czar should no longer interfere in the affairs of the Poles, or of the Cossacks, who were dependent either on the Poles or on the Khan of the Crimea: and all the Russian forces in their territories were to be withdrawn.

The fourth provided for freedom of commerce; but directed that in future, no Russian ambassador should reside at Constantinople. It is probable that the Russian intrigues with the Greeks and other Rayas may have caused this stipulation.

The fifth article required that the Russians should set at liberty all the Moslems whom they had taken prisoners, or made slaves of, either before or during the war.

The sixth declared that, inasmuch as the King of Sweden had placed himself beneath the wings of the mighty protection of the Sublime Porte, he should have a free and safe passage to his own kingdom without any hindrance from the Muscovites: and it was recommended that Russia and Sweden should make peace with each other, if they could come to an understanding.

The seventh ordained that in future the Porte should do no harm to the Muscovites, and that they should do none to the subjects and dependents of the Sublime Porte.

The treaty concluded with a declaration of the Grand

Vizier, that the royal and infinite goodness of his thrice powerful and gracious Lord and Padischah was intreated to ratify those articles, and to overlook the previous evil conduct of the Czar. It averred that the Vizier made the peace by virtue of full powers vested in him. It directed that hostages should be given by the Czar for the fulfilment of the articles, and that the army of the Czar might then return forthwith by the nearest road to their own country, without being molested by the victorious forces, by the Tartars, or by any other persons whatever. The Chancellor Baron Schaffiroff, and General Scheremitoff, were given up to the Ottomans, as hostages; and then the Czar and his surviving troops, glad at this escape from destruction, but shame and sorrow-stricken at their losses and humiliations,* marched back from the fatal banks of the Pruth to the Russian territories.

It has been said by an able investigator of Turkish history and institutions,† that "The genius of the Ottoman Empire slumbered when the treaty of the Pruth was signed:" and it might be interesting to speculate on the probable complexion that would have been given to the subsequent history of the world if Baltadji Mehemet had availed himself to the utmost of the advantages which the Turkish arms possessed when the Russians supplicated for peace; if the Czar

* Ἀκαχήμενοι ἦτορ,
Ἄσμενοι ἐκ θανάτοιο, φίλους ὀλέσαντες ἑταίρους.
Odyss. ix. 408.

Compare the magnificent description in Livy ix. 6, of the return of the Roman legions from Caudium.

† Thornton.

and his troops had then perished, and Charles had been sent with strong supplies back to Sweden, to seek his revenge for Pultowa. Many of the reforms which Russia owes to Peter the Great, were scarcely commenced in 1711. None were mature. It is quite possible, that by his death or captivity at that period, Russia might have been remanded into barbarism; and also that Sweden might have recovered and retained the international rank which Gustavus Adolphus formerly gave her, that of a first-class European power, and the dominant state of the north.

With regard to the personal conduct of the chief actors in the campaign and pacification of the Pruth, the Czar more than compensated for any want of generalship which he may have shown, by the magnanimity which he displayed as a patriot and a sovereign, when encompassed by his enemies, and reduced to the apparent extremity of adverse fortune. His body was at this time prostrated by an attack of a fearful malady, to which he was subject, but his spirit was unshaken; and a letter, written by him from his tent at the Pruth to the Russian Senate at Moscow on the evening before Catherine made her happy attempt at negotiation, "ensures to Peter a place among the heroes of antiquity, for he thereby sacrifices himself and his family for the well-being of the Empire."* Fortunately for the fame of the great Czar, the bearer of that letter passed the Turkish lines in safety, and conveyed it to the Russian Senate, while the pacification was yet unknown. That document is preserved in the Imperial

* Schlosser.

palace at St. Petersburg ; nor is there the least reason to question its authenticity, or to doubt that it represents the genuine feeling of Peter on the occasion when it was written. It is as follows :—"I announce to you, that deceived by false intelligence, and without blame on my part, I find myself here shut up in my camp by a Turkish army four times stronger than mine. Our supplies are cut off ; and we momentarily expect to be destroyed or taken prisoners, unless Heaven come to our aid in some unexpected manner. Should it happen to me to be taken captive by the Turks, you will no longer consider me your Czar and Sovereign, nor will you pay attention to any order that may be brought to you from me ; not even if you recognise my own handwriting : but you will wait for my coming in person. If I am to perish here, and you receive well confirmed intelligence of my death, you will then proceed to choose as my successor him who is the most worthy among you."* Codrus or Leonidas could not have surpassed the unselfish heroism that was shown here. Francis I. and Charles XII. were far beneath it.

The debt of Russia to Catherine, who united all woman's wit to all man's firmness at the Pruth, was worthily acknowledged by Russia's sovereign in 1724, when Peter caused her to be solemnly crowned as Empress, and proclaimed to his subjects and the world, how Catherine had aided him at the battle of the River Pruth against the Turks, where our [the Russian] "army was reduced to 22,000 men, and that of the Turks consisted of 270,000. It was in this desperate

* Levesque, Histoire de Russie, vol. iv. p. 410, n.

exigency that she especially signalised her zeal with courage superior to her sex, and to this all the army and the whole empire can bear witness." Historians of all nations have vied with each other in repeating these praises of the heroine of the Pruth; but with respect to the third chief actor in that memorable scene, the Turkish commander, a far different tone has prevailed both among his contemporaries, and among those who in subsequent times have discussed that crisis in the affairs of the Muscovite and the Ottoman nations. The current charge against the Vizier is that he was bribed by the gifts of Catherine, and consented to the escape of the deadly enemies of his country. It has been replied to this, on behalf of Mehemet Baltădji, that all the presents which Catherine had in her power in the Russian camp at the Pruth to offer to him and his Kiaya, even if all that she could collect from the officers and soldiers were added to her own jewels and furs, must have been quite insignificant as bribes for one in the station of Grand Vizier. It may also be thought that the Turkish commander, if avaricious, could have gratified his avarice better by compelling an unconditional surrender of the Russian army, and all that it possessed; in which case he would also have had a prospect of obtaining rich gifts from the friends of the chief captives, in order to secure his influence for their release. By some it has been thought that the Vizier favoured the Czar, out of dislike to his rival the King of Sweden, who had treated Mehemet Baltadji with injudicious rudeness and contempt. But so many other methods of punishing the ill-manners of Charles were open to the Vizier, if

he chose to do so, that it is difficult to suppose such a motive to have been the primary principle of his conduct in signing the armistice with the Muscovite commanders. It is impossible to suppose that the Vizier feared the effect of a desperate attack by the enemy, whom he spared, and to adopt the opinion expressed by one historian of Russia,* that the Russians at the Pruth would probably have defeated the Turkish force if they had boldly attacked it. They had already been worsted in several engagements; and the spirit and discipline of Mehemet Baltadji's army was far superior to that of the oft-defeated Ottoman troops whom Romanzoff afterwards broke through in a similar situation. The Czar's confession of his extreme distress, (made by him both at the time in his letter to the Senate, and in the armistice, and also afterwards in the treaty of 1713, and in the proclamation calling Catherine to the throne,) is decisive evidence that the condition of the Russian army was forlorn, when the Vizier consented to treat. It was probably on no one fixed principle, or from any one definite motive that the Turkish commander acted, when he took the half-measure of releasing his prey on conditions which humiliated and injured, without incapacitating for revenge. Mehemet Baltadji deserves credit as a military man for his conduct of the war; but, though we may acquit him of corruption, the pacification by which he concluded the campaign must be censured as grievously unstatesmanlike. If it was his desire to disarm the hostility of Russia by generous moderation, he exacted

* Levesque, vol. iv. p. 415.

too much; if he wished to crush her power, he did too little. The advice of the old Samnite, Herennius Pontius, to his son, when he held the Roman legions in his power at Caudium, even as Mehemet Baltadji held the Russians at the Pruth, was sound and true. "Frank generosity may, in such cases, win a friend; or stern severity may destroy an enemy. To halt between the two is pernicious imbecility."* Turkey had as deep cause as Samnium to rue the middle course that was taken by her general. Though the war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte did not actually break out again during the life-time of Peter, it is well-known that he designed its renewal, and made immense preparation for that purpose, of which the leaders of the Russian armies availed themselves in the campaign against the Crimea in 1736.† The heritage of hatred and revenge passed undiminished to Peter's successors; and Russia taught Turkey in 1774, when the anniversary of the treaty of the Pruth was carefully selected for the signature of the treaty of Kainardji, that the ignominy which Baltadji Mehemet had inflicted on the Great Czar, was neither forgiven nor forgotten.

The indignation of Charles XII. at the pacification of the Pruth, his refusal to leave the Turkish dominions, and his obstinate conflict at Bender with the Spahis and Janissaries sent to remove him, are well-known

* "Ista quidem sententia ea est, quæ neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit. Servate modo quos ignominiâ irritaveritis, et ea est Romana gens quæ victa quiescere nesciat. Vivet semper in pectoribus illorum quicquid istuc præsens necessitas inusserit; neque eos tante multiplices pœnas expetitas a vobis quiescere sinet." Livy, lib. ix. c. 3.

† See Manstein's Memoirs of Marshal Münnich, p. 117.

passages of the biography of that adventurous prince. It was not only by the partisans of the Swedish king at the Sultan's court that the Grand Vizier was assailed with reproaches for his suspicious lenity to the Russians. The general discontent of the Turks was such that Achmet deposed Meliemet Baltadji from the vizierate; and the two officers who were believed to have been most active at the Pruth in forwarding the peace, the Kiaya, Osman Aga, and the Reis Effendi, were put to death at Constantinople by the public executioner. The delay of the Russians in fulfilling the treaty increased the irritation of the Porte against the Czar; and it was with considerable difficulty that the English ambassador, Sir Robert Sutton, and the Dutch ambassador, Collyer, prevented a new declaration of war on the part of the Turks. By their mediation a treaty was signed on the 16th of April, 1712, which substantially re-enacted the stipulations agreed on at the Pruth, and explicitly provided that the Czar should withdraw his troops from Poland within thirty days. But the Russian sovereign showed no disposition to cease from his armed interference in the affairs of that unhappy country; and, in the East, though some of the smaller fortifications which had been raised by him near the Sea of Azof and the Black Sea, were demolished by his orders, the important new city of Taganrok was maintained by him, nor was Azof itself surrendered to the Turks. The Sultan again prepared for war; but again the intervention of the English and Dutch ministers was successful. A treaty was finally arranged in 1713, between Russia and Turkey; of which the

six first and the eleventh articles corresponded with the seven articles dictated by Baltadji Mehemet at the Pruth. The eleventh article determined the respective frontiers of the two empires between the rivers Samara and Orel in such a manner that the territory near the banks of the Samara was thenceforth to belong to the Turks, and that washed by the Orel to the Russians. Eastward of those rivers to the Don and to Azof the boundary was to be the same that it had been before the first Russian occupation of Azof. It was stipulated that on the one part the Cossacks and the Calmucks, and on the other, the Tartars of the Crimea, the Noghai Tartars, and the Circassians, who were subject to the Porte, should cease from molesting each other. Five commissioners were appointed to mark out the frontier line in accordance with those terms. This was effected in the course of the year 1714. Azof was then restored to the Turks, and Taganrok demolished; and the great strife between Turkey and Russia now ceased for an unusually long period; though the Czar never forgot his purposes of ambition and revenge, and the collection of magazines and military stores at the river Don was continued throughout his reign.*

The Grand Vizierate was at this time held by Sultan Achmet's favourite son-in-law, Damad Ali, called by some writers Ali Coumourgi, the name by which he is immortalised in English poetry.† He was a statesman of considerable administrative ability, an eloquent

* See Manstein's Memoirs of Marshal Münnich, *ut supra*.

† See Byron's Siege of Corinth.

speaker, and distinguished for his literary acquirements. The character of wild and bigoted ferocity which has sometimes been ascribed to him, is erroneous. He was an earnest advocate of the peace with Russia; but he willingly promoted the scheme of a war of retaliation and recovery against Venice, a design which the Porte had never ceased to cherish since the peace of Carlowitz. At the very time of that treaty the Turks seem to have been well aware of the weakness of the Venetian republic, if unsupported by the great powers of Christendom; and, when they ceded the Morea, it was with the knowledge that they were powerful enough to regain it, whenever they could compel Venice to fight single-handed against them.* The feebleness shown by Venice during the great war among the Christian states, which was closed by the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt;—her timorous inaction, which she vainly strove to hide under the pretext of dignified neutrality;—and the contemptuous infringements of her territory by the belligerent parties, all tended to excite the Ottomans to attack her. Her

* "A consciousness of the real weakness of Venice, and of their own ability at some more opportune period to reclaim their possessions, was, no doubt, one powerful cause of the facility with which the Porte acceded to the treaty of Carlowitz; and Cantemir relates an anecdote of the Reis Effendi, which amply supports the assumption. During the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries, previous to the accommodation of the articles, the Ambassador of Venice had conducted himself rather haughtily towards the Ministers of Turkey, when the officer I have alluded to gave him a cutting reproof, by relating a proverb of a pickpocket having slily crept in and stolen away the garments of two athletic wrestlers, which they had for a moment doffed for the sake of convenience; but he added, that a period was fast approaching when the thief should be obliged to surrender his booty, and, in all probability, be obliged to yield up his *skin* along with his borrowed habiliments."—Emerson Tennant's Modern Greece, vol. i. p. 240.

great captain Morosini, to whose individual genius her victories in the last war were mainly due, was now dead; and it was known that so far from having strengthened her hold on the Morea by winning the affections of the Greeks, and binding them to her cause by a feeling of community of creed and of interest against the Turks, she was as bitterly hated in her new province, as she had formerly been hated by her subjects in Cyprus and Candia; and that the Moreotes would rather be under the rule of the Mahometans than under that of the schismatics of the Latin Church. The Turks had made great military preparations in 1712 and 1713, in consequence of the expectation then prevalent of a renewal of hostilities with Russia: and when the risk of war in that quarter had ceased, it was resolved to employ the forces of the empire in a sudden and overwhelming attack upon Venice. The Grand Vizier, Damad Ali, led this enterprise the more readily, because he was a firm believer in astrology, and the language of the stars announced to him in 1715 that he was to be the conqueror of the Morea. Some collisions that had taken place between the Turkish and Venetian galleys, and the aid which Venice had given, or was said to have given, to the insurgents of Montenegro, served as pretexts for the war. The Grand Vizier led an army of 100,000 men, supported by a fleet of 100 sail, against the weak Venetian force in the Morea, in the summer of 1715. The siege of Corinth terminated by the fall of that city, on the 25th of June; Palamidi, Napoli di Romania, Modon, and Koron, were captured by the triumphant vizier, with

almost equal celerity. The operations of the Turkish fleet were no less successful; and, by the end of November 1715, Venice had lost the whole of the Morea, and had been driven from all the islands of the Archipelago.

The Ottomans designed to follow up their success by attacking Corfu, and then proceeding to assail the Venetian possessions along the coasts of the Adriatic. But the Emperor, Charles VI. who at first only offered his mediation between the belligerents, had now decided on taking a more active part; ostensibly for the sake of protecting the Venetians, but, it is probable that hopes of aggrandising himself by further conquests from the Turks principally led him to form an offensive and defensive alliance with Venice, in the beginning of the year 1716.* The greater number of the Turkish statesmen and generals were anxious to avoid a war with the Germans; but the Grand Vizier was eager to attack them. He had again had recourse to his favourite astrological science; and the stars appeared to promise him victory over Austria, as clearly as in the preceding year they had assured him of triumph over Venice. His self-conceit also was inflated by success; and, in the words of his Turkish biographer Raschid, "his pride had spread the veil of negligence before the eye of his sagacity." War was declared against Austria in a council held at Adrianople; and the Fetva of the

* "Austria was now roused, in which at that time Prince Eugene had fortunately the greatest influence. He found the circumstances very favourable; and besides a war with the Turks would serve as an excellent pretext for keeping the army on foot, without raising the suspicion of the Christian power, instead of disbanding it after the close of the war with France, as was the custom; and this was the more desirable as Spain still continued threatening."—Schlosser, Hist. Eighteenth Century, vol. iii. p. 285.

Mufti sanctioning the war was solemnly read before the assembled dignitaries of the Sword and Pen. The Grand Vizier had shown in previous divans that he would brook no opposition to his martial policy, and he now addressed them thus: "We are not met here to waste idle words about the necessity of a war, which we have already resolved on, but to excite ourselves to conduct it in a fitting manner, and in accordance with the word of the Prophet, 'Fight against the unbelievers, and be wrathful with them.' Ye, Sirs, who are learned in the law, what say ye?" Some of the Ulemas, whom the Grand Vizier thus addressed, replied, "God speed you and give you success." Others referred to the generals present, as the fit persons to answer. The Grand Vizier glanced at the military members of the Divan, and they all protested in loud and strong words that they were the Padischah's slaves, and that they were ready to offer themselves, body and soul, in the service of the Faith and the Empire. The Grand Vizier then said, "Beyond doubt, God will give us the victory, if we obey the precept. 'Exult not, and despond not, so shall ye prevail.'" The Sheikh of the Imperial Camp closed the proceedings of the council by reciting other verses of the chapter of the Koran, which the Grand Vizier had partly quoted, and which forms the noblest of the war hymns of the Mahometans. "Exult not, and despond not, so shall ye prevail. If a calamity hath happened unto you in war, a like calamity hath already happened to others, and we cause these days of different success interchangeably to succeed each other among men, that God may know those

who believe, and may have martyrs from among you: (God loveth not the workers of iniquity;) and that God may prove those who believe, and destroy the unbelievers. Did ye imagine that ye should enter paradise, when as yet God knew not those among you who fought valiantly in his cause, nor proved those who persevered with patience? Moreover, ye did sometimes wish for death before that ye met it; but ye have now seen it, and ye looked on but retreated from it. Mahomet is no more than an apostle; the other apostles have already died before him; if he die, therefore, or be slain, will ye turn back on your heels? but he who turneth back on his heels will hurt himself, and not God; and God will surely reward only the thankful. No soul can die unless by the permission of God, according to what is written in the book containing the determinations of things. And whoso chooseth the reward of this world, we will give him thereof; but whoso chooseth the reward of the world to come, we will give him thereof; and we will surely reward the thankful. How many prophets have encountered those who had many myriads of troops! and yet they desponded not in their minds for what might befal them in fighting for the religion of God; and were not weakened, neither behaved themselves in an abject manner. God loveth those who persevere patiently. And their speech was no other than that they said, Oh Lord, forgive us our offences, and our negligence in all our doings; and strengthen our feet, and help us against the multitudes of the unbelieving people. And God gave them the reward of this world, and a glorious reward in the life to come:

for God loveth the well-doers. O ye who believe, if ye give way to the unbelievers, they will cause you to turn back on your heels, and ye will be turned back and perish: but God is your Lord; and he is the best helper. We will surely cast a dread into the hearts of the unbelievers, because they have associated with God that concerning which he sent them down no authority; their dwelling shall be the fire of hell; and the receptacle of the wicked shall be miserable. God had already made good unto you his promise, when ye destroyed the unbelievers by his permission until ye became faint-hearted, and disputed concerning the command of the apostle, and were rebellious, after God had showed you what ye desired. Some of you chose this present world, and others of you chose the world to come. Then he turned you to flight from before them, that he might make trial of you: (but he hath now pardoned you, for God is full of merciful kindness towards the faithful). Therefore God rewarded you with affliction on affliction, that ye be not grieved hereafter for the spoils which ye fail of, nor for that which befalleth you, for God is well acquainted with whatever you do. Then he sent down upon you, after affliction, security; a soft sleep which fell on some of you, but others were troubled by their own souls falsely thinking of God a foolish imagination, saying, Will anything of the matter happen unto us? Say, verily the matter belongeth wholly unto God. They concealed in their minds what they declared not unto thee; saying, If anything of the matter had happened unto us, we had not been slain here. Answer, if ye had been in your

houses, verily they whose slaughter was decreed would have gone forth to fight, to the places where they died; and this came to pass that God might try what was in your breasts, and might discern what was in your hearts, for God knoweth the innermost parts of the hearts of men. Verily, they among you who turned their backs on the day whereon the two armies met each other at Ohod; Satan caused them to slip for some crime they had committed; but now hath God forgiven them, for God is gracious and merciful. O true believers, be not as they who believed not, and said of their brethren, when they had journeyed in the land, or had been at war, if they had been with us, those had not died, nor had these been slain; whereas what befel them was so ordained that God might make it matter of sighing in their hearts. God giveth life, and causeth to die; and God seeth that which ye do. Moreover, if ye be slain, or die in defence of the religion of God, verily pardon from God, and mercy, is better than what they heap together of worldly riches. And if ye die, or be slain, verily unto God shall ye be gathered. And what happened unto you, on the day whereon the two armies met, was certainly by the permission of God and that he might know the faithful, and that he might know the ungodly. It was said unto them, Come, fight for the religion of God, and drive back the enemy: they answered, If we had known ye went out to fight, we had certainly followed you. They were on that day nearer unto unbelief, than they were to faith; they spake with their mouths what was not in their hearts; but God perfectly knew what they concealed;

they who said of their brethen, while themselves staid at home, if they had obeyed us, they had not been slain. Say, then, keep back death from yourselves, if ye say truth. Thou shalt in no wise reckon those who have been slain at Ohod in the cause of God dead; nay, they are sustained alive with their Lord, rejoicing for what God of his favour hath granted them; and being glad for those who, coming after them, have not as yet overtaken them, because there shall no fear come on them, neither shall they be grieved. They are filled with joy for the favour which they have received from God, and his bounty; and for that God suffereth not the reward of the faithful to perish. And let not the unbelievers think, because we grant them lives long and prosperous, it is better for their souls: we grant them long and prosperous lives only that their iniquity may be increased; and they shall suffer an ignominious punishment. God is not disposed to leave the faithful in the condition which ye are now in until he sever the wicked from the good; nor is God disposed to make you acquainted with what is a hidden secret, but God chooseth such of his apostles as he pleaseth, to reveal his mind unto; believe, therefore, in God, and his apostles; and if ye believe, and fear God, you shall receive a great reward. And let not those who are covetous of what God of his bounty hath granted them, imagine that their avarice is better for them; nay rather it is worse for them. That which they have covetously reserved shall be bound as a collar about their neck, on the day of the resurrection. Unto God belongeth the inheritance of heaven and earth, and God is well

acquainted with what ye do. Every soul shall taste of death, and ye shall have your rewards on the day of resurrection; and he who shall be far removed from hell fire, and shall be admitted into paradise, shall be happy, but the present life is only a deceitful provision. Ye shall surely be proved in your possessions, and in your persons; and ye shall bear from those unto whom the word of God has been delivered before you, and from the idolators, much hurt: but if ye be long-suffering and fear God this shall surely have an end. Think not that they who rejoice at what they have done, and expect to be praised for what they have not done; think not, O Prophet, that they shall escape from punishment, for they shall suffer a painful punishment; and unto God belongeth the kingdom of heaven and earth. God is almighty. Now, in the creation of heaven and earth, and the vicissitude of night and day, are signs unto those who are endued with understanding; who remember God at all times and in all postures, and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee; therefore deliver us from the torment of hell fire. O Lord, surely, whom thou shalt throw into the fire, thou wilt also cover with shame, nor shall the ungodly have any to help them. O Lord, we have heard a preacher inviting us to the faith, and saying, Believe in your Lord: and we believed. O Lord, forgive us therefore our sins, and expiate our evil deeds from us, and make us to die the death of the righteous. O Lord, give us also the reward which thou hast promised by thy apostles, and cover us not with shame on the day of resurrection;

for thou art not contrary to thy promise. Their Lord therefore answereth them, saying, I will not suffer the work of him among you who worketh to be lost, whether he be male or female: the one of you is from the other. They therefore who have left their country, or have been turned out of their houses, or have suffered for my sake, or have been slain in battle; verily I will expiate their evil deeds from them, and I will surely bring them into gardens watered by rivers; a reward from God; and with God is the most excellent reward. Let not the prosperous dealing of the unbelievers in the land deceive thee, it is but for a time; and then their receptacle shall be hell; an unhappy couch shall it be. But they who fear their Lord shall have gardens through which rivers flow, they shall continue therein for ever: this is the gift of God, for what is with God shall be better for the righteous than short-lived worldly prosperity. There are some of those who have received the scriptures, who believe in God, and that which hath been sent down unto you, and that which hath been sent down to them, submitting themselves unto God; they sell not the signs of God for a small price; these shall have their reward with their Lord; for God is swift in taking an account. O true believers, be patient, and strive to excel in patience, and be constant-minded, and fear God, that ye may be happy." *

Damad Ali took, in person, the command of the

* This is from the 3rd Chapter of the Koran, and was addressed by Mahomet to his followers after their defeat at Ohod. See Notes in Sale. I have left out some verses: and have partly followed Hellert's translation.

forces that were to act against the Austrians. This army was assembled at Belgrade in July; and a council of war was held there, in which (as at the opening of the campaign under Sultan Mustapha, in 1696) it was debated whether Temeswar or Peterwaradin should be the point on which the troops should march. Houscin, the Aga of the Janissaries, advised a movement towards Temeswar. The Khan of the Crimea (who, as usual, had joined the army at the Danube with his contingent of Tartar cavalry) proposed that an incursion should be made into Transylvania. The Beylerbey of Roumelia replied that they ought to remember the disaster of the Zenta, and not risk another army in the presence of Prince Eugene, along the difficult line of march to Temeswar. With regard to the scheme of an inroad into Transylvania, he remarked that the Tartar cavalry, if once let loose on such an enterprise, would cumber themselves with plunder, and would thereafter be no more fit for warfare than so many pregnant women. Consequently, his voice was for the march on Peterwaradin, either to fight the enemy if he would give them battle, or to form the siege of that city. The Grand Vizier heard the discussion without giving his own opinion, but he determined to march upon Peterwaradin, which he believed to be protected only by 1500 Austrians under Count Pfalfy, the main body of the army being encamped at Futaks, under Prince Eugene. A bridge was accordingly formed across the river Saave, and the Turkish army moved along the south bank of the Danube towards Peterwaradin. It was remarked, and remembered by the Ottoman

soldiery, as an evil omen, that their commander, though he might have chosen one of the lucky days of the week for the passage of the Saave, such as Saturday, Monday, or Thursday, yet thought fit to cross the river on a Tuesday, and not in the fortunate hour of morning, but in the afternoon.

The first encounter with the Austrians took place near Carlowitz. The Turks found a body of the enemy's troops posted there, under Count Pfalfy, amounting to 8000 men, according to the Ottoman historians; to 3000, according to the reports of the German generals. Kourd Pacha, who commanded the Turkish vanguard, demanded of the Grand Vizier, and obtained permission to charge them; and thus the first act of hostilities, by which the peace of Carlowitz between the Houses of Hapsburg and Othman was formally broken, took place in the immediate vicinity of the spot where the treaty had been signed. The Turks were victorious in the action, and took 700 prisoners, among whom was General Count Brenner. On the following day, Damad Ali continued his advance upon Peterwaradin, which is only two leagues from Carlowitz. But Prince Eugene had already taken up a position across the intended Turkish line of march. He encamped in the very entrenchments which Surmeli Pacha had formed in the last war. Damad Ali halted his army in presence of the Austrians, and kept his men under arms for three hours, in the expectation that Eugene would sally from his lines and attack him. But the Austrians moved not, and the Vizier hesitated to assail them in their fortified camp. He ordered his

men to break ground, and form trenches as if for a siege; and the Turks laboured so zealously during the night that before morning they had pushed the approaches within a hundred feet of the Austrian camp.

On the following day (13th August, 1716,) Eugene drew out his forces for a regular battle, which Damad Ali had neither the power nor the wish to avoid. Eugene had 187 squadrons of horse and 62 battalions of infantry. He arranged them so that the left wing was protected by a marsh, and his right by some rising ground. The Turkish army numbered 150,000, of whom 40,000 were Janissaries, and 30,000 Spahis; the rest consisted of Tartars, Wallachians, Arnaouts, and Egyptians. Ali drew up his cavalry on the right wing to oppose that of the Austrians; his infantry was ranged in the centre and on the left. The battle began at seven in the morning. The German cavalry proved their old superiority to the Asiatic in regular charges,* and the victory of the Christians seemed secure, when the Janissaries on the Turkish left broke the Austrian infantry, routed the wing opposed to them, and pressed hard upon the centre. Eugene immediately brought up a reserve of horse, with which he charged the Janissaries, and retrieved the fortunes of the day. The Grand Vizier, during the beginning of the action, took his station near the Sacred Standard of the Prophet, which was displayed in front of his tent; he remained there till Turk Ahmed, the commander of his right wing, was slain, and till the flying Spahis from that part of the battle began to sweep by

* See p. 40, *supra*.

him, heedless of the reproaches and sabre strokes by which he strove to check their panic rout. Damad Ali then put himself at the head of a body of officers, and galloped forward into the thick of the fight. A bullet pierced his forehead, and he fell mortally wounded. His followers placed him on a horse, and removed him to Carlowitz, where he soon expired. Two of the Turkish generals and the historian Raschid formed a guard round the Sacred Standard, and bore it safely away to Belgrade. As soon as their flight and the Grand Vizier's fall were known in the left wing, where Sari Ahmed, the Beylerbey of Anatolia, commanded, the Janissaries who had hitherto combated valiantly, gave way, and retreated towards Belgrade. The battle was over at noon. Three thousand Germans and twice that number of Turks had fallen. Eugene took possession of his enemy's camp, and 140 cannon: 150 banners, five horse-tails, and an immense amount of booty and military stores, were the trophies of the prince's victory. But the joy of the Austrians was troubled by the sight of the body of the unfortunate General Brenner, which was found barbarously mutilated.

The chief surviving Turkish officers, who re-assembled their defeated forces at Belgrade, after paying the last honours to the corpse of Damad Ali, met together in the tent of the Sacred Standard to draw up a report of the disastrous campaign to be sent to Constantinople, and to elect a provisional commander of the army. Sari Ahmed Pacha, the Beylerbey of Roumelia, was next in rank to the slain Grand Vizier, and was entitled

to assume the chief authority; but he declined the office, from fear of exposing himself to the envious intrigues of the Kiaya, who was with the troops, and who was the object of universal hatred and fear.* The other generals felt a similar reluctance. But they all concurred in resolving that the Kiaya should not take the command of the forces; and the remark made by one of the council, that it could not be the Sultan's wish for that functionary to lead the army, inasmuch as he had not received the Horsetails, was admitted to be conclusive. At last, a deputation of the troops prevailed on Sari Ahmed to take the command in chief; but he was soon afterwards put to death in a mutiny of the garrison of Belgrade, whom he had irritated by a severe reprimand.

A feeble attempt was made by the Turks to relieve the important city of Temeswar, the last bulwark of Islamism in Hungary, the siege of which had been commenced by Prince Eugene twenty days after his victory at Peterwaradin. Eugene defeated Kourd Pacha, who led a division of the Ottoman army against him, and Temeswar capitulated on the 26th of November, 1716. At the beginning of the war, Eugene had endeavoured to rouse the Servians and

* M. Hellert cites, as a specimen of Turkish historical style, the portrait of this Kiaya, as drawn by Raschid. "Deceiver and troubler, oppressor of his contemporaries, astonishing the world by his trickery and craft, born from the same egg with Satan to cheat and to play diabolical tricks, a duplicate in every trait of the arch impostor Mosellima; bent on hypocrisy and dissimulation, he made it his glory not only to cause evil to the servants of God, but to debase and deny his own kindred, lest he should seem to be dependent on them. Contemptible in stature, disgraced by nature, he had little eyes and a sallow complexion; and (to employ an expression of Scripture) he was an assemblage of all vices, an utterly abject being."

their kindred tribes beyond the Saave to co-operate with the Austrians, and had promised them the aid of the Emperor's armies to shake off the yoke of Turkish oppression. The Servian youth flocked zealously under Eugene's banners; and after the fall of Temeswar a corps of 1200 Servians, under the command of the Imperial General Dettin, made an inroad into Wallachia, and penetrated as far as Bucharest.

The great object of the Austrian operations in the year 1717 was the capture of Belgrade. Eugene invested that city in June with a magnificent army of 80,000 men, which comprised great numbers of the princes and nobles of Germany and France, who sought distinction by serving under so renowned a commander as Eugene, and in so brilliant an enterprise. Belgrade was garrisoned by 30,000 Turks, who resisted their besiegers bravely, and endured with patience a blockade of two months. In the beginning of August, an Ottoman army, 150,000 strong, under a new Grand Vizier, advanced to attempt the rescue of Belgrade. Eugene's troops had suffered severely during the siege; and, if the Turks had attacked him promptly on their arrival, their superiority of numbers and condition, and the panic caused by their appearance, would, in all probability, have assured their victory. But the Grand Vizier hesitated, and held councils of war, and formed earthworks and redoubts round the lines of the Austrian army, which was now besieged in its turn, but which rapidly regained its former confidence in itself and its commander, on finding that the foes, notwithstanding

their numbers, delayed the expected attack. The greater part of the Imperialist forces was posted round Belgrade, between the Danube and the Saave, but there were strong detachments on the opposite banks of these rivers, which were required to keep the garrison in check and complete the investment of the city. The Vizier's army was ranged round the rear of Eugene's main force, in a large semi-circle, from the south bank of the Danube to the east bank of the Saave. For fifteen days the Vizier kept up a heavy cannonade upon the Austrian lines; which Eugene replied to with all the artillery that he could safely withdraw from the batteries against the city; but the sufferings of the Austrian troops from fatigue, disease, and want of provisions were so severe, that the liberation of Belgrade and the capture or destruction of the besiegers seemed inevitable. The Vizier now drew his works nearer to those of the Austrian entrenchment; the cannonade grew fiercer, and the Turks were evidently making preparations to storm the Imperialists' lines of defence. In this emergency, Eugene resolved on the daring measure of anticipating the enemy's assault, and of leading his enfeebled and scanty army against the strong fortifications and immense numbers of the Vizier's host. He made the attack at two in the morning of the 16th of August, with complete success. The Turkish outposts were negligent; the discipline of their whole army was lax; they had slept in careless confidence; they woke to panic confusion: and when once the Christian columns were within their works, the greater part of them fled without even

attempting resistance. Ten thousand Ottomans were slain or trampled to death in flight. Their camp, their artillery, aud the whole of their military stores were captured. Belgrade surrendered on the second day after the battle. Eugene had the prudence to grant favourable terms of capitulation to its numerous garrison; and a campaign which had seemed likely to be marked with his utter ruin and the destruction of the Austrian army, was thus terminated by him with a splendid triumph and a most important conquest.

The Porte now sought earnestly for peace with Austria; and the proffered mediation of England and Holland was again gladly accepted. The Court of Vienna was at this time alarmed at the prospects of a new general war in the west of Europe, which had been created by the restless genius of Cardinal Alberoni. The victorious career of Eugene in the east was therefore checked; and the Emperor determined to secure the conquests which had been already won, by treating with Turkey on the basis of the "uti possidetis;" though a negotiation on this principle was a flagrant sacrifice of the interests of Venice, the ally for whose sake Austria had pretended to embark in the war. The operations of the Venetian and Turkish forces against each other during 1716 and 1717 had been unimportant, in comparison with the great events of the war on the Danube and the Saave. Corfu had been ably defended for Venice against the Turks by Count Stahremberg and a German force; and several sea-fights had taken place, in which the Republic of St.

Mark had generally the advantage. But it was obvious that Turkey, if once liberated from an Austrian war, was far too powerful for Venice to cope with; and the humbled Queen of the Adriatic was obliged to consent to a pacification, in which she was the chief sufferer, and Austria the chief gainer; while their common enemy, the Porte, might be thought to indemnify herself for the cessions made by her to the latter power, by the acquisition which she obtained at the expense of the former.

The negotiations for peace were opened at a small town in Servia, call Passarowitz, in June, 1718. The representatives of the mediating states, England and Holland, were present, as had been the case at Carlowitz. The articles of peace were solemnly signed on the 21st of July. Venice gave up the Morea to the Porte; and though she retained a few fortresses, which she had acquired in Dalmatia or Albania, she was obliged to make over to the Sultan the unconquered districts of Zarine, Ottovo, and Zubzi in order to keep open the Turkish communications with Ragusa. Her cession of the Morea showed that the power and glory of Venice had departed from her with the last of her heroes, Morosini. After the peace of Passarowitz, Venice possessed no part of Greece except the Ionian Islands; and, on the Albanian coast, she had nothing but the cities and districts of Butrinto, Parga, and Prevesa, a little strip of territory two leagues broad, and twenty in length. Like Spain, Venice had been illustrious as a defender of Christendom against the Ottomans, when the power of Turkey was at its

height; and, like Spain, Venice sank into corruption and imbecility, even more rapidly than their fast-declining antagonist.

Austria, by the treaty of Passarowitz, not only obtained the city of Temeswar and its territory, and thus completed the recovery of Hungary from the Turkish power; but she then extended her dominion over large portions of Wallachia and Servia;—aggrandisements of her empire, which she failed to retain long, but which have been ever remembered by her rulers with ambitious regret and desire. The treaty of 1718, assigned to Austria the cities of Belgrade, Semendra, Rimnik, Krasova, and many more. It made the river Aluta, in Wallachia, the boundary of the two empires, thus assigning to Austria the whole of the country termed Little Wallachia. Six other rivers, the Danube, the Timok, the little Morava, the Dwina, the Saave, and the Unna then formed the frontier line; so that nearly all Servia, and some valuable territories in Bosnia, were transferred from the Sultan to the House of Hapsburg. The Austrians had not indeed realised the threat expressed by some of their generals in the first year of the war, when they boasted that they would go on conquering until the Austrian empire touched the Black Sea and the Egæan; but Eugene gave to the Emperor Charles VI. a dominant position in Eastern Europe, such as the most renowned of his predecessors had never acquired, and which that emperor himself lost soon after the death of the great commander, to whom its temporary possession was due.

It is difficult to read without a melancholy smile that Russia and Turkey, in 1720, made a solemn treaty of eternal peace with each other. At that time the Czar was menaced by a league which was formed against him by many of his late allies, and which the Porte was vainly solicited to join by the ambassadors of Austria and England. This made Peter desirous to secure tranquillity, at least for a time, on his Turkish frontier: though he never abandoned his schemes for aggrandising his empire at the expense of its Mahometan neighbours. The next war in which Turkey and Russia took part, found them arrayed not as antagonists, but as confederates. The extreme weakness into which the Persian empire had been reduced by misgovernment, insurrection, and the attacks of the Affghans, tempted both Muscovite and Ottoman cupidity; and the armies of the Czar and the Sultan invaded the north-western provinces of Persia with the design of dismembering her, and of appropriating at least those portions of her empire. A partition treaty was signed by the Russian and Turkish ministers in 1723, by which the Czar was to take the Persian provinces that lie near the Caspian Sea, from the country of the Turcomans, round to the confluence of the Araxes and the Kur, and thence to Derbend. This assigned to Russia the districts of Asterabad, Mazanderad, Ghilan, part of Schirvan, and Daghistan. The acquisitions of the Porte were to be traced out by a line drawn from the junction of the Araxes and the Kur, and passing along by Erdebil, Tabriz, and Hamadan, and thence to Kermanschai. The Persian Shah Tahmasp was to

retain the rest of his paternal kingdom on condition of his recognising the treaty. Both Russia and Turkey had already attacked parts of Persia before that treaty was signed; and the Porte had manifested considerable jealousy of the extension of the power of the Czar along the shores of the Caspian. But the Russian diplomatists were too skilful for the Turkish, and prevailed on them to assent to terms, which (besides the original injustice of the whole transaction with regard to Persia,) were very unequal, and very disadvantageous for the Ottomans: inasmuch as the Czar had already led his troops down from Astrakhan between the Caucasus and the Caspian, and secured the greater part of the countries assigned to him by the treaty; while nearly all the territories, which Turkey was to gain, remained yet to be conquered. The Ottomans however subdued a large part of Georgia; and they strengthened their positions in Mingrelia, Imeritia, Gouriel, and other Caucasian districts, eastward of the Black Sea, which had long acknowledged the supremacy of the Porte, or of the Porte's vassal, the Khan of the Crimea, but where little effective authority of the Sultan had been practically exercised. The Turkish Court sought to palliate to itself the moral iniquity of the war upon Persia, by procuring a Fetva from the Mufti, which sanctioned all hostilities against the Shiis; and expressly required the orthodox Mahometans to put the men of an heretical nation to the edge of the sword, and to reduce their wives and children to slavery. The polemical adage that a heretic is worse than an infidel,

has nowhere been more frequently or more atrociously verified than in the Divans of Sunnite Turkey.

The abilities of Sultan Achmet's Grand Vizier Ibrahim, who directed the goverment from 1718 to 1730, preserved an unusual degree of internal peace in the empire, though the frontier provinces were often the scenes of disorder and revolt. This was repeatedly the case in Egypt and Arabia; and still more frequently in the districts northward and eastward of the Euxine, especially among the fierce Noghai tribes of the Kuban. The state of the countries between the Black Sea and the Caspian was rendered still more unsettled by the rival claims of Russia and the Porte; for it was difficult to define a boundary between the two empires in pursuance of the partition treaty of 1723; and a serious dispute arose early in the reign of Achmet's successor, in 1731, as to the right of dominion over the Circassians of the Kabartas, a region about half way between the Euxine and the Caspian, near the course of the river Terek. The Russians claimed the Kabartas as lands of Russian subjects. They asserted that the Circassians were originally Cossacks of the Ukraine, who migrated thence to the neighbourhood of a city of Russia called Terki, from which they took their name of Tchercassians, or Circassians. Thence (according to the memorial drawn up by the Czar's ministers) the Circassians removed to the neighbourhood of Kuban: still, however, retaining their Christian creed and their allegiance to the Czar. The continuation of the story told that the tyranny of the Crim

Tartars forced the Circassians to become Mahometans, and to migrate further eastward to the Kabartas; but it was insisted on that the Circassians were still to be regarded as genuine subjects of their original earthly sovereign, and that the land which they occupied became the Czar's territory.* This strange political ethnology had but little influence upon the Turks, especially as the Czar had in a letter, written nine years previously, acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultan over the Circassians.

The course of the Persian war, in which the Turks had at first made successive conquests with little check from the Schah's armies, though often impeded by the nature of the country and the fierce spirit of the native tribes, became after a few years less favourable to Ottoman ambition. The celebrated Nadir Kouli Khan (who afterwards reconquered and conquered states for himself), gained his first renown by exploits against the enemies of Schah Tahmasp. A report reached Constantinople that the lately despised Persians were victorious, and were invading the Ottoman empire. This speedily caused excitement and tumult. Sultan Achmet had become unpopular by reason of the excessive pomp and costly luxury in which he and his principal officers indulged; and on the 20th of September, 1730, a mutinous riot of seventeen Janissaries, led by the Albanian Patrona Khalil, was encouraged by the citizens as well as the soldiery, till it swelled into an insurrection, before which the Sultan quailed, and gave up the throne. Achmet voluntarily led his

* See Von Hammer, book lxvi. note 1.

nephew Mahmoud to the seat of sovereignty, and made obeisance to him as Padischah of the empire. He then retired to the apartments in the palace from whence his successor had been conducted, and died after a few years of confinement.

The reign of Achmet III., which had lasted for twenty-seven years, though marked by the deep disasters of the Austrian war, was, on the whole, neither inglorious nor unprosperous. The recovery of Azof and the Morea, and the conquest of part of Persia, more than counterbalanced the territory, which had been given up to the Austrian emperor at the peace of Passarowitz. Achmet left the finances of the Ottoman empire in a flourishing condition, which had been obtained without excessive taxation or extortionate rapacity. He was a liberal and discerning patron of literature and art; and it was in his time that the first printing press was set up in Constantinople. It was in this reign that an important change in the government of the Danubian principalities was introduced. Hitherto, the Porte had employed Voivodes, or native Moldavian and Wallachian nobles, to administer those provinces. But after the war with Peter the Great in 1711, in which Prince Cantemir betrayed the Turkish, and aided the Russian interests, the Porte established the custom of deputing Greeks from Constantinople as hospodars, or viceroys, of Moldavia and Wallachia. These were generally selected from among the wealthy Greek families that inhabited the quarter of Constantinople, called the Fanar, and constituted a kind of Raya Noblesse, which supplied the Porte with

functionaries in many important departments of the state. The Moldo-Wallachians call the period of their history, during which they were under Greek viceroys (and which lasted till 1821), the Fanariote period.*

* Ubicini, vol. ii. 66.

CHAPTER VI.

MAHMOUD I.—TOPAL OSMAN—PEACE WITH PERSIA—RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA ATTACK TURKEY—RUSSIAN INVASIONS OF THE CRIMEA—SUCCESSES OF THE TURKS AGAINST THE AUSTRIANS—BELGRADE RECOVERED—TREATY OF BELGRADE—PACIFIC POLICY OF TURKEY—DEATH OF SULTAN MAHMOUD. SHORT PACIFIC REIGN OF OTHMAN III.*

SULTAN MAHMOUD was recognised by the mutineers, as well as by the court officials; but for some weeks after his accession the empire was in the hands of the insurgents. Their chief, Patrona Khalil, rode with the new Sultan to the Mosque of Eyoub, when the ceremony of girding Mahmoud with the sword of Othman was performed; and many of the chief officers were deposed, and successors to them were appointed at the dictation of the bold rebel, who had served in the ranks of the Janissaries, and who appeared before the Sultan bare-legged, and in his old uniform of a common soldier. A Greek butcher, named Yanaki, had formerly given credit to Patrona, and had lent him money during the three days of the late insurrection. Patrona showed his gratitude by compelling the Divan to make Yanaki Hospodar of Moldavia. The insolence of the rebel chiefs became at length insupportable.

* Von Hammer, books 66—70.

The Khan of the Crimea, whom they threatened to depose, was in Constantinople; and with his assistance the Grand Vizier, the Mufti, and the Aga of the Janissaries, succeeded in freeing the government from its ignominious servitude. Patrona was killed in the Sultan's presence, after a Divan in which he had required that war should be declared against Russia. His Greek friend Yanaki, and 7000 of those who had supported him were also put to death. The jealousy which the officers of the Janissaries felt towards Patrona, and their readiness to aid in his destruction, facilitated greatly the exertions of the Sultan's supporters in putting an end to the reign of rebellion, after it had lasted for nearly two months.

The conduct of the war in Persia against the Turks was resumed in 1733, by Nadir Kouli Khan, (during whose absence the Ottomans had obtained considerable advantages,) and that chieftain gave the Sultan's forces several defeats, and laid siege to the city of Bagdad. But that important bulwark of the Ottoman empire was rescued from him by the Grand Vizier, Topal Osman.

This is a name justly celebrated by Christian as well as Mahometan writers; and it is gratifying to turn from the scenes of selfish intrigue, and of violence and oppression, which the careers of Grand Viziers generally exhibit, and to pause on the character of a Turk of the last century, who was not only skilful, sage, and valiant, but who gave proofs of a noble spirit of generosity and gratitude, such as does honour to human nature. The English traveller, Hanway, has given a biography of

Topal Osman, which he introduces by saying that "the design of it is to instruct us by example, which is confessedly the great use of history; and I am pursuaded this relation will give pleasure to every one who does not think gratitude a pious frenzy, or that it is a virtue fit only for little minds, whose weakness betrays them into a passion, which clashes with self-love, so much the idol of mankind."*

Osman was born in the Morea: he was educated in the Serail, at Constantinople, where native Turks were now frequently brought up, since the practice of levying Christian children for the Sultan's service had been discontinued. At the age of twenty-six he had attained the rank of Beylerbey; and was sent on a mission from the Porte to the governor of Egypt. On the voyage his ship encountered a Spanish corsair, and was captured after a brave defence, in the course of which Osman received a wound, which lamed him for life, whence he obtained his name of Topal or lame Osman. The Spanish pirates carried their prize into Malta, where a Frenchman of Marseilles, named Vincent Arnaud, was then harbour-master. Arnaud came on board the prize, and was scrutinising the prisoners, when Osman addressed him, and said, "Can you do a generous and gallant action? Ransom me, and take my word you shall lose nothing by it." Struck by Osman's appearance and manner the Frenchman turned to the captain of the vessel, and asked the amount of the ransom. The answer was a thousand sequins, a sum nearly equal to 500*l*. Arnaud then said to the

* Hanway, vol. iii. p. 100.

Turk, "I know nothing of you, and would you have me risk a thousand sequins on your bare word?" Osman replied that Arnaud could not be blamed for not trusting to the word of a stranger; "but," he added, "I have nothing at present but my word of honour to give to you, nor do I pretend to assign any reason why you should trust to it. However, I tell you if you *do* trust to it, you shall have no occasion to repent." The Oriental proverb says well that "there are paths which lead straight from heart to heart." Arnaud was so wrought upon by Osman's frank and manly manner, that he prevailed on the Spaniards to set him at liberty for 600 sequins, which sum the generous Frenchman immediately paid. He provided Osman with a home and medical assistance until his wounds were healed; and then gave him the means of proceeding on his voyage to Egypt. As soon as Osman reached Cairo, he sent back 1000 sequins as payment to Arnaud, with a present of 500 crowns, and of rich furs, which are considered the most honourable of all gifts in the East. A few years afterwards, Osman signalised himself greatly in the Turkish re-conquest of the Morea, and in 1722 he was appointed Seraskier, and commanded all the Turkish troops in that country. He immediately invited Arnaud's son to visit him in the Morea, and conferred mercantile privileges on the young man, and placed opportunities for lucrative commerce within his reach, which enabled him to accumulate large wealth, with which he returned to his father. In 1728 Osman was governor of Roumelia, and he then invited his French benefactor and his son to visit him at Nissa,

his seat of government, where he treated them with distinction and honour, such as no Ottoman Turk had ever before been seen to accord to a Christian. On taking leave of him at Nissa, Arnaud said, as a compliment, that he trusted to live to visit Osman as Grand Vizier, at Constantinople. When Topal Osman attained that rank in 1731, he again invited Arnaud and his son to become his guests; and, receiving them in his palace, in the presence of the highest dignitaries of the state, Osman pointed out the elder Arnaud, and said, "Behold this Frenchman: I was once a slave loaded with chains, streaming with blood, and covered with wounds: this is the man who redeemed and saved me; this is my master and benefactor; to him I am indebted for life, liberty, fortune, and everything I enjoy. Without knowing me, he paid for me a large ransom; sent me away upon my bare word, and gave me a ship to carry me where I pleased. Where is there even a Mussulman capable of such generosity?" He then took both the Arnauds by the hand, and questioned them earnestly and kindly concerning their fortune and prospects, ending with an Asiatic sentence, "God's goodness is without bounds." He afterwards gave them many receptions in private, when they met without ceremony as friends, and he sent them back to their country loaded with the richest presents. Hanway well remarks on this exhibition of gratitude by the Vizier, that "his behaviour was truly great and noble, since every action of his life demonstrates a mind superior to affectation. This conduct appears the more generous, when it is considered what contempt and aversion the prejudices of

education often create in a Turk against the Christian; and, if we reflect further that this confession was made before his whole court, the action will appear in all its lustre."*

Topal Osman was superseded in the Grand Vizierate in 1732. His friends and dependents lamented bitterly over his downfall, but Osman bore it with a nobler feeling than the ordinary stoicism of a Turk under misfortune. According to his English biographer, he summoned his friends and family round him, and addressed them thus: "What is the reason of your affliction? Have I not always said that the office of Grand Vizier is of all the most likely to be short? All my concern was I should get out of it with honour; and, thanks to God, I have done nothing with which I reproach myself. My master, the Sultan, approves of my services, and I resign with perfect satisfaction." He then gave orders for rendering thanks to heaven, as if it had been one of the most happy events of his life. †

Before Topal Osman had been long in retirement, the alarming progress of the Persian armies made the Porte again require his services; and he was sent into Asia as generalissimo of the Turkish armies in that continent, and was invested with almost unlimited powers. He marched to encounter the dreaded Nadir; and on the 19th July, 1733, gave him a complete overthrow in a pitched battle, near the banks of the Tigris,

* Hanway's Travels, part iii. p. 106. Hanway travelled in the East between 1743 and 1750. Von Hammer praises his works, and states that they were eulogised by Arago.

† Hanway, part iii. p. 106.

about twelve leagues from Bagdad. There is a narrative of this battle, written by Jean Nicodeme (who attended Topal Osman as his physician) to the Marquis of Villeneuve, which exhibits the manners and spirit of Osman in the same amiable and noble light in which they are presented to us by Hanway:- He is represented as free from all pride and arrogance; he treated his soldiers as if they were his brothers; and all who served under his command, regarded him with the strongest feelings of personal attachment. The movements of his troops were ably directed, and in the actual conflict his forces were handled by him with great judgment and decision. The French writer thus describes Topal Osman's own conduct and demeanour on the day of battle. "After he had prayed, he mounted on horseback, which he had not done before throughout the campaign, having been carried in a litter on account of the infirmity of his health, and the pain of his old wounds. I could not attribute the strength which he now showed to aught but his martial spirit, and the fire that glowed within him. I saw before me on horseback, a man, who had been bowed down by weakness, and by the numerous sword and gunshot wounds which he had received in war, and several of which had been injudiciously treated by his surgeons. I saw him riding along like a young man, sword in hand, with animated countenance and sparkling eyes. He rode from rank to rank, examined all with his own eyes, and gave his orders with admirable readiness and presence of mind."*

The victory thus gained by Topal Osman on the

* The report of Nicodeme is cited in the note to Von Hammer's 66th book.

Tigris, rescued Bagdad; and he again defeated the Persians, near Leitan, in the same year. But in a third battle with Nadir, near Kerkoud, the Turks were routed; and Topal Osman himself died the death of a gallant soldier, fighting sword in hand to the last, rather than disgrace himself by flight. His body was borne off the field by some of his attendants, and was afterwards brought for burial to Constantinople.

Nadir gained repeated victories over the Ottoman generals who succeeded Topal Osman, and in 1736 the Porte gladly made a treaty of peace with its formidable enemy, which fixed the same boundary between Turkey and Persia that had been determined by the old treaty made with Amurath the Fourth. In the preceding year the Russians had made a compact of peace and amity with Nadir, by which they abandoned those Persian provinces which they had appropriated by the partition treaty made between Peter the Great and Achmet III. The Court of St. Petersburg thought it more profitable to begin a war of conquest against Turkey, now weakened by the sword of Nadir Shah, than to strive for the retention of districts round the Caspian Sea, which were then far distant from any strong parts of the Russian empire.

It was with reluctance and alarm that the Porte found itself again involved in hostilities with the powers of Christendom. The war with Persia had been zealously undertaken; and, though unsuccessful, was not unpopular. In combating the Persians, the Turks fought against heretics, whom they hated a hundredfold worse than the unbelievers, and they hoped also

to achieve new conquests, or to recover ancient dominions. But the prospect of collision with either of the great neighbouring Christian empires caused far different feelings. Neither Ottoman pride nor Mahometan fanaticism could now expect to see the Crescent reassert in the battle-field that superiority over the Cross which it had held in the days of Mahomet the Conqueror, and in those of Solyman the Lord of his Age. The last dreams of such a reaction had vanished when Damad Ali, the conqueror of the Morea, fell before Eugene at Peterwaradein. The Turkish ministers who succeeded that "dauntless Vizier,"* knew the superiority which the military system of Austria and Russia had acquired over the Turkish. They watched carefully the political movements of Christendom, and made it their chief study to preserve peace. It was in vain that the French ambassadors at Constantinople strove to excite the Porte to war with Austria, and that the Swedish envoys urged it to recommence the struggle against Russia. The Turkish statesmen sought and followed the pacific advice of the representatives of England and Holland, the two maritime powers, whose intervention had obtained the treaties of Carlowitz and Passarowitz, and who had no selfish interest in plunging Turkey into the perils of new wars. In general the Ottoman empire was then regarded by the Christian powers much as it has been in our own times. The decay of its military power was considered to be irretrievable; and the speedy expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the dis-

* "Thus uttered Coumourgi, the dauntless Vizier."—BYRON.

memberment of their dominions, were confidently and covetously expected. Some sagacious observers judged differently. The celebrated French military writer, the Chevalier Folard, attributed the defeats of the Turkish armies in the early part of the 18th century almost entirely to their neglect, in not availing themselves of the improvements that had been made in the weapons of war. In his opinion it was the bayonet that had given the Christians their victories over the Moslems. He thought the Turks inferior in courage to no nation living, and far superior in all soldierly qualities to the Muscovites, whom Peter the Great had then recently made formidable to all Europe. Folard believed that there needed but the appearance of some military reformer, some enlightened Vizier among the Ottomans, to restore them to their old renown, and change the face of the affairs of the whole world.* Montesquieu also, the highest political genius of the first half of the 18th century, pointed out to his contemporaries that their anticipation of witnessing the fall of the Ottoman

* "Les Turcs ne sont battus que par le seul desavantage de leurs armes. Ils ne sçavent ce que c'est que baionette au bout du fusil: car, depuis l'invention de cette arme ils n'ont pû rien gagner contre les Chrétiens, &c. Nous méprisons les Turcs: ils sont certainement peu à craindre par le seul desavantage de leurs armes et non pas autrement.

"A l'égard du courage, les Turcs ne le cédent á aucune nation du monde. Il viendra quelque Vizir un jour plus habile et plus éclairé qu'un autre, qui ouvrira les yeux sur la cause de tant de défaites, et qui changera toute la face des affaires du monde entier. Les Moscovites étoient moins que les Turcs. Pierre le Grand a fait voir à toute la terre, qu'il naît des soldats partout où il naît des hommes, et que tout dépend de la discipline, de l'exercise, et de l'avantage des armes. Il ne faut pas croire qu'un tel changement soit plus difficile aux Turcs qu'aux Moscovites, dont les qualités pour la guerre sont fort au-dessous de celles des premiers."—FOLARD. *Polybe*, vol. iii. p. 266, and vol. v. p. 180.

empire were premature. He foresaw with marvellous sagacity, that Turkey, if her independence were ever seriously menaced by either of the great military monarchies in her neighbourhood, would find protection from the maritime powers of Western Europe, who knew their own interests too well, to permit Constantinople to become the prize of either Austrian or Russian invaders.*

This caution was in 1734, as in after years, unknown or unheeded at the Court of St. Petersburg. Russia had at this time ready for action a veteran army, which had gained reputation in the war in Poland; and she possessed a general of no ordinary military genius in Count Münnich, who had brought her troops into a high state of efficiency, and was eager for opportunities of further distinction. The Russian army was excellently officered, chiefly by foreigners from Western Europe; and the artillery (that important arm of modern warfare to which the Russians have owed so many advantages) was unusually numerous and well-appointed. The Czarina Anne and her advisers thought that the time had come for avenging upon the Turks the disgrace which had been sustained in 1711, on the banks of the Pruth; and Austria, which was then governed by the infirm Charles VI., was persuaded to join Russia in her schemes of

* "L'Empire des Turcs est à présent à peu-près dans le même dégré de foiblesse où étoit autrement celui des Grecs; *mais il subsistera long-temps.* Car, si quelque prince que ce fût mettoit cet empire en péril en poursuivant ses conquêtes, les trois puissances commerçantes de l'Europe connoissent trop leurs affaires pour n'en pas prendre la défense sur-le-champ." *Grandeur et Décadence des Romaines* (published in 1734), c. 23. Mr. Pitt referred to this passage in the debates on the Russian armament in 1792.

aggression. There had been numerous disputes between the Czarina and the Porte, arising out of their unsettled claims to Daghestan, and the Kabartas, and other districts between the Black and the Caspian Seas. The march of Tartar troops from the Crimea through the Caucasian territories for the purpose of co-operating with the Ottoman armies in the north of Persia, had been forcibly resisted by the Russians; and collisions had taken place, which gave an ample supply of pretexts for war to the Czarina, and her licentious favourite, Biren, by whom the councils of St. Petersburg were chiefly swayed. Turkey had also caused grave offence to Russia, by earnestly remonstrating, in 1733, against the iniquitous attacks of the Russians upon the independence of Poland. The Reis Effendi made an explicit protest against the occupation of that country and its capital by the Czarina's troops. He was met by the answer that the Russians had only entered Poland for the sake of enabling the Poles to proceed to the election of their new king in freedom, which France was endeavouring to disturb by her intrigues in favour of Stanislaus Leczynski. The Turk rejoined that the Sublime Porte did not concern itself as to whom the Poles chose for their king, but that it was resolved to uphold the national independence of Poland. The envoy of Russia then made a long catalogue of complaints against the Porte for permitting the Tartars to attack the Cossacks, for marching troops through the Caucasian territory, and for not delivering up a refugee from Russia, named Caluminski. These grievances were said to be the reason why Russia

increased her forces in the South. These and similar recriminations were continued during the two next years; but Biren and the Czarina were resolved on war, which the ministers of the maritime powers vainly laboured to prevent.

So long as the hostile intentions of Russia were only manifested by conflicts with the Tartars along the ill-defined frontiers of Turkey near the Crimea and the Caucasus, the Porte continued to negotiate; but in May, 1736, intelligence reached Constantinople that the Czarina's army under Marshal Münnich had captured two Turkish fortresses near Azof, and that Russian troops were actually besieging that important city. War was then (28th May, 1736), declared by a solemn Fetva against Russia, and on that very day Münnich stormed the lines of Perekop.

We possess in the memoirs of General Manstein,* who served under Marshal Münnich, and who was also frequently employed in the diplomatic service of the Russian cabinet, an unquestionable source of ample information respecting these Crimean campaigns, to which recent events have given so much interest, and also respecting the inveterate policy of Russia towards Turkey. General Manstein expressly states that Peter I. unable to stomach the treaty of the Pruth, had long ago planned the war on the coasts of the Black Sea, which the Empress Anne undertook. He had formed vast magazines on the River Don, and had collected materials for a flotilla which was to waft his army down that river and the Dnieper. All was ready for the

* Mémoires de Général Manstein.

commencement of a campaign, when death cut short his projects (May 16, 1727). On the accession of the Empress Anne in 1730, the design of a Turkish war was revived; and General Keith was sent by the Court of St. Petersburg to Southern Russia, to inspect the state of the magazines which Peter the Great had formed, and to re-organise, so far as was necessary, his armaments for an attack on the Ottoman dominions. The troubles in Poland obliged the Empress to defer hostilities against the Porte; but when, in 1735, the Russians had been completely successful against the independent party among the Poles, Münnich and his best troops were moved into the Ukraine; and it was resolved to commence the campaign against Turkey by attacking Azof, and to make also the greatest possible efforts against the Tartars of the Crimea, in order to conquer their whole country, and establish the Russian power over the Black Sea.*

Münnich made his preparations for the campaign while it was yet midwinter; and he laboured earnestly to prepare his army for the hardships which he partly foresaw, and for resisting the numerous Tartar cavalry by which he knew that he would be surrounded. Each Russian regiment was ordered by him to collect a large number of waggons for the transport of its stores. Münnich also reintroduced the pike, a weapon which had for many years been entirely discontinued in the Russian service. Each regiment was by his command provided with 350 pikes, eighteen feet in length. The

* Manstein, p. 123.

men in the second rank were armed with them; but they were found to be useless in action, and extremely cumbersome to the troops when on march. Another device of the marshal's was far more successful. He supplied every regiment with twenty chevaux-de-frise two yards in length. These were found to be eminently serviceable, both as temporary defences against the enemy's horse, and as fortifications to the camp. When the army halted, the chevaux-de-frise were planted round the position, which was thus secured against surprise, and furnished with a barricade of no slight efficacy against the pressure of superior numbers. Münnich also made his officers and sergeants lay aside their spontoons and halberds, and carry instead of them the firelock and bayonet, as far more useful than their former weapons.

In the month of March he advanced with six regiments of infantry, three of dragoons, and three thousand Cossacks of the Don, to St. Anne, a fortress which the Russians had erected about eight miles from Azof. The Turkish governor of that city sent one of his officers to compliment the Marshal on his arrival on the frontiers, and to express the Pacha's full belief that the Russian force had no design of breaking the peace which existed between the two empires. Münnich replied in terms of vague civility; but on the 27th of March he passed the River Don, and marched on Azof with such speed and secrecy that he captured two of the outworks of the city before the main body of the Tartars knew of his approach. He then invested Azof itself; and on the arrival of the Russian General Leontiew with reinforcements,

Münnich left him to carry on the siege until the arrival of Count Lascy, for whom the command of the operations in that quarter was designed. Münnich himself on the 6th of April repaired to Zaritsinka, where the main Russian army was assembling, which was to effect the great enterprise of the campaign, the invasion of the Crimea.

The Russian forces for this operation, when concentrated at Zaritsinka, two leagues from the Dnieper, on the 19th of May, 1736, consisted of twelve regiments of dragoons, fifteen regiments of regular infantry, ten of militia, ten squadrons of hussars, 5000 Cossacks of the Don, 4000 Cossacks of the Ukraine, and 3000 Zaporogian Cossacks; amounting altogether to 54,000 men. Münnich had directed every regiment to take with it supplies of bread for two months; and the officers were bidden to make similar provision for themselves. Such ample magazines had been prepared, that even a larger supply might have been distributed; but the means of transport were deficient. Münnich was unwilling to defer operations until more waggons and beasts of burden could be collected; but he ordered Prince Troubetski to undertake that important duty, and to send forward continual convoys of provisions with the fresh regiments, which had not yet arrived, but were on their march to join the army. These orders of the Marshal were ill-obeyed by the Prince; and the invading forces suffered severely from his neglect.

Münnich formed his army in five columns, and marched down the left bank of the Dnieper, defeating some bodies of Tartar horse, which had advanced to

reconnoitre the invaders; they then moved by Selnaya Dolina, and Tchernaya Dolina, to the banks of the little river Kolytschka. Thence he marched to the narrow isthmus which connects the Crimean peninsula with the continent, and on the 26th of May, 1736, the Russian Marshal halted at a short distance from the celebrated lines of Perekop.

These lines were drawn across the isthmus a little to the north of the town of Perekop, at a part where the land is not more than five miles in breadth, from the Black Sea, to that recess of the Sea of Azof which is called the Putrid Sea. The defences consisted of a trench about thirty-six feet wide, and twenty-five feet deep, backed by a rampart seventy feet high, if measured to its summit from the bottom of the ditch. Six stone towers strengthened the lines, and served as outworks to the fortress of Perekop, which stood behind them. The position was believed by the Tartars to be impregnable; and they assembled here under their Khan against Münnich to the number of 100,000, aided by a force of 1,800 Turkish Janissaries, who garrisoned the towers.

Münnich sent a letter to the Tartar Khan, in which he reproached him for the depredations committed by his subjects in the Ukraine, and declared that the Empress of Russia had ordered the whole of the Crimea to be laid waste, in revenge for these misdeeds of its inhabitants. Still, the Russian Marshal declared, such was the clemency of his imperial mistress, that the offending country should be spared, but only on condition of the Khan and all his people submitting to

Russia and acknowledging themselves subjects of the Czarina. Perekop was to be instantly ceded, and to receive a Russian garrison ; and, if this pledge of submission were given, Münnich professed his readiness to enter into negotiations. The Tartar Prince, in answer, denied the charge made against his subjects, and expressed his astonishment that the Russians should attack him without any declaration of war. He represented the impossibility of his severing the long connection between the Crimea and the Sublime Porte; and professed his inability to surrender Perekop, even if he were willing, inasmuch as it was occupied by Turkish troops. He implored the Marshal to suspend hostilities, and to allow an opportunity of settling by negotiations any just cause of complaint that might exist. He added, that if attacked he should do his best to defend himself.

Münnich sent back a reply, that inasmuch as the Khan would not appreciate the gracious clemency of the Russian Court, he should soon see his country laid waste, and his cities given to the flames. The Russian army followed close upon the messenger who bore this fierce message to Perekop, and moved forward to the assault during the night before the 28th of May, 1736, in profound silence, halting about an hour before daybreak, at the distance of a quarter of a mile before the lines.

Münnich first sent a detachment of 2,500 men and some pieces of artillery forward on his left, (the side nearest to the sea of Azof,) to make a false attack on that quarter and draw away the enemy's attention from

the Russian right, (the side nearest to the Black Sea,) on which he designed the real assault to be given. The manœuvre was perfectly successful; and the Tartars, who had hurried to the eastern part of the lines to meet the Russian detachment that menaced them, were thrown into alarm and confusion when the main Russian force appeared, in six strong columns, advancing steadily and rapidly against the Tartar left, on the western part of their position. No attempt seems to have been made to flood the ditch; and the Russian columns descended into it, crossed it, and began to clamber up the opposite rampart, while their batteries poured a heavy fire upon the parapet, and prevented the Tartars from forming so as to offer any effective opposition. Terrified at seeing the enemy thus boldly passing through the works on which they had relied, the Tartars betook themselves to flight; and the Russians surmounted the rampart, and drew up on the southern side almost without resistance. The Russian General, Manstein, who took part in the events of the day, remarks that it would probably have been impossible to force the lines in that manner against any other enemy than the Tartars. But he observes that the entrance into the Crimea would, nevertheless, have been practicable, inasmuch as the neighbouring part of the Sea of Azof is so shallow in summer that it is easily fordable, and Perekop can can thus be always turned, even if it cannot be stormed. It does not appear that either party in this campaign endeavoured to avail themselves of the all-important co-operation, which a flotilla of heavily armed gun-

boats would give, for the purpose either of attack or defence.

The tower and the city of Perekop were speedily captured by the victorious Russians; and Münnich then detached General Leóntiew with 10,000 regular troops and 3000 Cossacks to attack the fortress of Kilburun or Kilbourn,* on the extremity of the tongue of land of the same name, which projects into the Black Sea near the mouth of the River Dnieper, and opposite to Oczakof on the mainland. This was on the 4th of June; and, on the same day, the Marshal held a council of war, in which the future operations of the main army were considered. The greater number of the Russian officers were averse to entering farther into the Crimea; and they pointed out to the commander-

* Von Hammer (vol. iv. p. 323) says that the first syllable of Kilburun preserves part of the name of the Greek hero Achilles, who was in the classic times believed to have performed many exploits in these regions. I wish I could share Von Hammer's faith, though I neither doubt the prevalence of the legends about Achilles which he refers to, nor the real personal existence of Achilles himself. These legends were as old at least as the time of Euripides, who alludes to them in the Iphigenia in Tauris, l. 436. The long narrow spit of land that stretches from opposite Kilbourn nearly to the Crimea was called "The Course of Achilles," and he was worshipped here as Pontarches, or Lord of the Pontus. (See Clarke's Travels, vol. ii. p. 362.) According to another legend, the White Island (now called the Isle of Serpents), off the mouths of the Danube, was given to Achilles by his mother, Thetis; and it was the chosen dwelling-place of the spirits of the hero and his friend Patroclus. Mariners, favoured by Heaven, were, when they approached the island, visited in dreams by Achilles and Patroclus, and instructed where to land. (See Clarke's Travels, vol. ii. p. 397; and the notes to the Variorum edition of Euripides, vol. v. p. 86.) Few subjects can now be more attractive to an English classical scholar than the early traditions and history of the Tauric Chersonese and the neighbouring regions. The Argonauts, Achilles, Iphigenia, Euripides, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Diogenes, Mithridates, Ovid, are among the names indissolubly associated with scenes, to which recent events have imparted so much practical and patriotic interest.

in-chief that the army had now only twelve days' supply of bread. They urged that at least it would be prudent to halt until expected convoys of provisions arrived. But Münnich was eager for the glory of being the conqueror of the Crimea, and would not rest content with the capture of Perekop. He told his generals, that if they advanced boldly into the Tartar territory they would find the means of subsisting at the enemy's expense; and he refused to halt longer at the isthmus, and so give time for the Tartars to recover from their panic. The army accordingly moved forward across the steppes of the northern part of the Crimean peninsula; harassed incessantly by the Tartar cavalry, but protected against any serious attack by the skilful dispositions of the Marshal. Münnich formed his force into one vast hollow square composed of several battalions, each of which was also formed in square. The baggage was in the middle. This arrangement has, since his time, been generally adopted by the Russian generals when acting in open countries with forces chiefly of infantry against large masses of hostile cavalry. As Münnich advanced, he kept up his communication with Perekop and the Ukraine by forming little redoubts in favourable positions, at a short distance from each other. Each of them was garrisoned by an officer, and ten or twelve regular foot soldiers or dragoons, and thirty Cossacks. A complete chain of fortified posts was thus formed, along which intelligence was readily transmitted. General Manstein observes, that it was astonishing to the army to find how vainly the Tartars endeavoured to assail their little citadels.

Not one of them was captured; and it was only in a few instances that the Russian couriers failed to pass from post to post in safety. Besides thus preserving the army's communications, the soldiers who were posted along the line of march were charged with the useful service of making hay, and storing it up for the supply of the horses of the army on their return, when the herbage of the steppes was likely to be exhausted.

Thus arrayed, and with these precautions, the Russians moved on through the Crimea, taking also constant care to guard against the peril of fire, which they incurred from the Tartar custom of setting light to the long grass of the steppes, now dried by the fierce sun-beams of the Crimean summer. Vessels of water were ordinarily carried in the numerous waggons that accompanied the army, for the refreshment of the soldiers while on the march; and Münnich now ordered that every waggon and carriage should be provided with the means of putting out fire; and whenever the army halted, the grass and soil were dug up, and removed for the breadth of three feet round the camp. The town of Koslof, now better known as Eupatoria, on the western coast of the Crimea, was the first point on which Münnich marched on leaving Perekop. Koslof was considered at that time to be the richest commercial city in the Peninsula. It was taken and sacked by the Russians on the 17th of June. Thence Münnich led his troops to Bakchiserai (the Palace of Gardens), the ancient residence of the Khans of the Crimea. This city was also assaulted; and after a short resistance, the

Tartar garrison fled from their post. Münnich then drew his Muscovites and Cossacks up outside the defenceless town, and sent in a quarter of his army at a time to pillage for a fixed number of hours. The barbarous work was fully accomplished. Two thousand private houses, and all the public buildings were destroyed. The vast palace of the Khans, the splendid library which Selim Gherai had founded, and that which had been collected by the Jesuit mission in the Crimea, perished in the flames. Simpheropolis, to the north-east of Bakchiserai, was next attacked by the Russians; its inhabitants and its wealth were given up to the brutality and rapacity of the soldiers, its buildings to the flames. Münnich then took the road towards Kaffa, with the desire of establishing the Russian force permanently in that advantageously situated city. But his army, which had inflicted so much misery and devastation on the Crimea, was itself suffering fearfully; and the Marshal saw his ranks thinning every day, not by battle, but by disease, want, and fatigue. The Tartars laid waste the country wherever the march of the invading columns was pointed; and the barbarous cruelties of the Russians themselves co-operated in increasing their privations. General Manstein asserts that the Crimean campaign of 1736, cost Russia nearly 30,000 soldiers: and he justly censures the rashness of Münnich, who plunged with his army into the peninsula, on the sole hope that *perhaps* they would be able to subsist at the enemy's expense. He blames also the excessive severity of the Marshal in discipline, and his recklessness in imposing unnecessary

fatigues on the soldiers. He states that the Russians were so exhausted by their sufferings and trials, that men used to drop down stark dead on the march ; and that even officers died of famine and misery.* Münnich returned to Perekop on the 17th of July ; and evacuated the Crimea on the 25th of August, having first razed a considerable portion of the defences of the Isthmus. General Manstein observes as a proof of the severity of the losses which the invaders had sustained, that every Russian regiment which entered the Crimea in 1736, had its full complement at the beginning of the campaign—that is to say, each regiment of infantry was 1575 strong, and each regiment of dragoons 1231. But when the army was reviewed at Samara by Münnich at the end of September there was not a single regiment that could array 600 men round its colours. Never in the annals of warfare had the sufferings of an invading force been more deeply deserved. The whole campaign of the army under Münnich in the Crimea had been marked by the most atrocious cruelty, and the most savage spirit of devastation. No mercy was shown by the Russians to age or sex. Towns and villages were fired and their inhabitants slaughtered, even where no resistance was offered to the Russian troops. The monuments of antiquity were wantonly defaced ; libraries and schools were given to the flames ; and public buildings and places of worship were purposely and deliberately destroyed. The whole enterprise (which was commenced without any declaration of war) was

* Manstein, p. 174.

planned and conducted in a spirit of truly Scythian ferocity.*

Azof had been captured by the Russian force under General Lascy, within a short time of that officer's taking the command against the town; and while Münnich's army was in the Crimea, the Kalmuck troops of the Czarina attacked the Tartars of the Kuban in Asia, and not only prevented them from crossing the straits of Kertch to aid their kinsmen and fellow-subjects of the Porte in the Crimea, but compelled large numbers of them to renounce their allegiance to the Sultan, and to acknowledge the Russian Empress as their sovereign. Kilbourn also capitulated to General Leontiew. Russian fraud and force were almost universally triumphant in the first year of the war.

The Sultan's arms were visited but by a single gleam of success. In November, when the survivors of Münnich's army were in winter-quarters, Feth Ghirai, the new Khan of the Crimea (his predecessor Kaplan Ghirai having been deposed by the Porte for want of vigour in opposing Münnich's invasion), made an inroad into the Ukraine, defeated a body of 500 Russians, and spread devastation throughout the province. The Tartar force returned to the Crimea with a living booty of no less than 30,000 Russian captives, whom they carried off into slavery.

The Ottoman court was solicitous to put an end to the war with Russia, and made frequent attempts to

* Von Hammer, cites the indignant remarks on this invasion, made by De Castelnau, in his Essais sur l'histoire ancienne et moderne de nouvelle Russie, vol. ii., p. 60. Von Hammer himself classes Münnich with the desolators of the Palatinate, with Louvois and Catinat. Vol. 4., p. 324.

negociate a peace, sometimes through the intervention of France and Sweden, and sometimes through that of Austria, which last was insidiously proffered in the hopes of retarding and arresting the preparations of the Turks for a new campaign. The Emperor Charles VI. was, in reality, eager to share with Russia the spoliation of the Turkish provinces: and in January 1737, a secret treaty was made between the Court of Vienna and St. Petersburg, which stipulated that the Austrian armies should invade Turkey in concert with the Russian forces. But it was wished that the Emperor's troops should have the same advantage of taking the Turks by surprise, which the Russians had obtained when they attacked Azof and the Crimea without any declaration of war. The Austrian statesmen therefore feigned to be solicitous for peace; and a congress was opened at Nimirof, in which the Czarina's and the Emperor's plenipotentiaries kept up the hollow show of negociations till the November of 1737. Turkey was willing to make great sacrifices for the sake of peace; but when at last the representatives of Russia and Austria were pressed into a declaration of the terms on which they were willing to grant it, their demands were such, as not even the farther humiliations and defeats of another century have yet brought the Ottoman spirit to regard as endurable.

Russia required, first, that all the former treaties between her and the Porte should be annulled; secondly, that the Crimea, the Kuban, and all the countries inhabited by the Tartars should be ceded to her; thirdly, that Wallachia and Moldavia should be

recognised as independent principalities under the protection and suzerainty of Russia; fourthly, that the Porte should concede the title of Emperor to the sovereign; fifthly, that the Russian fleets should have free passage to and from the Mediterranean, by the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Austria asked for fresh territories in Bosnia and in Servia, and for the extension of her Wallachian frontier as far as the river Doumbovisa. The Turkish plenipotentiaries rejected their arrogant claims with becoming indignation. But the language used by them was remarked as new from Ottoman lips, inasmuch as, besides their customary references to the Koran, they appealed to the Christian gospels, and to Christian writers on the law of nations, to prove the bad faith of their adversaries. On the other side, the Russian and Austrian ministers taunted the Ottomans with the precept of Islamism which bids its followers offer to unbelievers the Koran or the sword. "How," said they, "can ye Moslems be sincere when you negociate with Christians against your law?" The Turks answered that the text which had been cited, applied only to idolators and heretics; and that the Mahometan sword ought to cease from smiting the confessors of the old Testament, the Gospel, or the Tora, from the instant when they either submitted to pay the capitulation tax, or asked for peace, which ought to be granted. They added that the Sublime Porte would make war or give peace, as was desired; and they appealed to the glory of their former victories at Mohacz and Cerestes, to prove the power of the House of Othman. They ended by asking

if the Christian religion permitted the Austrian Emperor to break the peace, to which he had recently pledged his oath on the succession of Sultan Mahmoud? One of the Austrian ministers, confused by this appeal, muttered that ambassadors were the mere servants of their courts; and he cursed the authors of the war. He added that the Ottomans themselves had been the real causers of it, by troubling Russia and making her put herself into a state of defence, so that the Emperor, as Russia's ally, was obliged to take part in the war. "It is on you, therefore, as the authors of the war," said the Austrian, "that all the miseries of this war will fall." "So be it," replied the Turk, "may the authors of the war bear the curses of the war! May God distinguish between the guilty and the innocent: and may the sword of his justice fall on the guilty only!" All present cried "Amen," and the congress terminated with this solemn anathema and international appeal of battle.

While the diplomatists of Russia and Austria had been spinning out the web of faithless negociation, their armies had attacked the Turks with equal ambition, but with far different success.

Münnich took the field two months before congress had begun its meetings at Nimirof, with an army of 70,000 men, and a park of artillery that numbered 600 pieces of different calibre. Münnich was high in favour with the court at St. Petersburgh, which cared little for the cruel sacrifice of troops by which the exploits of the last campaign had been purchased; and the resources of the empire were freely placed at

the Marshal's disposal for the new operations which his daring ambition suggested. Münnich employed the early months of 1737 in the collection of stores, and of waggons, in the formation of a flotilla of flat-bottomed gun-boats, and in perfecting the organisation and training of his army. His severity was inhuman ; but it is to him that the foundation of that iron discipline is ascribed, by which the Russian armies have ever since been distinguished.

Münnich left to General Lascy the renewal of the invasion of the Crimea. His design for the main army under his own command was to advance down the north-western coast of the Euxine and to capture the important city of Oczakof. He crossed the river Boug on the 25th of June, without experiencing the least opposition from the Turks, whose troops were slowly assembling at Bender. On the 10th of July the Russian forces encamped before Oczakof. The Turkish generals had succeeded in throwing a division of their best men into that city before Münnich had arrived, and the Russian general found that he had to deal with a garrison 20,000 strong, well provided with artillery and stores of every description. The Turks fought bravely, and made many desperate sallies, which from the number of troops engaged and the heaviness of the slaughter, deserve to be considered regular battles. Münnich's men suffered severely from want of provisions, of fascines, and other ordinary materials for carrying on a siege. Still Münnich persevered with fierce temerity, which his own generals censured, and which the Marshal's good fortune alone crowned with success.*

* Manstein, p. 210.

After a cannonade of two days a fire was observed to break out in the city, and Münnich instantly hurled his whole army on the defences, without regard to the state of the fortifications in the quarter where the assault was given, and without providing his columns with ladders or fascines, or other usual means for passing any obstacle that they might encounter. The Russians forced their way to the foot of the glacis, and found there a deep trench, which completely checked their further advance. With unflinching, but useless bravery, they remained there nearly two hours, under a heavy cannonade and musketry fire from the city, to which they replied by useless vollies. At length they broke and fled back in confusion ; and, had the Turkish commander followed up his success by a vigorous sally of the whole garrison, the siege must have been raised, and Münnich's army would have been almost certainly destroyed. But only a few hundred of the garrison followed the flying Russians, and Münnich was able before long to reform his men, and prepare for a renewal of the attack. The conflagration continued to spread in the city, and early on the morning after the first assault, the principal Turkish magazine of powder exploded, and destroyed 6000 of the defenders. The Seraskier, alarmed at this catastrophe, and seeing the flames within gathering still greater fury, and the Russians without re-assembling for the charge, hung out the white flag and capitulated, on the conditions of surrendering himself and his forces prisoners of war. While the capitulation was being arranged, the Russian Hussars and Cossacks of the Don forced their way into the city, and began to plunder it.

The Seraskier and part of his troops had already marched out to surrender, but the Russian soldiery attacked them, slaughtered many, and drove the rest back into the town. The Seraskier sent again to Münnich to say that he surrendered at discretion, and to beg quarter for himself and men. The Russian commander then sent forward a regiment of guards, who conducted the Seraskier and between 3000 and 4000 of the garrison as prisoners to the Russian camp. But great numbers of the Turks were massacred without mercy, and many were drowned in a vain attempt to swim off to some Turkish vessels, which had been moored near the city during the siege, but which on seeing its capture weighed anchor, and sailed with the evil tidings to Constantinople. The bodies of more than 17,000 Turks were buried by the victorious Russians when they took possession of Oczakow. They had themselves lost in killed and wounded during their short, but sanguinary siege, nearly 4000 men. Disease, want, and fatigue were, as usual, still more deadly scourges to the invaders. Münnich found that his army was less strong by 20,000 men than it had been at the commencement of the campaign. He had projected a further advance upon Bender, but a report that the Turks had fired the steppes which it would be necessary to cross in a march upon that city, and the enfeebled state of his army, made him determine on returning to the Ukraine, after repairing the fortification of Oczakof, and leaving a strong garrison to secure his conquest.

In the meanwhile Lascy attacked the Crimea with a

force of 40,000 men, supported by a fleet under Admiral Bredal in the Black Sea, and by a flotilla of armed rafts and gun-boats, which Lascy caused to be constructed in the Sea of Azof. The Khan of the Crimea had repaired the lines of Perekop with great care, and posted his army behind them, with the intent to defend them much better against Lascy then they had been defended by his predecessor against Münnich. But Lascy marched his army along the narrow bank of land which extends from near Yenitchi on the mainland towards Arabat in the Crimea, nearly across the whole entrance of the Putrid Sea. He formed bridges of casks and rafts over the gaps in this perilous water, and entered the Crimea on the 23rd of July 1737 ,without the loss of a single man.* He defeated the Tartars near Karasou Bazaar, and then led his men up and down through the devoted country, pillaging, burning, and slaying, after the manner of Münnich's troops in the preceding year. Lascy left the Crimea in August by a bridge, which he formed over the narrow part of the Putrid Sea near Schoungar. The Russians boasted that during this short invasion they had burnt 6000 houses, thirty-eight Mosques, two churches, and fifty mills.

Austria commenced her treacherous attack upon

* Lascy took this bold measure against the remonstrances of all his generals except one. They came in a body to his tent, and protested against the risk to which he was exposing the army. Lascy replied that there was risk in all military operations, and that they might return if they liked. He made his secretary write their passports, and even ordered out 200 Dragoons, who were to escort them to the Ukraine, where they were to remain until his return from the campaign. Awed by his firmness, the refractory chiefs gave way, but it was three days before Lascy would pardon them. Lascy was an Irishman.

Turkey in 1737, by suddenly assailing the city of Nissa, in imitation of Münnich's advance against Azof in the preceding year. One Imperialist army, under Field-Marshal Seckendorf, entered the Ottoman territory in Servia in the month of July; and at the same time other Austrian forces were marched against the Turkish possessions in Bosnia. Nissa was captured without difficulty; and Seckendorf then sent part of his army against Widdin; but the Turks had time to strengthen the garrison of that city, and the invaders perished rapidly by disease and want in their marches and counter-marches along the banks of the Timok and the Danube. The Austrians had begun the war in a spirit of overweening pride in their own military skill and prowess, and in arrogant contempt of their enemy. Full of recollections of the triumphs of Eugene, they thought that the superiority, which under that great captain they had maintained over the Ottomans, was certain to continue, and that to advance against the Turks was necessarily to conquer. The cabinet of Vienna was even more arrogant and rash than the officers whom it employed. When one of the generals proposed to the army-board at Vienna that the palpable weakness of the artillery force should be remedied, by providing each battalion with two field-pieces, his request was rejected, on the principle that the Emperor's armies had always defeated the Turks notwithstanding any deficiency in cannons, and that the same would continue to be the case. The natural results of such a spirit in the camp and council were visible early in the campaign. It was found that the Turks fought with courage and

skill ; and rash attempts on the part of the Imperialists met with severe repulses. At the first appearance of reverse the Austrian generals began to quarrel among themselves, and the calamities of their troops soon increased. On the Turkish side the Grand Vizier took the command, ably assisted by the French renegade Bouneval, the fruits of whose military ability were manifested in the unusual accuracy of the manœuvres of the Ottoman forces, and in the improved discipline of the troops. After a short and inglorious campaign Seckendorf led the remains of his army back into Hungary. The Turks recovered Nissa and penetrated at several points into the Austrian territories. In Bosnia the result of the campaign was similar. The Mahometan population of that province resisted the invading Imperialists with enthusiastic valour ; and though the Austrian troops at first gained some advantages, they were before the close of the year driven back out of Bosnia with disgrace and loss.

In the following year the Emperor placed new generals at the head of his armies, and a new Grand Vizier, Yegen Mahommed Pacha, led the Ottomans against them. The Turks did not wait for the advance of the Austrians, but acted on the offensive in great force and with remarkable boldness. They took Meadia in Hungary, and laid siege to the important fortress of Orsova on the Danube. The Austrians were successful in an action at Kornia near Meadia (4th July, 1738) against Hadji Mahommed, but their loss of men was greater than that of the Turks ; and the Grand Vizier coming up with fresh forces, drove the Imperialist army

back; captured Semendria, and resumed the siege of Orsova, which surrendered to the Ottomans on the 15th of August. The Austrian commanders, disunited and disheartened, led their troops back in precipitate retreat within the walls and lines of Belgrade. The Turkish cavalry followed them, and occupied the heights near that city, where the Imperialist army lay shamefully inactive, and became the prey of pestilential disorders. A body of Austrian hussars that ventured to encounter the Turks, was routed with severe loss; and the Grand Vizier, when he recalled his cavalry from Belgrade, closed the campaign amid merited honours and rewards, which the Sultan caused to be distributed to the general and officers of the army, and to every private soldier who had distinguished himself by bravery and good conduct.

Though less brilliantly successful against the Russians, the Turks during the year 1738, prevented those formidable enemies from making any important progress along the coast of the Black Sea. Marshal Münnich again led his army across the Dnieper and the Boug, and defeated several bodies of Turkish and Tartar troops, that encountered him near those rivers. But on arriving at the Dniester he found a powerful Ottoman army strongly entrenched in a position, which he was unable to force, and which barred his intended advance for the purpose of besieging Bender. Several conflicts took place, in one of which, according to the account, Sasi Ghirai, the Seraskier of Boudjak, with 20,000 Tartars and an equal number of Ottomans, dealt a severe blow on the Russian army. In the

inflated style of the Ottoman writers, "A great number of the accursed ones, destined to hell, took the fatal leap over the arch formed by the sparkling sabre of the True Believers, into the infernal gulf." But disease and the want of supplies were as usual much more deadly enemies to the Russians than either Turkish or Tartar swords; and Münnich returned in the autumn to the Ukraine, with an army that had accomplished little and suffered much.

Marshal Lascy repeated the invasion of the Crimea in the July of this year. He appeared with an army of from 30 to 35,000 men at the northern part of the isthmus of Perekop; and the Khan, who thought that the Russians now really meant to penetrate the Crimea by that route, prepared for an obstinate defence of the lines. But Lascy turned them without the loss of a life. The inlet of the Sea of Azof (called the Putrid Sea) which adjoins the eastern side of the Isthmus, is shallow at all times, and especially so in summer. The consequence is, that if the wind at that season blows for a few hours strongly from the west, and drives back the water, the passage from the mainland to the Crimea may be effected without making use of the isthmus of Perekop. On the 7th of July the favourable wind sprang up; and Lascy instantly formed his army in a single line along the coast and marched them across the bed of the gulf, before the wind had lulled and the waves returned. A few baggage-waggons, that followed in the rear, were lost, the wind having ceased to blow from the west soon after the Russian troops had effected their passage. Lascy immediately

took the Tartar position at Perekop in the rear. That city surrendered on the 8th; and the Russians were successful in an engagement on which the Tartars ventured against part of Lascy's army. Lascy's object in this campaign was to obtain possession of Kaffa, then the strongest place in the Crimea, and the mastery of which was considered to involve the conquest of the whole peninsula. But the ravages of the Russian armies in the preceding years had so wasted the country, that Lascy could not find the means of subsistence for his army. The Russian fleet, which was ordered to bring him supplies, was blown off the coast and severely damaged by a storm. After a few ineffectual marches and counter-marches the Russians were obliged to return to Perekop and thence to their own country.

Negotiations for peace had been frequently resumed during the war; and in the winter of 1738, fresh attempts to terminate hostilities were made under the mediation of France. But these were baffled by the exorbitant demands which the Russian court continued to put forward. Marshal Münnich was the great inspirer of this ambitious spirit in the councils of the Czarina, and the vehement opposer of peace. He had repaired to the Russian capital at the close of the campaign of 1738, and employed all his influence to cause the continuance of the war, and to induce Russia to strike boldly for the conquest of Constantinople itself. He proposed to effect this not merely by Russian arms, but by raising the Christian subjects of the Turk against their master. He pointed out to the court of St. Petersburg what was the true state of the Ottoman

Empire in Europe, with its Mahometan population so many times outnumbered by the millions of Rayahs, who had been oppressed for centuries, but who had never ceased to hate their conquerors, and who were now watching with anxious joy the progress of the Russian power. He told the Czarina that all the Greeks regarded her as their legitimate sovereign, and that the strongest excitement prevailed among them. "Now," he said, "now is the time to take advantage of their enthusiasm in our cause, and to march upon Constantinople, while the effect which our victories have produced is fresh and vivid. Such an opportunity may never be offered again."* The Empress Anne adopted readily this "Oriental project," as it was termed, of Marshal Münnich. The army in the south of Russia was largely recruited, and emissaries were sent into Epirus and Thessaly to prepare the inhabitants for a rising against the Turks. Münnich determined in 1739 to gain the right bank of the Dniester without exposing his troops to the sufferings and losses, which he knew by experience were the inevitable attendants of the march along the north-western coast of the Euxine. He accordingly led his army into Podolia, audaciously violating the neutral territory of the Polish Republic, in spite of the remonstrances that were addressed to him against this contemptuous breach of the law of nations. Spreading desolation round them as if in an enemy's country, Münnich's Muscovites and Cossacks traversed Podolia, and crossed the Dniester into Moldavia at Sukowza, (12 August, 1739,) about six leagues from

* Ruhiere i. 164; iii. 286. Emerson Tennent's Greece, ii. 301.

the Turkish fortress of Khoczin. The Seraskier of Bender, Veli Pasha, took up a position in front of Khoczin, but was completely defeated on the 18th of August, and Khoczin surrendered a few days after the battle to the Russians. Münnich proclaimed Cantemir, (a descendant of the former rulers of Moldavia,) Prince of Moldavia under Russian protection, and Cantemir immediately raised the natives in arms against the Ottomans and the Sultan's viceroy. Münnich marched upon Jassy, the capital of the province, and he and Prince Cantemir entered that city without opposition. Thence the Russian general wheeled into Bessarabia, intending to reduce Bender, and the other strong places of that district, and so secure his base of operations before he advanced southward into the heart of European Turkey. But he was checked in the mid career of triumph by tidings of the disastrous defeats which his Austrian allies had been sustaining on the Upper Danube, and of the still more disgraceful terms on which they had begged peace of the common enemy.

Yegen Mohammed had given offence to Sultan Mahmoud, and had been superseded by Elhadj Mohammed Pacha. The new Grand Vizier, like his predecessor, took the command against the Imperialists: and it may well be credited that he caused the best troops of Turkey, and especially the veterans who had returned from the Persian wars, to be enrolled in his own army, while the recruits and inferior regiments were given to the Pachas who commanded against the Russians. But the miserable imbecility of Generals Wallis and Neipperg

(the two leaders whom the Emperor Charles VI. this year gave to his armies) is of itself sufficient to account for the difference of Austria's fortunes in the field from that which the Russians obtained under Münnich's guidance.

The main Austrian force was assembled near Peterwaradin in May. It amounted to 56,000 men, without reckoning the artillerymen, or the hussars, and other light and irregular trops. Marshal Wallis intended to commence the campaign by the siege of Orsova, and he had positive orders from the Emperor to fight a pitched battle with the enemy at the first opportunity. The Austrians crossed the river Saave on the 27th of June, and marched along the right bank of the Danube towards Orsova. The Turkish army under the Grand Vizier Elhadj Mohammed Pacha, about 200,000 strong, advanced through Semendria, and took up a strong position on the high ground near Krotzka. Wallis on approaching Krotzka thought that he had only a detachment of the Turks to deal with; and hurried forward through a deep defile with only the cavalry of his army to the encounter. On debouching from the hollow way the Austrian horse regiments found themselves among vineyards and tracts of underwood, where it was impossible for them to form line or charge; and they were assailed in all directions by a heavy musketry fire from the Turkish infantry, which the Vizier had skilfully posted round the mouth of the defile. Unsupported by any foot or artillery, the Austrian cavalry suffered severe loss, and was driven back in disorder through the pass. The Turks advanced,

occupying the heights on either side of the road, and assailed the right wing of the Austrian infantry. A furious engagement was maintained in this part of the field till sunset; when Wallis drew back his troops to Vinza. The Austrian loss in the battle of Krotzka was more than 10,000 in killed and wounded; and though the Turks also had suffered severely in the latter part of the action, they were in the highest degree elated by their victory. The Austrian general, whose despondency equalled his former presumption, soon fell back upon Belgrade. The Turks followed, and opened their batteries against the city, the soldiers exclaiming, "Let us take advantage of the panic and blindness which God has inflicted upon the unbelievers, for having broken the peace of Passowitz." * Wallis and Neipperg now endeavoured to obtain terms from the Grand Vizier; and a series of negotiations ensued, in which the Austrian generals and plenipotentiaries showed infatuation, cowardice, and folly even greater than general Mack afterwards displayed in the memorable capitulation of Ulm. The French ambassador Villeneuve came to the Grand Vizier's camp near Belgrade to give the mediation and guarantee of France to the pacification which Wallis and Neipperg sought with almost shameless avidity. Preliminary articles were signed on the 1st of September, by which Austria was to restore to the Porte the city of Belgrade, and all the districts in Bosnia, Servia and Wallachia, which the Emperor had taken from the Sultan at the peace of Passarowitz. As a security for the execution of these preliminaries, a

* Cox, iii. 213.

gate of Belgrade was given up to the Turks. It was stipulated by the Austrians, that Turkey should at the same time make peace with Russia; and messengers were sent accordingly to the camp of Münnich. The victorious Russian general received the intelligence of the convention of Belgrade with the greatest indignation; but he knew that it was impossible for him to resume his march upon Constantinople with the powerful and victorious army of the Vizier free to act against his flank; and Russia reluctantly consented to terminate a war, which had cost her such heavy sacrifices in treasure and in men, at the very time when her most ambitious schemes of conquest seemed to be on the eve of realisation.

The terms of the treaty of Belgrade, as finally arranged between the Porte and Austria, were substantially the same as those of the preliminary articles. The treaty * between Russia and Turkey provided that the city of Azof should be demolished, and its territory remain desert, as a border-land for the two empires. Russia was to be at liberty to erect a fortress on the Kuban, but Taganrog was not to be rebuilt. It was expressly provided by the third article of the treaty that Russia should keep up no fleet either in the Sea of Azof, or in the Black Sea, and that she should build no vessels of war on the coast of any part of those seas.† She acknowledged the independence of the Kabartas; and a commission was appointed to fix the boundary line between the two empires. This gave Russia an increase of territory on the side of the Ukraine.

* See the Appendix B. † See Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 365.

Khoczim, and the other conquests of Russia in Moldavia and Bessarabia, were restored; and the treaty gave to the subjects of both the Turkish and Russian sovereigns assurance of pardon for anything done by them during the war.

Such was the peace of Belgrade, one of the most honourable and advantageous for Turkey that she has ever made with European powers. It marks the reign of Sultan Mahmoud I. with lustre, which is the more conspicuous from the contrast between this pacification, and the humiliating and calamitous character of the treaties, by which subsequent struggles of the House of Othman with its European neighbours have been concluded.

The evil day seemed now to be long deferred. A period of rest from the perils of war, unusually long in Ottoman history, intervenes between the signature of Turkey's treaties with Austria and Russia in 1739, and the calamitous renewal of her strife with the latter power in 1768. Not that these twenty-nine years were seasons of perfect calm. A war with Persia broke out in 1743, but was terminated in 1746 by a treaty which made little change in the old arrangements between the two empires, that had been fixed in the reign of Amurath IV. There were from time to time the customary numbers of tumults and revolts in various territories of the Sublime Porte; and the governors of remote provinces occasionally assumed practical independence, disregarding the Sultan's commands, though professing allegiance to him, and handing down their power from father to son, as if they were hereditary potentates in their own right. These disorders were

sometimes quelled, and sometimes overlooked, according to the relative strength and weakness, vigilance and supineness, of the central government and the insubordinate provincials.* The most serious of these internal disturbances of the empire were those that became chronic in Egypt, proving that that magnificent conquest of Selim the Inflexible was gradually passing away from the feeble grasp of his successors.

The latter part of the reign of Sultan Mahmoud I. is made not only memorable in Turkish history, but in the general history of Mahometanism, by the rise and rapid increase of the sect of the Wahabites in Arabia. These Puritans of Islamism (of which they claimed to be the predestined reformers and sole true disciples) were so named after their founder, Abdul Wahab, which means "The Servant of the All-Disposer." Abdul Wahab, was born at Alaynah, in Arabia, near the end of the seventeenth century of the Christian era, and about the beginning of the twelfth century after the Hejira. His father was Sheikh of his village, and young Abdul Wahab was educated in the divinity schools at Bassorah, where he made rapid progress in Mahometan learning, and at the same time grew convinced that the creed of the Prophet had been overlaid by a foul heap of superstition, and that he himself was called on to become its reformer. He returned to Arabia, where, fearless of danger, and unbaffled by temporary failure, he proclaimed his stern denunciations of the prevalent tenets and practices of the Mosque and State. He inveighed particularly against the

* See Porter's Turkey by Larpent, vol. i. p. 270.

worship of saints, which had grown up among the Mahometans, against their pilgrimages to supposed holy places, and against their indulgence in several pleasures which the Koran prohibited, especially that foul form of profligacy, which had become almost nationalised among the Turks and other chief peoples of the East. He at first met with ridicule and persecution from those to whom he preached; but he gradually made converts; and at length his doctrines were adopted by Mohammed Ben-Sououd, the Scheikh of the powerful tribe of the Messalikhs, who at the same time married Abdul Wahab's daughter. The new sect now became a formidable political and military body: Abdul Wahab continuing to be its spiritual chief, but the active duties of military command being committed to Ben Sououd, who enforced the new faith by the sword, as had been done previously by the Prophet and the early Caliphs. Aziz, the son, and Sououd, the grandson of Mohammed Ben Sououd, continued the same career of armed proselytism with increased fervour; and the Wahabite sect spread through every region of Arabia. The attempts of successive Sultans and Pachas to quell this heresy and rebellion were vain, until the late Pacha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, undertook the task. He overthrew the temporal empire of the Wahabites, and sent their last Emir in chains to Constantinople, where he was beheaded in 1818. But the Wahabite doctrines are said still to prevail among many of the Bedouin tribes.*

* See Biographical Dictionary, commenced by the Useful Knowledge Society, title, Abdu-l-Wahhab.

The pacific policy maintained by Turkey towards Austria upon the death of the Emperor Charles VI. in 1740, is the more honourable to the Ottoman nation, by reason of the contrast between it and the lawless rapacity, which was shown by nearly all the Christian neighbours of the dominions of the young Austrian sovereign, Maria Theresa. The King of Prussia, the Elector of Bavaria, the Elector of Saxony, and the Kings of France, Spain, and Sardinia, agreed to dismember the Austrian Empire; and began the war of spoliation (called the war of the Austrian Succession) which was terminated by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748. Sultan Mahmoud not only scrupulously abstained from taking any part against Austria, the old enemy of his House, but he offered his mediation to terminate the hostilities which raged between the powers of Christendom. With equal justice and prudence the Turks took care not to become entangled in the other great European contest, which followed that of the Austrian Succession after no very long interval; and which, from the period of its duration (1756—1763) is known in history as The Seven Years War.

Sultan Mahmoud I. had died (1754) before the outbreak of this last-mentioned contest; but his brother and successor, Othman III., adhered to the same system of moderation and non-interference which his predecessor had established; and he thus preserved peace for the Ottoman Empire during his three years' reign, from 1754 to 1757. He was succeeded by Sultan Mustapha III., the son of Sultan Achmet III. The name of Mustapha has always been accompanied in Turkish

history by calamity and defeat; and we now approach the time, when, under the third Sultan of that inauspicious designation, the struggle between the Porte and Russia was resumed, with even heavier disasters to Turkey, than those which she endured when she strove against Austria and Prince Eugene in the reign of Sultan Mustapha II.

The first years, however, of Mustapha III. were not unpromising or unprosperous. The administration of the affairs of the empire was directed by the Grand Vizier Raghib Pacha, a minister, not perhaps equal to the great Ottoman statesmen, Sokolli and the second and third Kiuprilis, but a man of sterling integrity, and of high diplomatic abilities. He turned the attention of the Sultan (who showed a perilous restlessness of spirit), to the construction of public works of utility and splendour. The most important of these undertakings, was the project, so often formed, and so often abandoned, of making a canal which should give a communication between the Black Sea and the Gulf of Nicomedia, in the Sea of Marmora, without passing through the Bosphorus. For this purpose it was proposed to dig a channel from the eastern extremity of the gulf of Nicomedia to the lake of Sabandja; and to form another from the lake of Sabandja to the river Sakaria, which falls into the Black Sea. The commercial advantages of such a canal would be great; and the Turks would be enabled to use the lake of Sabandja as a naval depôt of complete security, and of ample capacity for fleets of the greatest magnitude, which could rapidly issue thence as emergencies required

either into the Euxine or the Propontis. This mode of uniting the two seas had been attempted before the commencement of the Ottoman Empire, twice by the kings of Bithynia, and once by the Emperor Trajan. Three Sultans, Solyman the Great, Amurath III., and Mohammed IV., had commenced the same enterprise before Mustapha III. But it had never been completed; though the distances to be trenched through are inconsiderable, and the engineering difficulties presented by the character and elevations of the soil are said to be few and trivial. Sultan Mustapha abandoned the project in 1759, after having caused great interest and excitement among the French and English residents at Constantinople, who were anxious for the accomplishment of the design, and who in vain urged the Turks to persevere. Von Hammer observes that the realisation of this great work can then only be hoped for, when it is taken up by European energy and skill.* Perhaps, therefore, our own generation will see it resumed and accomplished.

The chief efforts of Raghib Pacha himself were directed to the strengthening of Turkey against the inveterate hostility of the courts of Vienna and St. Petersburgh, by alliances with other states of Christendom. The results of the War of Succession, and of the Seven Years War, had been to bring Prussia forward as a new power of the first magnitude in Europe. Prussia, from her geographical position, had nothing to gain by any losses which might befall Turkey; and both Austria and Russia had been bitter

* Von Hammer, vol. iv., p. 517.

and almost deadly foes to the great sovereign of the House of Brandenburg, Frederick II. A treaty therefore between Prussia and Turkey seemed desirable for the interests of both states; and many attempts had been made to effect one, before Raghib Pacha held the seals as Grand Vizier. At length in 1761, the envoy of Frederick II., to Constantinople, signed a treaty of amity between Prussia and the Porte, similar to treaties which the Turkish Court had already concluded with Sweden, Naples, and Denmark. But Raghib Pacha's design was to convert these preliminary articles into a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. The English ambassador strove earnestly to forward this scheme, while the ministers of Austria and Russia endeavoured to retard and baffle it. Considerable progress had been made in the negotiations, when the death of Raghib Pacha in 1763 put an end to a project, which, if successful, would certainly have been followed by a new war with Austria. In that war the Prussians would have co-operated with the Turks, and it might have materially varied the whole current of subsequent Ottoman history.

CHAPTER VII.

RUSSIAN ATTACK ON POLAND—TURKISH REMONSTRANCES—WAR WITH RUSSIA—OPINIONS OF EUROPE—DEFEATS OF THE TURKISH ARMIES—RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—BATTLE OF TCHESME—EXPLOITS OF HASSAN OF ALGIERS—LOSS OF THE CRIMEA—NEGOTIATIONS—WAR RENEWED—SILISTRIA AND SHUMLA DEFENDED—DEATH OF MUSTAPHA III.—ABDUL HAMID SULTAN—TREATY OF KAINARDJI.*

After the death of Raghib Pacha in 1763, Sultan Mustapha III. governed for himself. He was a prince of considerable industry and talent, and honestly desirous of promoting the interests of the Ottoman empire; but he was hasty and headstrong, and he often proved unfortunate during the latter part of his reign in his selection of councillors and of commanders. And the sceptre of the power most inimical and most formidable to Turkey, was now grasped by one of the most ambitious, the most unscrupulous, and also the ablest sovereigns that ever swayed the vast resources of the Russian empire. Catherine II. (who has been termed with such terrible accuracy both as to her public and private character, the Semiramis of the North) reigned at St. Petersburg. A military revolution had placed her on the throne instead of her

* Van Hammer, books 70—72.

weak and pacific husband; and it was only by preserving the favour of the Russian army, and gratifying the fanaticism of the Russian people, that she could hope to preserve her royalty or her life. The military chiefs, by whom her husband had been murdered, and who were her own personal favourites, the Orloffs, and their associates, were eager for hostilities in which they might gratify their rapacity and pride, and display the courage which was their only merit. The Porte watched with anxiety and alarm the aggressive but insidious policy, which was pursued towards every weak state that was within the sphere of Russian influence. That policy was to foment disturbances and civil war; to interfere in the pretended character of a friend of the weaker party; to sow the seeds of new and worse dissensions; and then to make the misery and anarchy, which Russian arts had produced, the pretext for the subjugation of the exhausted state by Russian arms. It was in Poland "that commonwealth of common woe" * that this Muscovite Machiavellianism was chiefly practised during the first years of Catherine's reign. Prussia, unhappily for herself and Europe, became the accomplice of Russia against Poland. Frederick II. no longer sought the alliance of Turkey against his old enemies at Vienna and St. Petersburgh; but concluded, in 1764, a treaty with Catherine, by which the two parties mutually pledged themselves to maintain each other in possession of their respective territories; and agreed, that if either power were attacked, the other should supply an auxiliary

* The phrase is Sir Walter Raleigh's, applied by him to Ireland.

force of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse. But it was expressly provided that if Russia were assailed by the Turks, or Prussia by the French, the aid should be sent in money. There was also a secret article to this treaty, which was directed against Polish independence, and which has earned for this confederacy between Russia and Prussia, the name of "the Unholy Alliance of 1764, whence, as from a Pandora's box, have sprung all the evils that have afflicted and desolated Europe from that time until the present day."*

The Ottoman Court protested continually but vainly against the occupation of Poland by Russian and Prussian troops; against the disgraceful circumstances of fraud and oppression, under which the election of Catherine's favourite, Stanislaus Poniatowski, as king, was forced upon the Poles; and against the dictatorship which the Russian general Repnin exercised at Warsaw. The Turkish remonstrances were eluded with excuses so shallow, as to show the contempt with which

* "This was that unholy alliance which, from 1764 till the present day, has proved the source of all the misfortunes of the European nations, because it has served as a model for all the treaties which have been since concluded, by means of which the fate and internal administration of the weaker states have become wholly dependent on the compacts, arms, and diplomatists of powerful nations. This first treaty was against the Poles; and those by which it has been followed, and which have been drawn up after its model, have been concluded against the liberties of the nations; and in this way the seeds of discontent and discord between the governed and those who govern, have continued to grow and fructify till the present day. As soon as the rights of the bayonet were once made good against Poland and Turkey, they were also regarded as good against the freedom and rights of the people. The oppressed have gnashed their teeth in despair, and waited for the visitations of the divine vengeance, which has followed close upon the footsteps of those insolent and tyrannical oppressors for five-and-twenty years, and will one day overtake them as sure as the world is under the superintendence of an overruling Providence."—Schlosser's "History of the Eighteenth Century."

the Russians must now have learned to regard their Ottoman neighbours, both in diplomatic and warlike capacities. Von Hammer expressly writes, that "the exchange of notes between the Turkish, Prussian, and Russian ministers on the affairs of Poland till January, 1768, is a singular proof of the simplicity of the Ottoman diplomacy, and of the duplicity of that of Russia and Prussia at this epoch. The Turkish government, through their interpreters, continued from time to time to put the most pressing questions to the ministers of these courts, seeking for an explanation of the deeds of violence which were taking place in Poland. The Russian resident always pretended that he heard nothing of such events, or declared that these were merely measures for the protection of the freedom of the republic, and for the maintenance of solemn engagements."

Sultan Mustapha and his viziers at last felt that they were treated as dupes and fools; and the indignation raised at Constantinople against Russia was violent. This was augmented by the attacks made by the Russian troops on the fugitive Poles of the independent party, who had taken refuge within the Turkish frontier; and who sallying thence carried on a desultory warfare against their enemies, which the Russians retaliated at every opportunity, without heeding whether they overtook the Polish bands beyond or within the Ottoman dominions. At last the Russian general Weissman followed a body of the confederated Poles into the town of Balta, on the confines of Bessarabia, which belonged to the Sultan's vassal, the Tartar Khan of the Crimea.

The Russians besieged the town, took it by storm, plundered, and laid it in ashes. Turkey had received proofs of Russian hostility in other regions. There had been revolts in Montenegro and in Georgia, and there had been troubles in the Crimea, all of which were aggravated, if not created, by Russian agency. The Divan resolved, on the 4th of October, 1768, that Russia had broken the peace between the two empires, and that a war against her would be just and holy. But it was determined that the Grand Vizier should have a final interview with M. d'Obresskoff, the Russian Minister at Constantinople, and inform him that peace might be preserved, but solely on condition that Russia should bind herself under the guarantee of her four allies, Denmark, Prussia, England, and Sweden, to abstain from all future interference with elections to the crown of Poland, or in the religious differences in that kingdom; that she should withdraw her troops from Poland, and no longer hinder the Poles from enjoying full liberty and independence. Obresskoff was summoned to an audience by the Grand Vizier, who interrupted the complimentary speeches of the Russian diplomatist by showing him a paper, by which Obresskoff had pledged himself on behalf of the Czarina, four years previously, that the Russian army of observation in Poland should be reduced to 7000 men, whereas it had been augmented to 30,000. Obresskoff replied, that this last number was exaggerated, but owned that there were 28,000 Russian soldiers in Poland.

"Traitor, perjurer!" cried the Vizier. "Hast thou

not owned thy faithlessness? Dost thou not blush before God and man for the atrocities which thy countrymen are committing in a land which is not theirs? Are not the cannons, which have overthrown a palace of the Khan of the Tartars, Russian cannons?"

The Vizier required him to sign instantly a paper containing the pledge on which the Divan had determined. Obresskoff replied that he had not sufficient authority for such an act. The declaration of war was then pronounced, and the Russian minister was sent to the prison of the Seven Towers; an impolitic as well as unjustifiable act of violence on the part of the Turks, which enabled the Russian Empress to represent herself to the world as the injured party; although the war had been sought by her, and all the acts of aggression which caused it, had been deliberately planned by the Russian Cabinet.

The general feeling of Europe was favourable to the Empress. England in particular, though she offered her mediation to prevent the Turkish war, was, at this period and for many years afterwards, desirous of seeing the power of Russia augmented, and of uniting her with Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and England herself, in a great Northern alliance in opposition to the combination of France and Spain under the House of Bourbon. This design had been formed by Lord Chatham (then Mr. Pitt) during the Seven Years' War; and it continued to be a favourite project of English statesmen. The French minister Choiseul naturally regarded Russia with very different feelings. But that great statesman also discerned how necessary it was to

watch jealously the growth of the Muscovite power, not only for the sake of French interests, but for the sake of the general commonweal of Europe. Choiseul now, at the outbreak of the war between Russia and Turkey in 1763, laboured anxiously to make the English ministry understand the true character of Russian power and ambition. His efforts were vain, but one of his state papers on the subject deserves citation. Referring to the well-known desire of England for a Northern Alliance, Choiseul said :—

"The English secretary of state is in the wrong : he does not look at these objects from the higher point of view, which should engage the attention of a great minister. Nothing can be more dangerous for the happiness and repose of humanity, nor more to be feared for the principal powers of Europe, than the success of the arms and the ambitious projects of Russia. Far from seeking, on such a supposition, the alliance and the friendship of the Empress, it would become their most essential interest to unite to diminish her strength and destroy her preponderance. If the balance of power, that unmeaning word, invented by William III., on becoming king of England, to raise all Europe against France, could have a just application, and if this pretended balance of power could be annihilated, it would be by the prodigious increase of the material and moral strength of Russia. She is now labouring to enslave the south ; and she will next encroach on the liberty of the north ; unless an effective check is seasonably put to her inordinate passion of despotism.

"Instead of contributing to the aggrandisement of Russia, the principal courts ought jointly to restrain her ambition and her cupidity, which may in some respects realise the chimerical idea, once attributed to France, of aiming at universal monarchy." *

However just their cause, the Turks began the war too soon. When Sultan Mustapha issued his declaration of hostilities against Russia in the autumn of 1768, his anger had got the mastery over his judgment. He should have endured the affronts offered to him a little longer, and not taken up arms before the summer of the following year. He might then have had the full force of his empire in readiness to make good his threats. But it was impossible to bring his Asiatic troops together during the winter, and the opening of the campaign on the Dniester and Danube was thus delayed till the spring of 1769; a delay which enabled the Russians to make ample preparations for assailing Turkey on almost every part of her northern frontier, both in Europe and Asia. Neither were the Turkish fortresses in a proper state of repair, or sufficiently stored, when the war was proclaimed at Constantinople. The Ottoman government endeavoured to make good these defects during the winter; but the spring found the Turkish equipments still far from a due state of efficiency.

One bold leader, on the side of the Moslems, and almost the only one who displayed any warlike abilities in support of the Crescent during the first years of this

* Choiseul to Châtelet, April 16, 1769, cited in Bancroft's "America," vol. iii. p. 298.

disastrous war, made a vigorous onslaught on the southern provinces of the Czarina's empire long before the other generals on either side thought it possible to bring troops into the field. This was the Tartar Khan of the Crimea, Krim Ghirai. Before the end of January, 1769, the Tartar chief collected at the ruins of Balta, which the Russians had destroyed in the preceding summer, a hundred thousand cavalry. With this vast force of hardy marauders, Krim Ghirai crossed the river Boug, and then sent one detachment towards the Doneck, and another towards Orel, while the main body under his own command swept over the Russian province of New Servia. Khan Ghirai was accompanied in this expedition by Baron de Tott, one of the ablest (though not the least vaunting) of the numerous officers and agents, whom the French minister, Choiseul, had sent into Turkey to encourage and assist the Ottomans. De Tott has minutely described the predatory activity and adroitness of the wild host which he marched with, and the stern discipline under which they were kept, amid all the seeming license of the campaign, by the military genius of their chief. For fourteen days, Krim Ghirai rode at his will through Southern Russia, with drums beating and colours flying, while his wild horsemen swept the land with an ever-widening torrent of devastation. The Khan, and his guest, the Baron, fared like the rest of the Tartars. Their food was meat, sodden and bruised between the saddle and the horses' backs, a mess of fermented mares' milk, smoked horse-hams, caviare, boutargue, and other Tartar aliments; but wine of Tokay was served to the

guest in vessels of gold. The Khan camped and marched in the middle of his army, which was arranged in twenty columns. Before him waved, together with the Turkish and Tartar standards, the colours of the Ynad Cossacks, who had abandoned the Russian empire in the time of Peter the Great, under the guidance of the Cossack Ignacius, and who had since been called Ygnad, or Ynad, which means the Mutineers. By their influence, Krim Ghirai prevailed on the Zaporofkian Cossacks to revolt against the authority of the commandant of the fortress of Elizabethgrod. A prince of the Lezghis also joined the Crimean Khan, and offered a reinforcement of 30,000 men to the Sultan's armies, on condition that certain honours should be paid him by the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, and that he should retain at the peace all the territories out of which he could drive the Russians. Had Krim Ghirai lived a few years, or even months, longer, it is probable that his ascendancy over the wild warriors of these regions, and his marvellous skill in handling irregular troops, would have materially changed the course of the war. De Tott admired the severe discipline which he maintained, while he permitted and encouraged his followers to develope against the enemy to the utmost their astonishing talent, both for acquiring booty, and for preserving it when taken. But, woe to the Tartar who pillaged without the Khan's permission, or who offered any outrage against the Khan's command! Some Noghai Tartars in the army having insulted a crucifix, received each a hundred blows of the stick in front of the church where they committed

this offence; and De Tott saw others, who had plundered a Polish village without orders, tied to the tails of their own horses and dragged along till they expired.

Krim Ghirai died within a month after his return from this expedition against Russia. It was believed that he was poisoned by a Greek physician named Siropulo, an agent of the Prince of Wallachia, against whom he had been vainly cautioned by De Tott. The Porte appointed, as the Khan's successor, Dewlet Ghirai, a prince without spirit or capacity. These were deficiencies in which he too closely resembled the Grand Vizier and the other leaders of the Sultan's forces. Meanwhile, the Empress Catherine and her generals had been preparing for the war with their characteristic energy. One Russian army, 65,000 strong, was collected in Podolia, under the command of Prince Alexander Michailovitsch Gallitzin, who was directed to besiege and capture the city of Khoczin, and then to occupy Moldavia. The second, under General Count Peter Alexandrewitsch Romanzoff, was to protect the frontiers of Russia between the Dnieper and the sea of Azof, and to reconstruct the fortresses of Azof and Taganrog, which had been razed in pursuance of the treaty of Belgrade. A third army of from 10,000 to 11,000 men was to occupy Poland, and prevent the Poles from giving any assistance to Turkey. A fourth army, under Major-General Medem, advanced from Zarizin into the Kabartas and the Kuban; and a fifth, under General Todleben, was directed upon Tiflis, in order to attack Erzeroum and Trebizond in concert with the Georgian princes of Karthli, Mingrelia,

Gouriel, and Imeritia, who had submitted themselves to the sovereignty of Russia. At the same time, money, arms, ammunition, and officers were sent to the Montenegrins; and those warlike mountaineers were set in action against the Turkish forces in Bosnia. While the Grand Vizier was slowly moving with the Sultan's main army from Constantinople to the Danube, Gallitzin passed the Dniester, and made an unsuccessful attempt upon Khoczin; after which he retreated across the Dniester. Indeed, so far as Gallitzin was concerned, the sarcasm of Frederick II. of Prussia, on the conduct of this war, was well deserved. He called it a triumph of the one-eyed over the blind. But among the other Russian commanders and generals of division were Romanzoff, Weissman, Bauer, Kamenski, and, above all, Suwarrow, in whom Frederick himself would have found formidable antagonists.

The Turkish Grand Vizier, Emin Mohammed, was the Sultan's son-in-law. How far he was qualified for the duties of generalissimo, may be judged from the report of the proceedings at a council of war which the Turkish historian, Wassif, has preserved. The Vizier had reached Isakdji (on the lower part of the Danube, near Ismail), early in May. He halted there twenty days, to complete his magazines of provisions and military stores. He then summoned his generals together and addressed them in these words,—"On what point do you think that I ought to direct the march of the army? I have no experience in war: it is for you, therefore, to determine what are the operations which are fit for us to undertake, and

which present the most favourable chances for the arms of the Sublime Porte. Speak, then, without reserve, and enlighten me with your counsels." All the generals sat for some time silent, and stared in astonishment at the Grand Vizier and each other. At length Schedh Osman Effendi began a long discourse, the pith of which was, that inasmuch as the enemy had made an unsuccessful attempt on the side of Khoczin, it was probable that they would next show themselves on the side of Bender. When the Grand Vizier comprehended the speaker's meaning, he interrupted his oratory by exclaiming, "Enough, enough! everybody must have time to speak." Some of the officers then recommended a march on Khoczin, thinking that Oczakof and Bender were strong enough to be left to their own resources. Others thought that the wisest plan was first to pass the Danube, and then act according to circumstances. The Grand Vizier approved of this policy; and the Turkish army crossed the Danube and advanced as far as Khandepé on the Pruth, between Khoczin and Jassy. The deficiency of provisions, and the swarms of gnats and musquitos which tormented the Turks in that locality, made the Grand Vizier change his line of operations and march towards Bender. They halted at Jassipede (June 9, 1769), where they found the supplies of food equally scarce, and the gnats and musquitos equally abundant as at Khandepé. Meanwhile, Gallitzin had reorganised his army, and received large reinforcements in Podolia. The wretched government of Poland had been compelled by the Russians to declare war against Turkey, and Sultan

Mustapha and his Mufti issued a fetva, by which the Turkish troops were directed to attack Poland and treat it as a hostile country. A series of operations and skirmishes in the neighbourhood of Khoczin followed, in which Prince Gallitzin and the Grand Vizier rivalled each other in imbecility. At last, the numerous complaints which the Sultan received against his son-in-law, made him recall Emin Mohammed, who was beheaded at Adrianople in August. Ali Moldowandji, who had distinguished himself in some engagements near Khoczin, succeeded Emin Mohammed in the Grand Vizierate. Ali had been a Bostandji, or gardener in the palace, and had been sent on an expedition against some gangs of robbers who infested the communications between the northern European provinces and the capital. In that enterprise, Ali captured a number of Moldavian vagrant women, whom, with their children, he sold as slaves. It was from this incident that he acquired his surname of Ali the Moldavian. On receiving the chief command of the Ottoman forces, he made several bold attacks on the Russians near Khoczin, and endeavoured to penetrate into Poland. Ultimately, the Turks were unsuccessful, and Khoczin surrendered on the 18th September, 1769. The Turkish army was now utterly disorganised, and hurried back to the left bank of the Danube, re-crossing that river at Isakdji, by the same bridge of boats that had been constructed for their passage at the beginning of the campaign. The Empress had now recalled Gallitzin, and given the chief command to Romanzoff. Under that bold and able chief, the

Russians speedily overran Moldavia, defeating the Turks at Galacz and at Jassy. Romanzoff entered the capital of the principality, and received there, in the name of the Empress Catherine, the homage of the Moldavian Boyards. The Russian influence speedily extended to Wallachia. On hearing of these events, the Sultan Mustapha, and his rash and violent adviser, the chief Mufti, published a fetva commanding the slaughter of all Moldavians and Wallachians who had submitted to the enemy; and giving authority also for the confiscation of their property, and the selling of their wives and children into slavery. The chief effect of this foolish and tyrannical edict was, as the Turkish historian, Wassif, himself observes, to bind the Moldavians and Wallachians more firmly to the cause of Russia. Some of its immediate results were, that the Wallachian Boyards, at Bucharest, solemnly placed the insignia of government in the hands of Russian commissioners, took the oath of allegiance to the Empress Catherine, and sent a deputation to St. Petersburg to protest their loyalty and implore her Imperial protection.

The same Mufti, Pirizadi Osman Effendi, who was the author of the fetvas against the Poles and the Moldo-Wallachians, endeavoured also in his rabid fanaticism to excite the Sultan to a general massacre of all the Christians in the empire. This atrocious project had twice before been mooted, in the reigns of Selim I. and Mahomet III. It was now revived for the last time; but the Mufti found no seconders or sympathizers in the Divan. He was universally abhorred for his

violence and cruelty; and his death at the end of the first year of the war was the subject of general rejoicing to his brethren, and to the great body of the Mussulman as well as the Christian subjects of the empire.

In Trans-Caucasia and Armenia the Russian generals Todleben and Medem had been uniformly successful, and had received in the Empress's name homage and oaths of allegiance from great numbers of the inhabitants. But Catherine had resolved on carrying out her project of conquering Turkey by means of its own Christian population on a bolder and grander scale in another part of the Ottoman dominions. The designs of Peter the Great and Marshal Münnich to arouse the Greeks against their Turkish master had never been forgotten at St. Petersburg, and Catherine now revived them with enthusiasm. The aged Marshal Münnich (who during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth had been banished to Siberia) was at Catherine's Court, and eagerly encouraged the Czarina to renew what had been termed his "Oriental Project." Russian emissaries had long been actively employed in the Morea, and other parts of Southern Turkey in Europe; and the Empress received numerous assurances of the devotion of the Greeks to the crown, and of their eagerness to rise against their Mohammedan oppressors. The Empress and her favourites, the Orloffs, resolved not to wait till their land armies had effected the perilous and doubtful march from the Dniester to the vicinity of Greece, but to send a Russian fleet with troops into the Mediterranean, and thus assail the Sultan in the very heart of

his power, at the same time that he was hard-pressed on the Danube, in the Crimea, and in upper Asia. The state of Egypt, where Ali Bey had made himself virtual sovereign, and had discarded even the appearance of allegiance to the Porte, furnished an additional motive for the expedition. It was thought that Greece, Egypt, and Syria might be rent from the House of Ottoman in a single summer; and Constantinople itself was supposed not to be safe, if a sudden and bold attack were to be made through the ill-fortified channel of the Dardanelles and the sea of Marmora. Towards the end of the summer of 1760 a Russian fleet of twelve ships of the line, twelve frigates, and a large number of transports carrying troops, left the port of Cronstadt for the Mediterranean. Count Alexif Orloff had the chief command of the expedition, and was nominated by Catherine, Generalissimo of the Russian armies, and High Admiral of the Russian fleets in the Mediterranean Sea. Admiral Spiridoff commanded the fleet under Orloff; but the real leaders in all the naval operations were Admiral Elphinstone, Captain Gregg, and other English officers, some of whom were to be found in almost every ship of the Czarina's fleet.* The equipment of this expedition was attended by great boasting and ostentation in the Russian Court, and in the numerous circles of the literary men of the age, with whom Catherine loved to correspond, and who

* Schlosser, Hist. Eighteenth Century, vol. iv. The Russian fleet never could have reached the Mediterranean, had it not been for the assistance which it received in the English ports. See the full account of the expedition in Emerson Tennant's "Modern Greece," vol. ii., and see the Oczakof debates in the House of Commons in 1792.

debased their genius and their profession by heaping flatteries on her character, and rhapsodising glory to her arms. The report that a Russian fleet was on its way along the Atlantic to liberate Greece, spread as far even as Constantinople. But the Turkish statesmen refused all credence to the rumour, and would not believe that there could be any communication between the Baltic and the Mediterranean Seas. The fact of this astounding ignorance is attested by Wassif, the Turkish historian himself. When afterwards, early in 1770, indisputable tidings reached the Divan that the Russian ships were actually approaching Greece, the Ottoman ministers made a formal complaint to the representative of Vienna that the Venetian government had permitted the Russian fleet to pass into the Mediterranean by way of the Adriatic. Von Hammer, in recording this, mentions that a similar instance of Turkish ignorance came under his own notice in 1800, when he acted as interpreter to Sir Sidney Smith in an interview with the Grand Vizier Yousouf Sia, respecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt. That Ottoman grandee denied the possibility of the English auxiliaries from India reaching Egypt by the way of the Red Sea. How lamentably had the Turks of the eighteenth century degenerated from their ancestors in the time of Solyman the Magnificent, when Turkish admirals surveyed the Archipelago, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Seas, and published scientific as well as practical treatises on their geography and on every matter connected with their navigation! *

* See Vol. i. p. 287, 288.

At the end of February, 1770, the Russian fleet was off the Morea; and Orloff landed among the Mainotes, who rose fiercely in arms against their Turkish masters. The force of Russian troops, which Orloff disembarked, was utterly insufficient to maintain order or discipline among those savage mountaineers, and their countrymen from the rest of Greece, who also joined him in large numbers. They practised the most revolting cruelties upon all the Turks whom they could overpower in the open country or less defensible towns; Misitra, the chief place in Maina, in particular, was the scene of fearful atrocities, afterwards still more fearfully revenged. Four hundred Turks were slaughtered there in cold blood; and Ottoman children, torn from their mothers' breasts, were carried up the tops of the Minarets, and thence dashed to the ground. At Arkadia the Turkish garrison surrendered to the Russian general, Dolgorouki, on the faith of articles of capitulation which guaranteed their lives. Dolgorouki's Greek followers slew them all, and burnt the town to the ground. In the stronger cities the Turks repelled all the assaults of Orloff and his Greek brigands. He was obliged to raise the sieges of Modon and Coron; and on the 8th of April the Albanian troops, which several of the Turkish Beys had drawn together from beyond the isthmus, encountered the main body of the Russo-Greek force near Tripolitza. The Greeks thought themselves so sure of victory, that they had brought women with them, with sacks ready to be loaded with the spoil of the Mussulmans. But they were utterly defeated, and massacred without mercy in the flight. After having

issued some vaunting manifestoes, in which he called on the Greeks to imitate the example of their fellow-Christians of the true church in Moldavia and Wallachia, who, he said, had risen to the number of 600,000 in defence of their faith and freedom, Orloff reimbarked his troops, and the Turkish Seraskier, Mouhinzadi, who had commanded at Tripolitza, assumed the title of "Fatihi Mora," which meant that he had reconquered the Morea.

At sea, the Russian undertakings were more successful, because (it is a German historian who makes the statement) they were under the direction of Englishmen. On the 7th of July, 1770, Orloff's fleet came in sight of the Turkish near the Isle of Scios. Sultan Mustapha had, throughout his reign, paid especial attention to his navy; and the Turkish Kapitan Pacha, Hosameddin, had now under his command a force which the Turkish writers describe as two corvettes, fifteen galleons, five xebecques, and eight galliotes: it comprised one ship of 100 guns, one of 96, four of 84, one of 74, one of 70, and six of 60. The Russians had eight ships of the line and seven frigates. The Turks were worsted in the action, which was chiefly memorable for the desperate bravery shown by one of the Sultan's admirals, named Hassan of Algiers. This man had been born on the frontiers of Persia, and was, while a child, sold as a slave. He had been a boatman, a soldier, a corsair, and had acquired such reputation in the Algerine squadrons, as to be raised to the rank of Port Admiral of Algiers. A quarrel with the Dey sent him to Italy as a refugee. Thence he found

his way to Constantinople, and acquired the favour of Raghib Pacha. At the battle of Scio, while his superior officer kept at a distance from the enemy, Hassan ran his ship alongside that of the Russian admiral, and fought yard-arm and yard-arm, till both vessels caught fire by the Russian hand-grenades, and blew up together. Spiritoff and Theodore Orloff escaped in the Russian ship's boats before the explosion, in which 700 of their men perished. Hassan kept the deck to the last; and, though severely injured, escaped with life, and swam to shore. The defeated Turkish ships took refuge in the port of Tchesmé, the ancient Cyssus, where the Roman fleet, B.C. 191, defeated that of king Antiochus. Seeing the Turkish ships cooped together in this narrow bay, the English officers on board Orloff's fleet formed and executed the bold project of attacking them and burning them as they lay, on the very night after the battle. To use the words of the German historian Schlosser, "The whole merit of the execution of this plan was due to the English. It was three Englishmen who conducted the whole of the exploit at Tchesmé; Elphinstone blockaded the Turkish ships, Gregg directed the cannonade, and Lieutenant Dugdale was entrusted with the dangerous commission of guiding the fire-ship by which the fleet was to be set in flames. At the very moment of departure, the Russians who were with Dugdale on board the fire-ship left him exposed to the danger, leapt into the water, and swam away: he alone steered the ship, and set fire to one of the Turkish vessels, which rapidly conveyed the flames to the other

ships of the fleet. Only one ship of fifty guns and five xebecques remained unconsumed, and these were carried away by the Russians. The small town of Tchesmé, also, with its fort, batteries, and cannon, was taken."

After this signal triumph (which procured for Count Orloff the surname of Tschesmeski), Elphinstone proposed that the Russian fleet should instantly sail for the Dardanelles, force the passage, and then at once proceed to bombard Constantinople.* Such a bold stroke would probably have been successful, as the panic caused at Constantinople by the tidings from Tchesmé was extreme, and the fortifications both of the Straits and the capital had been neglected. But Orloff hesitated and lost time, while the Sultan despatched his late Vizier, Moldowandji, (who had been recalled from the Danube and deprived of the seals,) together with Baron De Tott, to strengthen and defend the Dardanelles. The proceedings of the two officers were characteristic. Moldowandji began by whitewashing the old walls of the forts, to make the Russians think the works, which looked so bright and clean, must be new or newly repaired. The Frank engineer erected four batteries, two on the European and two on the Asiatic side, so as to place any vessel, that endeavoured to pass, under a cross fire. An attempt which Orloff at last made to destroy the first Turkish fort was ineffectual; and the Russian chief then resolved to make himself master of Lemnos, and formed the siege of the castle of that island. After sixty days' investment, the Turkish garrison offered to capitulate; and, according to some

* Eton, 186. Emerson Tennant, vol. ii. 367.

accounts, the articles were actually prepared, and hostages given for their execution, when a daring exploit of Hassan of Algiers saved Lemnos, and drove Orloff discomfited from his prey. After the sea-fight off Scio, Hassan had gone to Constantinople to be cured of his wounds. As soon as he was capable of exertion, he obtained an interview with the new Grand Vizier, and offered to raise the siege of Lemnos. He asked for no troops, or ships, or artillery, but merely for permission to collect volunteers among the population of Constantinople, for sabres and pistols to arm them with, and for some light vessels to take them to Lemnos. With 4000 such volunteers he said he should save the island. Hassan's reputation was high among the Turks of all ranks; and the fanatic rabble of the capital enrolled themselves readily for this service against the Giaours under so valiant a chief of the True Believers. The French general De Tott felt it his duty to remonstrate with the Grand Vizier against a proceeding, which seemed to be so insane, and which was in such palpable contravention of all the rules of war. The Vizier answered that he also thought Hassan's scheme absurd, but that it was sure to do good; as, if it succeeded, it would save Lemnos; or, if it failed, it would rid Constantinople of 4000 rogues and ruffians.* The event showed that the Algerine corsair knew how such work was to be done, better than the Vizier and the Baron.

* See "Mémoires du Baron de Tott," vol. ii. p. 81, cited by Lord Stanhope, "History of England," vol. v. p. 474. Compare also the reasoning of the Athenians when they let Cleon lead his expedition to Sphacteria; Thucyd. book iv. c. 28.

Landing unperceived by the besiegers with his 4000 desperadoes on the eastern side of Lemnos, Hassan, in the grey of the morning of the 10th of October, fell suddenly upon Orloff's lines, sabre and pistol in hand, cut down Russian artillerymen, soldiers, and sailors, in the trenches; and drove the rest in a panic to their ships, in which they re-embarked and abandoned the enterprise.

Raised to the chief command of what remained of the Turkish navy, Hassan, within a short time after the deliverance of Lemnos, fought a severe action against Orloff near the port of Monderos, in which each admiral claimed the victory; but, as Von Hammer observes, it is clear that the superiority was on the side of the Turks, as after the battle Orloff sailed away, having first given up, on Hassan's requisition, the hostages who had been placed in his hands by the garrison of Lemnos. The Russian armament in the Mediterranean effected little during the rest of the war, though it took possession of one of the Greek islands, frequently captured Turkish merchant-vessels, and impeded the communications between the maritime Pachalics and the capital. Orloff endeavoured to sustain the rebellion of Ali Bey of Egypt, and the Scheikh Tahir of Acre against the Porte. He concluded a treaty with the Egyptian insurgent, who at one time was not only master of Egypt and part of Arabia, but occupied Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Damascus. Ali was preparing to march into Asia Minor against the Ottomans, where his brother-in-law Abouzeheb betrayed him, and revolted against his authority, as he had

revolted against that of the Sultan. Ali Bey was defeated in Egypt by Abouzeheb, and then betook himself to Syria, where, aided by the Russian squadrons, and his friend the Scheikh Tahir of Acre, he maintained for some time the struggle against the Sultan's officers; but he was at last defeated and taken prisoner in a battle near Sahiliè, where 400 Russians who were in his army perished to a man, except four officers, who were taken prisoners.

So went the war in the South; but it was on the natural line of contest between Russia and Turkey, in the frontier lands of the weaker of the two empires, that the fortune of the combatants was decided. The inauspicious campaign of 1769 was followed there by others still more disastrous for the Ottoman arms. Moldavia was the scene of the early operations in 1770; and before the new Grand Vizier, Khalil Pacha, had reached that province, the Russian general Romanzof had defeated the advanced bodies of the Turks and Tartars, and driven them in confusion back upon the army with which the Vizier was advancing. Khalil Pacha came in presence of the enemy near Kartal. The Vizier had led and rallied a force of about 30,000 effective troops; with these he intrenched himself in front of the Russian position, while a vast host of Tartars, under Kaplin Ghirai, the new Khan of the Crimea, collected on the other side. Romanzof's troops were emboldened by repeated victories; and he knew the disaffection and demoralisation which previous defeats had created among his adversaries. He led his army in three columns

against the Vizier's camp (August 1, 1770), stormed it with inconsiderable loss, and took possession of immense treasures and stores, with which the Ottomans had cumbered themselves, and of their whole artillery, amounting to 160 pieces. The number of slain on the Turkish side was small, in consequence of the panic haste with which they fled. The Vizier reassembled a part of his host on the southern side of the Danube; and the Tartar Khan undertook to provide for the safety of the Turkish fortresses in the Dobruscha and Bessarabia. But Kaplan Ghirai was as incompetent as his predecessor Dewlet had been; and fortress after fortress fell before the Russians. Kilia, Ackerman, and Ismail surrendered after short sieges; but at Bender, in Bessarabia, the Tartar population resisted desperately. The siege lasted two months; and when the final assault was given (27th September, 1770), although the Russians by favour of a dark night and the laxity of the Turkish discipline, succeeded in escalading the walls by surprise, the conflict in the streets was maintained with equal fury on both sides for ten hours, and two-thirds of the population perished before the Russians won the town. Their own loss is said to have been so severe, as to have drawn a caution from the Empress to Count Panin, that it was better not to take such a town than to win it at such a price. Brailow, or Ibrail, on the Danube, also made a gallant defence for eighteen days, and repulsed an assault of the Russians with heavy loss; but there was no hope of relief for any of the Turkish garrisons on the Dniester or the Danube. The Grand Vizier's army

had disbanded; and that high commander was left with about 3000 half-starved men to receive tidings of the successive capture of the bulwarks of the empire. At the close of the campaign all the Turkish fortresses on the Lower Danube were in the power of the Russians, and the line of advance along the coast of the Black Sea was laid open.

A gleam of consolation came this year from the Crimea, where an attempt of the Russians to force the lines of Perekop was defeated. But in the following summer the armies of the Giaours were again directed upon the Crimean peninsula with fatal efficacy; and that splendid conquest of Mahomet II. was reft by Catherine II. from the House of Othman. Another new Khan had been appointed by the Porte, named Selim Ghirai, and the Turkish council of war judged his presence in his own country to be more important than it would be on the south of the Danube. Selim Ghirai accordingly left the Grand Vizier's camp, and repaired to Baghdjiserai, the Tartar capital of the Crimea, and the ancestral residence of its sovereigns. There Selim indulged in the pomps and pleasures of viceroyalty, until he was roused by the startling tidings that Prince Dolgorouki was before Perekop with a Russian army of 30,000 regular troops, and 60,000 Noghai Tartars, who had taken service under the Empress. Selim hurried to defend the isthmus; but the lines were stormed, a division of the Tartar army beaten by Prince Prosorofski, and the town of Perekop besieged and taken. While the siege of this place was proceeding, Selim Ghirai received intelligence that

another Russian army 10,000 strong had attacked and captured Taman on the Asiatic side of the straits of Kertch; that they had entered the Crimea on its eastern point, and were in full march for Kaffa. Bewildered by these multiplied perils, the unhappy Khan quitted an entrenched camp which he had formed at Tuzla, and hastened to Baghdjiserai. He entered his capital, almost alone, and in such a state of agitation and terror, that he was incapable of giving any commands for defence. The Russians soon appeared before the walls; and Selim then fled to Mount Karadagh, where several members of his family had collected with their followers, and had formed a fortified post. Fearing to fall into the hands of his enemies, the Khan abandoned this refuge also without striking a blow, reached the coast, and embarked with a few friends in a vessel, which conveyed them to Constantinople. This ignominious flight of the Prince deprived the Tartars of the last ray of hope. Many sought the means of leaving their fatherland, which they saw about to become the dominion of the Giaours; and considerable numbers set sail for Anatolia. Others sought to make peace with the conquerors. Dolgorouki acted with consummate craft, and promised them independence under the rule of a prince of the royal house of Ghirai, and also under the protection of the Empress of Russia. They took the oaths of allegiance to the Russian Empress accordingly, and sent forty-eight deputies of their nation, and two sons of Selim Ghirai to St. Petersburg, to implore the imperial favour of Catherine. Kaffa, Kertch, and Yenikale now opened

their gates to the Russians. Eupatoria was captured; and the Turkish Sèraskier in the Crimea, who vainly strove with his feeble force of Ottoman regular troops to stem the torrent of disaster and disaffection, was beaten in battle, taken prisoner, and sent to St. Petersburg. While waiting the gracious response of Catherine to her Crimean suppliants, Dolgorouki installed Schahin Ghirai as Khan. The Russian general received the surname of Krimski for this important conquest; and the Muscovites rejoiced that they had now completed their revenge for the ancient ignominies and oppressions which their race had formerly endured under the Tartars. Of the three great Tartar Khanates, which so long afflicted Russia, those of Kazan and Astrakhan had been overthrown by Czar Ivan the Terrible. It had been reserved for Catherine II. to strike down the last stem of the Tartar stock by subjugating the Khanate of the Crimea.*

This heavy blow to the House of Othman was poorly compensated by the successful resistance which both Oczakof and Kilburn made to the Russian forces which besieged them in the same year. On the Danube the Turks obtained some advantages in the beginning of the campaign of 1771. They recovered Giurgevo, which the Russians had taken in the preceding winter; and Mouhinzadi Mohammed, who had distinguished himself against the Russians and Greeks in the Morea, displayed equal energy and bravery as governor of Widin, which important post was now confided to his care. He crossed the Danube, and camped at Kalafat,

* See Levesque, Histoire de Russie, vol. v. p. 357.

whence he pushed his troops as far as Crajova and Kalle. He defeated the Russian general Essen, who had endeavoured to regain Giurgevo, but was himself beaten in an attack which he made upon Bucharest. The Russian generals Miloradovitch and Weissman defeated bodies of Turks at Tuldja; and altogether the Russians maintained their superiority, though their general, Romanzoff, did not press the Turks with the vigour which usually characterised his movements. Probably the despatch of Dolgorouki's army to the Crimea weakened the Russians in Bessarabia and the Principalities; and it is also certain that Romanzoff was watching the progress of the negotiations for peace which had now been commenced.

The rapid progress of the Czarina's armies, the seemingly approaching ruin of the Ottoman empire, and the establishment of Russian authority in Bessarabia and the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, had made even Austria desirous to interpose in behalf of her ancient Mahometan enemy, and to save herself from the perilous proximity of her ambitious Muscovite friends. France, England, and Russia had offered to mediate between the contending parties early in the war; but the Empress Catherine had made it a point of personal and national honour to allow no one to interfere between her and the Ottoman enemy. Romanzoff had caused an intimation to be conveyed to the Turkish government, that peace might be obtained on much easier terms by a direct application to the Empress herself, than would be granted if the agency of any third parties were employed. But the

tangled web of diplomacy was still continued; Austria, Prussia, and France being the most active in its complication. The English ambassador at Constantinople, Mr. Murray, seems to have offended equally the Turkish and his own government by some maladroit attempts which he made to gain the especial favour of the Reis Effendi, and by his not being sufficiently convinced that "Russia was the natural ally of the British Crown." * Unhappily also for the interest and honour of himself and his empire, Sultan Mustapha thought highly of his own statecraft, and followed an eccentric tortious policy, alike inconsistent with high principle or sound calculation. Indeed an universal spirit of selfish rapacity seems to have animated Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the Turkish Sultan in these negotiations; Poland being the victim which all four considered feeble enough to be plundered with impunity. It is certainly to be remembered that Turkey was at war with the nominal government of Poland; which makes the Sultan's policy towards her less execrable, than that of the three Christian powers, who were her nominal friends.

Frederick II. of Prussia, and Joseph II. of Austria (who was now associated with his mother, Maria Theresa, in the rule of that empire), had determined at a personal interview which took place between those two sovereigns, to interpose on behalf of Turkey; † but

* See Von Hammer, and see Lord Rochford's despatch, censuring Mr. Murray, in the appendix to Lord Stanhope's "History of England," vol. v.

† According to Archdeacon Coxe it was on this occasion that Frederick proposed to Joseph the partition of Poland. He places the scene of those royal consultations at the Austrian camp at Neustadt in Moravia in 1770. He

as they had not agreed on any joint line of action, their respective representatives at Constantinople, Zegelin and Thugut, made their offers of mediation in separate interviews with the Reis Effendi. In a conversation between that minister and M. de Thugut, the Turks suddenly proposed that Austria and the Porte should enter into an offensive and defensive alliance against Russia. The Reis Effendi added, "When the Russians are driven out of Poland, it will depend entirely on the pleasure of the Imperial Court whether it will place a king of its own choice on the throne of Poland, or divide the territories of that kingdom with the Porte." To this project of Polish partition (of which Sultan Mustapha himself was the author) Thugut replied, that it was not a fit time for the consideration of so vast a project, which could only be effected by a great effusion of blood, whereas the object of his communications with the Porte was to put an end to a war which had already been too sanguinary. At the same time that he was making these offers to Austria, the Sultan was treating with France for an active alliance against

states that the Austrian statesman, Prince Kaunitz, who was present, endeavoured to persuade the Prussian king to join the House of Austria in opposing by force of arms the ambitious designs of Russia, and urged that such an union was the only sufficient barrier against the torrent from the north, which threatened to overwhelm all Europe. Frederick evaded this demand, and advised that they should rather invite Russia to join with them in the partition of Poland, and either persuade or compel her to accept a portion of that country instead of retaining Moldavia and Wallachia. See Coxe's "House of Austria," vol. iii. pp. 446, 447, (Bohn's edition,) and note. Schlosser also (vol. v. p. 525) represents that Polish as well as Turkish affairs were discussed at Neustadt. I think, however, that the account of Von Hammer, which I have followed, that the scheme of dismemberiug Poland was not formally proposed by Frederick till 1771, is but borne out by the dates and tenour of the documents, which Von Hammer cites and refers to.

Russia. The French Court offered the Porte to place at its disposal a fleet of fourteen or fifteen ships of war, in return for which certain annual subsidies were to be paid by Turkey. France promised also to obtain similar assistance for the Sultan from Spain. This project, which was called the Scheme of the Maritime Alliance, was not accepted by the Porte; though the French ambassador was requested, and promised to obtain from France ships of war, stores, and artillerymen, which were to be purchased and hired at a fixed rate of payment. The Austrian minister, Thugut, obtained information of this project, and sought to conclude an engagement on the same principle between Austria and the Porte. A convention was actually signed (July 6, 1771) by which the Porte bound itself to pay a subsidy of 20,000 purses (equal to 11,250,000 florins), to cede Little Wallachia to Austria,* to liberate Austrian commerce from all taxes, and to guarantee her merchant ships from all attacks by the Barbaresque powers. Austria in return pledged herself to procure the restoration to the Porte of all the territories that Russia had conquered in the war. An instalment of the money was paid to Austria, and the troops were put in motion towards the frontiers, where they served to overawe the Turks and Poles far more than the Russians.

Russia, on her part, again endeavoured to open negotiations for peace with the Porte on the understanding that no intermeddling by any other power should be permitted; and a categorical announcement

* Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 629; Coxe's House of Austria, vol. iii. p. 457.

was made to the Austrian Court (September, 1771) that the Empress Catherine was determined to make the Crimea independent of Turkey, and to place an independent prince on the throne of Moldavia and Wallachia. Soon afterwards Frederick of Prussia notified to Austria that he designed to appropriate certain parts of Poland, especially Pomerelia; and that he should invite the Court of Vienna to take an equivalent portion of the Polish kingdom. This was in October; and about the same time the Russian Empress laid before the Austrian government a written scheme for dismembering the Ottoman empire, in which Wallachia and Moldavia were allotted to Russia, while it was signified that the Austrians were welcome to take Bosnia and Dalmatia.*

The English ambassador had succeeded in obtaining a copy of the secret convention between Austria and the Porte, and had communicated it to the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin. Frederick was desirous of a peace between Russia and Turkey, both on account of his plans against Poland, and because his annual payment to Russia, by virtue of the treaty of 1766 (which bound him to supply certain sums in lieu of troops to Russia in a Turkish war), began to be burdensome. He saw in this secret treaty between Austria and the Sultan an engine for moving Russia to make peace with the Porte. The Empress Catherine on the other hand was more and more anxious for the Prussian money. But before January, 1772, though no progress had been made towards a

* Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 616.

Turkish peace, the common avidity of Russia and Prussia for the dismemberment of Poland had drawn those powers closer together; and a secret convention had been concluded, to which, in return for a promise of part of the Polish territory, Frederick bound himself to take arms against Austria, if Russia should be attacked by that power. But the same guilty bribe was now operating on the Court of Vienna. Austria joined the crowned conspiracy against Poland, and totally changed her position towards the Ottoman Court. She did not offer to return the Turkish money which she had received in part payment of her promised co-operation against Russia; but her ambassador was instructed to memorialise the Porte in concert with the Prussian minister, and to urge the necessity of convoking a congress for settling terms of peace. Catherine, by arrangement with her confederate spoliators of Poland, now abated somewhat of her haughty pretensions to sole action, and declared that she was ready to accept the good offices of the Imperial Court. An armistice by sea and land between the Turkish and Russian forces was agreed on; and during the remainder of the year 1772, negotiations were carried on at Fokschani and Bucharest. They were prolonged into the following spring, when they were finally broken off, and hostile operations resumed. The Russian plenipotentiary, Obreskoff (who had been released from the Seven Towers on the repeated and vehement intercession of the other European ambassadors) delivered the Empress's ultimatum on the 15th February, 1773. It contained seven articles, which stipulated—1. That

Russia should be recognised as protectress of the independence of the Tartars: that the fortresses of Kertch and Yenikale should remain in the hands of the Russians. 2. That Russian merchant-ships, and ships of war, should have free right of navigation in the Black Sea and the Archipelago. 3. That all the other fortresses in the Crimea should be given up to the Tartars. 4. That the Voivode of Moldavia, Gregory Ghika, then in the hands of Russia, should be reinstated in his principality as hereditary prince, with the obligation of sending a year's revenue once in three years as a tribute to Constantinople. 5. That Russia should have a permanent representative at Constantinople. 6. That Kilburn should be ceded in full property to Russia; and that the fortress of Oczakof should be rased. 7. That the Porte should allow to the sovereigns of Russia the title of Padischah, and the right of protecting those inhabitants of the Ottoman empire who profess the religion of the Greek Church.

The Reis Effendi and the Vizier submitted these articles to the dignitaries and generals who were with the Turkish troops. Their unanimous answer was, that the principal object of Russia was to possess the posts of Kertch and Yenikale; that the rest of the note was mere verbiage and sophistry; that it would be easy to come to an understanding on the article respecting the navigation of the Ottoman seas; that it would be better to recognise the absolute independence of the Tartars than to leave things in their actual state, especially as in good time it would be possible to seize again what was then given up; that the sum of 50,000

purses, which Russia threatened to exact for the cost of the war, if the articles were not accepted, might be supplied; but that, even if the war were to go on for seven years, it would be impossible to win an advantageous peace. Atallah Bey was sent to Constantinople with these resolutions of the council of war. After a long discussion in the Imperial Divan it was resolved to reject the terms. The Turkish plenipotentiaries endeavoured to protract the negotiations, and to induce the Russians to relax some of their demands. The Sultan (who was sincerely desirous for peace) sent an autograph letter to the Reis Effendi, authorising him to offer to Russia a sum of 70,000 piastres if Russia would forego the possession of Kertch and Yenikale. Obreskoff replied: "You suppose that my Court is almost in a state of bankruptcy; but I will pledge myself that we will, without further difficulty, forthwith pay you the same sum, if you will accept the articles." The required cession of the two extreme Crimean fortresses to Russia was the insuperable difficulty with the negotiations. All the Turkish Ulema protested against such a sacrifice, no matter what might be the consideration. The Sultan would have given them up, but he feared that the Ulemas would raise an insurrection against him. He caused an intimation to be conveyed to the Turkish plenipotentiary at Bucharest, the Reis Effendi Abdurrisak, that he would do the state a signal service, if he would take it upon himself to agree to all the articles, and sign a treaty of peace; but Sultan Mustapha owned at the same time, that if such a treaty were to be followed by tumults at Constantinople, he should

loudly disavow his minister's act, and banish Abdurrisak and all his family. The Reis Effendi declined to take upon himself so perilous a responsibility; and the congress at Bucharest was dissolved.

The breathing-time which these negotiations procured for the Turkish forces, had been well employed. At the end of the year 1771, Sultan Mustapha had again conferred the Grand Vizierate on Mouhinzadi Mohammed Pacha, who had signalised himself in 1770 by the recovery of the Morea, and afterwards by his energy when transferred from the chief command in Greece, to the important Danubian government of Widin. Mouhinzadi had been Grand Vizier before the war; but he had offended the Sultan by advising him not to commence hostilities against Russia until his preparations for war were more complete. For this sound counsel, Mouhinzadi had been displaced from his high office; but the bitter experience of three campaigns taught the Sultan how unwise had been his haste both in attacking the Czarina, and in degrading his Vizier. In the inferior posts of Seraskier of the Morea, and Seraskier of Widin, Mouhinzadi had made an honourable exception to the general incompetency of the Turkish commanders; and the Sultan turned to him as the man in his dominions best fitted, both by his abilities in the field, and by his sagacity in council, to bring the calamitous war to an end, or to maintain it with better fortune for the empire. Mouhinzadi had striven hard to obtain a pacification at the Fokschani and Bucharest congress; but he had also throughout the fifteen months of negotiations, neglected no avail-

able means for restoring the spirit of the Ottoman troops, and for barring the further advance of the Russians towards Constantinople. He punished all acts of brigandage with unrelenting severity, and beheaded a number of officers who had set the example of cowardice in presence of the enemy. He reorganised the wrecks of the defeated armies, and raised fresh troops, especially from among the Bosnians and the other most warlike of the Mahometan populations of the empire. He strengthened the garrisons and stores of the fortresses, which the Turks yet retained on the Danube, especially of Silistria; but he foresaw the necessity of being prepared to defend the inner barrier of the Balkan against the Russians, and with this view he made Shumla the head-quarters of his forces.

The city of Shumla (more correctly called Schoumna), which has become so celebrated in modern wars between the Turks and Russians, lies at the eastern foot of a group of hills which rise a little in advance of the northern side of the Balkan. These hills curve forwards towards the north-east, and send out projecting ridges like the extremities of a horse-shoe. The town of Shumla is situate in the basin formed by this curvature of high ground. It is of little strength in itself, though it is provided with fortifications, and is partially screened from an enemy advancing towards it from the Danube by a little range in its front of rising ground of inferior altitude to that of the hills already mentioned, which back and flank the city. It is the plateau of these hills that forms the position of Shumla. This plateau is from eighteen to twenty miles in area; the

sides of it falling at first in precipitous walls of rock, and then sinking with decreasing steepness. The southward roads from nearly all the towns on the lower Danube converge upon Shumla, and from Shumla the roads or tracks radiate, which lead farther southward through the chief passes of the Balkan. Shumla does not physically close any of these passes. They might be reached by circling it, but it would be very perilous for an invading army to attempt this in the presence of a large force encamped on the plateau. From the extent of the position, and the nature of the country in the vicinity, it is almost impossible to invest Shumla; and a strong defending army stationed there, if vigorously handled, can not only make the capture of the place impossible, but can deal heavy blows against any hostile troops operating in its vicinity, and can cut off their lines of communication, should they turn Shumla, and advance southward through the Balkan.* If invading troops from Russia endeavour to avoid the reach of the Turkish army which holds Shumla, and force a passage through distant parts of the Balkan, they must (by reason of the difficulties of the ground) emerge from the defiles of that mountain-range in disconnected detachments, and may be easily crushed, before they can reunite, by the Turkish army of support, which they must expect to find stationed at Aidos, or some other suitable position in the rear of the mountain barrier. Such is Shumla, a position which the Turks have strengthened by field-works and redoubts wherever practicable, and which they have for the last

* Möltke, p. 118. Chesney, p. 86.

century regarded as the position of paramount importance for the defence of their capital against the Russians, and as the grand pivot for a line of operations on the Danube.*

Two other places which have acquired an almost equal celebrity with Shumla in the Russo-Turkish campaign of our own age, were the scenes of important operations in 1773 and 1774. These are Silistria and Varna.

Silistria is situate on the right bank of the Danube, nearly at the commencement of the Delta of that river. The town is built almost in the form of a semicircle, of which the river front forms the chord. There are high grounds in its vicinity on the landward (or Bulgaria) side, the military importance of which has been peculiarly exemplified in recent sieges. When Silistria became the object of attack in 1773, its principal defences were deep trenches surrounding the towns, which inclosed also suburbs, and spacious vineyards, and magnificent gardens of rose-trees. The possession of Silistria is considered indispensable for a successful invasion of Turkey through Bulgaria from Wallachia, as it lies on the immediate flank of any operation that can be undertaken against the line of the Balkan.† Varna (the scene of the great defeat of the Christian confederates by Amurath II. in 1444) ‡ lies on the western coast of the Black Sea, about forty-eight miles eastward of Shumla, and is second only to that position in importance; as no hostile army can move with safety

* Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 625. † Möltke, p. 285.

‡ See vol. i. p. 110.

through the eastern passes of the Balkan, while Varna is untaken in its rear. The attention paid by Mouhinzadi to the securing Varna, Silistria, and Shumla in 1773, is a high proof of the strategic talents of that Vizier, and the movements of Romanzoff also prove that the Russian generalissimo understood the value of these posts, as well as they have been appreciated by his successors in more recent wars.

By fixing his head-quarters at Shumla, Mouhinzadi was enabled not only to provide best for the defence of the Balkan, but also to direct with the greatest efficiency operations either of defence or of attack along the Danube, as occasion might require. When hostilities recommenced in 1773, the arrangements of the Russian corps in Wallachia indicated a design to cross the Danube near Touldja. A Turkish force under Tcherkes Pacha was at Babatagh in the Dobruscha, and the Grand Vizier ordered them to watch with the greatest care every movement of the enemy. But the troops at Babatagh deserted their colours in disgraceful panic, and the Russians advanced as far as Karasou, and destroyed the fortifications of Karakerman. Not dismayed by this reverse, the Vizier continued to direct and animate the commanders of his garrisons and advanced posts; and a victory near Rustchuk was the first-fruits of this campaign for the Turkish arms. The Russians had grown over-confident from success, and advanced boldly against that place; but an Ottoman force under Daghistani Ali joined the garrison, and they completely defeated the attacking corps, taking 1500 prisoners, and capturing three of the Russian guns.

On the other hand, General Weissman surprised and defeated the Turks under Bakht-Ghirai and Tcherkes Pacha at Karasou; and took sixteen cannons from them (7 June, 1773). From Karasou the Russian general marched upon Silistria to support the operations conducted by the Generalissimo, Romanzoff, against that city.

Romanzoff crossed the Danube at Balia with the principal Russian army, which was commanded under him by Generals Stoupischin and Potemkin. Osman Pacha, the Seraskier of Silistria, endeavoured to prevent the passage of the river; but the flank movement of General Weissman protected the operation, and the Seraskier's troops, after fighting bravely, were repulsed and driven into Silistria. The importance of this post was keenly felt by the Sultan as well as by the Russian leaders; and Ibrahim Pacha, who had commanded the Turkish vanguard in a late unsuccessful attack on the enemy, received a letter from Sultan Mustapha himself, which contained these laconic but emphatic orders: "If thy life is dear to thee, thou wilt rally thy beaten horsemen, and fly to the succour of Silistria."

Romanzoff battered the town with seventy cannons and a large number of mortars. The walls were soon trenched, and the Russian columns advanced to storm. A hundred waggon-loads of fascines had been provided to fill up the outer ditches; and a murderous conflict took place, the Russians charging with their characteristic obstinacy, and the Ottoman garrison resisting with determined valour. Romanzoff continuously sent fresh

troops forward; and the assault was renewed again and again for six hours, when at last the Turks gave way, the outer lines were passed, and the Russians poured into the suburbs, exulting at having won Silistria. But here Osman Pacha's troops, reinforced by all the male population, rallied, and fought with redoubled fury. The peculiarity in the sieges of Turkish towns (which has been so often remarked by military writers), that the chief resistance in them begins at the very crisis where all resistance in ordinary sieges terminates, was fully exemplified at Silistria in 1773.* The Russian columns were at last beaten back, and Romanzoff abandoned the siege with a loss of 8000 killed and 1000 wounded. This victory of Osman Pacha, which was mainly due to his own courage, and to the gallantry of Essud Hassan Pacha, the commandant of the place, is the most brilliant exploit on the Ottoman side during the campaign of 1773.

Romanzoff formed his retreating army into three columns, two of which he led back across the Danube,

* Baron Möltke at the close of his description of the siege of Brailow in 1828, remarks:—"The Turkish commanders have the great merit of being blind to the weak points of places. Capitulations were not relished by the Divan, and those who made them risked their heads. The garrisons too were defending their own wives, children, and worldly goods, within their walls, and fighting for their faith and for dominion over their Rayahs. They make up for the want of out-works by a skilful use of the dry ditch, and their most vigorous defence commonly begins at the point where with the European troops it usually ends, from the moment when a practicable breach has been effected. With us a large number of wealthy householders are a serious impediment to the protracted defence of a fortress; but in Turkey it is quite the reverse; every man capable of bearing arms is a soldier, and makes his appearance upon the walls daily. Thus it is from the large towns, and from them only, that a very determined resistance is to be expected." p. 44. See ibid, pp. 102—104.

while he placed the third under the orders of General Weissman, and directed him to retire to Bábatagh in the Dobruscha. The Turkish force under Nououman Pacha endeavoured to intercept this column at Kainardji. The Russians were, as usual, formed in a system of squares; but Nououman's janissaries charged with such spirit, that they broke through the Russian centre; and the whole Russian force would have been destroyed, had it not been for the good conduct of their rear-guard, who charged the victorious janissaries when in confusion, drove them back, and restored the formation of their own army. Eventually the Russians were successful, and captured twenty-eight Turkish guns; but their success was purchased by severe loss, including that of their brave and able general, who was shot dead at the very commencement of the battle. The beaten Turkish army was soon reinforced, and made an attempt to recapture Hirsova, but was repulsed with severe loss by Suwarrow, who commanded there. After this second defeat, Nououman Pacha was deposed by the Grand Vizier; and the command of his force was given to Daghistani Ali, the victor of Rustchuk. Promotions and rewards were at the same time liberally showered on Osman Pacha, Essud Hassan, and the other officers whose good conduct had been conspicuous.

The Russian generalissimo, Romanzoff, irritated at his failure at Silistria, was anxious to obtain some success on the right of the Danube before he placed his troops in winter quarters. Accordingly, he sent a column under Prince Dolgorouki across the Danube at Hirsova,

and ordered General Ungern (who had succeeded to Weissman's command) to move from Babatagh, and co-operate in an attack on the Ottoman forces, which were again assembled at Karasou. This proved completely successful, and the greater part of the Turkish troops dispersed and fled towards Shumla. Elated with this triumph, the Russian generals separated their forces; and Ungern, with about 6000 infantry and 3000 horse, marched towards Varna in the hope of carrying that important place by a sudden attack, while the rest of the Russians moved upon Shumla. This division captured the town of Bazardckik after a feeble resistance, nearly all the garrison and inhabitants having fled. The facility of their conquest did not prevent the Russians from practising the most barbarous atrocities on the remnant of the population, which consisted almost entirely of feeble old men, and helpless women and children. But these cruelties were not long unpunished.

When it was known in the camp at Shumla that the army at Karasou had been routed, and that the enemy was marching towards the Balkan, the Grand Vizier assembled a council of war, and asked if there was any officer of spirit and resolution, who would undertake to rally the fugitives from Karasou and Bazardckik, and repair the calamity that had happened. The Reis Effendi, Abdurrisak, volunteered for the perilous duty, and his offer was gladly accepted by the Vizier and the other members of the council. Accompanied by Wassif Effendi (the Turkish historian), by the Mufti of Philippopolis, and by 400 men (nearly

all being his own household retainers), the brave minister for foreign affairs set forward; and on the road to Kozlidje he succeeded in reuniting the fragments of the different Turkish corps which were scattered about the neighbourhood. At Kozlidje he attacked the Russian vanguard and beat it; and then hurrying forward, he fell upon the Russians in Bazardckik. They fled before him with precipitation, thinking that the whole Ottoman army was upon them; and leaving part of their baggage and stores, as trophies of Abdurrisak's daring exploit.

Meanwhile, General Ungern had received a severe repulse at Varna. The Turkish commander in the Black Sea, Kelledji Osman Pacha, was cruising with a small squadron near Varna when the Russian army approached the walls. He immediately landed his Kiaza with 600 marines to the succour of the place. The fortifications were weak, and the Russians after a short cannonade advanced to storm. But they were driven back in disorder from one part, which they had endeavoured to carry without having fascines for the ditches, or scaling-ladders for the walls; and the division which at another part had made good its entrance and occupied the Christian quarter of the town, was attacked there in turn and driven out again by the Turks. Prince Dolgorouki, with part of the Russian force, retired to Babatagh, the rest under General Ungern retreated upon Ismail. The Russian loss at Varna amounted to nearly 2000 killed and wounded, and they left behind them 100 baggage-waggons and ten cannons. The successful defence of

Varna, and the recovery of Bazardckik, were the two last events of the campaign of 1773; a campaign in which the balance of advantages was considerably on the side of the Turks.

They brought, however, inadequate consolation to the Sultan, for the general decline of the fortunes of the empire since the commencement of the war, and for the disappointment of the hopes which he had based on his own supposed pre-eminence in state policy. He had also, like many of his race, been a devotee to supposed occult sciences, to the kabala of the Moors and the astrology of the Egyptians. These had been to him, as he believed, sources of assurance that he should prosper in the war; and he now, in the bitterness of his heart, felt that, either his cunning was foolishness, and he had been a visionary and a dupe, or that the stars had lied to him. Sick in body as in mind, he complained that he was weary of the mode in which his Seraskiers carried on war; and when the news of the second defeat at Karasou reached Constantinople, Mustapha exclaimed that he would repair to the army in person. His ministers represented to him that such an important step ought not to be taken without consulting the Divan; and the Ulema declared that the departure of the Sovereign for the army might be attended with evil consequences in the actual state of circumstances, expecially having regard to the bad state of his health. On this the Sultan deferred his journey to the camp until the restoration of his health, a time that never came. The hand of death was already upon him; and on the 25th of

December, 1773, after many weeks of severe suffering, Sultan Mustapha III. expired.

He was succeeded by his brother Abdul Hamid, who had been shut up in the serail for forty-three years, till called from the dreary monotony of a royal prison to the cares and fears of a royal throne. He made few alterations in the government, and had the good sense to appreciate the merits of his vizier, Mouhinzadi, and of his Kapitan Pacha, Hassan of Algiers. Above all, he was sincerely desirous of peace, as were his ministers, his generals, and every class of men in his empire, except the Ulema, who raised theological objections to the Sultan, as Caliph, abandoning his sovereignty over the Tartars, and against the cession of the Ottoman fortresses of Kertch and Yenikale to the Russian giaours. But the new campaign was soon marked by such reverses and perils, as silenced these orthodox demurrers; and the dignitaries of the sword, who longed for peace, prevailed over the dignitaries of the law, who demanded warfare.

On the 14th of April, the Grand Vizier displayed the horse-tails with great pomp in front of his camp at Shumla. A hymn on the birth of the Prophet was recited; and a grand council was held, at which it was resolved to take the offensive, and drive the Russians from Hirsova. But the Russian general at that place was Suwarrow; and, instead of waiting to be attacked, he advanced towards the Turks, formed a junction with the division of General Kamenski, and brought the Turkish army, 25,000 strong, to action at Kozlidje. He completely defeated them, captured their camp,

baggage, and military stores, and twenty-nine cannons. The defeated army dispersed over the country; and when the Generals Kamenski and Milarodovitch advanced, after the battle, upon Shumla, the Grand Vizier found that he had but 8000 troops under him to defend these extensive positions. Even among these a faction-fight broke out; and detachments of the Russians moved southward of Shumla to the very gorges of the Balkan. In this emergency the Grand Vizier sent an officer to the Russian camp, where the generalissimo, Count Romanzoff, now commanded in person, to request an armistice. This was refused, but the Vizier was invited to send plenipotentiaries to treat for peace. After a brief delay, during which Mouhinzadi obtained the sanction of the Sultan, the plenipotentiaries were despatched to treat with Prince Repnin, who acted on behalf of Russia, and the first conference took place on the 16th of July, at Kainardji.

The negotiations were carried on with military celerity; for both sides were sincerely anxious for a termination of the war. Notwithstanding the conquests and glory which Russia had achieved, she was suffering almost more severely than her beaten enemy.* Her losses in battle had been heavy; and, as is customary with Russian armies, the number of the soldiers that had perished by disease and privation, far exceeded the amount of the killed and wounded. At home, many of her provinces were ravaged by the plague. A district near Astrakhan had been left almost desolate by the migration of a horde of 400,000 Calmucks, who,

* Levesque, Histoire de Russie.

irritated by the oppressive interference of the Russian government with their free customs, left the territories of the Czarina in 1771, and retired within the frontiers of the Chinese Empire. Still more formidable to the power of Catherine was the civil war raised against her by the remarkable impostor Pugatcheff, who, during 1773 and the greater part of 1774, spread desolation throughout Southern Russia. If, in addition to all this, it is remembered that the first great treaty for the partition of Poland was made in 1773, and that there was deep need of Russian troops to coerce the anarchical but high-spirited population of that ill-fated land, we may appreciate at its true value the boasted magnanimity of Russia, in exacting no harsher terms of peace from Turkey, in 1774, than had been almost consented to in 1772.

After a discussion of only seven hours, the plenipotentiaries at Kainardji agreed, on the 17th July, 1774, to the minutes of the new treaty, that was to be made between the two empires; but the Russian generalissimo, Count Romanzoff, delayed the time for signature for four days, so as to make the treaty bear date on the 21st July, the anniversary of the treaty of the Pruth. That day was thenceforth to be a day of humiliation and shame, not to the Muscovite, but to the Ottoman race. Nor was it by accident that the town of Kainardji was chosen as the scene of the conferences. The Russian General Weissman had been slain there by the Turks in the preceding year, and Romanzoff designed the treaty to be a votive offering to the memory of his brave companion in arms.

The peace of Kainardji (to which recent events have given so much additional interest) consisted of twenty-eight public articles; to these were added two secret clauses, by which the Porte bound itself to pay to Russia, within three years, four millions of roubles, and the Empress engaged that her fleet should be withdrawn from the Archipelago without delay. The twenty-eight public articles were the most important.* They established that the Tartars of the Kuban, the Crimea, and the adjacent regions between the rivers Berda and Dnieper, and also of the countries between the Boug and the Dniester, as far as the frontier of Poland, were to be politically an independent nation governed by their own sovereign, of the race of Zenghis Khan, elected and raised to the throne by the Tartars themselves. It was expressly stipulated that "neither the Court of Russia nor the Ottoman shall interfere, under any pretexts whatever, with the election of the said Khan, or in the domestic, political, civil, and internal affairs of the said state, but, on the contrary, they shall acknowledge and consider the said Tartar nation, in its political and civil state, upon the same footing as other Powers, who are governed by themselves, and are dependent upon God alone."

But from out of the natural territories of this newly organised Tartar nation Russia retained for herself the fortresses of Kertch and Yenikale in the Crimea, with their ports and districts; also the city of Azof with its district; and the Castle of Kilburn at the north of the Dnieper, with a district along the left bank of the Dnieper.

* See the text of the whole thirty articles in the Appendix, No. C.

The opposite fortress of Oczakof, with a similar district, was to remain in the possession of the Turks. The two Kabartas were also to be Russia's; but the formal cession of them was to be made by the Khan and Ancients of the new independent Tartar nation. Russia was to withdraw her troops from the fortresses which she had conquered in Georgia and Mingrelia; and these provinces "were to be considered by Russia as belonging to those on whom they were formerly dependent; so that if, in ancient times or for a very long period, they have actually been under the Sublime Porte, they shall be considered as belonging to it." With the exception of Azof, Kilburn, Kertch, Yenikale, and the Kabartas, Russia gave up all her conquests. The Porte confessed that it received back from her Moldavia and Wallachia on conditions which it religiously promised to keep—these were (in substance) "the grant of an amnesty for all offences during the war; free exercise of the Christian religion; humane and generous government for the future; and permission from the Porte that, according as the circumstances of these two Principalities may require, the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia resident at Constantinople may remonstrate in their favour; and a promise to listen to them with all the attention which is due to friendly and respected powers."

A very important clause of the treaty (Art. VII.) respecting the Christian subjects of the Sultan, generally declared, that "The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of

Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in Article XIV., as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power." *

The words of the XIVth section (referred to by the VIIth) were, "After the manner of the other Powers, permission is given to the High Court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the Minister's residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglu, a public church of the Greek ritual which shall always be under the protection of the Ministers of that Empire, and secure from all coercion and outrage." And the VIIIth article stipulated that Russian subjects should have full liberty to visit the holy city of Jerusalem without being subjected to capitation tax, or other impost, and that they should be under the strictest protection of the laws. Other articles provided that merchant-ships belonging to the two contracting powers should have free and unimpeded navigation in all the seas which wash their shores; that merchants should have a right to such sojourn as their affairs required, "and," as the XIth clause of the treaty expressed it, "for the convenience and advantage of the two Empires, there shall be a free and unimpeded navigation for the merchant-ships

* This is the clause on which Prince Menschikoff in 1853 founded the claim of Russia to the general protection of all the inhabitants of the Turkish countries who were members of the Greek Church.

belonging to the two contracting powers, in all the seas which wash their shores."

The same clause gave expressly to Russia the right of having resident Consuls in all parts of the Turkish empire, where it should think fit to appoint them; but no equivalent right was given to Turkey to have Consuls in Russia. The treaty merely said that the subjects of the Sublime Porte were to be permitted to carry on commerce by sea and land in Russia, with all advantages of the most favoured nations.

It was formally declared by the IVth article, "that it is conformable to the natural right of every power to make, in its own country, such dispositions as it may consider to be expedient: in consequence whereof, there is respectively reserved to the two empires a perfect and unrestricted liberty of constructing anew in their respective states, and within their frontiers, in such localities as shall be deemed advisable, every kind of fortresses, towns, habitations, edifices, and dwellings, as well as of repairing and rebuilding the old fortresses, towns, habitations, &c."

By other clauses the Sultan was bound always to permit the residence of a Russian minister at the Porte, and to give the sovereign of Russia the title of "Padischah," which had hitherto been refused.* It was also declared that "the two empires have agreed to annihilate and leave in an eternal oblivion all the Treaties and Conventions heretofore made between the two states, including therein the Convention of Belgrade, with all those subsequent to it; and never to

* See vol. i. p. 160, and note.

put forth any claim grounded upon the said Conventions, excepting, however, the one made in 1700 between Governor Tolstoi and Hassan Pacha, Governor of Atschug, on the subject of the boundaries of the district of Azof and of the line of demarcations of the frontier of Kuban, which shall remain invariably such as it has heretofore been."

Finally, the whole treaty was drawn up and concluded without the insertion of a syllable relating to Poland, although the treatment of Poland by Russia had been one of the primary causes of the war. It was considered that this implied negation of all right in Turkey to interfere in Polish affairs, and also the circumstance that the treaty was concluded without any third power being allowed to be party to it as mediator between the Russian Empress and her defeated enemy, were not the least of the triumphs which were achieved for Catherine in the close of this contest.

Such in substance was the treaty of Kainardji; in which one of the ablest diplomatists of the age saw not only the preparation of the destruction of the Mahometan Empire of the East, but also the source of evil and troubles without end for all the other states of Europe.* The German historian of the

* "La position des deux Empires a été totalement changée par le traité de Kaïmardjé et que, par conséquent, s'il était encore possible de sauver la Porte, il conviendrait de trouver des mesures toutes nouvelles. * * * Par l'adroite combination des articles de ce traité, l'Empire Ottoman devient dès aujourd'hui une sorte de province russe, d'où la cour de Saint-Pétersbourgh peut tirer de l'argent et des troupes, etc.; enfin, comme à l'avenir la Russie est à même de lui dicter ses lois et qu'elle a entre ses mains les moyens de forcer la Sultan à les accepter, elle le contentera peutêtre, pendant

House of Othman (whose guidance I have so long enjoyed, but must henceforth regret through this work) considers that treaty to have delivered up the Ottoman empire to the mercy of Russia; and to have marked the commencement of the dissolution of that empire, at least in Europe. He sees in the articles of Kainardji "the germs of those of Adrianople." The judgments of Thugut and Von Hammer are not lightly to be controverted; but the northern power, which so long has ground down Turkey, may itself be shattered by the combined powers of the West; and new treaties of far different import may supersede those of Adrianople and Kainardji, even as that of Kainardji annulled the old conventions of the Pruth and Belgrade.

quelques années encore, de régner au nom du Grand Seigneur, jusqu' à ce qu'elle juge le moment favorable d'en prendre possession définitivement. * * Si à ces exemples d'une frénésie incroyable, on ajoute la mauvaise administration de la Porte, qui vicióe dans les fondemens prépare depuis quelque temps, come à dessein et mieux que ne l'ont pu faire les armes de la Russie, la destruction de cet Empire d'Orient, on sera convaincu que jamais une nation prête à disparaître de la scène politique n'aura moins mérité la compassion des autres peuples que les Ottomans; malheureusement les evénemens qui se passent en ce moment dans cet empire exerceront à l'avenir la plus grande influence sur la politique de tous les autres états, et feront naître des maux et des troubles sans fin."—Extraits des rapports de M. de Thugut datés du 8 Septembre 1774, et du 17 Août 1774.

CHAPTER VIII.

ATTEMPTS OF GAZI HASSAN TO RESTORE THE EMPIRE—FRESH ENCROACHMENTS OF RUSSIA—CONVENTION OF 1779—RUSSIA ANNEXES THE CRIMEA—VAIN ATTEMPTS OF FRANCE TO INDUCE ENGLAND TO ACT WITH HER AGAINST RUSSIA—CONVENTION OF 1783—SCHEMES OF AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA FOR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF TURKEY—WAR—RESISTANCE OF THE TURKS TO AUSTRIA—AUSTRIA MAKES PEACE—DISASTERS SUSTAINED BY THE TURKS IN THE WAR WITH RUSSIA—ACCESSION OF SULTAN SELIM III.—INTERVENTION OF ENGLAND AND PRUSSIA—TREATY OF JASSY.

THE literary men of Western Europe and the Ulemas of Turkey, alike regarded the treaty of Kainardji, as consummating the glory of Russia and the degradation of the House of Othman. The Encyclopædists of Paris * wrote felicitations to the Empress Catherine, and to her Generalissimo Count Romanzoff, which were echoed by all pretenders to enlightened opinions in other parts of Europe which recognised the centralisation of literary authority amid the circles of the French metropolis.†

* See Capefigue, Louis XVI. pp. 13, 14, 93. There is too much foundation for his bitter remark at p. 14, on the influence of the Encyclopædists and their admirers, on the foreign politics of the Western courts—"Il faut reconnaître cette triste vérité, que si un government veut se perdre, il n' a qu' à suivre l'opinion des écrivains, gens de lettres, sociétés sávantes et litteraires."

† One English literary man of this period deserves to be mentioned as an honourable exception to the general adulators of Russia. Even before the triumphs of Catherine II. in the war of 1765—1774, Oliver Goldsmith wrote thus of Russia in his Citizen of the World, published 1758:—

"I cannot avoid beholding the Russian empire as the natural enemy of the

In Constantinople devout followers of Islam looked wistfully to Asia as their refuge from the great infidels, as they termed the Russians; and sorrowfully recalled the old tradition, that the City abounding in faith is destined to be taken by the Sons of Yellowness.* But still many among the Ottomans were superior to the torpor of despairing fatalism. They understood better both their duty to their empire and the precepts of their Prophet, who bade his followers not to lose heart at reverses in warfare, but to view them as visitations of

more Western parts of Europe—as an enemy already possessed of great strength, and, from the nature of the Government, every day threatening to become more powerful. This extensive empire, which both in Europe and Asia occupies almost a third of the Old World, was, about two centuries ago, divided into separate kingdoms and dukedoms, and from such a division consequently weak. Since the time, however, of Johan Basilides it has increased in strength and extent, and those untrodden forests, those innumerable savage animals, which formerly covered the face of the country, are now removed, and colonies of mankind planted in their room. A kingdom thus enjoying peace internally, possessed of an unbounded extent of dominions, and learning the military art at the expense of others abroad, must every day grow more powerful; and it is probable we shall hear Russia in future times, as formerly, called the 'Officina Gentium.'

"It was long the wish of Peter, their great Monarch, to have a foot in some of the Western parts of Europe: many of his schemes and treaties were directed to this end, but, happily for Europe, he failed in them all. A fort in the power of this people would be like the possession of a floodgate: and whenever ambition entered, or necessity prompted, they might then be able to deluge the whole Western world with a barbarous inundation. Believe me, my friend, I cannot sufficiently condemn the politics of Europe, who thus make this powerful people arbitrators in their quarrel. The Russians are now at that period between refinement and barbarity which seems most adapted to military achievement; and, if once they happen to get footing in the Western parts of Europe, it is not the feeble efforts of the sons of effeminacy and dissension that can serve to remove them. The fertile valley and soft climate will be ever sufficient inducements to draw whole myriads from their native deserts, the trackless wild, or snowy mountain. History, experience, reason, nature, expand the book of wisdom before the eyes of mankind, but they will not read."

* Eton, 193. Thornton, 78.

Allah, designed to prove true Believers; and who gave them the great maxim of "Fortitude in adversity, and Self-control in prosperity:" "Despond not, neither exult; so shall ye prevail:" "God loveth those who persevere patiently:" "He turned you to flight before them that he might make trial of you:" "God giveth life and causeth to die; and God seeth that which ye do:" "Oh, true Believers, be patient and strive to excel in patience, and be constant-minded and fear God, that ye may be happy." *

Foremost among these better spirits was the Kapitan Pasha Hassan of Algiers, now commonly styled Gazi Hassan, for his glorious conflicts against the Giaours. Sultan Abdul Hamid placed almost unlimited authority in his hands; and Hassan strove to reorganise the military and naval forces of Turkey, and to prepare her for the recurrence of the struggle against Russia, which all knew to be inevitable. He endeavoured to discipline the troops; but finding that all attempts to introduce improved weapons and drill, or to restore subordination among the Janissaries and Spahis were fruitless, he gave up these schemes, but proposed a new order of battle, by which more effect was to be given to the fury of the wild Turkish onset. "He would have divided an army

* See the war hymn of the Mahometans cited above, p. 135. The leading rule recalls to the memory the lines of Archilochus:—

Θυμὲ, θυμ', ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε,
Ἀμάδα δυσμενῶν ἀλέξευ, προσβαλὼν ἐναντίον
Στέρνον, ἐν δοκοῖσιν ἐχθρῶν πλησίον καταστάθεις
Ἀσφαλέως· καὶ μήτε νικῶν ἀμφάδην ἀγάλλεό,
Μήτε νικηθεὶς ἐν οἴκτῳ καταπεσὼν ὀδύρεο,
Ἀλλὰ χαρτοῖσίν τε χαῖρε, καὶ κακοῖσιν ἀσχάλα
Μὴ λίην, γίγνωσκε δ' οἷος ῥυθμὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔχει.

of 100,000 men into ten different corps, which were to attack separately, and so arranged that the retreat of the repulsed corps should not overwhelm and put in disorder those which had not attacked. He affirmed, that though the artillery of an European army would make great slaughter, yet no army could withstand ten Turkish attacks, which are furious but short if they do not succeed, and the attack of 10,000 is as dangerous as of 100,000 in one body, for, the first repulsed, the rest on whom they fall back, immediately take to flight." *

This system of attacking in detail was never found practicable; and probably the Kapitan Pacha in proposing it, was judging more from his experience of the capacities of squadrons of ships, than from any sound knowledge of the possible evolutions of troops in face of an enemy. The navy was a force which Hassan understood far better; and his efforts to improve the Turkish marine were spirited and judicious, though some of his practical measures showed the true ruthless severity of the old Algerine sea-rover. Hassan possessed little science himself, but he respected it in others; and his great natural abilities and strong common sense taught him how to make use of European skill, and of the most serviceable qualities, which the various seafaring populations of the Sultan's dominions were known to possess. The repairs and improvements which he sought to effect in the Turkish navy, extended to the construction of the vessels, the education of the officers, and the supply of seamen. Aided by an English ship-

* Eton. Survey of Turkish Empire, p. 68.

builder, Hassan entirely altered the cumbrous rigging of the Turkish ships, and equipped them after the English system. He lowered their high and unwieldy sterns; and he gave them regular tiers of guns. He collected all the good sailors that he could engage from Algiers and the other Barbaresque states, and also from sea-ports on the eastern coasts of the Adriatic: though he was still obliged to depend chiefly on Greek crews for the navigation of his fleets, as the Turks refused to do any duty on ship-board beyond working the guns. He compelled the commanders of vessels to attend personally to the good order and efficiency of their ships and crews; * and, by a still more important measure, he endeavoured to keep a sufficient body of able seamen always ready at Constantinople to man the fleet in case of emergency. It was usual to lay up the ships from autumn till spring-time, and to dismiss the sailors for the winter. Hassan pointed out the danger of leaving the capital thus unprotected, and the ease with which the Russians might at any time during the winter

* "In 1778 the finest ship in the fleet foundered in the Black Sea, being too weak, she worked her caulking out, and leaked between all her planks. The famous Kapitan Pasha Hassan, attributed it to the bad caulking, and when the fleet came back into the port of Constantinople, he ordered all the captains of the ships of war to attend in person the caulking of their own ships, on pain of death. One of them, being one day tired of sitting by his ship, went home to his house, not above a quarter of a mile off. The Capitan Pacha happened to go himself to the arsenal to see the work, examined the caulking, found fault, and asked for the captain; the truth was obliged to be told him; he sat down on a small carpet, sent one man for his blunderbuss, and another to call the captain; as soon as the unfortunate man came near him, he took up his blunderbuss and shot him dead, without speaking a word to him. "Take and bury him," he said, "and let the other capitans attend him to the grave, and the caulking be suspended till they return."—Eton, p. 77.

months sail down from their new ports in the Black Sea, occupy the Bosphorus, and destroy the Turkish marine in its harbours. He proposed that a winter home for the sailors should be built at Constantinople; where they should be quartered, like troops in barracks. This scheme met with great though secret opposition from the Grand Vizier, and other high officers, who were jealous of the power which the Kapitan Pacha would acquire by having so large a force at his disposal in the metropolis. As the supply of the necessary funds for this design was continually retarded under various pretexts, Hassan formed an institution, such as he had projected, but on a smaller scale, at his own expense. He also founded a naval school for the scientific education of officers for the fleet. But all these plans of the brave and sagacious admiral were thwarted, and ultimately nullified, by the envy and prejudices of other officials of the state.* Nor was Hassan more successful in an attempt which he made at a thorough reform of the ancient but much aggravated abuses of the Turkish feudal system, by which Ziamets and Timars were given to court favourites, who trafficked in their sale, and the Porte was deprived in time of war of the greater part of its military resources.

The necessity of recovering for the Sultan some of the provinces, which during the recent troubles of the state had cast off all allegiance, made it impossible for Hassan to be a regular resident in the capital; and gave frequent opportunities for his enemies to countermine his policy during his absence. Against open foes

* Eton, pp. 66, 89.

in the field he commanded ably and successfully. He defeated the forces of Sheikh Tahir in Syria, besieged him in Acre, captured that important city, and reduced the district round it to temporary obedience to the Porte.

In 1778 he recovered the Morea, and destroyed or expelled the rebellious Albanians, who had been led into that peninsula in 1770 to fight against Orloff and the Greek insurgents; and who had after the departure of the Russians established themselves there in lawless independence; oppressing, plundering and slaughtering both the Greek and Turkish residents, with ferocious impartiality.*

After relieving the Peloponnesus from this worst of all scourges, the tyranny of a wild soldiery, which had killed or deposed its officers, which had never known the restraint of civil law, and had shaken off all bonds of military discipline, Hassan was made governor of the liberated province, and exerted himself vigorously and wisely in the restoration of social order, and the revival of agriculture and commerce.† Subsequently to this he led a large force to Egypt against the rebellious Mamelukes. He had made himself master of Cairo, and had effected much towards the re-establishment of the Sultan's authority in that important province,‡ when he was recalled to oppose the Russians in the fatal war of 1787—1792; a contest still more disastrous than that which had terminated in the treaty of Kainardji.

* Emerson Tennant's Greece, vol. ii. p. 376.
† Emerson Tennant, vol. ii. 378.
‡ Emerson Tennant, vol. ii. p. 379. Eton, pp. 88, 383.

The interval of fourteen years between the two wars, had been marked by measures on the part of Russia as ambitious, and as inimical towards the Turks, as any of her acts during open hostilities. Even the writers, who are the most unscrupulous in their eulogies of the Empress Catherine, and the most bitter against the Ottoman nation, avow that the Empress from the very beginning of her reign had constantly in view the expulsion of the Turks from Europe; and that the vast design which she sought to accomplish, was the same which Peter the Great first entertained, and which the cabinet of St. Petersburg has never lost sight of during the succeeding reigns to this day.* A temporary peace was necessary for Russia in 1774; but after Pugatchiff's rebellion was quelled, and the Russian grasp on the provinces which she had rent from Poland was firmly planted, Catherine scarcely sought to disguise how fully she was bent on the realisation of the "Oriental project." Her second grandson was born in 1778. He was named Constantine. "Greek women were given him for nurses, and he sucked in with his milk the Greek language, in which he was afterwards perfected by learned Greek teachers: in short, his whole education was such as to fit him for the throne of Constantinople, and nobody then doubted the Empress's design." Such is the testimony of Mr. Eton, an Englishman then resident at St. Petersburg, highly esteemed by the

* See Eton, p. 407. The position occupied by Mr. Eton at the Court of St. Petersburg; his intimacy with Count Potemkin, and other leading men in the Russian councils, and his strong prejudice in favour of Russia, make him an unexceptionable witness as to the ambitious schemes of the Empress Catherine; but his invectives against the Turks are to be received with great caution.

Empress and many of her favourite statesmen and generals, and strongly devoted to the cause of Russia. On his authority we also know that in the next year (1779) the Empress and Prince Potemkin formed a scheme for giving the King of England effective assistance against the Colonists in the American war, on condition of England giving the Empress aid in a renewed attack upon the Turks. The island of Minorca (then in the possession of the English) was to be ceded by this country to Russia, as a station for the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, and a rendezvous for the insurgent Greeks. According to Mr. Eton, the details of this project were drawn up by Prince Potemkin, ready for presentation to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, but the adroitness of Count Panin, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, (who favoured the French interests against the English) prevented its being proceeded with further, and caused the Empress to adopt the anti-British policy of the Armed Neutrality. It is added that Prince Potemkin, to the last day of his life, regretted the failure of this scheme, and constantly affirmed that the success of the Russian enterprise against Turkey depended upon the alliance with Great Britain.*

The annexation of the Crimea to the Russian dominions was formally completed in the year 1783; but the plot for the subjection of that Peninsula had been in progress from the very date of the treaty of Kainardji, by which Russia solemnly bound herself to treat the Crimean Tartars as an independent nation,

* Eton, p. 409.

accountable to God only for their internal government, and to abstain from all interference in the election of their Sovereign, or in other matters of their civil polity. Under the old pretexts of friendly mediation, and of relieving her frontier from the dangerous neighbourhood of anarchy, Russia soon made the Crimea a second Poland; except that in this case there were no accomplices with whom she was obliged to share the spoil. The Tartars had elected as their Khan, Dèwlet Ghirai, who did not prove sufficiently subservient to the influence of St. Petersburg. The Russians, therefore, fomented disaffection and revolts against him, and made these troubles the pretext for marching an army into the Peninsula for the ostensible purpose of restoring order. They sedulously disclaimed all projects of conquest, but they effected the abdication of Dewlet Ghirai, and the election in his stead of Schahin Ghirai, who had been a hostage at St. Petersburg, and was known to be most unpopular with the majority of his countrymen. The expected results soon followed. The new Khan, being threatened both by his own subjects and by the Turks, (who justly regarded his election through Russian intervention, as a breach of the late treaty,) sent a deputation of six of his Mirzas to St. Petersburg (1776) to implore the Empress's protection. This was graciously promised; and Romanzof was ordered to collect troops on the Dnieper, to act, if necessary, against the Turks. But the Sultan felt himself too weak to renew the war. Some risings of the Tartars of Kuban against Russia were sternly quelled by Suwarrow; and, in 1779, a convention was

signed between Russia and Turkey, by which the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji were formally recognised and renewed, with the addition of explanatory clauses, by which the Sultan acknowledged the new Khan as lawful ruler of the Crimea, and bound himself to prompt performance of the religious formalities, by which it was necessary for him, as Caliph of the orthodox Mahometans, to give due spiritual sanction to the Tartar sovereignty.*

Schahin Ghirai, the object and unhappy instrument of Russian state-craft, was not suffered long to enjoy even the semblance of royalty. Prince Potemkin (who appears to have regarded the acquisition of the Crimea by force or by fraud as his peculiar function) placed dexterous agents at the Tartar Court, who persuaded the weak Khan to adopt Russian usages and costume, (thereby offending the national pride and religious prejudices of his people,) and also to commit numerous costly absurdities, which brought him more and more into public hatred and contempt. At the same time they secretly but sedulously encouraged the disaffection of his subjects. A revolt soon broke out; and the terrified Khan was persuaded by his Russian friends to call in the troops of the Empress to his assistance. Again the Russian soldiers occupied the Crimea in the guise of pacificators; but Potemkin and his imperial mistress now thought that they might safely appropriate the long-coveted prize. The Tartars, who opposed the Russian measures, were slaughtered or expelled without

* Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 124-127. The Convention (dated March 10, 1779) may be seen in Martens et Cussy's Recueil des Traités, &c., vol. i.

mercy; and, partly by threats, partly by bribes, Schahin Ghirai was induced to resign the crown of the Crimea and the Kuban to the Empress, and to attest that the individuals of his family, in which the throne was hereditary, were for ever rightfully deposed.*

In the Empress's manifestoes respecting the annexation of the Crimea, the Kuban, and the adjacent territories to Russia (which were published in April, 1783), the same spirit of grim hypocrisy was maintained with which Europe was already familiarised by the sayings and doings of the Czarina and her confederates in the case of Poland. It was pretended that the Russian sovereign was only seeking to confer benefits on the Tartar nation. They were to be delivered by her from the miseries of civil war and internal anarchy; and were also to be relieved from the evils to which their former position between the frontiers of the Turkish and Russian dominions, exposed them in the event of any collision of those two powers. These flourishes of Russian liberality served the sophists and declaimers of Western Europe with materials for new panegyrics on the magnanimity of the Empress Catherine;† but the Tartars themselves felt the oppression of Russian conquest in all its bitter reality. Some of them took up arms for the inde-

* Clarke's Travels, vol. iii. pp. 174-177.

† Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 128. Mr. Fox in his advocacy of the proceedings of the Russian Empress put the matter on a broader and a clearer basis. He said, (in his speech in the House of Commons, March 29, 1791) "After the independence of the Crimea had been established by the peace of Kanargi, the Empress informed the Porte and other powers that she found it impossible to secure her old dominions if she was not complete mistress of Kuban Tartary and the Crimea; and, *by a kind of royal syllogism*, she said, 'And, therefore, I must have them.'"

pendence of their country; and the chief men of the nation hardly sought to disguise their disaffection under Muscovite rule. General Paul Potemkin (the cousin of the Prince) put the malcontents to the edge of the sword, in a massacre, in which 30,000 Tartars of every age and sex are said to have perished.* Many thousands more were obliged to quit the country. Among the refugees from Russian tyranny were 75,000 Armenian Christians, all of whom, except 7000, perished from cold, hunger, and fatigue, as they endeavoured to cross the steppes on the eastern side of the Sea of Azof.† Paul Potemkin was rewarded for this carnage and his conquests by the dignity of Grand Admiral of the Black Sea, and Governor of the new Russian province of Tauris, as the Crimea and the adjacent territory on the mainland were now denominated. Prince Potemkin (under whose directions the general had acted) was signalised by the title of the Taurian.‡ The result of these injuries and violences was, that Russia increased her dominion by the possession of all the countries which had made up the independent Tartar kingdom, so formally recognised and guaranteed by herself in the treaties of 1774 and 1779. These countries were not only the Crimean peninsula itself, with its admirable harbours and positions of unrivalled strength, but also extensive regions along the north coast of the Euxine; and, in Asia, the Island of Taman, and the important Kuban territory, where the outposts of Russian power were now planted,

* Schlosser, p. 129. † Clarke, vol. ii. p. 179 n., 184.
‡ Schlosser, p. 129.

ready for further advance against either the Turkish or the Persian dominions in Upper Asia.

The progress of this high-handed robbery excited the greatest indignation at Constantinople; nor did Western Europe observe unmoved such inordinate aggrandisement of the Russian power. The American war was over. The House of Bourbon had gratified its ancient feelings of feud with England, by aiding in the humiliation which the events of that war inflicted on this country. France for a brief period before her Revolution was at leisure to consider the general interests of the civilised world. Louis XVI. and his minister, M. de Vergennes, were sincerely desirous to check the ambitious career of Catherine, and to save the Turkish empire from dismemberment. Austria was found to be too much under Russian influence to be trusted; and the French court addressed itself to that of England on the subject of the Crimea, even before the definitive treaty of peace between France and England was formally signed. In June, 1783, M. d'Adhémar, the representative of France at London, informed Mr. Fox (then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) that "The Most Christian King had just received from the cabinet of St. Petersburg the official notification that Russia had taken possession of the Crimea and the Kuban. Would England look on with indifference at such a spirit of conquest?" The English minister replied by expressing a doubt of the fact of definite possession of those provinces having been taken by Russia: he said that Frederick of Prussia would make war sooner than allow it. Again

and again, by orders from his court, M. d'Adhémar addressed Fox on the subject. He asked, "Would England see with indifference a Russian fleet in the Bosphorus? was it wished that Constantinople should be given up to Catherine? at any rate, could not some limit be imposed on the Empress's career of conquest? might not the Kuban be conceded to her, so as on that cession to found a demand for her resigning the Crimea? If France and England would join in a remonstrance, their voice must be attended to at St. Petersburg; but, acting singly, France would not be heeded." Fox coldly replied that it was too late to interfere. "The annexation of the Crimea was now a *fait accompli*. Besides, England had engagements with the Empress which it was inconvenient to break." Thus repelled by the minister, M. d'Adhémar sought and obtained an audience from the King of England. He explained to George III. the importance of the Russian conquests; he pointed out the political intimacy that was forming between Joseph II. of Austria and the Russian sovereign, and their evident intention to dismember Turkey, as the greater part of Poland had already been seized and partitioned. The honesty and strong common sense of George III. were moved, and he exclaimed, with indignation, "If things are to go on in this fashion, Europe will soon be like a wood, where the strongest robs the weakest, and there will be no security for any one." But a king of England can only act constitutionally through his ministry and parliament. Fox persevered in his indifference to Turkey, or rather, in his partiality to Russia; nor, indeed, is it probable that

the English people, exhausted as they were by a long and unsuccessful war, would at that period have co-operated willingly with France in new hostilities. The irritation felt here against that country for the part which she had taken against England in the American contest was too bitter ; and the recollection of the combined fleets of the House of Bourbon riding supreme in the Channel, was far too fresh and painful.

The French minister, by a despatch of the 8th of August, 1783, sorrowfully assured his court that there was no hope of obtaining the co-operation of England, and that Mr. Fox seemed bound to a false system : but M. d'Adhémar added a prophetic expression of belief, that a nullification of the policy of England in so grave a matter could not be permanent ; and that sooner or later England would come to an understanding with France for the purpose of arresting the progress of the military and naval power of Russia, which threatened to overwhelm the East.*

The Prussian king, when applied to by M. de Vergennes to act in concert with France in the Oriental question, merely replied by complaints against the alliance of 1756 between the Houses of Hapsburg and Bourbon ; and he called on France to renounce her connection with Austria before she asked Prussia to take part with her.† Louis XVI. and his minister found the

* A minute and interesting narrative of these negociations is given by M. Capefigue in his recent historical work, entitled "Louis XVI., ses relations diplomatiques avec l'Europe, l'Inde, l'Amerique, et l'Empire Ottoman," pp. 195-209. See also Mr. Fox's speech in the Oczakow debates of 1791, in the Parliamentary History of England, vol. xxix. p. 63.

† Capefigue, p. 203.

same selfish indifference to prevail both at the court of Turin and in that of Vienna.* It was, indeed, well known that Austria was conspiring with Russia for the spoliation of Turkey, and that her policy was to indemnify herself against the increase of the Russian power by seizure of territories for herself. A vain appeal was made to her sense of expediency by M. de Vergennes, who bitterly lamented that, according to the new system of European international policy, it was useless to talk of justice ; and that self-interest was now openly recognised as the natural prime agent in the disposal of the affairs of the world.† The French ambassador at Vienna represented to the Austrian cabinet that "Austria could not desire to see her military and maritime interests sunk in the absorbing influence of Russia. Even if the Crimea and the Kuban were to be given up to the Empress, at least let an admission be required of her in behalf of the commercial and maritime interests of all nations. Let there be a stipulation that she is to have only merchant vessels in the Black Sea, or such vessels of war as mount less than twenty guns." ‡ The same disregard was shown at Vienna, as at the other capitals of Western Europe, to the proposals of France : Louis XVI. judged it imprudent to act alone. The Sultan was informed that he must look for no aid from the West. He knew too well the strength of his northern adversary and his own. The Turkish preparations for the recovery of the Crimea were discontinued ; and a new treaty was signed on the 8th of January, 1784, between Turkey and

* See Capefigue, p. 204, 206. † *Ibid, ut supra.*

‡ *Ibid*, p. 206.

Russia, by which it was agreed that the new state of things in the Crimea, Taman, and the Kuban, should not disturb the peace between the two empires. The stipulation of the treaty of Kainardji, which assured to the Porte the sovereignty over Oczakof and its territory, was formally renewed; and the third article of the new convention provided that whereas the river Kuban was admitted as the frontier in the Kuban, Russia renounced all sovereignty over the Tartar nations beyond that river; that is to say, between the river Kuban and the Black Sea.*

The pacific words inserted in this treaty, like those in the convention of 1779, were mere hollow formalities; for the Porte could not but cherish resentment for the wrongs to which it seemed to submit; and the aggressive ambition of Catherine was only stimulated by conquests and concessions. Austria was now entirely devoted to the interests of Russia; and a league was made between the two empires, by which each bound itself to aid the other.† In a triumphal progress which Catherine made in the early part of the year 1787 to her new Taurian province, she was joined by the Emperor Joseph at Kherson. He accompanied her to the Crimea, and, amid the festivities and frivolities of their journey, the imperial tourists sometimes argued, and sometimes jested, on the details of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and on the questions of what was to be done with the Greeks, and

* The treaty is printed in 1. Martens et Cussy, p. 345; and in Martens Recueil des Traités, vol. ii. p. 505.

† Coxe, vol. iii. p. 477.

what was to become of "those poor devils the Turks." * Batchiserai, the ancient capital of the deposed Tartar Khans, was the scene of many of these schemes and scoffs; and the downfall of the Sultan was gaily plotted at Sebastopol also, as Catherine's new city by the Gulf of Aktiar was pompously designated. The Empress and her guests saw there with pride and exultation a new Russian navy riding in the finest harbours of the Black Sea. Even then they boasted of the facilities which Sebastopol would give for a sudden and a decisive attack upon the Turkish capital. Few of the stately group of generals and diplomatists, that stood round the sovereigns of Russia and Austria at Sebastopol in 1787, imagined that more than half a century would pass away, and yet the House of Othman continue to reign over either shore of the Bosphorus; or that the time was to come when the combined forces of France and England would destroy the stronghold of Muscovite power, the foundation of which Catherine then viewed so complacently, and that Russia's proudest fleet would sink, self-doomed, beneath those very waves, to escape the vengeance of the Western Allies of the Turkish nation.

It was the design of Catherine and Joseph to attack Turkey along the whole line of her northern frontier,

* "Leurs Majestés Impériales se tâtoient quelquefois sur les pauvres diables de Turcs. On jetoit quelques proposés en regardant. Comme amateur de la belle antiquité, et un peu de nouveautés, je parlois de retablir les Grecs; Catherine, de faire renaître les Lycurges et les Solons: moi, je parlois d'Alcibiade; mais Joseph II., qui étoit plus pour l'avenir que pour le passé, et pour le positif que pour le chimère, disoit: 'Que diable faire de Constantinople?'"—Prince de Ligne, Lettres, etc., p. 55 (ed. 1810).

from the Adriatic to the Caucasus. But, as it was wished by the Empress to keep up her character for magnanimity and equity in the literary world of Christendom, means were taken to provoke the Turks to be the first in declaring war. The emissaries of Russia excited disturbances in Moldavia, Wallachia, Greece, and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Offensive claims were put forward on the part of the Empress to the province of Bessarabia, and the towns of Oczakof and Akerman, on the pretext that they had formerly been governed by the Khans of her new Taurida.* These and similar measures irritated more and more the haughty spirit of the Osmanlis, which had already been deeply incensed at the open insults put upon Turkey by the Russian and Austrian sovereigns during their progress to the Crimea, in which their hostility to Turkey had been so little veiled, that, when Catherine and Joseph passed through the southern gate of her new city of Kherson, a pompous inscription, in the Greek language, was set up, announcing that this was the way to Byzantium.†

Had Gazi Hassan been at Constantinople in the summer of 1787, it is probable that the war would have been deferred, until Turkey had prepared herself to sustain it with more vigour. His policy was to complete the subjugation of the rebellious and disaffected provinces of the Sultan, before the renewal of the contest with the foreign enemy. In furtherance of this

* Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 141; Parliamentary History, vol. xxix. p. 193; Emerson Tennent's Greece, vol. ii. p. 401.

† Coxe, vol. iii. p. 515.

plan, he was, in 1787, occupied in the recovery of Egypt to his sovereign's power.* But, partly through the rivalry with which the Grand Vizier, Yusuf, and other Ottoman grandees regarded Gazi Hassan, and partly through the popular indignation at Constantinople, which the studied insults and aggressions of Russia excited, hostilities were declared by the Sublime Porte against that country on the 15th of August, 1787;† the Sultan unfurled the sacred standard of the Prophet, proclaimed a holy war, and summoned the True Believers to assemble round the banner of their Faith.

The first object of the Turks was to recover the fortress of Kilburn (which had been ceded to the Russians by the treaty of Kainardji), and so regain the mastery of the important embouchure of the rivers Boug and Dnieper. For this purpose, Gazi Hassan was recalled from Egypt, and placed in command of the Sultan's land and sea forces in and near the Black Sea. On the Russian side, Prince Potemkin (who chiefly directed the operations of the war), sent Suwarrow to defend the menaced fortress. A division of the Turkish army was posted at Oczakof, on the coast immediately opposite to Kilburn; and Gazi Hassan's design was to land part of these forces, and also the troops which his fleet had conveyed from Constantinople, on the Kilburn side, for the purpose of assailing the fortress by land, while the Turkish fleet bombarded it from the sea. Suwarrow's troops were few in number, and Kilburn was then ill-fortified: but

* Eton, p. 423.
† Eton, 423; Coxe, vol. iii. p. 515; Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 141.

his generalship and daring not only protected it, but nearly destroyed the assailants. Kilburn has justly been called, "Suwarrow's glory,"* down to our own time. Suwarrow erected a battery at the very entrance of the Liman (as the embouchure of the two rivers, which widens out after the passage between Oczakof and Kilburn, is termed), and he drew together a strong force of Russian gun-boats from Nicolaieff under the prince of Nassau Siegen. Suwarrow permitted the Turkish fleet to enter the Liman without molestation; and he remained inactive till the Turks had disembarked from 6000 to 7000 men on the Kilburn shore. He then made a sudden and desperate attack on them with two batallions of infantry which he led on with fixed bayonets; and when he had broken them with this charge, he brought forward some regiments of Cossacks to complete their rout. All the Turkish troops that had been landed on the Kilburn shore were slain. At the same time, the Russian battery at the end of the promontory opened its fire upon the Turkish ships, and the flotilla of the Nicolaieff gun-boats assailed them in the Liman. The greater part of Hassan's armament was destroyed; and thus, at the very commencement of the war, the prestige of success (always important in war, but doubly so when the contest is with orientals) was fixed on the side of the Muscovites.†

The approach of the winter season checked the

* "Oh! Kilburn, Kilburn, Suwarrow's glory, and my shame!" was the exclamation of the Russian general on surrendering it to the combined French and English armament last autumn.

† Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 142; Eton, p. 91.

progress of hostilities during the remainder of 1787; and in the following year a seasonable diversion in behalf of Turkey was effected by the war which broke out between Sweden and Russia, and which detained the Empress's best fleet and many of her troops in and near the Baltic. War had not yet been declared between Austria and Turkey; and the Emperor Joseph's internuncio at Constantinople was instructed to offer the mediation of his sovereign to prevent the further effusion of blood.* The cause of this delay on the part of Joseph, was the troubled state of his dominions in the Netherlands; but so soon as a temporary suspension of these disturbances had been effected, the Austrian sovereign resumed his hostile preparations against Turkey. He even endeavoured to obtain a treacherous advantage by surprising the important fortress of Belgrade, while he still affected the character of a peacemaker. This discreditable enterprise took place on the night of the 2nd December, 1787. But the Austrian troops that were sent against the Turkish city across the Danube aud the Saave, were delayed by natural obstacles, and by the want of due concert between their commanders. The morning found a detachment of them under the walls of Belgrade, who were exposed to certain destruction if the Turkish garrison had assailed them. But the Pacha who governed there, pretended to be satisfied with the apologies of the Austrian officer in command, and permitted him and his men to withdraw unmolested. This shameful violation of public faith and the law of

* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 516.

nations on the part of Austria, was met by the Ottomans with only a dignified appeal to the gratitude of the Emperor. They reminded him of the forbearance of Turkey in the time of Austria's distress after the death of Charles VI., and of the scrupulous honesty with which the treaties between the two empires had been observed by successive Sultans.* But cupidity and ambition had more influence on Austria than such feelings as gratitude or generosity, as honesty or honour; and on the 10th of February, 1788, Joseph published a declaration of war, in which he imitated the document by which the Emperor Charles VI. had commenced the war of 1737, even as he had imitated the treachery of his predecessor in attacking the possessions of a neighbour, while still professing peace and goodwill.†

Joseph hoped to aggrandise his dominions by the conquest and annexation of not only Bosnia and Servia, but also of Moldavia and Wallachia. He began the war with an army of 200,000 men and a train of 2000 pieces of artillery; but what he effected in 1788 with this enormous force, was more in accordance with the scanty justice of his cause, than with the magnificence of his preparations. It had been arranged that a Russian army should enter Moldavia, and march thence to co-operate with the Austrians. But the breaking out of the Swedish war, obliged the Empress to reduce the Russian corps that was to act with Joseph's troops to a division of 10,000 men under General Soltikoff.

* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 516; and see p. 203 *supra*.

† Coxe, vol. iii. p. 516; p. 183, *supra*.

The same cause prevented the sailing of the intended Russian armament to the Archipelago. But the Empress's fleet on the Black Sea was now strengthened and well equipped, nearly all the officers being foreigners. Russian troops, under Generals Tallizyn and Tamara made vigorous progress in the regions between the Black Sea and the Caspian; and the main army which was collected near the river Boug, under the favourite, Prince Potemkin, was numerous and efficient, though little activity was shown in its operations during the greater part of the year.*

On the Turkish side Oczakof was strongly garrisoned; and was regarded as the bulwark of the empire against Potemkin's army. Gazi Hassan commanded on the Black Sea, and the Grand Vizier assembled his forces in Bulgaria, to act as necessity required, either against the Russians, who were expected to advance by their old line of invasion, through Bessarabia and Wallachia; or against the Austrians, who threatened Turkey from the north-west. Joseph wasted the early part of the year in waiting for the Russians, and in unsuccessful intrigues with the Pacha of Scutari, and other Turkish commanders, whose customary insubordination towards their Sultan was erroneously thought convertible into traitorous co-operation with the enemies of their race and faith. When, at length, the Austrian Sovereign, ashamed at the ridicule which his indecision had brought on him, began to advance, he encountered an obstinate resistance from the Mahometan population of Bosnia; though in Servia the

* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 517; Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 143.

Rayas again welcomed the Imperialists, and formed armed bands that fought bravely against the Turks.* But the Grand Vizier, who found that there was no serious peril of a Russian advance upon the Balkan during that year, moved his whole force upon the flank of the Austrian line of operations. Joseph retired with precipitation. The Turks crossed the Danube; defeated an Austrian army under Wartersleben at Meadia; laid waste the Bannat; and threatened to invade Hungary. Joseph now gave the command of part of his forces, called the army of Croatia, to Marshal Laudohn, a veteran hero of the Seven Years' War, who instantly assumed the offensive,† defeated the Turks opposed to him at Dubitza, and, before the close of the campaign, had advanced into the heart of Bosnia, and besieged and taken the town of Novi. Joseph, himself, had marched with 40,000 men to relieve General Wartersleben and to protect Hungary. For this purpose, he took up a position near Slatina, in the valley of Karansebes, where he closed his military career by inflicting upon himself one of the most remarkable defeats recorded in history.

The forces under his command amounted to 80,000 men. The Vizier's army was posted opposite to him at a little distance. Elated with the numbers and admirable condition of his troops, Joseph had resolved to attack the Turks, and to carry the war into Wallachia. The project was approved of by his

* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 518. Ranke's Servia, p. 91.

† "Laudohn had always disapproved of a defensive war; and his axiom was that more men are lost by sickness or desertion in inaction, than fall by the hand of the enemy in the most bloody battles."—Coxe, vol. iii. p. 518, note.

generals; and an easy victory was anticipated at the cost of not more than 3000 or 4000 men. On the 20th of September all was prepared for the attack, and the generals were assembled in the Emperor's tent to receive their final orders: the troops were in the highest spirits, and everything seemed to promise a brilliant triumph to Austria. Suddenly the Emperor felt nervous and disquieted, and asked the veteran Marshal Lacy if he was sure of beating the enemy. The Marshal replied (as any sensible man would under the circumstances *), that he expected victory, but that he could not absolutely guarantee it. This answer so discouraged Joseph, that he instantly abandoned the intention of attack, and resolved to fall back to Temeswar. The plan of retreat was arranged; and, as an additional security, orders were given that the retrograde march should begin at midnight. The troops had proceeded a little distance, when Marshal Lacy discovered that the piquets of the left wing had not been withdrawn. He immediately directed that this should be done, and that the further movement of the main body should be checked, till it was joined by those detachments. The word of command to halt was passed and repeated loudly through the ranks; and in the darkness and confusion some of the Austrian troops thought that it was the Turkish war-cry of "Allah" which they heard, and that the enemy was upon them. The panic spread rapidly. The drivers of the ammunition tumbrils urged their horses to full speed, in the hope of escaping. The infantry, thinking that the noise thus

* The words are Marshall Marmont's.

made was caused by the charge of the Turkish cavalry, clustered together in small bodies, and opened a musketry fire in all directions. At daylight they discovered their fatal error, and the havoc ceased, but not before 10,000 Austrians had fallen by the weapons of their own comrades. Order was then restored, and the army continued its retreat to Temeswar. But the Turks, whose courage was raised in proportion as that of their adversaries fell, captured part of the Austrian baggage and artillery; and before the campaign was terminated in November by an armistice for three months, 20,000 more of Joseph's best soldiers had perished by sickness, which was the consequence of his prolonged occupation of an unhealthy tract of country.* Altogether Austria lost in the operations of this year 30,000 men in killed and wounded, the greater part of whom fell at Karansebes or in desultory skirmishes; and 40,000 more, who were swept away by pestilential disorders.

On the north-western coast of the Black Sea, where Prince Potemkin commanded, the Russians effected little during the greater part of the year; though Oczakof was invested as early as August. At length Potemkin summoned the victor of Kilburn to urge on the siege, and the Russian arms made their customary progress under Suwarrow, though he was obliged by a wound to retire from head-quarters before the final assault was given. This took place on the 16th of December, 1788. Valour, maddened to ferocity, was

* See Marshall Marmont's account of the havoc of Karansebes at p. 11 of his Memoirs (Sir F. Smith's translation); see too Coxe, vol. iii. p. 520.

shown on both sides. The Turks of Oczakof had, before the siege, surprised a Russian village in the vicinity, and mercilessly slaughtered all the inhabitants. Potemkin and Suwarrow caused the Russian regiments that were to assault the town, to be first led through this village as it lay in ashes, and with its streets still red with the blood of their fellow-countrymen. With their natural stubborn savage courage thus inflamed by the longing for revenge, the Russians advanced on the 16th of December over the frozen Liman against the least fortified side of the city. Whole ranks were swept away by the fire of the besieged; but the supporting columns still came forward unflinchingly through musketry and grape; 4000 Russians fell; but the survivors bore down all resistance, and forced their way into the city, where for three days they revelled in murder and pillage. No mercy was shown to age or sex; and out of a population and garrison of 40,000 human beings, only a few hundreds (chiefly women and children) escaped, whom the exertions of the officers in the Russian service rescued from the indiscriminate fury of the soldiery.*

* Eton, p. 424. Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 164. Mr. Eton, who was with Prince Potemkin at Oczakow, describes a touching scene which he witnessed there, and which he cites as a proof of the "fortitude and resignation bordering upon apathy," with which the Turks bear evils of the greatest magnitude. He says, (p. 115), "The Turkish women and children (in number about 400) who were brought out of Ochakof when the city was taken, to the head-quarters of the Russian army, were put all together the first night under a tent. No better accommodation could under the pressure of the circumstances be made for them, though it froze exceedingly hard, and they suffered dreadfully from cold and nakedness, and many from wounds. As I spoke Turkish, I had the guard of that post, and the superintendence of them that night. I observed that there reigned a perfect silence among them, not one woman weeping or lamenting, at least loudly, though every one, perhaps, had lost a parent, a child, or a husband. They

In the March of 1789, the Turkish Grand Vizier began the campaign against Austria with unusual activity. He left troops on the lower Danube to observe the enemy in Wallachia and Moldavia; he crossed the river at Ruschuk, with 90,000 men, whom he led in person. He advanced rapidly towards Hermanstadt in Transylvania, with the design of pressing forward and carrying the war into the hereditary provinces of the Emperor. Unfortunately for Turkey the death of Sultan Abdûl Hamid at this crisis caused a change of Grand Viziers; and the able leader of the Turks was susperseded by the Pacha of Widdin, a man utterly deficient in military abilities. The effect of this change was the abandonment of the late Vizier's plans for the campaign; and the Turkish troops were drawn back to the south of the Danube.*

Sultan Selim III., the successor of Abdul Hamid, ascended the Turkish throne on the 7th of April, 1789,

spoke with a calm and firm voice, and answered the questions I put to them apparently without agitation. I was astonished, and knew not whether to impute it to insensibility, or the habit of seeing and hearing of great vicissitudes of fortune, or to a patience and resignation inculcated by their religion; and at this day I am equally unable to account for it. One woman sat in a silent but remarkably melancholy posture, insomuch that I was induced to offer her some consolation. I asked her why she did not take courage and bear misfortune like a Mussulman, as her companions did. She answered in these striking words, '*I have seen my father, my husband, and my children killed; I have only one child left.*' 'Where is it?' I asked her with some precipitation, '*Here!*' she calmly said, and pointed to a child by her side, which had just expired. I and those with me burst into tears, but she did not weep at all. I took with me that night into my warm subterranean room as many of these miserable women and children, wounded and perishing with cold, as it would contain; they staid with me twelve days, during all which time none of them either complained aloud, or showed any signs of excessive internal grief, but each told me her story (both young and old) as of an indifferent person, without exclamation, without sighs, without tears." Page 115.

* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 521.

being then twenty-seven years old. He was a young man of considerable abilities and high spirit; and his people gladly hailed the accession of a youthful prince, active in person, and energetic in manner, under whom they hoped to see an auspicious turn given to the long-declining fortunes of the empire. Selim had been treated by his uncle, the late Sultan, with far greater kindness, and had been allowed much more freedom both bodily and mental, than the non-reigning princes of the blood-royal were usually permitted to enjoy. One of his intimate associates was an Italian physician, named Lorenzo; and from him and other Franks, Selim eagerly sought and obtained information respecting the nations of Western Europe, their civil and military institutions, and the causes of that superiority which they had now indisputably acquired over the Ottomans. Selim even opened (through a confidential agent, Isaac Bey) a correspondence with the French King and his ministers Vergennes and Montmorin, in which he sought political instruction from the chiefs of what he was taught to regard as the foremost nation of the Franks.* He felt keenly the abuses which prevailed in his own country; and it is said that his father, Sultan Mustapha III., had bequeathed to him a memorial (diligently studied and venerated by young Selim), in which the principal events of Mustapha's unhappy reign were reviewed, the degeneracy of the Turkish nation discussed, and the great evils that prevailed in the state were pointed out, with exhortations to their thorough

* Aleix. Précis d'Histoire Ottoman, vol. ii. Article Selim III. Biographie Universelle.

removal. Thus trained and influenced, Selim came an ardent reformer to the throne; but the war which he found raging between his empire and the confederate powers of Austria and Russia, required all his attention in the beginning of his reign, which opened with the darkest scenes of calamity and defeat.

The great mass of the Austrian forces in 1789 was placed under the able guidance of Marshal Laudohn. The Prince of Coburg commanded the corps which was to cooperate with the Russians. Potemkin's army, after the destruction of Oczakow, occupied the country from the Dnieper to the Delta of the Danube; and Suwarrow (who had now recovered from his wound) was sent into Moldavia with the Russian division, which was to assist the Prince of Coburg.* Sultan Selim had recalled Gázi Hassan from the command of the fleet in the Black Sea, where he had experienced several reverses; and the old admiral was now placed at the head of the Turkish army, which was to act against Coburg's forces. Hassan advanced upon the Austrians, who were stationed at Fockshani, at the extreme point of Moldavia. He would probably have overwhelmed them, if they had not been succoured by Suwarrow, who marched his army no less than sixty English miles over a wild mountainous district in thirty-six hours.† Suwarrow reached the Austrian position at five o'clock in the evening of the 30th of July. Instead of waiting for Hassan's assault, he issued his order for battle at eleven the same night; and at two hours before daybreak the

* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 521. Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 166.
† Marmont, p. 32.

next morning, he led the allied armies forward against the Turkish fortified camp, in one of those wonderful bayonet attacks, which became national and natural to the Russian soldiery under his guidance.* The Turks were utterly routed, and all their artillery and baggage taken. Another and a larger army was collected by Selim's orders and exertions, which on the 16th of September encountered Suwarrow with the same result, though the contest was more obstinate. This great victory of the Russian general was gained by him near the river Rimnik, whence came the well-merited surname of Rimnikski, which was conferred on Suwarrow by his Empress.† The excitement and alarm of the Turks was now extrême ; and Selim, in order to appease the popular tumult at Constantinople, disgraced himself by putting to death the gallant, though lately unsuccessful veteran, Gazi Hassan. The Ottoman forces in Bosnia and Servia experienced defeats almost as severe from the Imperialists under Laudohn. Belgrade and Semendria were captured ; and the advance of the converging Russian and Austrian armies upon the Turkish capital seemed irrestrainable, when the Emperor Joseph was compelled by the disorder and revolts, which had broken out in almost every part of his dominions, to check the progress of his forces in Turkey, and to employ them against his own subjects. The death of the Austrian sovereign in 1790, relieved the Sultan from one of the most vehement, though not of the

* Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 167, n.

† Coxe, vol. iii. p. 521. Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 168. Biographie Universelle, tit. Souwarof.

most resolute foes of the Ottoman power.* The succeeding Emperor, Leopold, alarmed at the perilous condition of many of his most important provinces, and menaced with war by Prussia, was anxious to conclude a secure and honourable peace with Turkey: and after some further operations on the Danube, in the course of which the Austrians captured Orsova, but were defeated by the Turks near Giurgevo, an armistice was agreed on, which was eventually followed by a peace: though the negotiations were protracted into the middle of the year 1791. The treaty of Sistova (as this pacification was termed) was signed on the 4th of August of that year. The Emperor relinquished all his conquests except the town of Old Orsova, and a small district in Croatia along the left bank of the river Unna. With these slight variations the same boundary between Austria and Turkey was reconstituted in 1791 that had been defined by the treaty of Belgrade in 1739.†

Russia was a far more persevering and a far more deadly enemy to the Ottomans. The Empress Catherine made peace with Sweden in the August of 1790; but she long treated with haughty neglect the diplomatic efforts of England and Prussia in favour of the Turks.‡ Constantinople was the great prize which she sought to win at any cost, and at all hazards; and she boasted that she would find there a capital for her empire, even if the Western powers were to drive her from St. Petersburg. In general, this design was veiled under the showy pretext of rescuing the Greeks

* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 541.

† Coxe, vol. iii. p. 550.

‡ Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 170.

from the Ottoman yoke, and reviving the classical glories of the Hellenic name. As in the preceding war, Russia now used every available method by which she might make the Greek population of the Turkish empire fight her battles against the Sultan. Before hostilities commenced in 1787, Catherine had sent manifestoes to all parts of Greece, inviting the inhabitants "to take up arms and co-operate with her in expelling the enemies of Christianity from the countries they had usurped, and in regaining for the Greeks their ancient liberty and independence."* The Suliotes and other mountain tribes of Northern Greece (or rather Epirus) were leagued at her instigation in active insurrection against the Turks. The Swedish war at first, and afterwards the menacing attitude assumed by England towards Russia, detained in the Baltic the ships which the Empress had destined for the Archipelago and the Propontis; but a Greek squadron of twelve vessels had been equipped by her orders in various ports in the Mediterranean; and the Hellenic patriot, Lambro Canzani, sailed early in 1790 in command of this little force against the enemies of the Czarina. Lambro cruised for some weeks in the Archipelago, where he captured many Turkish vessels, made frequent daring descents on the mainland, and conquered the island of Zea, which he occupied with part of his crews. The Sultan was compelled to withdraw from the Black Sea part of the remaining Turkish navy to act against these active enemies, and he sought and obtained also the more effectual aid of a squadron from Algiers. The

* Eton, p. 323. Emerson Tennent's Greece, vol. ii. p. 401.

united Ottoman and Barbaresque fleet, brought Lambro to action on the 18th of May, and succeeded, by the superiority of their numbers and the skilful gunnery of the Algerines, in destroying the whole of his ships.* On land, the insurrection continued; and the troops of the Pacha who attacked the Suliotes, (the celebrated Ali of Yanina), met with repeated defeats. A general deputation of the Greeks was sent in the early part of 1790 to St. Petersburg, to implore the aid of "the most magnanimous of sovereigns," and to beseech that she would give to the Greeks, for a sovereign, her grandson Constantine.† This address was graciously received by the Empress, who promised them the assistance which they requested. They were then conducted to the apartments of her grandson, where they paid homage to the Grand Duke Constantine, and saluted him as Emperor of the Greeks (*βασιλεὺς τῶν Ελλήνων*). A plan for the military co-operation of the Greek insurgents with the expected advance of the Russians upon Adrianople was then discussed; and the deputation were sent with the Russian General Tamaran to Prince Potemkin's head-quarters in Moldavia.

The great military event of the year 1790, was the capture of Ismail by Suwarrow. This important city is situate on the left bank of the Kilia, or northern arm of the Danube, about forty miles from the Black Sea. It was strongly garrisoned by the Turks, and

* Emerson Tennent, vol. ii. p. 407.

† Emerson Tennent, vol. ii. p. 405. Eton, p. 344, gives the Greek original of the address itself.

presented an almost insurmountable barrier to the advance of the Russians through the coast districts of Bessarabia and Bulgaria. Potemkin besieged it in person for several months without success. He then retired to Bender, to enjoy his usual life of more than vice-regal pomp and luxury, and sent for the hero of Kilburn, Fockshani, and the Rimnik to reduce the obstinate city. His laconic orders to Suwarrow were, "You will take Ismail, whatever be the cost." * Suwarrow joined the besieging army on the 16th of December, and on the 22nd, Ismail was taken; but at a cost of carnage and crime, for which the hideous history of sieges, ancient or modern, can hardly furnish a parallel.

An accomplished scholar and linguist, a highly scientific tactician, an acute and profound calculator, Suwarrow yet assumed the manners and appearance of an eccentric humourist; and encouraged the belief that each of his successes resulted rather from the happy inspiration of the moment, than from elaborate combinations and consummate military skill.† He acted this part through his deep insight into human nature; through his perfect understanding of the dispositions and inclinations of those around him, and especially through his knowledge of the character and capabilities of the Russian soldiers. The men, who would have misunderstood and perhaps suspected him, if he had displayed the high accomplishments which he possessed, loved him for the rough frankness and grotesque coarse-

* Schlosser vi. p. 173. Castera, Histoire de Nouvelle Russie, vol. ii. p. 205.

† See Marshall Marmont's account of Suwarrow, p. 29, of his Memoirs.

ness which he assumed. "Brother," was the term by which Suwarrow spoke to and of a Russian common soldier, to whom the sound of kindness from a superior was new; and there was a thorough heartiness in this military fraternity. He was ever ready with the rude but cheering jest, as he mixed familiarly with the ranks in the drill, on the march, or in battle. He shared too in all the hardships and privations which he required them to endure; and he knew how to address them in homely, spirit-stirring phrases, which roused at once the patriotism, the fanatic devotion to his creed and his sovereign, which the Russian recruit brings with him from his peasant-home, and the military pride which the Russian soldier soon acquires under the colours.*

However elaborate might be Suwarrow's strategy, his mode of handling his troops in action was most simple. "*Stuppai e Be!*" "Forward and Strike!" was his favourite maxim. He knew that his Russians were deficient in the alacrity and intelligent bravery which the troops of some other European nations possess; but he knew that he could rely on the same dogged obstinacy which had made Frederick II. exclaim that "Russians might be killed, but not routed." Suwarrow, therefore, led his men on in masses, which were taught always to attack, and to attack instantly and decisively. He discouraged long musketry firing, and evolutions in the presence of the enemy. His

* See for specimens of these phrases the extraordinary document called "Suwarrow's Catechism, or the Discourse under the Trigger." It is printed at the end of the second volume of Clarke's "Travels," and also at the end of Mr. Danby Seymour's valuable work on the Crimea.

rules were—"Draw out the line immediately, and instantly attack with the cold steel,"—"Fire seldom, but fire sure,"—"Push hard with the bayonet, the ball will lose its way—the bayonet never!"—"The ball is a fool—the bayonet a hero!"* The Russian soldiers almost idolised him; and, during his long military career, he never met with a single defeat. At Ismail, the army, which had been preparing to abandon the siege in discouragement, returned to its duty with enthusiastic ardour, as soon as the men saw Suwarrow among them. He drilled the young soldiers in person, and taught them how to use the bayonet against the Turkish sabre. Abandoning the tedious operations of a formal siege, Suwarrow ordered a general assault to be made on the Turkish defences, which, though not regularly breached, were not insurmountable. So far as the loss of life among his own troops was concerned, he probably judged well; as the protraction of the siege through the winter would have caused the death of far more men in the Russian lines, through cold, privation, and disease, than even the amount of the thousands who fell in the storming. But the slaughter of the brave defenders, and of the helpless part also of the population of Ismail, which stained Suwarrow's triumph, was horrible beyond the power of description. The assault was given at night, and it was not till after sustaining heavy loss, and frequent repulses, that the Russians forced the walls. But the fiercest part of the contest was within the city itself: every street was a battle-field; every house was a fortress, which was

* See the Military Catechism, *ut supra*.

defended with all the wild energy of despair. It was near noon before the Russian columns, slaying and firing all in their way, converged upon the market-place, where a body of Turks and Tartars of the garrison had rallied. The struggle raged there for two hours, quarter not being even asked, till the last of the Moslems had perished. Fresh troops from the Russian camp, eager for their share of booty and bloodshed, continued to pour into the devoted city, the remnants of which were given up for three days to the licence of the soldiery. According to Suwarrow's official report to Potemkin, in the course of four days 33,000 Turks were either slain or mortally wounded, and 10,000 taken prisoners. According to other accounts, nearly 40,000 of the defenders were destroyed by the Russians at Ismail, and only a few hundreds survived as captives. No reckoning seems to have been taken of the thousands of feeble old men, and of women and children, who suffered death, and worse than death, in the annihilated city. Suwarrow, while the ruins yet reeked before him, wrote a despatch to the Empress, in which he announced, in a couplet of doggrel exultation, that Ismail was won. It is probable that this callous buffoonery was affected. He afterwards told an English traveller that when the massacre was over, he went back and wept in his tent. So Scipio wept over Carthage burning; but such tears cannot wash out such blood.*

Many of the ablest Turkish generals and officers

* The Siege of Ismail is described in the Annual Register for 1791 by Dr. Lawrance, and Castera in the Histoire de Nouvelle Russie. Large extracts

perished at Ismail; and the remaining part of the war was a series of uninterrupted calamity to the

from these and other authorities are given in the notes to Mr. Murray's late editions of Byron.

Some of Byron's stanzas on the storming of Ismail, are of almost unrivalled power. Oh si sic omnia!

The town was enter'd: first one column made
  Its sanguinary way good—then another;
The reeking bayonet and the flashing blade
  Clash'd 'gainst the scimitar, and babe and mother
With distant shrieks were heard Heaven to upbraid:—
  Still closer sulphury clouds began to smother
The breath of morn and man, where foot by foot
The madden'd Turks their city still dispute.

The city's taken—only part by part—
  And death is drunk with gore: there's not a street
Where fights not to the last some desperate heart
  For those for whom it soon shall cease to beat.
* * * * * *

The city's taken, but not render'd!—No!
  There's not a Moslem that hath yielded sword:
The blood may gush out, as the Danube's flow
  Rolls by the city wall; but deed nor word
Acknowledge aught of dread of death or foe:
  In vain the yell of victory is roar'd
By the advancing Muscovite—the groan
Of the last foe is echoed by his own.

The bayonet pierces and the sabre cleaves,
  And human lives are lavish'd everywhere,
As the year closing whirls the scarlet leaves
  When the stripp'd forest bows to the bleak air,
And groans; and thus the peopled city grieves,
  Shorn of its best and loveliest, and left bare;
But still it falls in vast and awful splinters,
As oaks blown down with all their thousand winters.

But let me put an end unto my theme:
  There was an end of Ismail—hapless town!
Far flash'd her burning towers o'er Danube's stream,
  And redly ran his blushing waters down.
The horrid war-whoop and the shriller scream
  Rose still; but fainter were the thunders grown:
Of forty thousand who had mann'd the wall,
Some hundreds breathed—the rest were silent all!

Ottoman Empire. Sultan Selim still found the means of sending forward fresh armies; but these dispirited and undisciplined levies only furnished the Russian generals with the materials for further triumphs. Kutusoff routed a Turkish army near Babadagh, in January, 1791, and in the following July the host of 100,000 men, which had been collected under the Grand Vizier, was scattered by 40,000 Russians under General Repnin. The death, however, of Potemkin in the October of this year, removed the most violent promoter of the war on the Russian side, and the remonstrances of Prussia and England began at last to command attention from Catherine. William Pitt was now Prime Minister of England; and he discerned, far more sagaciously than most of his contemporaries, the true interest of England with regard to Russia and Turkey. A triple alliance had been formed in 1788, between England, Holland, and Prussia; the immediate object of which was to terminate the internal dissensions of the United Provinces. But the alliance was maintained after that purpose had been effected. The powers that were parties to it, had interfered at the Congress of the Hague, in 1790, in the disputes between the Emperor Joseph and his Belgian subjects; and they also had compelled Denmark to withdraw the support which she had given to Russia against Sweden in 1788.* Prussia, in her extreme jealousy of the power of the House of Hapsburg, had offered, when the Austro-Turkish war broke out in 1788, to conclude a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive with the Porte; and articles

* "Wheaton's History of Modern Law of Nations," p. 286.

had been prepared, by which the Prussian King was to guarantee the recovery of the Crimea.* These, however, were never executed; the triple alliance mediated between Austria and the Porte in the Congress at Reichenbach, in 1790, the result of which was the peace between Austria and Turkey, signed at Sistova, in 1791.† Having succeeded in the case of Austria, Prussia and England endeavoured to induce the Court of St. Petersburg to negotiate with the Porte, on the same basis to which Austria had consented, which is called in diplomatic terminology, the basis of the *statu quo*, and involves the principle of a general restoration of conquests. This was refused on the part of Russia; and various modifications of the *statu quo* were insisted on by Catherine's representatives. One design which she communicated to the Courts of Berlin and London, was a project for erecting the provinces of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia into an independent sovereignty, to be governed, as the Russian proposal vaguely phrased it, by a Christian prince. Some supposed that this sovereign was to be the Archduke Constantine; others, that the new crown was designed for the Empress's favourite, Prince Potemkin, who was actually ruling these regions with fully regal pomp and power.‡ But whoever might receive the title of King of Moldo-Wallachia, the recent fate of the Crimea had shown that the erection of such a state was the mere preliminary to its annexation with Russia. The pro-

* Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 170, and note. † Wheaton, p. 280.

‡ Adolphus' Hist. of England, vol. v. p. 5. Tomlin's Life of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 236. Parliamentary History, session, 1791.

posal was rejected by England and Prussia; and the Empress was obliged to abandon this not the least cherished of her schemes. But she was peremptory in excepting Oczakof and its territory from the suggested rule for negociation, and in requiring that the Russian frontier should be extended to the Dniester.* We have better means, than the majority of our countrymen possessed sixty years ago, for appreciating the wise policy of the English minister, who wished to prevent the Empress from converting the Liman of the Boug and the Dnieper into a Russian lake, where armaments prepared at Nicholaiff and other places on those rivers, may be collected in secresy and security; and whence they may suddenly issue into the Black Sea for decisive operation against Constantinople itself. Pitt resolved to support his diplomatic remonstrances by the guns of an English fleet in the Baltic; and the requisite forces for a naval expedition were prepared accordingly in the English ports at the close of the year 1790. But the project of a Russian war was made unpopular in England by the violent and unscrupulous exertions of Fox and other opponents of Pitt's ministry. In the numerous debates on the subject which took place in the English Parliament in the session of 1791, Turkey was reviled by the opposition speakers as a barbarous country, which had no part in the European state-system, and the fate of which could have no effect on the balance of power. The Empress was eulogised as the most magnanimous

* Parliamentary History, vol. xxix. *passim*. See also in Martens, Recueil des Traités, vol. v. p. 55, the various notes on this subject.

of sovereigns; and the idea of any peril accruing to Western Europe from the aggrandisement of Russia was derided as chimerical. It was asserted by Mr. Fox that the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire was improbable, and that, if it happened, it would be an advantage. Mr. Whitbread said, "Suppose that the Empress could realise all her imputed views of ambition and get possession of Constantinople, and expel the Turks from all their European provinces, would any unprejudiced man contend that, by such an event, mankind would not be largely benefited?" The ministerialist speakers replied by pointing out how much cause England had for guarding against the inordinate aggressiveness of the Empress, and for taking care that the Russian maritime power should not acquire predominance first in the Black Sea, next in the Dardanelles, and then by a natural consequence in the Mediterranean, where it would assume its true and most formidable appearance. They exposed the real character of Catherine in her conduct towards weak foreign nations; and protested earnestly against the influence of Great Britain in the pending negociation being impaired by such party attacks, as those which where resorted to by the British Parliamentary Opposition. Afterwards, in the debates of the subsequent session in 1792, when the English minister was at liberty to speak more freely than he could have prudently spoken while our relations with Russia were yet undetermined, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Jenkinson (afterwards Lord Liverpool) splendidly demonstrated that the principle, by which the foreign policy of this country should be directed, was the funda-

mental principle of preserving the balance of power in Europe; and that the true doctrine of the balance of power required that the Russian Empire should not, if possible, be allowed to increase, nor that of Turkey to diminish.*

France at this time (1790, 1791) was in the early agonies of her revolution; and no joint action against Russia, such as M. de Vergennes had proposed in 1783, could be hoped for now. But though thus deprived of what would have been the most effective co-operation abroad, and thus hampered by party warfare at home, Pitt continued his interposition in behalf of Turkey. The intended armament was not indeed sent to the Baltic, but the Empress thought it wise not to provoke its appearance there by increasing her demands for cession of Turkish territory; though the victories which her armies continued to gain during the negociations between the Court of St. Petersburg and those of London and Berlin, made her waver for a time, and almost resolve to brave England and Prussia, and place her grandson on the throne of Constantinople.† Ultimately, more prudent councils prevailed, and it is probable that she was in no little degree induced to assume an appearance of moderation towards Turkey, by the state of affairs in Poland. Kosciusko and his compatriots had effected important reforms in that country, of which the Empress had openly expressed

* The debates on the Russian armament in the session of 1791, and the Oczakof debates (as they have been termed) of the session of 1792, deserve careful study at the present time. They are reported in the xxixth volume of "The Parliamentary History of England."

† Eton, pp. 539, 560.

her disapprobation. She saw with anxiety the progress that was being made in reorganising the military force and general resources of the Polish provinces, which had not yet been deprived of independence, and she felt that she had need of her General Suwarrow, and her veterans from the Turkish wars, to consummate the final invasion and dismemberment of Poland, on which she had already resolved.

Preliminary articles of peace were agreed on between General Repnin and the Grand Vizier in the autumn of 1791; and regular conferences were opened at Jassy which ended on the 9th of January, 1792, in the peace between Russia and Turkey of that name.

By the treaty of Jassy,* the dominions of Russia were extended as far as the Dniester; and that river was made the boundary line of the two empires. An article was inserted (the 5th) which in somewhat vague terms enjoined that the Turkish commandants on the north-eastern frontiers of the Ottoman empire should cause no annoyance or disquiet under any pretext, either secretly or openly, to the countries and people, then under the rule of the Czar of Tiflis or Kartalinia; and that he should levy nothing from them. In order to show the full purpose of Russia in making this astute stipulation, it is necessary to explain that Catherine, like her predecessor Peter the Great, coveted the provinces that lie between the Euxine and the Caspian Seas, not only for their intrinsic value as acquisitions to the Russian empire, but on account of the advantages, which the possession of them seemed

* See the Treaty in Appendix D.

to offer for attacks on the Turkish dominions in Asia, and also for wars of conquest against Persia. Catherine caused lines of fortresses to be constructed between the two seas, and she maintained a fleet on the Caspian. Russian emissaries continually tampered with the Christian Princes of Georgia, Immeritia, Mingrelia, and the other smaller principalities, to induce them to renounce their ancient allegiance to the Sultan, or the Shah, and to place themselves under the sovereignty of the Russian Empress. These practices had been especially successful with Heraclius of Georgia, who was styled Czar of Tiflis and of Khartil. He had become the pensioner, and acknowledged vassal of Russia as early as 1785. The effect of the 5th article of the treaty of Jassy was to make Turkey acknowledge Russia as the protector of these important regions. The same policy, the same design of Russia to appropriate the Caucasian provinces had dictated the seemingly obscure 19th article of the treaty of Kainardji; we shall recognise it presently more clearly in the provisions of the treaty of Akerman.*

The pacification of Jassy was never regarded by the Russian Empress as anything more than a temporary pause in her operations against Constantinople, until the thorough subjugation of the Poles should be effected, and the Western powers should be too much engaged in other operations to be willing and able to interfere with her Oriental schemes. This was the case in 1796; and she was then on the very eve of accomplishing what her admirers term "the great design," when her death

* Chesney, p. 2. "Progress of Russia in the East," p. 30.

rescued the Ottoman empire from a more formidable attack than it had ever experienced. We know, from Mr. Eton's pages, how she intended to recommence the war, and how it was proposed to overwhelm the Sultan by the combined operations of Russian armies in Europe and Asia, and of a fleet and flotilla from Nicolaieff and Sebastopol conveying a force across the Black Sea, which was to strike at the Turkish capital itself. His words (proceeding from a knowledge of facts acquired at St. Petersburg) deserve consideration. He says of Catherine immediately before her death, that "She was now in possession of every resource she required in Poland for her army, in acting against the Turks on the European continent. The government of the acquired provinces was so firmly settled, that she had no apprehension of disturbances; her army was so formidable, that she could have marched beyond her frontiers at least 300,000 effective men; and she had raised 150,000 men to recruit it. Her fleet in the Black Sea was much superior to the whole Turkish navy, and there was a flotilla of small vessels built for the purpose of landing troops in three feet of water, which could have conducted, in three days, 60,000 men within a few miles of the capital of the Turkish empire. The first blow would have been the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in its own port, and the attack of Constantinople by land at the same time. A great army had passed Derbent; an arrangement would have immediately taken place with the Persian Khans, in whose quarrels, without any apparent interest, she had intermeddled; and this army would have

fallen on the Turkish Asiatic provinces, the consequence of which would have been, that all the Asiatic troops, which compose the garrison of their fortresses in Europe would have quitted them, and fled to succour their own country, and have left the road to Constantinople defenceless." *

As we are now approaching the time when Turkey became involved in the great wars of the French Revolution, and also the commencement of the reforms which cost Sultan Selim his life, but which Sultan Mahmoud II. effectively resumed, it may be convenient to pause, and take a brief survey of the state of the Turkish empire, as it was near the close of the last century, and before the changes which have been wrought in its inhabitants and institutions by the Nizam-Djinid and other innovations.

* Eton, p. 438.

CHAPTER IX.

VIEW OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF SELIM III.'S REFORMS — TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS; EYALETS, LIVAS, KAZAS—APPOINTMENTS OF THE PACHAS —THE AYANS—EXTENT OF THE EMPIRE—ITS MISRULE AND MISERY — FEEBLENESS OF THE SULTAN'S AUTHORITY — THE WAHABITES, DRUSES, MAMELUKES, AND SULIOTES — REVOLTS OF THE PACHAS—ABUSES OF THE FEUDAL SYSTEM —TYRANNY OF THE FARMERS OF THE REVENUE — MILITARY WEAKNESS OF THE EMPIRE—THE JANISSARIES AND OTHER TROOPS—THE HOUSE OF OTHMAN AT ITS NADIR.

SULTAN SELIM III. reigned over twenty-six Eyalets (as the larger divisions of the Ottoman empire were named) in Europe, Asia, and Africa. These were parcelled out into 163 smaller departments called Livas; and each Liva was again subdivided into Kazas, or communal districts.* Each Kaza had its own municipal jurisdiction; and it generally consisted either of a town and its dependencies, or of a rural canton (Nahiya) which often comprised small towns as well as villages. An Eyalet was presided over by a Pacha with three horse-tails, who had the rank of Vizier. He had assigned to him as the special sphere of his government, one or more of the chief Livas of his Eyalet, and

* This description of the Turkish Empire is chiefly taken from the 7th vol. of the work of Mouradjea D'Ohsson.

he exercised a general superior authority over the local rulers of the rest. Seventy-two Livas were under the immediate command of Pachas with two horse-tails, and these, as well as the Eyalets, were generally, though not accurately, spoken of as Pachalics. In general the appointments to the Pachalics were annual; though the same individual often retained his post for many years, and sometimes for life, if he was too strong for the Porte to depose him, or if he provided a sufficient sum of money from time to time to purchase his reappointment from the venal ministers of the Imperial Divan. Twenty-two of the Livas were held by Pachas on life-appointments.

The Turkish governor was supposed to be assisted in his administration by two or three individuals chosen by the inhabitants of his province, and confirmed in their functions by the Porte. These were called Ayans or Notables. Sometimes the office of Ayan was hereditary; but it was then requisite that the succession of the new Ayan should be ratified by the majority of the inhabitants. The Rayas also, or tributary subjects of the Porte, had officers called Codji Bachis of their own nations, who assessed upon individuals the tax imposed on the district.

The list of the twenty-six Eyalets was as follows :— Roumelia, Bosnia, Silistria, Djezaer (which included the greater part of Greece), Crete, Anatolia, Egypt, Bagdad, Ricca, Syria, Erzeroum, Sivas, Seide, Tchildeir, Djiddar, Aleppo, Caramania, Diarbekir, Adana, Trebizond, Moussoul, Taraboulous, Elbistan, Kars, Scherzroul and Van. There were also several districts and

cities not included in any Pachalic or Eyalet. Such were the trans-Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Such also were the cities of Mecca and Medina; and many cantons of Kurdistan were under their own hereditary chiefs, and were merely bound to supply the Sultan with a certain number of soldiers. The political condition of six Tourkman cantons was the same. The Barbaresque regencies continued to hold the position relatively to the Sublime Porte, which has been before described when we were tracing the reign of Sultan Mahomet IV.*

Thus, although the Turkish power had, before the end of the last century, been reft of many fair provinces; though its Padischah had no longer dominion in Hungary, in Transylvania, in the Crimea, or along the northern coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof, still, the empire over which the House of Othman claimed sovereignty, might have been deemed one of the amplest and richest in the world, if its natural advantages and capacities only were regarded. But the authority of Sultan Selim III. was scarcely recognised, even in name, in many of the best provinces of which he styled himself the ruler; and almost the whole of Turkey was in that state of official insubordination and local tyranny, in which the feebleness of the sovereign is commensurate with the misery of the people. The Wahabites were masters of all Arabia, except the two cities of Mecca and Medina, which they had not yet conquered. In Egypt, the Mamelukes treated the Sublime Porte and its officers with open scorn, though

* See p. 65, *supra*.

the Sultan's standard was permitted to float at Cairo. In Syria, the Druses and the Metualis of Mount Lebanon, and the hill-country of Palestine were practically independent tribes. So were the Suliotes, and others in northern Greece and Epirus. So were the Montenegrins, and the dwellers in the Herzegovene. Moldavia and Wallachia, though in form restored to Turkey, were in reality far more under Russian than Ottoman authority. And not only by these races, (which though comprised within the populations that had submitted to the House of Othman, were aliens from that house in creed, in language, and in blood,) but also by the most powerful of his Mahometan subjects, the Sultan's authority was systematically disregarded, though the forms of allegiance and lip-worship might still be preserved. Revolt and civil war were the common practices of the chief pachas. In Acre, Djezzar Pacha refused tax and tribute, put to death the Sultan's messengers, and tyrannised over the neighbouring country with a savage cruelty that procured him his surname of The Butcher. The Pacha of Bagdad was equally insubordinate, and for many years the Porte received no revenues from the rich territory which that potentate commanded. The same was the case with the Pachas of Trebizond, and Akhalzik.* In Widdin, the celebrated Passwan Oglou for many years defied the whole force of the Sultan, and made invasions of the adjacent provinces, like an independent and avowed foreign enemy. These are only some of the most conspicuous instances of viceregal revolt. It would be

* Eton, p. 280.

impossible to enumerate all the cases of local rebellion and civil war, of which the pachas were the causes or the victims, or both; and it is hardly possible for the imagination to comprehend the character or the amount of the sufferings, with which these things must have worn and wasted the population of the empire.

Even when the orders of the Central Government received obedience, the misery of the people was extreme. It has been already mentioned that the appointments of the Pachas (with some exceptions) were annual; and they were generally and notoriously obtained for money. It was seldom that the Turk, who intrigued among the officials and court-favourites at Constantinople for a Pachalic, was possessed of the necessary purchase and bribery-money. He usually borrowed the requisite sums from one of the wealthy Greeks of the Phanar, or from one of the Armenian bankers. The lender of the money became in reality the mortgagee of the Pachalic; and he may be said to have been a mortgagee in possession, inasmuch as his confidential agent accompanied the Pacha as secretary, and was often the real ruler of the province. As usually happens when a few members of an oppressed race purchase power under the oppressors, these Raya agents of Moslem authority were the most harassing and merciless in their policy towards their fellow-countrymen. The necessity which the Pacha was under of re-purchasing his appointment at the end of each year, prevented him, in ordinary cases, from shaking off this financial bondage. Sometimes, before an appointment could be obtained from the Porte, it was required

that one of the Sarrafs, or Armenian bankers, should become surety for the due transmission of the imperial revenue. The power thus given to the money-lenders, who, by their refusal to continue their security, could reduce the Turkish grandee to the state of a private individual, was a fresh source of exaction to the inhabitants of the Pachalic. By these and similar other abuses, the greatest possible amount of extortion and cruelty towards the subject was combined with the smallest possible benefit to the Imperial Government; as each of the agents, and sub-agents who were employed in this system of bribery, usury, and peculation, endeavoured to wring all he could from those beneath him, and to account for as little as possible to his superiors. The Ayans, or Provincial Notables, who ought to have protected their fellow-countrymen from the Pacha and his attendant harpies, became too often his accomplices. If an Ayan was refractory and honest, it was an easy thing to ruin him by a false charge brought before a Cadi, who had generally purchased his appointment by the same means as the Pacha, and was therefore as venal and as cruel.

As the Pachas had the power of life and death in their respective districts, and each maintained the pomp and luxury of an eastern court as well as the force of a camp, all of which had to be paid for by the provincials, the motives to tyranny on the part of the viceroy were infinitely multiplied, and the checks to it were almost entirely absent. If the requisite amount of revenue was regularly transmitted to Constantinople, no questions were asked as to how it had been collected.

Long and vehement complaints against the cruelty of a Pacha might rouse the Sublime Porte to punish him, especially if he was wealthy. But in such cases the provincials obtained no redress for their past wrongs. The treasures of the bow-strung Pacha were appropriated by the Sultan; and those, from whom they had been extorted, only gained a new governor, frequently more rapacious, because more needy than his predecessor.

The power of the inferior Turkish officers, the Beys and Agas, was like that of the Pacha in kind, both as to obtainment and exercise, though less in degree. There were also throughout the empire swarms of petty local tyrants, who farmed from the Porte the revenues of small districts of four or five villages each, under grants which were termed Mocatteh, if the lease was for life, and Iltezim, if it was for a term of years.* The misery, which the inhabitants of the Turkish Pachalics endured, may best be paralleled by referring to the descriptions which we possess, of the sufferings which were inflicted on the same regions, nearly two thousand years ago, by the Proconsuls and Publicani of the Roman commonwealth in its last age of corruption.†

* See Browne's Travels, published in Walpole's Turkey.

† "Surrounded by an army of officials all engaged in the same work of carving out fortunes for themselves and abetting their colleagues, the proconsuls had little sense of responsibility to the central government, and glutted their cupidity without restraint. The tithes, tolls, and other imposts from which the public revenue was drawn, were farmed by Roman contractors, belonging generally to the order of knights, who had few opportunities of rising to the highest political offices at home; and the connivance of their superiors in the province, backed by the corrupt state of public feeling in Rome, shielded to a great extent the sordid arts by which they defrauded both the state and its subjects," &c. Merivale, vol. i. p. 25.

The weakness and disorder of the Turkish empire were seriously increased by the enormous abuses of its feudal system, and by the infinite and antagonistic variety of dominations, princedoms, and powers, that had been suffered to grow up in many of its most important provinces. In describing the state of the Ottoman empire when at its meridian of glory under Solyman the Ordainer,* I have drawn attention to the peculiar incidents of feudalism among the Turks in their best ages, and to the causes which prevented the growth of an insubordinate noblesse, like that which defied the throne and oppressed the commons throughout nearly all Christendom in the mediæval times. But, before the close of the eighteenth century all this had been widely changed; and Turkey (especially in its Asiatic districts) abounded with mutinous hereditary feudatories, who generally were styled Dereh Beys or Lords of the valleys; and whose lawless arrogance towards their sovereign, and oppression of their dependents, emulated the worst baronial and knightly abuses, that ever were witnessed in Germany or France. A nominal deference to the Sultan and his Pacha might be professed; but an officer from Constantinople who endeavoured to enforce any order of the Sublime Porte in the stronghold of a Dereh Bey, would have met with the same treatment that an emissary of the Emperor Frederic III. might have expected in the castle of a German baron on the Rhine, or as the messengers of Charles the Simple would have received, if they had carried threat or mandate to Brittany or Rouen.

* Vol. i. p. 165.

It is impossible to supply any adequate description of the number and nature of the minor local powers, that struggled with each other and with the central government of Turkey, during this period of "her wild misrule of her own anarchy." The account which Sir John Cam Hobhouse (now Lord Broughton) gave of a single province, Albania, as seen by him a few years after the close of the last century, may serve as an example. He says, "Specimens of almost every sort of government are to be found in Albania. Some districts and towns are commanded by one man, under the Turkish title of Bolu Bashee, or the Greek name of Capitan, which they have borrowed from Christendom; others obey their elders; others are under no subjection, but each man governs his own family. The power in some places is in abeyance, and although there is no apparent anarchy, there are no rulers. This was the case in our time at the large city of Argyro Castro. There are parts of the country where every Aga or Bey, which, perhaps, may answer to our ancient country squire, is a petty chieftain exercising every right of the men of the village. The Porte, which in the days of Ottoman greatness divided the country into several small Pachalics and commanderies, is now but little respected, and the limits of her different divisions are confused and forgotten."

In the nominally central government at Constantinople, the Grand Vizier was still the Sultan's principal officer in temporal affairs, both civil and military; and the Mufti, as head of the Ulema, continued to be next in spiritual rank to the Sultan, who, as Caliph, was and

is, the religious chief of all Sunnite Mahometans. Under the Grand Vizier, besides his Kaimakan or lieutenant, were the Kehaya Bey, who attended to the home department, and also to the war office. Foreign affairs were the special province of the Reis Effendi. The Tchaoush Baschi was vice-president of the Grand Vizier's judicial tribunal, and chief of the police force of the capital. He also acted as the Lord High Marshal. Besides these, there were the Nischandjis or secretaries, the Deftendars or treasurers, and the holders of the other ancient offices that have been described when we examined the Turkish system of government in the times of Mahomet the Conqueror.* And, without attempting to enumerate or analyse the prolix catalogue of ceremonious courtiers and peculating placemen, who are described by those who wrote fifty and sixty years ago on Turkish matters, it may be generally stated, that, both in quantity and character, they were such and so many, as are usually found to multiply in decaying empires, especially in empires of the East.

The Imperial Divan was now generally convened not oftener than about once in six weeks. The ordinary Divan of the Grand Vizier sate much more frequently; and formed a court of justice, at which, besides the Vizier, the Kapitan Pacha, the two Kadiaskers, and the Nischandjis and Deftendars attended. On important occasions a grand council was summoned, consisting of nearly forty members, and comprising the chiefs of all the orders in the State. In extreme emergencies the

* Vol. i. p. 158 et seq.

members were called together to what was termed a standing Divan, and deliberated without taking seats.

The power of the Ulema, and especially of the head of them, the Mufti (which has been before alluded to *), had increased and was increasing. So was the amount of ecclesiastical property, the Vakoufs.† And though the system of permitting so large a proportion of the landed property of the empire to be held in mortmain was unquestionably evil, it was made to act in some degree as an alleviation of other evils, which generally affected the possessors of property under the extreme misgovernment of Turkey. Not only private estates, but whole districts and cities, were the properties of Mosques or other ecclesiastical foundations; and the occupier of them, on paying the stipulated quit-rents (which were usually light), lived in undisturbed possession, and in immunity both from the imposts of the central government, and the exactions of the local functionaries. Similar privileges were often enjoyed by those who dwelt in districts, that were the special property of the Sultana Validè and other high individuals. There were also many places, where, by ancient custom or royal grant, the Raya lived almost free from the intrusion of any of the dominant race; and where it was absolutely forbidden for any Turk to become a resident. It was to the existence of these and similar privileged localities in the empire,—to the protection which the Frank residents enjoyed under their own laws and consuls,—to the exceptional good government of just and able men who sometimes became Pachas,—and also

* Vol. i. p. 154. † See Vol. i. p. 337.

to the stern order sometimes enforced in their provinces by some of the most ferocious Pachas, who would tolerate no crimes but their own, that Turkey was indebted for what little commercial activity and wealth was to be found in her, at the period of which we are speaking.

If we look to the means which the Sultan possessed of asserting his authority against domestic rebels or foreign invaders, we shall find the military system of the empire so wretched, that instead of wondering at the success of the Christian powers against it, there seems to be rather cause for surprise at the Russians and Austrians not having completed its overthrow. The classification of the Turkish troops which Thornton has adopted in his "Treatise on the Ottoman Empire" (published in 1807) seems to be authentic and convenient. There were the paid troops, called generally the Kapikouli (which means, literally, slaves of the Porte), and the unpaid troops, who were termed Toprakli. The largest and by far the most important part of the paid troops was the once renowned corps of the Janissaries. In one of the earlier chapters of this work* we have traced the institution of this soldiery by the councils of the Vizier Alaeddin and Black Khahil Tschendereli in the reign of Orchan, the second sovereign of the House of Othman. We have seen the increase of their numbers, and the excellence of their discipline under Mahomet the Conqueror,† and Solyman, the Lord of his age;‡ their growing insubordination under the subsequent sultans;§

* Vol. i. p. 21.
† Ibid. p. 161.
‡ Ibid. p. 323.
§ Ibid. p. 388.

the change in the system by which they were recruited;* the increase of their numbers; and the decrease of their military efficiency. At the close of the eighteenth century they were computed to consist of 150,000 registered members, who were settled in the various towns of the empire, where they arrogated authority and military pre-eminence, and at the same time followed various trades. But the large number of those, who procured the enrolment of their names as Janissaries for the sake of the privileges and immunities which were thereby acquired, was no proof that any force of corresponding amount could be relied on by the State for actual service. The grossest frauds as to the character and capacity of the individuals who were placed on the muster-rolls, were practised by the private Janissaries themselves, and still more extensively by officers, who also enriched themselves by drawing pay for non-existent hundreds and thousands. Still, the Janissaries formed a large community in the empire, and one of the greatest importance both in war and in peace. They were conspicuous for their bigotry as Mahometans; and, as they knew the suspicion with which they and their predecessors had been regarded by successive Sultans, they in turn watched every innovation and reform with jealousy and hatred, and were even ready to rise in each other's aid to exercise the right of oppressing the Rayas who were beneath them, and what they deemed their still more sacred right of insurrection against the authorities that were over them.†

* Supra, p. 63.

† See as to the number, composition, &c. of the Janissary force (besides

Besides the Janissaries, there was a force of artillery-men, called Topidjis, said to be 30,000 in number, but dispersed, like the Janissaries, in the chief cities of the empire, and bound to join their standards on receiving orders.* The Bostandjis, or gardeners, of the Imperial palaces of Adrianople and Constantinople, continued to be enrolled and armed, and formed a kind of body-guard for the Sultan. There were other small bodies of regular infantry: and the old cavalry corps of the Sipahis and the Silihdars were still preserved, though in little numerical strength or efficiency. The irregular forces, the Toprakli, consisted chiefly of the old feudal contingents which the holders of Ziamets and Timars were bound to supply;† but which, owing to the abuses in these institutions, were now uncertain in amount and inferior in quality; nor could the services even of those who appeared beneath the Horse-tails, be relied on for the continued operations of a war. There were also in time of hostilities, levies of troops called Miri-Askeris, which received pay while in the field. When a Turkish town was besieged, the Mahometan inhabitants were enrolled as a kind of national guard for service while the peril lasted, and were called Yerli Neferats. The other irregular volunteers that joined a Turkish army were termed Guenullus.

Besides the forces of the Sultan, regular and irregular, that have been mentioned, there were also corps of provincial troops called Serratkuli, who were levied and paid by the Pachas. These were not kept permanently

D'Ohsson), Ranke's Servia, pp. 41, 100; Thornton's Turkey, 180; Eton, pp. 27, 66; Porter, vol. i. 273.

* Thornton, 183.

† See Vol. i. p. 163.

embodied, but were only called together in time of war, or during the march of an army. They consisted of Azaps, or pioneers, of Lagunjis or miners, and Hissarlis, who assisted the Topidjis in the artillery service.*

Great assemblages of armed men from these various sources were sometimes arrayed under the Ottoman standards, especially in the early part of a war. At the opening of a first campaign, the Porte could set in motion 300,000 sabres; and if the war was a successful one, there was no lack of volunteers to recruit the armies. But these large hosts were for the most part mere heaps of irregular troops, incapable of discipline, and destitute of experience. They were seldom even nominally enrolled for more than six months, and, at the first serious reverse that the army met with, they disbanded by thousands, and dispersed towards their homes, generally plundering the provinces in their way, whether hostile or friendly, Christian or Mahometan. Behind walls or entrenchments, and in confused engagements in broken countries, the native valour of the individual Turk, and his skill in the use of the sabre, made him a formidable opponent; and the wild charge of the Ottoman horse, often over ground which no other cavalry would dare to traverse, was still more destructive to a shaken or unready enemy. But, as compared with the steady movements and intelligent organisation of the forces of European Christendom, a Turkish army was (as Napoleon termed it) a mere Asiatic rabble. Two astonishing but indisputable facts both attest and account for this. Throughout the Turkish infantry and

* Thornton, 186.

cavalry there was now no regulation whatever, as to what weapons should be used, nor were any of them ever drilled together, or instructed to act in bodies in the commonest military evolution.* Each armed himself as he pleased; and, when an action had commenced, each may be said to have fought as he pleased. The French General Boyer well describes the Turkish soldiers of this time as "without order or firmness; unable even to march in platoons, advancing in confused groups, and falling on the enemy in a sudden start of wild and savage fury." †

The barbarous custom of receiving pay for the heads of fallen enemies, and the consequent eagerness of the Turkish soldiers to obtain "these bloody testimonials,"‡ tended not a little to increase the disorder and the heedlessness of mutual support, in which they combated. More than once the advantage which Ottoman armies gained at the beginning of a battle, was lost in consequence of the men dispersing to gather these hideous trophies, and to obtain head-money for them at the Seraskier's tent.

The condition of the navy, notwithstanding the exertions of Gazi Hassan, and of the Kapitan Pacha Hussein, who succeeded him, were even worse than that of the army. And altogether it may be safely asserted that the Turkish empire had reached its nadir of misery and weakness about half a century from the present time. With the commencement of Sultan

* D'Ohsson, vii. pp. 345—370.

† Intercepted Correspondence from Egypt, 183. Adolphus, Hist. of England, vol. v. 112.

‡ See Sir Walter Scott's observation, Life of Bonaparte, vol. iv. p. 126.

Selim's reforms a new era was opened. It is true that Turkey has since then suffered from defeats and revolts,—she has lost armies, fleets, and provinces: but a new spirit has been infused into her rulers and statesmen, which, though often checked, has never been extinguished; and which, whatever may be her ultimate doom, has falsified the confident predictions of Volney and other writers at the close of the last century, according to whom "the Sultan, equally affected with the ignorance of his peoplé, was to continue to vegetate in his palace; women and eunuchs were to continue to appoint to offices and places; and governments were still to be publicly offered to sale. The Pachas were to pillage the subjects, and impoverish the provinces. The Divan was to follow its maxims of haughtiness and intolerance. The people to be instigated by fanaticism. The generals to carry on war without intelligence, and continue to lose battles, until this incoherent edifice of power, shaken to its basis, deprived of its support, and losing its equilibrium, should fall, and astonish the world with another instance of mighty ruin." *

This vaticination of Volney's may well be compared, both with that of Sir Thomas Roe, in 1622,† and with many of the present day. Threatened states, like threatened men, sometimes live long; especially if the threatenings make them forewarned and forearmed.

* Volney, Considerations sur la Guerre actuelle des Turcs.

† See Vol. i. p. 392.

CHAPTER X.

SELIM'S REFORMS—THE NEW TROOPS—NAPOLEON ATTACKS EGYPT—WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND FRANCE—ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA AND ENGLAND—DEFENCE OF ACRE—FRENCH EVACUATE EGYPT—GENERAL PEACE—TROUBLES IN SERVIA —THE DAHIS—KARA GEORGE—WAR WITH RUSSIA AND ENGLAND—THE PASSAGE OF THE DARDANELLES—TRUCE WITH RUSSIA—SELIM III. DEPOSED BY THE JANISSARIES—MUSTAPHA IV. SULTAN—DEPOSED BY MUSTAPHA BAIRACTAR —MAHMOUD II.—DEATH OF BAIRACTAR—TRIUMPH OF THE JANISSARIES, AND APPARENT END OF REFORMS—RUSSIAN WAR CONTINUED—TREATY OF BUCHAREST.

RELIEVED from the immediate pressure of Russian war by the peace of Jassy, and from the imminent peril of its renewal by the death of the Empress Catherine, Sultan Selim earnestly applied himself to the difficult and dangerous duty of internal reform. To meet the multitude of evils that distracted the State, he projected manifold and extensive changes in almost all its departments. The abuses of the feudal system were to be dealt with by abolishing feudality itself. The Ziamets and Timars were to be resumed by the sovereign on the deaths of their holders; and their revenues were thenceforth to be paid into the royal treasury, and appropriated to the maintenance of a new military force. The administration of the provinces was to be ameliorated by curtailing the powers of the Pachas. Each ruler of an Eyalet or a Liva was to be appointed

for three years ; and at the expiration of that term, the renewal of his office was to depend on his exertions to give satisfaction to the people over whom he ruled. Another reform was proposed, from which the provincials would have derived still greater benefits. All farming of the taxes was to be abolished ; and the revenue was to be collected by officers of the Imperial treasury. In the General Central Government the Grand Vizier's power was restrained by making it necessary for him to consult the Divan on all important measures. The Divan was to consist of twelve superior ministers ; one of whom was bound to attend especially to the collection of the funds by which the new troops were to be kept on foot.* The spread of intelligence, and the advancement of education among all classes of his subjects, were earnestly encouraged by Selim III. The printing establishment which had been founded in the reign of Achmet III., was revived ; and many European works on tactics and fortification were translated from the French and published by the Sultan's orders, under the inspection of the Turkish mathematician, Abdurrhahim Effendi.† Selim also showed favour and patronage to the establishment of schools throughout his dominions. It was especially among the Greeks that new educational institutions sprang up, and old ones regained fresh energy under the Sultan's auspices : ‡ and, when it was found that the revolutionary party among the Greeks availed themselves of this

* See Ranke's Servia, p. 100, and the authorities therein.
† White's Three Years in Constantinople, vol. ii. p. 205.
‡ Emerson Tennant, vol. ii. p. 423.

intellectual movement to excite their fellow-countrymen against the Turks, Selim, instead of closing the Greek schools and printing-offices, established a Greek press at Constantinople, and sought to counteract the efforts of those opposed to the Turkish government, by employing the pens of the Greek clergy of the capital in its favour.* He designed to provide a certain number of his Ottoman subjects with a better political education than could be acquired at Constantinople, by attaching them to the permanent embassies which he sought to establish at the chief European Courts. Turkish missions were received at London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin ; but the cabinet of St. Petersburg artfully avoided Selim's proposal to accredit a regular ambassador to the Russian empire.†

However needful were these and other measures for improving the civil and social condition of the inhabitants of the Turkish empire ; and however valuable they were likely to prove, if carried into effect ; Selim well knew that a properly disciplined and loyal armed force was as indispensable for the enforcement and maintenance of internal reform, as it was for preserving the integrity of the empire from further attack from without. The example of Peter the Great of Russia, who, by means of the new troops that Lefort trained for him on the model of the armies of Western Europe, overthrew both domestic and foreign foes, was ever before the eyes of Selim ; and the inquiring Turkish Sultan may have been aware that almost the highest political authority of the West had deliberately

* Emerson Tennant, vol. ii. p. 521, note. † D'Ohsson, vol. vii.

pronounced that "whoever examines with care the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves into the establishment of a well-regulated standing army."* Among the prisoners made by the Turks during the last war, there was one who was a Turk by birth, but had long been in the Russian service, in which he had attained the rank of Lieutenant, and the reputation of a good officer. The Grand Vizier, Yussuf Pacha, (by whose troops he had been taken,) was fond of conversing with him on the military systems of the two nations; and was at last persuaded to allow a little corps (consisting chiefly of renegadoes) to be armed and drilled on the European plan. The Vizier used to amuse himself with seeing them go through their exercises; and when he left the camp at the end of the war, he took the little company with him, and stationed them at a village at a short distance from Constantinople. The Sultan, hearing of them, expressed a wish to see "how the infidels fought battles," and went to one of their parades. He instantly saw the superiority of their fire to that of the ordinary Turkish troops, and appreciated more than ever the advantages which the arms and discipline of his Christian enemies had long given them over the Ottoman troops. The little band was kept on foot; and Omer Aga, as its chief was called, was enabled to recruit it by enrolling other renegadoes, and also a few indigent Turks, who consented to learn the exercise and wield the weapons of the Giaour.† The Divan was required

* Adam Smith.

† Eton, p. 92; Ranke, p. 99.

by the Sultan to consider the policy of introducing the new system among the Janissaries; but this produced a mutiny, which the Sultan appeased for the time by fair promises, and by desisting from any further measures, though Omer Aga's company was still kept together.* In 1796, General Albert Dubayet arrived at Constantinople as ambassador from the French republic. He brought with him, as a new and acceptable present to the Sultan, several pieces of artillery, with all their appointments and munitions, to serve as models, and a number of French artillerymen and engineers, who were to instruct the Turkish Topidjis, and to aid in the management of the Ottoman arsenals and foundries. The ambassador was accompanied also by drill-sergeants from the French horse and foot regiments, who were to give lessons to the Spahis and Janissaries. The efforts of the French artillerymen were well received; and marked improvements in the fabric, and the equipment and the working of the Turkish guns were effected by them. Some progress was made in arming and training a squadron of horse on the European system; but the Janissaries again absolutely and angrily refused to adopt the arms or learn the manœuvres of Frankish infantry; and Dubayet's drill-sergeants were only able to serve the Sultan by improving the discipline of Omer Aga's men. Albert Dubayet died within a few months after his arrival at Constantinople, and many of his officers then left Turkey. But the Kapitan Pacha, Hussein, who, like the Sultan, saw the value of the new system, took

* Ranke, 168; Eton, 93.

some of them into his own service, and by high pay and patronage induced a few more Mussulmans to enter into Omer's corps. These new troops were about 600 in number, when war broke out between France and Turkey in 1798, in consequence of the attack which the French Republic, or rather Napoleon Bonaparte, made on Egypt.*

It had been the anxious wish of Sultan Selim to keep clear of the conflicts which the French Revolution had produced in Europe. He knew the paramount necessity of reorganising his empire, and the impossibility of this being effected while it was involved in the jeopardies of war. But the tidings which reached Constantinople in July, 1798, that a French army, 30,000 strong, under the most celebrated general of the Republic, had suddenly landed in Egypt and taken the city of Alexandria by storm, left the Sultan no alternative. It was true that the Turkish authority in Egypt was little more than nominal; and that the Mamelukes, the real lords and tyrants over that country, were as deeply hated by the Sublime Porte as by the Copts and the Fellahs whom they oppressed. It was true, also, that Napoleon professed hostility against the Mamelukes only, and put forth proclamations, in which he vaunted the sincerity of the alliance between the Turks and the French, at the very time that he was ordering all the severities of military execution against the Turkish Janissaries who had defended Alexandria. But the intention of the French General to conquer and retain Egypt for France, or rather for himself, was self-evident;

* Juchereau de Saint Denis, Revolution de Constantinople.

nor could the Porte forego its rights of dominion over that province, where its Pacha was still titularly the supreme ruler, and which it had made vigorous efforts to reduce to effective obedience so lately as 1787, when the outbreak of the Russian war checked Gazi Hassan in his successful performance of that duty. We know from Napoleon's own memoirs that he expected to overawe Constantinople by means of the magnificent fleet which had brought the French army to Egypt.* His victory over the Mamelukes at the battle of the Pyramids on the 21st of July, and the submission of Cairo six days after that battle, seemed to ensure the realisation of the dazzling visions which had led him across the Mediterranean. But on the 1st of August Nelson destroyed the French fleet in the battle of the Nile. This at once removed all considerations of alarm, which might have made the Sultan pause. An alliance was concluded between Turkey, Russia, and England, and war was solemnly declared against France. An Ottoman army and a fleet were forthwith ordered to be assembled at Rhodes, and another army was collected in Syria. The formidable Pacha of Acre, Djezzar Pacha, though contemptuously independent of his Sultan in times of peace, consented to act as his Seraskier against the Giaours of Franghestan, and took the command of the Syrian forces. It was designed that the Syrian army should cross the desert and attack the French in Egypt early in 1799, and that the armament from Rhodes should act simultaneously with it by landing 16,000 of the best Turkish troops under Mustapha

* Montholon's History of the Captivity of Napoleon, vol. iv. p. 195.

Pacha'ħt Aboukir. The activity of Napoleon disconcerted these projects. Instead of waiting to be thus assailed in Egypt, he anticipated his enemies by crossing the desert into Syria during the winter, and carrying offensive war into that important province. In his own words, he expected that "according to this plan, the divisions of the army of Rhodes would be obliged to hasten to the aid of Syria, and Egypt would remain tranquil, which would permit us successively to summon the greatest part of our forces to Syria. The Mamelukes of Mourad Bey, and of Ibrahim Bey, the Arabs of the Egyptian desert, the Druses of Mount Lebanon, the Metualis, the Christians of Syria, the whole party of the sheiks of Azor, in Syria, might join the army when it was master of that country, and the commotion would be communicated to the whole of Arabia. Those provinces of the Ottoman empire in which the Arabian language was spoken, desired a great change, and only waited for some one to bring it about. Should the fortune of war be favourable, the French might, by the middle of summer, reach the Euphrates with 100,000 auxiliaries, who would have as a reserve 25,000 veteran Frenchmen of the best troops in the world, and numerous trains of artillery. Constantinople would then be menaced; and if the French could succeed in re-establishing friendly relations with the Porte, they might cross the desert, and march upon India towards the end of autumn."*

These dreams of oriental conquest were finally dissipated before St. Jean d'Acre. Djezzar Pacha had

* Montholon's History of the Captivity of Napoleon, vol. iv.

proved himself in readiness and energy no unworthy opponent of the great victor of Italy and Egypt; and English skill and gallantry now co-operated with the stubborn valour of the Turks. Djezzar had sent Abdallah, the Pacha of Damascus, forward with the advanced guard of the Syrian forces as early as January, 1799. Abdallah garrisoned Gazi and Jaffa, and proceeded as far as El Arisch, which is the key of Egypt on its Syrian side. Napoleon commenced his march in February. He took, without difficulty, El Arisch on the 15th of February, and Gaza in a few days afterwards. Jaffa resisted more obstinately, but was breached and stormed on the 3rd of March. Two thousand Turkish soldiers, who were made prisoners here, were on the following day put to death in cold blood. As the best biographer of Napoleon relates this fearful scene:—"The body of prisoners were marched out of Jaffa, in the centre of a large square batallion. The Turks foresaw their fate, but used neither entreaties nor complaints to avert it. They marched on silent and composed. They were escorted to the sand-hills to the south-east of Jaffa, divided there into small bodies, and put to death by musketry. The execution lasted a considerable time, and the wounded were despatched by the bayonet. Their bodies were heaped together, and formed a pyramid, which is still visible, consisting now of human bones, as originally of bloody corpses." *

Napoleon then advanced upon Acre, which was the only place that could stop him from effecting the complete conquest of Syria. The siege began on the 20th of

* Scott's Life of Napoleon.

March, and was maintained with the greatest vigour and determination on both sides until the 20th of May, when Napoleon reluctantly abandoned his prospects of an imperial career beyond the Euphrates and the Indus, and retreated with the remains of his forces upon Egypt. In this siege, no less than eight assaults were given by the French, and eleven desperate sallies made by the defenders. The operations of Napoleon were greatly retarded in the first weeks by his deficiency in heavy artillery. Sir Sydney Smith, who was cruising off Syria with two English ships of the line, captured the flotilla which was conveying the French battering train along the coast; and he aided the defenders of Acre still more effectively, by landing gunners and marines from his own ships, and also the emigrant French officer, Colonel Philippeaux, who took the command of the engineer force in the city. Philippeaux, and many more brave men perished during the defence; and the French obtained in April some mortars and heavy guns which their Rear-admiral Perrée landed near Jaffa. A large army also, which the Pacha of Damascus assembled in Syria for the relief of Acre, was completely defeated and dispersed by Napoleon, and two divisions of his troops at the battle of Mount Thabor; while the remainder of his force maintained the position before the besieged city. But it was impossible for him to prevent Djezzar Pacha from receiving reinforcements by sea; and on the 7th of May a Turkish squadron landed 12,000 men in the harbour. These included the new troops, armed with musket and bayonet, and disciplined on the European

system, who have been already described. This body signalised itself by gallantry and steadiness during the remainder of the siege, and attracted the notice of the besieging general as well as of the Turks. Napoleon had received further supplies of artillery, and the greater part of the defences of Acre became a mass of blood-stained ruins. But every attempt of the French to charge through the living barriers of the garrison and their English comrades was repulsed with heavy loss. The number of Napoleon's wounded who lay at Jaffa and in the camp, was 12,000 ; and the plague was in his hospitals.* His retreat was conducted with admirable skill and celerity ; and Napoleon soon found that his presence in Egypt was deeply needed to quell the spirit of insurrection that had arisen there, and to encounter the Turkish army from Rhodes.

This army, commanded by Mustapha, the Pacha of Roumelia, and escorted by Sir Sydney Smith's squadron, landed at Aboukir on the 11th of July. It consisted of about 15,000 infantry, with a considerable force of artillery, but without horse. Mustapha Pacha assaulted and carried the redoubts which the French had formed near the village of Aboukir, put to the sword the detachment of Marmont's corps which he found there ; and then, in expectation of an attack from the main French army, he proceeded to strengthen his position with a double line of entrenchments. Napoleon collected his forces with characteristic rapidity, and on the 25th of July was before the peninsula of Aboukir. The action that ensued was

* Montholon, vol. iv. p. 286.

well contested but decisive. Napoleon cut off some detached bodies of the Turks, and carried their first line without much difficulty. But behind the second line the Pacha's troops resisted desperately; and aided by the fire of the English gun-boats in the bay, they drove the French columns back with considerable loss. At this critical moment, the Turks left their entrenchments and dispersed about the field to cut off the heads of their fallen enemies. Napoleon took instant advantage of their disorder. He sent his reserves forward; and Murat, with the French cavalry, dashed through an opening between the redoubts into the midst of the Ottoman position. Murat forced his way to Mustapha Pacha's tent, and had exchanged blows with the Turkish general, each slightly wounding the other, before the Pacha, seeing the inevitable ruin of his army, consented to surrender.* Pursued at the point of the bayonet by the victorious French, the mass of the Turks was thrust into the sea, the whole bay appearing for a few minutes to be covered with their turbans, until they sank by thousands, and perished beneath the waves. After this victory, which restored to the French, for a few months, the undisputed possession of Egypt, Napoleon departed from that country to win empire in the West, though it had eluded him in the Eastern world.

General Kléber, who was left in command of the

* "Mustapha Pacha was taken, and carried in triumph before Bonaparte. The haughty Turk had not lost his pride with his fortunes, 'I will take care to inform the Sultan,' said the victor, meaning to be courteous, 'of the courage you have displayed in the battle, though it has been your mishap to lose it.' 'Thou mayst save thyself the trouble,' answered the prisoner haughtily, 'My master knows me better than thou canst.'—Scott.

French force in Egypt, entered into a convention with Sir Sidney Smith, the English Commodore, for evacuating the province, but the English Admiral, Lord Keith, refused to ratify the terms; and a large Turkish army, under the Grand Vizier, entered Egypt early in the year 1800. Kléber, completely defeated this host at the battle of Heliopolis, on the 20th of March; and it was ultimately by the English expedition under Abercrombie and Hutchinson that Egypt was wrested from the French.

On the western frontier of the Ottoman dominions in Europe some territorial acquisitions were made in consequence of the war between the Porte and France, and of the alliance of the Sultan with Russia and England, which that war produced. France had, by the treaty of Campo Formio, between her and Austria, in 1797 (when these two powers agreed that the republic of Venice should be extinct), obtained possession of the Ionian Islands and their dependencies on that continent, Prevesa, Parga, Vonitza, Gomenitza, and Butrinto, which had formed portions of the Venetian dominions. Immediately that the war was declared against France by the Porte, in 1798, Ali Pacha, the celebrated Vizier of Epirus, marched troops upon Prevesa, Vonitza, and Butrinto, and won these cities from the French. Soon afterwards, a Russian fleet from the Black Sea sailed to the Bosphorus, where it was joined by a Turkish squadron, and the combined armament entered the Mediterranean, where it conquered the Ionian Islands, and afterwards endeavoured to aid the enemies of the French on the coasts of Italy; which then witnessed the

strange spectacle of the forces of the Sultan and the Czar co-operating to support the Pope.*

The Ionian Islands were at first (1801) placed under the joint protectorate of the Russians and Turks. Disputes naturally followed: and it was agreed in 1802 that one of these ill-matched guardians should resign. It was left to the Greek inhabitants of the islands to make the selection. They chose to retain the Russian Emperor as their protector, and the Turks withdrew accordingly. The acquisition of these islands was always a favourite project with Ali Pacha: more, however, with a view to aggrandise himself than from any desire to strengthen his master. But he never succeeded in obtaining them. They passed, in 1807, from Russian to French sovereignty, and were afterwards captured by the English, who are still the supreme rulers of what is termed the Septinsular Republic.

The possession of the old Venetian districts on the mainland was confirmed to Turkey by agreement between her and Russia in 1800. Butrinto, Prevesa, and Vonitza, which had been taken by Ali Pacha, were retained by him; but Parga, which was garrisoned by a body of hardy Suliotes, refused to submit, and nobly maintained her independence for fourteen years. During four more years she was protected by England; and when that protection was withdrawn, and the city given up to the Pacha, the inhabitants (like the Phocæans of old) abandoned their homes rather than become the subjects of an eastern despot. We have been glancing far forward, while speaking of the fate of these relics of

* See Ranke's Servia, p. 210.

the old Venetian empire in Greece, in order that they may not again require our notice. But we must now revert to the early part of the nineteenth century. It has been mentioned that the Turks, in the year 1802, gave up to Russia their share of the protectorate of the Seven Islands: and in the October of that year that the influence of Russia obtained a Hatti-scheriff from the Sultan in favour of the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia; by which the Porte pledged itself not to remove the reigning hospodars of those principalities without previous reference to Russia, and not to allow any Turks, except merchants and traders, to enter either territory.* The November of the preceding year, 1801, had been a still more important epoch. It was then that a general though brief pacification throughout Europe was effected, in which the Ottoman empire was included, so far, at least, as regarded foreign powers. By a treaty between France and Turkey (negotiated concurrently with the peace of Amiens between France and England), Napoleon, then Chief Consul, acknowledged the sovereignty of the Porte over Egypt and its other dominions in full integrity; and the Sultan renewed the ancient privileges which the French had, under their kings, enjoyed in Turkey. The old policy of France, in seeking the friendship of the Ottoman Court, was now revived: and, before long, the skill of Napoleon's ambassadors, Generals Brune and Sebastiani, restored the French influence at Constantinople.

Selim had now a second respite from war with any European power, until he was attacked by Russia in

* Ranke's Servia, p. 145.

1806. But this was no period of tranquillity for the Turkish empire. The Wahabites renewed their attacks on Syria; and in 1802 they captured the cities of Mecca and Medina, so that all Arabia was now in their possession. The loss of the Holy Cities, and the indignities with which the Wahabites treated the sanctuaries and reliques of Mahometanism, and the cruelties practised by them towards the Hadjis, or pilgrims, especially those of the Sunnite persuasion, excited a profound sensation throughout the Ottoman empire, and tended to prejudice the Turkish part of the population against their innovating Sultan, whose reign was marked by such visitations. In Egypt, the remnant of the Mamelukes long kept at bay the troops by which Selim endeavoured to bring that province under effectual control. In Syria, Djezzar Pacha resumed his old attitude of haughty insubordination towards the Porte, and exercised independent tyranny until his death, in 1804. On the Danube, Passwan Oglou maintained himself against all the forces that the Sultan could employ for his reduction; until, at last, the Porte, in 1806, made peace with its stubborn rebel, confirmed him in all the power which he had usurped, and sent him the insignia of a Pacha of the highest rank.

The troubles in Servia deserve more careful consideration, as their ultimate effect was to withdraw that important province from the practical authority of the House of Othman, and to convert it into an independent Christian State. The narrative of this is also closely connected with that of the contest between the Janissaries and the Sultan, and it gives fearful proof of the stern

necessity under which Selim and Mahmoud acted in all their measures against that force.

It has been mentioned, while tracing the events of the war of the Emperor Joseph II. against Turkey, that the Austrian forces, which entered Servia, were actively assisted by the Rayas of that province. The Servians formed a considerable force, both of horse and foot, which rendered excellent service to the Emperor, and defended many important districts from the attempts made by the Turks to reconquer them. When the peace of Sistova gave Servia back to the Porte, with merely a provision for an amnesty in favour of such of the inhabitants as had acted against the Sultan, Turkish commissioners were sent from Constantinople to take possession of the province: their surprise was extreme, and not unmingled with apprehension, when they found the change that had taken place in their Christian subjects, whom they had been accustomed to regard as "a weaponless and submissive herd." * One of them exclaimed to the Austrian officers, when a Servian troop, fully armed and accoutred, marched out in military array from one of the fortresses, "Neighbours, what have you made of our Rayas?" † The Servian regiments were disbanded, and the Turks returned to their old dominion; but the military spirit which had been called into action among the Rayas could not be easily extinguished.

It was, however, not against, but in aid of the Sultan, that the Servians next appeared in arms. The turbulent tyranny of the Janissaries was the cause of this

* See Vol. i. p. 176. † Ranke's Servia, p. 84.

strange phenomenon. At no place had the members of that body proceeded to such lengths of lawless outrage, as at Belgrade, where their commanders already styled themselves Dahis, in imitation of the rulers of the Barbaresque States, who had originally been raised to independent power from among a mutinous soldiery.* The Janissaries of Belgrade, and the other Servian towns, robbed and murdered not only the Rayas, but their fellow-countrymen, the Spahis—the feudal lords of the land. The Pacha's authority was so insignificant, that the Austrians, during the war, treated with the Aga of the Janissaries instead of with the legitimate viceroy of the Sultan. As this state of insubordination and violence was renewed in Servia after the peace, Selim determined to act vigorously against these rebels; and Ebu Bekir was sent to Belgrade as Pacha, with a firman which commanded the Janissaries to quit that city and the entire pachalic. According to the too common policy in the East of using the basest crimes to punish criminals, the chief leader of the Janissaries was removed by assassination, and the firman was then published and enforced. The expelled Janissaries joined Passwan Oglou, the rebel of Widdin; and at their instigation, Passwan's forces invaded Servia. In this emergency, Hadschi Mustapha (who had succeeded Ebu Bekir as Pacha of Belgrade) called on the Servians to take up arms in defence of the province. Both Hadschi Mustapha and Ebu Bekir had governed Servia with justice and humanity, and the country had flourished and become enriched by com-

* Ranke, p. 104.

merce with Austria under their rule. The Servians gladly obeyed the summons of the Pacha against their old tyrants, the rebel Janissaries, and victoriously defended the pachalic. But the other Janissaries of the empire, and especially those at Constantinople, received the tidings of the events in Servia with the highest indignation, with which the Ulema and the Mahometan population in general largely sympathised. "The pride of the Mussulmans revolted at the idea that old Moslems of the True Faith should be banished from the pachalic, and that Rayas and Giaours should be armed and set up against them."* Selim found it necessary to give way; Hadschi Mustapha received an order of the Divan to re-admit the Janissaries to Belgrade. They were restored accordingly; and they recommenced their sway there by murdering one of the chief Servian officers, and soon proceeded to overpower and murder the Pacha. They condescended to ask for a new Pacha from the Porte; but their intention to keep the sovereign power in their own hands was evident. Four of their chiefs assumed the title of Dahis, and allotted the country between them. Each was the Tetrarch of a district; but Belgrade was their common capital, where they met and deliberated. As the number of the Janissaries of Belgrade seemed insufficient to uphold their power, they formed another armed force of Mahometans from Bosnia and Albania, who flocked together to the pillage of Servia. It was not only the Rayas over whom they tyrannised—the old Turkish feudal proprietors, the Spahis, were expelled

* Ranke, p. 112.

by them from the province, and the Janissaries now established themselves as absolute lords of the soil.

In Bosnia Ali Bey Widaitsch of Sumnik, made himself master of a large territory in the same manner, and entered into close alliance with the Dahis of Belgrade. Passwan-Oglou also (who was still in rebellion against the Porte) was their confederate; and thus a Mahometan brigand league was formed nearly across the whole North of European Tartary, in direct antagonism to the House of Othman. The exiled Spahis of Servia implored the Sultan's aid; and the Rayas, whose sufferings were now infinitely multiplied, also called on him as their sovereign, to rescue them from these oppressors. The Servian Kneses (as the Christian local magistrates were termed) sent an address to Constantinople in which they recapitulated some of the wrongs which they endured. They said they were not only reduced to abject poverty by the Dahis, but "they were attacked in their religion, their morality, and their honour; and no husband was secure in the possession of his wife, no father of his daughter, no brother of his sister. The church, the cloister, the monks, the priests, all were outraged." They demanded of the Sultan—"Art thou still our Czar? then come and free us from these evil-doers; or, if thou wilt not save us, at least tell us so, that we may decide whether to flee to the mountains and forests, or to seek in the rivers a termination to our miserable existence." *

The Porte was at this time destitute of means to

* Ranke, p. 118.

crush the Dahis. It could only threaten. An intimation was sent to Belgrade, that unless the Janissaries amended their conduct, the Sultan would send an army against them; "but not an Ottoman army, for it would be a grievous thing to cause true believers to fight against each other; but soldiers should come against them of other nations, and of another creed; and then such evil should overtake them as had never yet befallen an Osmanli." *

On hearing this the Dahis said to one another—"What army can the Padischah mean? Is it to be of Austrians or Russians? Nay, he will not bring those foreigners into his empire." "By Allah," they exclaimed, "he means the Rayas." They believed that the Sultan would send a general to arm and lead the Servians under their Kneses against them. They resolved to prevent this by a massacre of all such Rayas as, from their position or spirit, might prove dangerous. Each Dahi repaired for this purpose to his own district; and, in February 1804, they simultaneously commenced the work of horror. Great numbers of the chief Servians were at first surprised and slaughtered; but some received timely warning and fled. The Dahis and their emissaries continued to murder; and the belief grew general in Servia that it was intended to extirpate the entire Christian population.† But there were still bold and able men among them; and too high a military spirit had been created by recent events in the Servian Rayas, for them to perish without resistance. At first the shepherds and

* Ranke, p. 119. † Ibid. p. 121.

peasants, who fled from their homes, and joined the Heyducs, or robbers, in the mountains, did so merely to save their lives, or to gain a chance of taking life for life. Their next thought was how they could return to their homes in safety. But soon came the reflection that, in order to be safe, they must put down their oppressors; and that this could only be done by a national war throughout the country. Such a war was soon organised in Servia. The Heyduc chiefs came forward zealously in the good cause; and there were many other men of capacity and courage who combined the peasantry of the various districts in a general rising. The bands of the Dahis were rapidly driven from the open country, from the villages, and from all the smaller towns; and, in a few weeks, all Servia was in the hands of Servians, except Belgrade and some of the other strong fortified places.

The Servians now determined to choose a commander-in-chief of their nation. They offered the supreme dignity to George Petrowitcsh, called Czerny George by his countrymen, and Kara George (both meaning Black George) by the Turks. The name of Kara George is that by which he is most conspicuous among the heroes of revolutionary warfare.

Kara George was the son of a Servian peasant named Petrowni, and was born at Vischessi between 1760 and 1770. He served in the corps of Servian volunteers against the Turks in the Austrian war of 1788-91; and after the peace of Sistova, he was for some years a dealer in swine, one of the most profitable and respectable employments in Servia. When the Dahis began

their outrages, Kara George left his forests and swine-droves, and betook himself to the mountains, where he became one of the most redoubtable of the Heyducs. When the war of independence broke out, he showed himself as eminent for skill in command, as for personal bravery in action. He despised pomp and parade; and, in the days of his highest prosperity, when sovereign of Servia, and of more than Servia, he was always seen in his old herdsman's garb, and his well-known black cap. He was in general kindly disposed; but was easily irritated, and was terrible in his wrath. He would cut down or shoot the offender with his own hand; and he made no distinction between friend and foe, between stranger and kinsman. But though cruel, he was not vindictive; and if he could be brought once to promise forgiveness, he pardoned with the heart as well as with the lip. It is recorded of him with truth, that he shot his own father and hanged his own brother; but it ought to be added, that he shot the old man in order to prevent his falling into the power of enemies, who would have put him to death with lingering tortures; and that his brother, presuming on his relationship with the Commander of Servia, had acted with violence and licentiousness, which Kara George for a time overlooked; but at length the young man committed a gross outrage on the honour of a family, which complained loudly, saying that it was for such crimes the nation had risen against the Turks. Kara George instantly had the offender hanged at the door of the house, and forbade his mother to wear mourning for her son.*

* Ranke, 206.

Kara George knew the fierceness of his own character, and so did the Servian people before they chose him to rule over them. When he was proposed in the assembly, he at first excused himself on the ground that he did not know how to govern. The Kneses replied that they would give him counsel. He then said, "I am too hasty of mood for the office. I cannot stop to take counsel. I shall be inclined to kill at once." They answered that "such severity was needed at that time."*

Such was Kara George; and thus did he become Commander of Servia. He afterwards styled himself "Supreme Ruler." However arbitrary we may think his acts, and however ferocious his energy, he unquestionably saved his country, and for many years maintained her independence with matchless resolution and ability. And yet, such is the inconsistency of genius, that ultimately this very man, while still in the prime of life, wavered and grew fatally weak of heart, at a crisis, and in a situation, where even ordinary men might have been expected to be firm. But in 1804 none could foresee the ignominious termination of his career; and all eyes were directed to him, as the victorious patriot, and as the establisher of the principle of the emancipation of the subjected Christian races from the government and power of the Mahometans.

It was not in a single year that the liberation of Servia was accomplished. The Dahis had been surprised and driven out of the open country, at the first uprising of the patriots, but they were not thoroughly overcome

* Ranke, 127.

without a formidable struggle. They called to their aid their confederate, Ali Bey, of Bosnia ; and they enrolled among their supporters many of the bands called Kridschalies, formed of adventurers of every description, creed, and class, who had fought in the late wars, and who were leagued together, like the Free Companies of the Middle Ages.

On the other hand, the Servians received help from an unexpected ally. The Pacha of Bosnia came to their assistance with the Sultan's forces from that province ; and Turkish recruits appeared in the Servian camp. The Porte was now firmly resolved that the Janissaries of Belgrade, as the most turbulent of that turbulent body, should, if possible, be crushed ; and the arms of the Servians were to be employed, together with those of loyal Mahometans, for that purpose. The union was again successful ; but the Servians this time insisted that the destruction of their tyrants should be made sure. The Dahis and their followers were not to be exiled, they were to be slain. The Pacha felt little anxiety to interpose in their favour. Such as could not escape to Passwan Oglou, were cut down without mercy; and the heads of the four Dahis were displayed in the Servian camp. The Pacha now pronounced the object of the war to be gained. The rebellious enemies of the Sultan had been punished ; and the old order of submission by Rayas to Turks was to be restored. He directed the Servians to disarm, and return to their flocks and herds. But the command was issued not to spiritless and powerless Rayas, like those of the olden time, among whom humility before the Moslems had

become a second nature; but to practised and victorious soldiers, who had fought and beaten the most renowned of the old Ottoman troops; who had stormed Turkish fortresses, and had torn down Mahometan standards. The Servians regarded as their real chiefs, not the Pachas and the Spahis, but Kara George and the other leaders of their own race and creed—men who had shared in the extremity of the land's distress, and had been foremost in fighting their way out of it. These were the commanders, whose words alone were heeded; and their words were not words of submissiveness. The Servian chiefs were men who had created their own strength and power; they were surrounded each by his band of resolute partisans, called Momkes, ready for any service; and they were not disposed to resign the pleasure of commanding, which they so recently had enjoyed.* The original objects of the uprising of Servia had been merely to obtain protection for life and honour against the bloodthirsty and brutal Dahis; but, in the course of that struggle, a national feeling had been evoked, and a national power evolved, which made it impossible that Servia should not now aspire to a higher destiny, than she had known since Sultan Amurath II. overthrew the Prince George Brankovitch and his Christian confederates at Varna.†

The struggle which the Servians had hitherto maintained against the Sultan's Mahometan rebels, was now to be continued against the Sultan himself. They determined to seek the aid of one of the great powers of Christendom. Austria was first thought of. Many

* Ranke, p. 141. † Vol. i. p. 111.

of them had fought under her banner; and many of their kindred tribes were already under the sovereignty of the Kaisar of Vienna. But it was remembered that the Austrians, though they had more than once occupied Servia, had always given back the country and the people to the Turks. Moreover, Austria was known to be now directing all her energies to the conflict, which was approaching on her western frontiers between her and the French, by whom she had been twice humbled during the last few years. But there was another great Christian empire near Servia. Russia was strong and active, and undefeated by either Turks or French, both of whom her famous general, Suwarrow, had repeatedly vanquished. The Russians, moreover, were, like the Servians, Christians of the Greek Church; and they had shown their zeal for their co-religionists by their repeated and formidable intercessions with the Porte in behalf of the Moldavians and Wallachians. The Servians accordingly, in August 1804, sent a deputation to St. Petersburg, which returned, in February 1805, with a favourable answer. But the Russian Emperor advised the Servians first to prefer their requests at Constantinople, promising to support them by all his influence with the Sultan.*

The Servians, in obedience to this direction, sent, in the summer of 1805, an embassy to Constantinople, which was instructed to demand, that in future all the fortresses of their country should be garrisoned by Servian troops; and that, in consideration of the sufferings of the province during the recent troubles,

* Ranke, 146.

all arrears of taxes and tribute should be remitted. The first article was the most important, and the one respecting which most difficulty was anticipated, especially as, at the time when it was preferred, Belgrade and other strong places in Servia were still in the power of the Moslems.

The period when these demands were laid before the Porte, was an important crisis in Selim's reign. The rival influences of France and Russia in the Divan, and also the conflicting spirits of reform and conservatism in the Ottoman nation, were now engaged in a trial of strength, with which the Servian question became closely connected.*

Russia was at this time at war with France; and was redoubling the efforts, which she had been making for several years, to gain such a paramount authority in Turkey, as should render the populations and resources of the Ottoman empire subservient to the Czar's schemes of aggrandisement against his Western enemies, as well as in the Eastern world. Selim had made large concessions to Russia since they had become allies in 1798: concessions which the Turkish nation viewed with anger and alarm. Her fleets had been permitted to pass and repass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, after as well as before the general pacification in 1801. This had caused great indignation among the Turks in Constantinople; and the Sultan had been obliged to declare that such permission should not be repeated, if Russia were at war with any nation friendly to the Porte. By means of the squadrons which she thus

* Ranke, 150.

sent from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, Russia had largely increased her force in the Ionian islands; and she further augmented that force by levying troops among the Albanians of the mainland, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Turkish authorities.* We have already noticed her successful claims regarding Moldavia and Wallachia in 1802; and in the early part of 1805 the influence of Russia over the Sultan was still more strikingly displayed on the south-eastern coasts of the Black Sea. The Porte consented that the Russians should have the free navigation of the river Phasis in Mingrelia, and erect fortresses, and place garrisons on its banks for the better security of their flotillas. The Pacha of Erzeroum was ordered to assist the Russians in establishing these posts, and in any other operations that might be of use to them, for the purposes of the war with Persia, in which Russia was then engaged.

The Russians took more than full advantage of this permission by occupying districts at some distance from the Phasis, seizing the fortress of Anakria, and building another on the coast of the Black Sea. At last, when Russia was about to join Austria and England against Napoleon in 1805, her ambassador, M. Italinsky (Suwarrow's son) formally declared to the Reis Effendi, that his government found it necessary, owing to the state of affairs in Europe, to require that Turkey should forthwith enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia; that all the subjects of the Sultan, who professed the faith of the Greek Church, should thenceforth be considered to be under the protection of the Emperor of

* Alix. pp. 154, 169.

Russia, and that, whenever they were molested by the Turks, the Porte should be bound to do right upon the representations of the Russian ambassador.* These requisitions of M. Italinsky were made at the same time, that the demands of the Servian deputation were laid before the Sultan on the avowed recommendation of Russia.

It is said that when Sultan Selim heard that Russia required the Protectorate of all the inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, who professed the faith of the Greek Church, he shed tears of anger and humiliation. For many days he remained in silent gloom : he then called to him such members of the Divan, as were not notoriously influenced by Russian bribes, and he took counsel with them in this emergency. All agreed that it would be better to bury themselves beneath the ruins of Constantinople, than to sign a treaty which would annihilate the Ottoman power. But when they reflected that the troops of Russia then assembled in her ports on the Black Sea, could in eight days be under the Serail; that the forces which she had gathered in the Ionian Islands could instantly land in Albania, and, joined by the insurgent Arnauts and Greeks, march without resistance upon Adrianople ; that her army in Georgia, which had been victorious over the Persians, could advance upon the Turkish capital through Asia Minor ; that on the Danube she could join her troops with the revolted Servians, and at once overrun Bulgaria ;—when Selim and his advisers thought over these things, on the strength of the enemy

* 3 Alix. p. 170.

which thus grasped them, and on their own weakness, they resolved that they must not venture to return a direct refusal to the demands of Russia, but must temporise, and negociate, and make any sacrifice of treasure or territory, if absolutely needed, rather than consent to a term so fatal.*

The Turkish ministers succeeded in gaining time in their conferences with Italinski; but it was necessary to come to a prompt decision, as to what line the Porte should follow in dealing with the Servians. There were strong inducements to endeavour to win their loyal devotion to the Sultan, by a frank concession of their wishes. Selim had now made considerable progress in his military reforms. The Topidjis (the artillerymen) had been trained to a considerable extent by French officers; and they were placed on a footing superior to that of the Janissaries. Omar Aga's little corps, which had acquired so much credit in the defence of Acre, had further signalised itself by destroying some formidable bands of brigands or free companions, which had ravaged Bulgaria and Roumelia, and defeated the Janissaries, whom the Pachas of those provinces led against them. Selim increased the number of new troops. Two regiments of the Nizam Djididites, uniformly armed and accoutred after the most approved French models, were now seen performing the same evolutions as those of the best European troops. Special funds were provided for their pay: a few of the Pachas—especially Abdurrahman of Caramania—adopted zealously their Sultan's views; and in 1805,

* Alix. vol. iii. 168—171.

Selim ventured on the bold measure of issuing a decree, that in future, the strongest and finest young men should be selected from among the Janissaries and other corps in the Empire, for the purpose of serving in the Nizam Djidid.*

This was at the time when the power of the Janissaries in Belgrade had been broken by the Rayas; but in other parts of the Empire they gave terrible proofs of their strength. At Adrianople they gathered together in resistance to the Sultan's edicts to the number of 10,000. A Cadi who endeavoured to enforce the royal orders, was seized by them and strangled; and in the greater part of the empire it was found impossible, at least for the present, to carry out the reforms which had been decreed. The services of a brave and well-armed Raya, like the Servian, would have been invaluable to Selim, if he could have been sure that they would have loyally preferred the cause of the Sultan to that of Russia; and if he could have employed them against the Janissaries of Adrianople and the capital, without raising in rebellion the great mass of his Mahometan subjects, already deeply incensed at the means which had been used against the Dahis of Belgrade. Threatened as Selim was at this very time by Russia, and in hourly expectation of being obliged to appeal to the fanatic energy of the Moslem population of his empire, for a final effort of despair against the invading Giaours, he abandoned the thought of winning the friendship of the Servian Rayas, and determined to treat them as foes, whom he must deprive of the means

* Ranke, 151. Juchereau St. Denys.

of injuring him. The Servian deputies at Constantinople were arrested; and Afiz, the Pacha of Nissa, was ordered to enter Servia and disarm the Rayas. Kara George met him at the frontier of the province and defeated him; and when, in 1806, Servia was attacked by two of the Sultan's armies on different sides of the province, the Servians (who had now become altogether a warlike people, every man bearing arms) defended themselves heroically. They drove back their invaders with heavy loss; and by capturing Belgrade and the other fortresses, which had hitherto been garrisoned by Turks, they made themselves completely masters of their own country. The generalship displayed by Kara George during this campaign was of the very highest order. Under him, Servia, in 1806, completed her independence, without foreign interference, and by the weapons of her own sons alone. But before another year's warfare commenced, she obtained important assistance through the outbreak of avowed hostilities between Russia and the Porte.

While the Russian ambassador, Italinski, had pressed the Porte with demands, which, if complied with, would have made the Sultan the mere vassal of the Czar, the French minister had been equally earnest in encouraging Selim to resist, and in endeavouring to induce him to acknowledge Napoleon as Padischah, or Emperor of France. The British ambassador, as well as the Russian, strongly opposed this recognition of their great enemy by his new Imperial title; and war was plainly threatened by both these powers in the event of any closer connection being formed between France and

Turkey. The successes gained by Napoleon over the Austrians and Russians, in the autumn and winter of 1805, materially augmented the influence of the French minister at Constantinople, and diminished the dread with which Russia was regarded. The effect of the French victories round Ulm and in Moravia, was practically felt in the Black Sea and the Bosphorus. A corps of 15,000 Russians, which had been collected at Sebastopol to overawe or attack Turkey, was withdrawn into central Russia, to replace the troops which it was necessary to march westward against the advancing French.*

Italinski grew more moderate in his demands on the Porte, which were heard with increasing indifference, while those of France were listened to with more and more attention.

The treaty of Presburg, by which Napoleon on the 26th December, 1805, triumphantly concluded his war with Austria, transferred to the French Sovereign, among other territories, Dalmatia and part of Croatia; so that the French was now in contact with the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon is said to have made it a point of primary importance, thus to advance his dominions to the frontier of Turkey, and acquire the means of keeping a force ever ready to act promptly and effectively, either in supporting Turkey, or in seizing on a share of her provinces, as circumstances might make it expedient.† A copy of the treaty of Presburg was promptly laid before the Grand Vizier by M. Ruffin,

* 3 Alix. 174.

† Alix. vol. iii. p. 175, and note. Marmont's Memoirs, p. 85, 148.

the French minister, who dilated on the advantage which it would be to the Sultan to secure the friendship of the great Conqueror, who had now become his neighbour. The effect of this was speedily displayed in a Hattischerif, by which the titles of Emperor and Padischah were solemnly given to the Ruler of the French: and, when in the summer of 1806 General Sebastiani arrived at Constantinople, as an ambassador extraordinary from Napoleon to Selim, that able military diplomatist persuaded the Sultan to take measures, which were almost certain to lead to a war between Turkey and Russia. Such a war was then most desirable for Napoleon's purposes, as it was calculated to make an important diversion of part of the Russian forces from the great scene of conflict in Prussian Poland, where the Czar Alexander was striving to support King Frederick William of Prussia against the armies of victorious France.

At Sebastiani's instigation, the Sultan deposed the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, Prince Moroutzi, and Prince Ipsilanti, who were more than suspected of being the pensioned agents of the Russian Court. This dismissal of the Hospodars without any previous notification to St. Petersburg, was a violation of the pledge given in the Hattischerif of 1802; and the Russian ambassador at Constantinople protested angrily against it. He was joined in his remonstrances by the ambassador of England; and they informed the Porte that "the armies and fleets of the Allies were about to receive a new impulse." This meant that a Russian army would be marched into Moldavia, and that an

English fleet would sail against Constantinople.* Selim offered to repair the breach of his engagement respecting the government of the Principalities; and an order was issued to reinstate Moroutzi and Ipsilanti as Hospodars. But before this could be accomplished, the tidings reached Constantinople that Russian troops had entered Moldavia and advanced as far as Jassy. The Emperor Alexander had promptly seized on the pretext, which the intelligence of the dismissal of the Hospodars gave him, for an attack upon Turkey; and 35,000 men under General Michelson were ordered into Moldavia and Wallachia, without even the formality of a declaration of war. The Russians speedily overran the Principalities, and beat back the scanty forces with which the Turkish commanders of the neighbouring Pachalics had endeavoured to check their progress. On the 27th of December, Michelson entered Bucharest: and it was announced that his troops would speedily cross the Danube.

A declaration of war by the Sublime Porte against Russia was the natural and inevitable result of the indignation which these things excited at Constantinople; nor was the Turkish government awed into submission by the threats of the British minister, Mr. Arbuthnot, who required that the Porte should instantly renew its alliance with Russia and England, and dismiss the ambassador of France; and who menaced Turkey with an attack by the combined English and Russian fleets, as well as by the Russian armies, in case of non-compliance with his demands. The Reis Effendi returned

* Lord Broughton's Travels, vol. ii. p. 390.

an answer of much sense and dignity, in which he recapitulated the exertions which Turkey had made to preserve peace, and especially alluded to the late humiliation which Sultan Selim had voluntarily undergone in reinstating the two traitorous Hospodars. He stated that in making war with Russia after her attack on Turkish provinces and Turkish troops, the Sultan was only repelling force by force. He expressed a hope that a great and enlightened nation like the British, would appreciate the sacrifices which the Sublime Porte had made for the sake of amity, and the spirit which now made it act in self-defence. "But if Great Britain was determined to aid Russia in attacking the Sultan, he would repel force by force, and would trust in God for deliverance from the most unjust of aggressions. And if, after all," said the Turkish Statesman, "Turkey is to perish, she will perish in the defence of her capital: and the English nation will, above all others, experience the irreparable mischief that will follow the downfall of the Ottoman Empire." *

On receiving this reply, the English minister repaired to the fleet, that was then moored off Tenedos, under the command of Admiral Duckworth. The admiral's instructions were to proceed forthwith to Constantinople, and to insist on the surrender of the Turkish fleet, or to burn it and bombard the town.† On the 19th of February, 1807, the fleet (consisting of seven ships of the line and two frigates), favoured by a strong wind from the south, sailed through the formidable straits of the Dardanelles

* 3 Alix. 229.

† Lord Broughton, vol. ii. p. 515, n.

with little or no loss. A Turkish squadron of one sixty-four gun ship, four frigates, and some corvettes, that lay in the sea of Marmora, was destroyed by the English; and, if Constantinople had been promptly assailed, it could not have been defended with any prospect of success; so defective were the fortifications, and such was the panic caused by the forcing of the straits. But the English wasted time in negociations; while the Turks, roused from their temporary consternation, and excited and directed by Sultan Selim and General Sebastiani, laboured energetically at the defences of the capital, until the English commander became convinced that it would be impracticable for him to make any impression.* Accordingly, the English fleet withdrew from the sea of Marmora, and on the 3rd of March repassed the Dardanelles, but not without a dangerous contest and severe loss. The Turks on the first occasion had been negligent, surprised, and dismayed. They were now well armed and prepared. Under the direction of French engineers, whom Sebastiani had sent down from the capital, they had repaired the old batteries and erected new ones. Even the huge granite-shooting guns, that had lain inactive opposite each other on the European and Asiatic shores for centuries, were now employed, and with no inconsiderable effect. Several of the English ships were struck and seriously injured by the 800 lb. globes of stone which these cannons discharged. One result of the expedition was certainly to destroy the belief, which had long prevailed, that the Dardanelles gave an

* See the Appendix to Lord Broughton, vol. ii. p. 510.

infallible protection to the Holy City against the fleets of the Infidels from the South; but the menacing appearance and ultimate retreat of the English force, raised greatly the spirit of the Mahometan population of Constantinople and the neighbouring provinces. Unhappily for Sultan Selim, the same events raised also the fanatic hatred of that population towards all who were supposed to favour the Giaours and their usages, and who were said to be traitors to the good old faith and the good old institutions of the true believers.

An English expedition against Egypt was undertaken almost immediately after that against Constantinople, and was still more unsuccessful. A small British force, utterly inadequate for such an enterprise, was landed near Alexandria. It occupied that city, and endeavoured also to reduce Rosetta, but was ultimately obliged to retire from Egypt, after much loss, both of men and reputation.

In the Archipelago, a Russian squadron, under Admiral Siniavin, gained some advantage over the Turkish fleet; but the Turkish Kapitan Pacha was able to retire into the Dardanelles and protect the capital: and altogether in the south the fortune of the war in 1807 was not unfavourable to the Ottomans. In the north, the Russian and Turkish forces on the Danube carried on the contest, without either side gaining a decided superiority over the other. Indeed the war which began at the close of 1806, and was terminated by the treaty of Bucharest in 1812, is, of all the struggles between Turkey and Russia, the least interesting and the least important. Neither party put

forth its full strength against the other. Hostilities were suspended for a considerable time by the truce of Slobosia; and, even while they were being carried on, Russia was obliged to employ her chief force either to combat, or to watch a far more formidable enemy. She had only the use of her left hand against the Turk. On the Ottoman side, the revolts, the civil wars, and the revolutions of this period, were almost incessant. At the commencement of hostilities, the Pacha of Caramania, (who was a partisan of Sultan Selim's reforms) while leading a force, trained on the new model, towards the seat of war on the Danube, was intercepted at Babaeska on the Yena by a large force of Janissaries and other troops opposed to the change of system. A battle ensued, in which the Caramanians were utterly defeated.

It was evident that Selim was the weakest in the balance of physical power between himself and his malcontent subjects, and that a decisive struggle was fast approaching. He had neither the military ability nor the cruelty, which the part of Cleomenes required; and he was soon destined to sustain that of Agis. The death (early in 1807) of the Mufti, who had been a devoted friend to Selim, and had aided in all his undertakings, was a heavy blow to the Sultan. The Ulema, as a body, were most inimical to his reforms; and their new chief entered into an active alliance with the leading Janissaries against the throne. But the individual who did most to overthrow Selim, was the Kaimakan, Mousa Pacha. This man had, during twenty years of court intrigue, been the seemingly meek instrument of the

ambition of others, and was generally despised as a submissive drudge of office. Djezzar Pacha, of Acre, had alone discovered the vindictive venom, that sweltered under Mousa's guise of patient humility. Djezzar foretold that he would be the cause of many troubles to the state. Selim gave Mousa Pacha the important office of Kaimakan, in the hope that its real powers would be dormant in his hands, and that he would be abundantly content with the mere pageantry of high station. Mousa used the opportunity of his office to instigate the mutinous spirit of the Janissaries and other malcontents, while he at the same time retained the confidence of the Sultan by the outward show of simple-minded loyalty. An order that was given by Selim in May (not much more than two months after the departure of the English fleet) for some changes in the equipment of the garrison of the forts on the Bosphorus, was the immediate signal for the fatal revolt. The garrison mutinied; and the Janissaries of the capital, who were in co-operation with them, repaired to the Etmeidan (the head-quarters of Janissary sedition for centuries), and there overturned their camp-kettles, in token that they would no longer accept food from Sultan Selim. Under the influence, and on the lying assurance of the traitorous Kaimakan, the Sultan tried to appease the storm by concession, and by the sacrifice of his best ministers, instead of sending for his new troops who were near the capital, and defending the seraglio with his body-guard until their arrival. The natural result was a resolution of the mutineers to depose their sovereign. They obtained a fetva from the Mufti

sanctioning their proceedings; and, headed by the traitor Mousa, who now threw off the mask, the Janissaries forced their way into the palace, and placed Mustapha, the eldest son of the late Sultan, Abdul Hamid, on the throne. Selim retired with dignity to the prison apartments, and there employed the brief remainder of his life, not vainly, in instructing his young cousin, Prince Mahmoud, afterwards Sultan Mahmoud II., how to rule the empire; and in holding out his own fate as a warning against the weakness, which the Sultan, who would reform Turkey, must discard, in order to save both her and himself.

Mustapha IV., whom the Janissaries and their accomplices then made Padischah of the Ottoman Empire (May 29th, 1807), was at this time about thirty years old. He was a prince of imperfect education, and slender capacity. During the few months for which he was the titular sovereign of Turkey, the armed multitude who had appointed him were its real rulers. But the deposed Sultan had friends: and a bold effort to restore, or at least to avenge him, was speedily and sternly made. The Pacha of Ruschuck, Mustapha Bairactar, owed his elevation to Selim; and as soon as the truce of Slobosia with the Russians (August, 1807) enabled him to move his forces from the frontier, Bairactar marched upon Constantinople. At the end of 1807 he was at the head of 40,000 soldiers, chiefly Bosnians and Albanians, who were encamped on the plains of Daoud, about four miles from the capital. He summoned to his camp many of the chief men of the empire, who assembled at his bidding and swore to

aid in abolishing the Janissaries, and in restoring good government to the Empire. Sultan Mustapha remained in his palace, little heeded and little honoured, even in semblance, for a space of six months, during which Mustapha Bairactar, from his tent on the plains of Daoud, exercised the chief authority in the Ottoman Empire. At length he led his Albanians to the capital itself, with the design of dethroning Mustapha and reinstating Selim III. The adherents of Mustapha (or rather the partisans of the Janissaries and the Ulemas) closed the gates of the Serail against him. Bairactar had brought with him, from the head-quarters of the army of the Danube, the sacred standard of Mahomet. He unfurled this before the Serail, and demanded that the gates should be opened to admit him and his brave soldiers, who were bringing back the holy banner from the wars. The chief of the Bostandjis replied from the wall, that the gates could not be opened but by command of Sultan Mustapha; "Talk not of Sultan Mustapha," shouted Bairactar with fury, "let us see Sultan Selim, our Padischah and thine, false slave." He gave orders for an immediate assault; an entrance into the palace was soon effected, but, brief as the delay was, it proved fatal to Selim. On hearing the demand of Bairactar, Mustapha ordered that Selim and his own brother, Mahmoud, should be instantly seized and strangled. By their deaths he would have been left the sole representative of the House of Othman, whom no Osmanli would dare to destroy or depose. The executioners found and murdered Selim, though not till after a desperate resistance, which was maintained by

the unhappy prince almost long enough to save his life; for at the very time when he was expiring under the bowstring of Mustapha's mutes, Bairactar's Albanians had forced the outer gate. As Bairactar pressed forward to the inner gate, it was suddenly thrown open, and Mustapha's eunuchs cast the body of Selim before him, saying, "Behold the Sultan whom ye seek." Bairactar bent over the corpse of his benefactor, and wept bitterly, but his confederate, the Kapitan Pacha Seid Ali, shook him by the shoulder and exclaimed "This is the time for vengeance not for tears." Bairactar roused himself, and they rushed into the presence-chamber, where Sultan Mustapha had placed himself on the throne, in the hope of awing the insurgents by the display of legitimate royalty. But Bairactar dragged him down, exclaiming, "What dost thou there? Yield that place to a worthier."

Mustapha had almost gained the security of being the last of the Othman Princes. The mutes and eunuchs who had murdered Selim, sought eagerly after young Mahmoud, who had been secreted by a vigilant and faithful slave in the furnace of a bath. While the ministers of death were searching the very apartment in which he was hid, the shouts of the victorious Albanians rang through the palace, testimonies not only of life preserved, but of royalty acquired for Mahmoud. Before the night had closed in, the cannon of the Seraglio announced to the people of Constantinople that Mustapha had ceased to reign, and that Mahmoud the Second was Padischah of the Ottoman world. (July 28, 1808.)

Bairactar assumed power as the Grand Vizier of the

new Sultan, and acted for a time with vigour and success against the party that had dethroned Selim. Mousa Pacha and other traitors were executed; and a plan was commenced for superseding the Janissaries by a new armed force under an old name. The troops, whom Bairactar designed to arm and train on the European system, were to be called Seymens, the title of an ancient corps in the Ottoman service. The Vizier's measures were received with simulated, which he mistook for real, submissiveness, by the Janissaries and the Ulemas. In fatal confidence he dismissed his provincial army, retaining not more than 4000 European soldiers on whom he could rely, in the capital; but Cadi Pacha, who was his friend, was encamped near Scutari with 8000 Asiatic troops. On the second night after the departure of the Bosnian and Albanian forces, a large body of the Janissaries surrounded the Palace of the Porte, where the Vizier resided, and set fire to the building. Bairactar escaped into a stone tower, which was used as a powder magazine. There he defended himself desperately, but, either by accident or design, the tower was blown up, and the Vizier perished, before he could collect his adherents or communicate with Sultan Mahmoud. The whole Janissary force of the capital now assailed the Seymens. But these were aided by Cadi Pacha, who led his 8000 Asiatics across from Scutari, and commenced a furious engagement with the Janissaries, which raged for two days in the streets of Constantinople with varying fortune. The Kapitan Pacha, Seid Ali, co-operated with Cadi Pacha; and caused a ship of the line, that lay

in the harbour, to fire repeated broad-sides upon the part of the town, where the Janissaries' barracks were situated. Several extensive districts of Constantinople, and immense magazines of military stores, were set on fire during this fearful conflict, which was still maintained on the morning of the 17th of March, 1809, when the Galiongees and the artillerymen, who had hitherto been neutral, pronounced in favour of the Janissaries, and determined the victory. The Sultan and his attendants had kept the palace gates closed; and the deposed Sultan, Mustapha, had been put to death in his apartments, while the result of the civil war in the streets was still doubtful. It is uncertain who gave the order for Mustapha's execution, but it is certain that if he had been left alive, the victorious Janissaries would have restored him to the throne, and have murdered Mahmoud. As sole scion of the House of Othman, Mahmoud knew that he bore a charmed life. But he was obliged to yield, at least in appearance, to the demands of the victors. An imperial edict was issued in favour of the Janissaries. All the customs of the Franks, and all the late innovations were solemnly cursed and renounced; and the old system, with all its abuses, seemed to be re-established more firmly than ever. But there were men of thought and action among the Turks, who had seen all these things, and who saw in them only the sterner proof of the necessity of sweeping changes. They were obliged to think in silence; but they were preparing themselves for the time when their thought might be embodied in deed. Above all, the Sultan himself watched from year to year, as Amurath IV.

had watched under not dissimilar circumstances,* for the hour and the means of ridding himself and his country from these worst, these home-oppressors of his race.

We must now turn again to the provinces near the Danube, that were the scenes of the war between the Porte and Russia. No great advantages had been obtained by the forces of the Czar over those of the Sultan; and Kara George, though victorious in defence of Servia, had been unsuccessful in an attempt to conquer Bosnia, when, in consequence of the peace of Tilsit, between Alexander and Napoleon on June 7, 1807, the French general, Guillemot, negotiated a cessation of hostilities between the Turks and Russians, which was agreed to at Slobosia in the August of the same year. One of those terms of the treaty of Tilsit, which were made public, stipulated that the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, but that the Turks should not re-enter those provinces until a peace between them and the Emperor Alexander was finally arranged. There was a show of attempting to make this the basis of a treaty at Slobosia, but nothing was definitively settled, although an armistice was agreed on, in which the Servians were included. Hostilities were in fact suspended for nearly two years, when the irritation caused among the Turks by the evident design of Russia to retain Moldavia and Wallachia, and the belief that their interests had been sacrificed by the French Emperor, led to the renewal of the war. It was not

* See vol. i. p. 399. The account of the Revolutions 1807—1809 is chiefly taken from Lord Broughton, and from Juchereau St. Denis.

without cause that the sincerity of Napoleon's professions of friendship for the Sublime Porte was suspected. In the interviews between him and the Emperor Alexander, when those two great potentates dazzled each other with the scheme that they should form an Imperial Duumvirate of the world, each gave up his weaker allies. As the Triumvirs who divided the Roman world, when they met on the little island on the Rhenus, sacrificed each his own friends to the ambition and wrath of the others, so Alexander and Napoleon, on their raft on the river Niemen, sacrificed friendly nations. Spain was to be abandoned to the French Emperor in return for his leaving Turkey at the mercy of the Muscovite. It was formally provided by a secret article of the treaty of Tilsit, that if the Porte did not comply with the private recommendations of France and Russia, her European provinces, except Roumelia and Constantinople, should be withdrawn from the vexation of Turkish government;* and it was arranged between the two Emperors, that the provisions in the public treaty for the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians should be practically disregarded. Afterwards, Napoleon, in the negociations of his ministers with Alexander, and in their subsequent interviews at Erfurt, sought to effect a dismemberment of Turkey, in which some of her best provinces should fall to his own share. Two plans were discussed; by one of which the Turks were to be allowed to retain their Asiatic, and part of their European terri-

* The text was, "Soustraire les provinces d'Europe aux vexations de la Porte, excepté Constantinople et la Roumilie." See Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, vol. vii. p. 668.

tories; by the other, the Ottoman Empire was to be almost annihilated. The first scheme assigned to Russia the Danubian principalities and Bulgaria. The Balkan was to be the boundary. France was to have Albania, Greece, and Candia. Bosnia and Servia were to be transferred to the Austrians, as a compensation to them for seeing the Russians established at the mouth of the Danube. According to the second project, Austria was to be bribed by receiving not only Bosnia and Servia, but Macedonia also, except the town and harbour of Salonika. France was to take, (besides Albania, Greece, and Candia,) all the islands of the Archipelago, Cyprus, Syria, and Egypt. Russia's portion was to be Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Thrace, and the Asiatic provinces nearest to the Bosphorus. The Turks, thrust back beyond Mount Taurus, might still worship Mahomet on the banks of the Euphrates.

This last gigantic scheme of national robbery involved the cession of Constantinople to Russia; and to this Napoleon would not consent. His minister, M. Caulaincourt, proposed to obviate the difficulty by making Constantinople and the shores of the straits a neutral territory, a kind of Hanseatic free state, like Hamburgh or Bremen. The Russian negotiator, M. de Romanoff, was tenacious as to Constantinople, the city of St. Sophia, the true metropolis of the Greek church, and the natural capital of the empire of the East. Caulaincourt hinted that Constantinople might perhaps be given up by France, but only on condition of her occupying the Dardanelles and the coasts of those straits, as the proper means of passage for her armies into Syria by the old

route of the crusaders. The Russian would not yield the Dardanelles, and stated that the Czar would prefer the first, the limited scheme of partition, to any arrangement that would give France the keys of the passage between the Euxine and the Mediterranean.* Thus wrangled they over the ideal proceeds of an uncommitted crime, little thinking that Moscow was soon to blaze, with French invaders for her occupants, and that Paris, in a few more years, was to yield to Russian cannon, while the House of Othman proceeded to complete its fourth century of unbroken dominion at Constantinople.

However much Alexander and Napoleon in 1807 and 1808 differed in their theories respecting the future of Turkey, the Russian Emperor had this practical advantage, that he retained possession of Wallachia and Moldavia; and it became evident to the Austrian as well as to the Ottoman Court, that he had no intention of retiring from them. Austria regarded the establishment of the Czar's dominion in these Danubian Principalities with the utmost anxiety and alarm. Justly suspecting that France and Russia were leagued together against the integrity of Turkey, Austria employed her mediation to reconcile the Porte with England, as the only power that could effectually withstand the project of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and St. Petersburgh.† Aided by this influence, Sir Robert Adair, the English ambassador, concluded the treaty of the Dardanelles with Turkey, in January 1809. The

* Thiers, vol. viii. p. 440. See also Montholon, vol. iv. p. 229, and De Garden, Histoire des Traités, vol. x. p. 243, et seq.

† Schlosser, vol. viii.

imperious menaces by which France and Russia endeavoured to prevent the Porte from making peace with England, only incensed the Turkish nation more and more against Russia. The national cry was loud for war; and the Ottomans demanded that it should be war in earnest, and not broken by armistices to suit the convenience of false foes and falser friends. Volunteers for the campaign came forward readily from the Mahometan populations of every part of the Empire; but such was the extreme disorganisation, which the recent revolution had caused, that there was no concert, no subordination, and sometimes not even the semblance of superior authority, among the Turkish commanders. Sir R. Adair, the English ambassador at Constantinople in a despatch to his government, dated June 3, 1809, gives a striking sketch of the disorders, which had then prevailed for several months, and which, though abated at the time when he wrote, were soon revived. The Janissaries had refused for a considerable time to accept the Grand Vizier whom the Sultan nominated, and until their consent was gained, that high officer did not venture to appear in Constantinople. Sir R. Adair proceeds to state—"During this long period, from the death of Mustapha, the Ottoman Empire may be said to have been without a government. The heads of the different departments confined themselves to the details of their several charges. No man would undertake the responsibility of a general measure. Public business in all its essential parts was at a stand. The disorders in the provinces continued with as little intermission. Government, indeed, appeared everywhere to be fallen into

such a state of relaxation, as to have lost the means of acting right, even when it was supported by the public sentiment. Nothing can so truly characterise both the nature and the source of these disorders as what has passed at the frontiers upon the renewal of hostilities with Russia. I have already had the honour of informing you to what degree the spirit of the people was roused by the insolent demand made at the end of March by that power. Some degree of vigour seemed also to have been inspired into the ministry on that occasion. Great activity prevailed in all the war departments. The fleet was ordered to be fitted out; and, in fact, ten sail of the line have been equipped with uncommon expedition. Troops and provisions were ordered to the fortresses; and numbers of men were seen to pass the Bosphorus, day after day, taking their route for the frontiers. Unhappily, when they reached the Danube, instead of being embodied into an army to oppose the enemy, finding no leader to command them, they enlisted under one or the other of two ferocious chiefs, who, in the very sight of the Russian tents, were desolating their country with civil war. There is an Ayan of Schumla, and a chief named Pehlivan Aga, under whose banners all the new comers engaged, and who have already had many desperate encounters, to the unspeakable injury of the public cause." *

The destitution of the state treasury, and the general embarrassment of the whole financial system of the empire, were such as inevitably follow the overthrow of established government and social order. An attempt

* Adair, Mission to Constantinople, vol. i. p. 206—7.

was made to obtain a loan from England, which proved ineffectual, though the negociation for it deserves attention, on account of the nature of the securities that were proposed, and on account of the testimony given by the English minister to the superior honesty and patriotism, which the Turks in their extreme need displayed, compared with the conduct of many nations at this period, to whom the arms of France were convenient pretexts for rapacious clamouring after English gold.*

About the same time that hostilities between the Turks and Russians recommenced on the Danube, the

* The following passage is from Sir R. Adair's principal despatch respecting Turkish finances in 1809 :—

"In addition to the state of disorder to which years, it may be said centuries, of mal-administration have reduced their finances, the loss which the government has recently sustained by the insurrection in which the Grand Vizier Mustapha lost his life, is most severe. What is worse, it falls on that department where the utmost energy must be displayed if this empire is to be saved. Almost all the tents belonging to the army, all the baggage, and an immense quantity of stores, provisions, and magazines, were destroyed in the late fires at Constantinople.

"These financial difficulties impede the progress of every effort which the Ottoman Government is disposed to make, and which the people are uncommonly eager to second, to carry the war into the enemy's country. The enthusiasm by which the whole mass of the population of this empire is animated, is stated to me to exceed anything known in the memory of modern times. On the other hand, the pecuniary distress is at least equal in proportion.

"The Ottoman Government does not apply to me on this occasion in the tone which has too frequently been adopted by other states, by declaring that unless Great Britain shall assist them, they shall be reduced to make cessions of territory, and other sacrifices, to obtain peace; they assure me that they mean to carry on the war to extremity whether we assist them or not; but they also point out to me the impossibility of carrying it on upon the only scale that can either insure them ultimate success, or enable them to render it an effectual diversion for Austria, unless some method can be devised for remedying the evil of which they feel so strongly the pressure at the present moment.

"In the different conversations which I have had on this subject with the

Austrian Empire began its calamitous war of 1809 with France; a war in which Russia in pursuance of her confederacy with Napoleon, took part against

plenipotentiary, Vaahid Efendi, (and I have had many, but have not hitherto deemed it necessary to trouble you with the details of them,) it has been my constant endeavour to impress upon the Government the necessity of calling out their own resources, which are immense, and of establishing rigorous reforms in the collection of their revenue. I have found, to all appearance, a serious disposition to adopt these measures; but it has also been justly observed to me, that their wants are immediate, and that the reforms in question are not only distant in their operation, but, until the ferment occasioned by the Nizam-Djedid shall be thoroughly appeased, not wholly safe to institute upon an extended plan.

"The method to which they seem chiefly to adhere is that of a loan from Great Britain; and, with a view of effecting one, the Porte invited me not long since to a conference with Vaahid Efendi.

"In the conference which I had with him accordingly, I assured this minister of every disposition on the part of his Majesty to assist in relieving the necessities of the Ottoman Government; and for this purpose I stated myself to be ready to consult with him day after day, and to assist in framing any plan which should clear the question from the numerous difficulties with which it was encumbered. A loan from the merchants of England, I convinced him, was out of the question; a loan from the Government I thought equally so, but I would not refuse to transmit any proposal for one which might be accompanied with a specification of sufficient security for the payment of the interest, and the gradual extinction of the capital.

"The particulars of their proposal, and of the security they offer, will be the subject of a future despatch. Vaahid Efendi was not prepared with any details, but he stated generally that *it was intended to propose that the Mufti, the Ulemas, and the whole body of their law should join in an act pledging the revenues appropriated to the maintenance of their religion, for the repayment of the sum borrowed.*

"In consenting to transmit any plan of which this security is to be the basis, you will easily perceive that I have been actuated solely by a desire to prove to the Turks my readiness to enter into the state of their necessities. Such is the composition of the Turkish character, that a refusal to listen to their proposals, however chimerical, would have been construed by them into an indifference to their situation, which I am far indeed from feeling.

"This conference, which had been so earnestly solicited by the Ottoman Government, appeared to me to afford a favourable opportunity for submitting to its attention a measure of a different nature, and one through which a foundation might be laid, not only for relieving them from their present embarrassments, but for augmenting their natural resources, and procuring for his Majesty's service a permanent supply of several valuable articles of consumption.

Austria. It is true that the Emperor Alexander's troops entered but languidly into that struggle; for the general feeling among the Russians towards Napoleon was already one of jealousy and dislike. But the prevalence of those very feelings, in which the Czar himself ere long fully shared, kept the attention of Russia fixed more on her perils from the West, than on her prospects in the South; and neither her best nor her largest armies were drawn away from the Polish to the Danubian provinces. Still, before the end of 1809, her general, Prince Bagration, had taken Isaktja, Tulosch, and Hirsowa, on the right bank of the lower Danube. The Servians and the Turks of Bosnia again fought with varying success, neither party being able to make any serious impression on the territories of the other. In the next year the Russians captured Silistria on the 10th of June; but they failed in a series of operations against the Grand Vizier's camp at Shumla; and on the

"*It is well known that the different dominions of this vast empire produce oak timber in abundance, likewise copper and hemp. This latter article is not so valuable as the Russian hemp; but in case of necessity may become a very serviceable commodity. The copper used in the Turkish navy is of the finest kind; and, as I learn, would be obtained cheaper than that used in his Majesty's dockyards. I need not expatiate on the importance of securing a constant supply of corn in the present, or indeed in any future prospect of our affairs in Spain, Italy, or the Mediterranean.*

"Instead of coming to Great Britain for a loan, therefore, I stated that these resources pointed out a much shorter and simpler method of supplying their wants; and I offered to submit to his Majesty's Government the outlines of a convention by which *Great Britain might engage to advance a certain sum to the Porte, bearing interest, and consent to receive in payment, at stated periods, ship timber, copper, hemp, and corn to an equal amount.*

"The utility of this measure to both countries will, I think, appear evident. To Great Britain, by insuring a supply of the most valuable articles of constant consumption; to Turkey, by showing them the extent of their own resources, and by teaching them habits of industry to call them forth."—ADAIR, *Mission to Constantinople*, i. 180-3.

3rd of August they sustained a sanguinary overthrow in an assault made by them upon Rustchuk. The Russians owned to a loss of 8000 killed and wounded in this obstinate contest. If the Turkish commander, Bosniak Aga, had followed up his success by a vigorous sally upon his defeated enemy, the whole army of the besiegers would have been destroyed.* But Bosniak Aga, was, like many of the Ottoman commanders during the war, rather an independent Mahometan potentate, than an officer of the Sultan. He had succeeded Mustapha Bairactar as Governor of Rustchuk; and, after Bairactar's death, he disregarded all orders from Constantinople, and reigned as petty autocrat of Rustchuk and its territories. When the Russians advanced against the city, Bosniak Aga resisted them heroically; but when he had saved Rustchuk from the Giaours, he remembered that he might have to save himself from the Grand Vizier, who regarded him as a rebel. He avoided, therefore, the risk of weakening his force by any operations against the Russians in the open field.† Afterwards, when reconciled to the Porte, he fought loyally and bravely in the last campaigns of the war; but this incident is a fair example of the manner in which the contest was often conducted on the Turkish side. In the autumn of 1810, the Russians obtained some important successes. A large Turkish army was entirely defeated at Battin, on the 7th of September, with the loss of camps, artillery, and baggage. Sistova, Rustchuk, and other strong places,

* Valentini, p. 104. † Valentini, pp. 64, 104.

were yielded to the Russians; but all their attempts at penetrating through Shumla, across the Balkan, were unsuccessful. In the following year, the Russian generals on the Danube were ordered to act only on the defensive; so evident and so imminent was the gathering storm from the West against Russia. The Turks boldly carried the war to the left bank of the Danube, and fought with great gallantry in several engagements; but through the incompetency of their commanders, they were beaten in detail, and one whole army was obliged to surrender to the Russian general, Kutosoff, as prisoners of war. Russia was now most anxious to conclude peace with the Porte, in order to have the full means of defending herself against Napoleon. Several attempts at negociating a treaty were made in 1811, but without success; as the Emperor Alexander required the annexation of, not only Bessarabia, but Moldavia and Wallachia, to his empire: terms which Sultan Mahmoud peremptorily refused. But the growing pressure of the danger from France made the Russians abate their demands, and consent to restore Moldavia and Wallachia, but on condition that Bessarabia should remain in their possession. Napoleon now recognised, when too late, the error which he had committed, in sacrificing the friendship of Turkey to the hope of propitiating or duping Russia. He directed his ambassador to urge the Sultan to advance with the whole strength of his empire on the Danube; and promised in return, not only to secure Moldavia and Wallachia, but to obtain also the restoration of the deeply regretted

Crimea to Turkey. But this "war-breathing message"* arrived too late. The Porte had already resolved on a cessation of hostilities with Russia. The envoys of the Emperor Alexander, and the English ministers, (who zealously promoted the pacification between the Czar and the Sultan) found means to give the Turks full information as to the designs which Napoleon had encouraged and brought forward for the dismemberment of their empire: so that Sultan Mahmoud now naturally disregarded the interests of the French, and sought only to obtain an alleviation of the miseries which his own nation was enduring. By the treaty of Bucharest,† which was signed on the 28th of May, 1812, the river Pruth was made the boundary between the Russian and Turkish Empires, from the point where it enters Moldavia to its confluence with the Danube. All Moldavia to the right of the Pruth, and the whole of Wallachia, were given back to the Sultan, who bound himself to maintain and respect all the former conventions and stipulations in favour of the inhabitants of the restored countries. The Eighth Article of the treaty relates to Servia. It recited that, "though it was impossible to doubt that the Sublime Porte would according to its principles act with gentleness and magnanimity towards the Servians, as to a people that had long been under its dominion, still it was deemed just, in consideration of the part taken by the Servians in the war, to come to a solemn agreement respecting their security." A full amnesty was therefore granted to the Servians. The regulation of their internal

* Scott.

† See the treaty, Appendix E.

affairs was to be left to themselves, and only moderate imposts were to be laid on them, which were not to be farmed, but received directly by the treasurers of the Porte. But the Servian fortresses were to be given up to the Sultan, and were again to be occupied by Turkish garrisons. The Servian statesman, Cunibert, who has lately become the historian of his adopted country, rightly comments on the selfishness with which Russia acted in this negociation; on her eagerness to obtain Bessarabia for herself, and her indifference as to the fate of her Servian allies. He observes that the vagueness of the stipulations in the treaty, as to the future relative positions of the Turks and Servians, was probably intentional on the part of the Russians; who knew well that disputes and conflicts would ensue, which would furnish pretexts for Russian intervention at a more convenient season. "Such conduct might promote the ulterior designs of Russia in the East; but it showed little justice and little generosity to Servia." *

* Essai Historique sur les Révolutions et l'Indépendance de la Serbie, vol. i. p. 46.

CHAPTER XI.

CHARACTER OF MAHMOUD II.—MEHEMET ALI—OVERTHROW OF THE MAMELUKES AND THE WAHABITES—FRESH TROUBLES IN SERVIA—MILOSCH OBRENOWITCH—GENERAL EXCITEMENT AMONG THE RAYAS—THE HETÆRIA—THE GREEK REVOLUTION—MAHMOUD DESTROYS THE JANISSARIES—RUSSIA UNDER NICHOLAS I. FORCES THE TREATY OF AKKERMAN ON TURKEY—FRANCE, ENGLAND AND RUSSIA, INTERFERE ON BEHALF OF THE GREEKS—BATTLE OF NAVARINO—WAR WITH RUSSIA—TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE—REVOLT OF MEHEMET ALI—BATTLE OF KONIEH—RUSSIAN TROOPS PROTECT THE SULTAN—TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI—FRESH WAR WITH MEHEMET ALI—DEATH OF MAHMOUD—THE TURKS DEFEATED—SULTAN ABDUL MEJDID AIDED BY ENGLAND AGAINST MEHEMET ALI—SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITH EGYPT.

Peril from Russia, peril from England, peril from France, peril from mutinous Janissaries, and factious Ulemas; peril from many-headed insurrection among Wahabites, Mamelukes, Servians, Albanians, Greeks, Druses, Kurds, Syrians and Egyptians; peril from rebellious Pachas, who would fain have founded new kingdoms on the ruins of the House of Othman;—such were some of the clouds that hung over the reign of Mahmoud, the second Sultan of that name, and the thirtieth sovereign of his dynasty. He braved them all. Though often worsted by fortune, he never gave up the struggle: and his memory deserves the respect of those

who are capable of judging historical characters according to the rule laid down by the great statesman and orator of antiquity:* according to the principle of giving honour to sage forethought and energetic action, whether favoured by prosperous or baffled by adverse circumstances. The time has not yet come, when a full biography of Mahmoud may be written. Our knowledge (in Western Europe at least) of the details of many parts of his career is imperfect. But the general features of his character are plainly discernible. He was neither coward, nor fool; nor was he a selfish voluptuary like Louis XV., who could understand the growing miseries of a state, and the approaching overthrow of a monarchy, but rest content with the calculation, that the means and appliances of pomp and indulgence were safe for his life at least, and that after him might come the deluge. The evils that Mahmoud saw around him were gigantic, and he gave up the repose of his seraglio to grapple with them, in the true heroic spirit.† It would be absurd to assert that he fell into no errors; it would be rash to maintain that he was sullied by no crimes; but, take him on the whole, he was a great man, who, amid difficulty, disappointment, and disaster, did his duty nobly to the Royal House whence he was sprung, and to the once magnificent empire, which it was his hard lot to govern.

* Τὸ μὲν γὰρ Πέρας ὡς ἂν ὁ δαίμων βουληθῇ πάντων γίγνεται· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις αὐτὴ τὴν τοῦ συμβούλου διάνοιαν δηλοῖ, κ.τ.λ.—DEMOSTHENES, *De Coronâ*. Vol. i. p. 292, l. 18. Ed. Reiske.

† Potiores
Herculis ærumnas credat sævosque labores
Et Venere et cœnis et plumâ Sardanapali.—JUVENAL.

It is observable in the early part of Mahmoud's reign, that two formidable classes of his enemies were swept away by the instrumentality of a high officer, who afterwards became himself the most formidable of all the foes who crossed the Sultan's path. The Mamelukes were destroyed, and the Wahabites completely conquered, by Mahmoud's Egyptian Pacha, Mehemet Ali, himself one of the most remarkable men that the Mahometan world has produced in modern times.

Mehemet Ali was born in Macedonia, about the year 1765. He served in the Turkish army against the French in Egypt, and learned there the superiority of the arms and tactics of Western Europe over those of the Turks and Mamelukes. He afterwards distinguished himself greatly in the repulse of the English expedition against Egypt in 1807. Having attained the rank of Pacha of the province, he strove sedulously to free the country and himself from the lawless tyranny of the Mamelukes. He effected this in 1811 by a stroke of the vilest treachery and most ruthless cruelty. Under the show of reconciliation and hospitable friendship he brought those formidable cavaliers to his palace ; and then caused them to be shot down by his Albanian guards, while cooped helplessly together in a narrow passage between high walls.*

The Mamelukes were effectually exterminated by this

* The following account (in Walpole's Travels, p. 32,) of the massacre of the Mamelukes, was written by an English gentleman who was at Cairo at the time :—

"Nothing can be imagined more dreadful than the scene of the murder. The Mamelukes had left the Divan, and were arrived at one of the narrow

atrocious massacre; and Mehemet Ali rapidly consolidated his power within his province, and also extended it beyond the Egyptian territory. His armies, under his sons, carried on a series of campaigns against the Wahabites in Arabia, at first with varying success; but at last the power of those fierce sectaries was completely broken. The holy cities and the rest of Arabia were recovered; and Abdullah Ibn Saud, the last Emir of the Wahabites, was made captive. Mehemet sent him to Constantinople, where he was beheaded on the 19th of November, 1819. The Egyptian Pacha next conquered Nubia and Sennaar, and annexed those regions to his dominions. He had formed an army on the European model, trained and officered by European military adventurers, chiefly from France, whom the cessation of the great wars in Christendom after 1815

passages in their way to the gates of the citadel, when a fire from 2000 Albanians was poured in on them from the tops of the walls, and in all directions. Unprepared for anything of the sort, and embarrassed for want of room, they were capable of scarcely any resistance; a few almost harmless blows were all they attempted; and those who were not killed by the fire were dragged from their horses, stripped naked, with a handkerchief bound round their heads, and another round their waists, they were led before the Pacha and his sons, and by them ordered to immediate execution. Even there the suffering was aggravated, and instead of being instantly beheaded, many were not at first wounded mortally. They were shot in different parts of their bodies with pistols, or stuck with daggers. Many struggled to break loose from those who held them, some succeeded, and were killed in corners of the citadel, or on the top of the Pacha's harem. Others, quite boys of from twelve to fourteen years, cried eagerly for mercy; protesting, with obvious truth, that they were innocent of any conspiracy, and offering themselves as slaves. All these, and, in short, every one, however young and incapable of guilt, or however old and tried in his fidelity, the more elevated and the more obscure, were hurried before the Pacha, who sternly refused them mercy, one by one, impatient until he was assured the destruction was complete. Here then is an end of the Mamelukes, and this is the Pacha who piques himself upon his clemency!"

had set at liberty, and who were tempted to Egypt by the high pay and favour which Mehemet offered. Equal care was taken in preparing and manning a naval force; in the improvement of harbours, the construction of docks and roads, and all those other territorial improvements, which are at once the emblems and the engines of what is called enlightened despotism. The people of Egypt suffered bitterly under Mehemet's imposts, and still more under the severe laws of conscription, by which he filled the ranks of his army. But, arbitrary and oppressive as was Mehemet's system, it succeeded in gaining him the great object of his heart, a permanent and efficient military force; as was well proved when he aided the Sultan against the Greeks, and still better proved at a later period, in the campaigns which Mehemet's son, Ibrahim Pacha, conducted against the generals of the Sultan himself.

Before, however, we consider these last-mentioned events, we must revert to the affairs of Servia, and the other northern provinces of European Turkey. It has been observed, how vague and unsatisfactory were the stipulations respecting the Servians, that were introduced in the treaty of Bucharest. One natural result of this was, that Kara George, and the other Servian chiefs, were desirous of having some definite provisions made for the security of their people, before the Turks took possession of the fortresses, whereas the Sultan's officers insisted on Belgrade and the other strongholds being given up to them immediately. While these and other differences were pending, Molla Pacha of Widdin

who (like the former chief of that pachalic, Passwan Oglou) was in active rebellion against the Sultan, proposed to the Servians that they should ally themselves with him against the Porte. The Servians declined this offer, in compliance with the advice of the Russians, who were endeavouring to induce Turkey to join the confederation against France (Napoleon not yet having been completely overthrown), and were consequently at that time desirous to save the Porte from embarrassment.* The disputes between the Turks and Servians continued to increase, and, in 1813, Turkish armies assailed, and overran the country. Kara George (who had made himself absolute ruler of the Servians, and from whom at least the example of courage was expected) now betrayed his self-assumed trust. He buried his treasure, which was considerable, and fled across the frontier into Austria. Once more Servia seemed hopelessly bowed down beneath the Turkish yoke, but the gallantry of one of her Kneses, Milosch Obrenowitch, once more preserved her. Animated and guided by him, the Servians rose in arms in 1815, and before the close of the year the Turkish troops that had occupied the country were broken and dispersed; though the fortresses remained in the occupation of the Sultan's garrisons. Two formidable Ottoman armies advanced upon Servia in the succeeding year; but instead of overwhelming her, they halted on the frontier, and offered to negociate. This hesitation on the part of the Ottomans was caused by the universal excitement then prevailing throughout the Christian populations of

* Cunibert, vol. i. p. 47.

Turkey, who expected an intervention in their behalf to be made by the confederate sovereigns of the Holy Alliance, and were ready to rise throughout the empire at the first signal of encouragement. The Porte also had watched with anxiety and alarm the proceedings of the Congress at Vienna, to which no representative of the Ottoman Empire was admitted; and the league of the three sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, as "Holy Allies," seemed eminently menacing to the excluded Ottomans. Under these circumstances the Sultan was averse to entangling and risking his whole available military force in a war against the Servian Rayas. No resolute attempt was made to conquer Servia; but a series of embassies and treaties occupied several years; during which Milosch made himself absolute ruler of the Servians, much after the manner of his predecessor, Kara George. Kara George himself, who ventured to return to his country, was seized and shot by the commands of Milosch, on the requisition of the Turks. Milosch observed the external semblance of obedience to the Porte; which had reason at that period to be content that a chief should rule the Servians, who would keep them in control, and whose self-interest would deter him from joining in revolutionary projects for the total overthrow of the Ottoman empire.* But it is not probable that, after the Holy Alliance had clearly shown its disinclination to interfere in the affairs of the East, Mahmoud would long have acquiesced in the real independence of the Grand Knes of Servia, had it not been for the grave difficulties that were

* Ranke, p. 365.

brought upon the Sultan by the Greek insurrection, and other circumstances connected with that celebrated event.

Many causes combined to originate and to sustain the Greek War of Independence. The first, and the most enduring, were unquestionably those feelings which are among the noblest of our nature ; and which the national historian of modern Greece refers to, when he claims peculiar glory for his country, because from the very commencement of the struggle, her purpose, proclaimed before God and man, was to break the yoke of the stranger, and to raise again from the dead her nationality and her independence. She took up arms that she might by force of arms thrust out of Greece a race alien to her in blood and in creed, a race that had by force of arms held her captive for ages, and that regarded her to the last as its captive, and as subject to the edge of its sword.* To these public feelings were added, in the bosoms of many, the remembrance and the sense of intolerable private wrong. Moreover, the general diffusion of knowledge among the Greeks, and the impulse that had been given to education and literary pursuits since the time of Selim III., powerfully contributed in arousing the courage as well as the intelligence of a long oppressed and much enduring people.† Many also of the Greeks had acquired both wealth and

* Ἡ Ἑλλὰς καὶ προέθετο καὶ ἐκήρυξεν ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἀγῶνός της, ὅτι ὡπλίσθη πρὸς συντριβὴν τοῦ ξένου ζυγοῦ καὶ πρὸς ἀνέγερσιν τοῦ ἐθνισμοῦ της, καὶ τῆς ἀνεξαρτησίας της'—νὰ ἐξώσῃ διὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μίαν ξένην καὶ ἀλλόθρησκον φυλὴν, ἡ ὁποία διὰ τῶν ὅπλων τὴν ἠχμαλώτευσε πρὸ αἰώνων, καὶ τὴν ἐθεώρει μέχρι τέλους αἰχμάλωτόν της, καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν μάχαιράν της. *Tricoupi*, tom. A. p. 2 & p. 1.

† See Emerson Tennant, vol. ii. p. 561.

habits of energetic enterprise by the advancing commerce of their nation; and the insular and seafaring population of the country had generally shown the greatest activity and skill in availing themselves of the opportunities, which the state of Europe for the first fifteen years of the century gave them, for securing a large share of the carrying trade of the Levant. While Greece thus possessed admirable materials for a national maritime force, she had also better resources for an immediate military struggle on land, than nations, which have been subject to others for centuries, can usually command. Her bands of Klephts, or robbers, were numerous, well-armed, and brave; and such an occupation in a country in the condition of Greece before the revolution, implied no greater degree of discredit than was attached in England during the early Norman reigns to the "bold outlaws" of Sherwood, or in Greece herself in the Homeric ages to the avowed sea-rover and pirate.* There was also in central and northern Greece another important class of armed natives, forming a kind of militia, which had been originally instituted and sanctioned by the Turks themselves for the purpose of maintaining order and repressing the Klephts. These national guards (as they might be termed) were composed exclusively of Greeks, and were officered by Greeks, but they acknowledged the authority of the Pachas of their respective districts. They frequently consisted of Klephts, who had come in from the mountains, and made terms with the government, and who were thenceforth denominated "Tame Klephts"

* Tricoupi, vol. A. p. 15; and Thucydides as there cited.

(Κλέφται ἥμεροι); but the regular name of the defensive troops was the Armatoli. The Porte had for some years before the Greek Revolution been jealous of the numbers and organisation of the Armatoles; and violent efforts had been made to reduce their strength, which chiefly resulted in driving them into open rebellion, and increasing the power of the Ἄγριοι Κλέφται, the armed, or wild Klephts. Another circumstance, which favoured still more the insurrection of Greece, was the density and homogeneousness of its Christian population, far exceeding the usual proportions to be found in the Turkish Empire. Napoleon had remarked, in one of his conversations at St. Helena on the subject of the East, that the Sultans had committed a great fault in allowing so large a mass of Christians of the same race to collect together, and in such numerical preponderance above their masters, as in Greece; and he predicted that "sooner or later this fault will bring on the fall of the Ottomans."*

Such were the impulses and resources, which Greece possessed within herself for her War of Independence, which must, however, have been ultimately unsuccessful (notwithstanding the gallantry with which it was waged) had it not been for the sympathy, which the Greek cause excited among all the nations of Europe: "a sympathy such as had never been known before, in which recollections of the classic ages, liberal tendencies, and an universal Christian feeling were united."† Unhappily, other motives, selfish and sordid motives, tended not a little to throw the sword of Christian

* Montholon, vol. iv. p. 229.

† Ranke, p. 365.

Europe into the scale against the Turks in the Greek war.* The ambition of one great power was predominant; and used as its most effective, though unconscious instrument the enthusiastic generosity of others. The liberation of Greece was not accomplished without an almost fatal blow being given to the general cause of the independence of nations: a blow which England and France aided to inflict, and which they are now lavishing their blood and treasures to repair.

Ever since the ineffectual rising with Russian help, which took place in 1770,† the Greeks had been incessantly scheming fresh attempts. Their national poet, Rhiga, (whose lyrics powerfully contributed to keep up the flame of freedom in the hearts of his countrymen), towards the close of the last century formed the project of uniting the whole Greek nation in a secret confederacy for the overthrow of their Turkish masters. Thus was originated and first organised the celebrated Hetæria. It made rapid and extensive progress under Rhiga; but it decayed after his death in 1798. It was revived in 1814 among the Greeks of Odessa, by Nicholas Skophas. He termed it the Society (or Hetæria) of the Philikoi,‡ and, by engrafting it on a Literary Society, which was flourishing at Athens, he obtained the means of spreading it with rapidity among the most intelligent Greeks,

* That strong-minded and strong-spoken man, William Cobbett, said that the Greek revolution was "a war got up by poets and stock-jobbers for the benefit of Russia."

† See p. 225, supra.

‡ I suppose the title Ἑταιρία τῶν Φιλικῶν answers to our "Society of Friends." But Tricoupi censures the name as Ὀνομασίαν ἀρκοῦσαν μόνην νὰ χαρακτηρίσῃ τὴν μικρὰν γνῶσιν τοῦ συστήσαντος καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μητρικῆς γλώσσης τόν.

and at the same time of masking it from the suspicion of the Turks. The association soon comprised many thousand members. A great number of officers in the Russian service were enrolled in it; and it was supposed to identify Russian policy and Greek interests more closely than really was the case; a supposition highly favourable to its advancement; as the belief that they were acting under Russian authority, and were sure to receive Russian aid in time of need, naturally increased the numerical strength and boldness of the confederates. The association had its hierarchy, its secret signs, and its mysterious but exciting formalities. Its general spirit may be judged of by the oath administered to the initiated in the third of its seven degrees:—"Fight for thy Faith and thy Fatherland. Thou shalt hate, thou shalt persecute, thou shalt utterly destroy the enemies of thy religion, of thy race, and of thy country." The Hetæria had its branches and agents in every province of European Turkey, in the chief cities of Asia Minor, and in every foreign state where any number of Greeks had settled. Early in 1820 its chiefs were making preparations for a general insurrection, which could not have been much longer delayed. But the event which was the immediate cause of the rising, was the war between the Sultan and Ali Pacha, which broke out in the spring of that year, and offered the Greeks the advantage of beginning their revolution, while the best troops of the Porte were engaged against a formidable enemy,—against one, who long had been himself one of the strongest and cruellest oppressors of the Greek race,

but now seemed driven by self-interest to become its most valuable ally.

Nothing certain at this time was known in the Divan at Constantinople of the danger that was gathering against the Ottoman power in the Hetæria of the Greeks, and Sultan Mahmoud had determined on commencing one of the many difficult tasks of his reign, that of effectually putting down the over-powerful and rebellious vassals, who had long maintained their empires within his empire, and who overshadowed the majesty of his throne. None of these was more insolently independent, or had given juster cause of alarm or offence to the Porte, than Ali of Epirus, the Pacha of Jannina, whose name has already often occurred to us, but who requires more special notice in considering the recent history of the Ottomans and their subject-races.

Ali Pacha was an Albanian, and his family belonged to one of the tribes, that had long embraced Mahometanism. His ancestors had, for several generations, been hereditary chiefs of the little fortified village of Tepelenè, where Ali was born about the year 1750. His father (who died before Ali was fourteen) had been deprived of nearly all the possessions of the family, in a series of unsuccessful feuds with the neighbouring chieftains. Ali's mother, Khamko, trained the lad up to make revenge and power the sole objects of his existence. He formed a band of freebooters, at the head of which he sometimes won plunder and renown, and sometimes experienced extreme reverses and peril. On some occasions he sought refuge in the mountains, where he

wandered as a solitary Klepht or robber, till he again gathered comrades, and struck for power as well as for existence. After some years of romantic but savage adventures, Ali had recovered the greater part of the territories of his family, and had acquired fame throughout Albania as a bold and successful chieftain. He did good service in the armies of the Porte against the Austrians, in 1788; and partly by the reputation thus gained, but still more by bribery, he obtained from the Divan the Pachalic of Tricala, in Thessaly. By unscrupulous and audacious craft and crime, he afterwards made himself Pacha of Janñina, in Epirus, which thenceforth was the capital of his dominions. Gifted with great sagacity, and embarrassed by no remorse and little fear, Ali triumphed over rival Beys and Pachas, and almost accomplished the subjugation of the neighbouring mountain tribes; though he experienced from them, and especially from the gallant Suliotes, a long and obstinate resistance. Every forward step of Ali's career was stained by the foulest treachery and the most fiendish cruelty. But the cities and lands under his rule obtained peace, security, and commercial prosperity. Ali watched eagerly the conflicts and changes, of which nearly all Europe was the scene for many years after the breaking out of the first French Revolution. He had frequent negociations with Napoleon and other rulers of the West, who substantially, though not formally, recognised him as an independent potentate. It is said* that "his scheme was, to make himself

* Biographical Dictionary of Useful Knowledge Society; title, "Ali Pacha."

master of all Albania, Thessaly, Greece, and the Ionian Islands; and the Gulf of Arta, a bay with a narrow entrance, but spacious enough to contain the united fleets of Europe, was to become the centre of this new empire. His Albanians were the best soldiers in Turkey; the forests of Jannina and Delvino abound with excellent timber, and Greece would have furnished him the most enterprising sailors in the Mediterranean. Ali never could realise this project; but he maintained and increased his dominion until 1819, when the acquisition of Parga was his last triumph. Mahmoud had long resolved to quell his insubordinate Pacha, whose haughty independence was notorious throughout Europe; and a daring crime committed by Ali, in February 1820, gave the immediate pretext for his destruction. Two of Ali's agents were detected in Constantinople in an attempt to assassinate Ismael Pacha Bey, who had fled from Jannina to avoid the effects of the Pacha's enmity, and had been employed in the Sultan's own court. A Fetva was forthwith issued, by which Ali was declared Fermanli (or outlaw), and all loyal viziers and other subjects of the Padischah were ordered to make war upon the rebel. In the conflict which ensued, Ali had at first some success; but Mahmoud inspired his generals with some portion of his own energy; and by sternly declaring that he would put to death any one who dared to speak in favour of the outlaw, the Sultan checked the usual efficacy of the bribes which Ali dispensed among many members of the Divan. Cooped up in Jannina, Ali prolonged his resistance till the beginning of 1822, when he was lured into the power of his ene-

mies by pretended terms of capitulation, and put to death by Churchid Pacha, who commanded the besieging army.

But while the "old Lion of Jannina" (as Ali was called) thus long held at bay the Sultan's forces, and detained one of the ablest, though most ferocious, of the Sultan's generals,* almost all Greece had risen and beaten back the Ottomans; and a similar insurrection had been for a time successfully attempted in the trans-Danubian provinces. In February, 1821, Ipsilanti, a Greek who had obtained high distinction in the Russian army, and who was then the chief of the Hetæria, crossed the Pruth into Moldavia with a small band, and called on his countrymen throughout the Turkish empire to take up arms. Unhappily, the very first acts of the Greek liberators (though Ipsilanti was not personally responsible for them) were the cruel and cowardly murders of Turkish merchants, in the towns of Galatz and Jassy.† The tidings of these things, with the addition of much exaggeration and many false rumours, soon reached Constantinople. The consequent indignation, and the alarm of the Mahometans at the wide-spread confederacy of their Rayas against them, which was now suddenly revealed, produced a series of savage massacres of the Greek residents in the capital; which were imitated or exceeded by the Turkish populations, and especially the Janissaries, in Smyrna and

* See the powerfully drawn character of Churchid Pacha in Tricoupi, vol. A. p. 67.

† Tricoupi, vol. A. p. 53. He expressly speaks of the number of the Turks at Galatz, as of Αἱμοσταγοῦς ταύτης πράξεως τῆς πρώτης πράξεως τοῦ ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας καὶ εὐνομίας ἀγῶνος.

other towns. Indeed, throughout the six years' war that followed, the most ferocious, and often treacherous cruelty, was exhibited on both sides. But many acts of heroism, worthy of the best days of ancient Greece, cast a lustre on the cause of the insurgents, and added to the sympathy with which the peoples of Christian Europe regarded their efforts; sympathy, which was shown in the accession of frequent volunteers to the Greek armies, and in liberal contributions by individuals and private societies to their funds, before the Kings of Christendom interfered in the conflict. In Moldavia and Wallachia, the Turks destroyed Ipsilanti's force, and put an end to the insurrection at the battle of Drageschan, on the 19th of June, 1821. But in Greece, and on the Greek seas, the bands and light squadrons of the insurgents were generally victorious over the Turkish armies and fleets, until, in 1825, Sultan Mahmoud summoned to Greece the forces of his Egyptian Pacha, Mehemet Ali. The effect of superior arms and discipline was at once apparent. Ibrahim Pacha, at the head of his father's regular battalions, defeated the Greeks in every encounter, laid waste their territory at his will, and gradually reconquered the cities and fortresses which had been won from the Turks: Missolonghi (which was regarded as the great bulwark of Western Greece) falling after a noble resistance, on the 22nd April, 1826, and Athens surrendering in the June of the following year.

While the Egyptian troops were thus maintaining a decided superiority by land, the squadron sent by Mehemet Ali had combined with the Turkish, and a

powerful fleet of heavily-armed and well-manned ships was thus collected under the Sultan's flag in the Greek waters, with which the lighter vessels of the insurgents were utterly unable to cope. The usual curses of a liberal cause, when the fortune of arms goes against it —disunion and civil war—now raged among the Greek chiefs; and despite of the general gallantry of the nation, and of the high abilities and boundless devotion displayed by some of the leaders, Greece must have sunk in 1827, if the forces of the Three Great Powers of Christian Europe had not appeared with startling effect on the scene.

Before, however, we consider the final catastrophe of the Greek war, we must revert to the intervening transactions between the Porte and the Court of St. Petersburg on the subject of Servia and the Principalities; and also to the bold measures by which the Sultan, in 1826, struck down the long-hated, and long-dreaded power of the Janissaries, and revolutionised the military system of his empire. The destruction of the Janissaries is the greatest event of Mahmoud's reign. While considering the state of Turkey in the first years of Selim III.,* we have seen how indispensably necessary it had become, both for the internal amelioration of the empire, and for strengthening it against attacks from without, that there should be a thorough change in the composition, the organisation, the discipline, and the arms of the regular troops. We have seen how obstinately the Janissaries resisted all improvements, and the savage fury with which they destroyed the sovereign and the

* Page 322, *supra*.

statesmen who endeavoured to effect the requisite alterations. Since those events the worthlessness of the Janissaries in the field had been further proved, not only in the campaigns on the Danube, in 1810 and 1811, but still more conclusively in their repeated failures against the Greek insurgents. On the other hand, the victorious progress of the Egyptian troops in Greece demonstrated that the European discipline could be acquired by Mahometans, as well as by natives of Christendom, and that the musket and bayonet were as effective in the hands of a Copt or Arab, as in those of a Muscovite or Frank. The comparison between the troops sent from his Egyptian provinces, and those supplied by other parts of his empire, was at once inspiriting and galling to the Sultan. He saw that Mehemet Ali had realised in Egypt the very projects, which had hitherto been beyond the power, and almost beyond the daring of the Padischahs of the Ottoman world. Mahmoud determined that this contrast should cease to shame him, and that the Janissaries should no longer survive the Mamelukes. But he knew well the numerical strength and the unscrupulous violence of the body which he was about to assail. Scarcely a year of his reign had passed, in which some part of his capital had not been destroyed by fires caused by malcontent Janissaries, or in which it had not been necessary to make some concession to their turbulent demands. It was impossible to collect and destroy them by any stratagem, such as Mehemet Ali had used against the Mamelukes; nor, indeed, is there any act of Mahmoud's life, which justifies us in suspecting that he would have been willing

to employ such treacherous artifices, even if they could have availed him. Mahmoud foresaw that a battle in the streets of Constantinople must decide the question between him and the Janissaries; and he diligently strengthened himself in the arm of war, which is most effective in street-contests. It is said that when he heard of the manner in which Murat, in 1808, used cannon to clear the streets of Madrid of the insurgent populace, it made such an impression on the Sultan's mind, that it never was forgotten.* He sedulously improved the condition of his own artillery force, and by degrees officered it with men on whose loyalty and resolution he could rely. When, in the eighteenth year of his reign, he made ready for the final struggle with his Janissaries, he had increased the force of Topidjis, or artillerymen, in and near Constantinople, to 14,000, and he had placed at their head an officer of unscrupulous devotion to his sovereign's will. This general of Turkish artillery was named Ibrahim; but his conduct on the day of the conflict, and his swarthy complexion, made him afterwards known by the grim title of Kara Djehennem, or "Black Hell." Mahmoud also had taken an opportunity to appoint as Aga of the Janissaries themselves, Hussein, who was ready to carry out all the Sultan's projects. The Grand Vizier was staunch to his sovereign, and a man of spirit; and a large body of trustworthy Asiatic troops was encamped at Scutari, which could be brought into action at the fitting moment. Mahmoud also reasoned, not unsuccessfully, with the leading Ulemas on the folly of their abetting by their influence the

* Ranke, p. 369.

obstinate disloyalty of the Janissaries, who might once have been the truest champions, but were now clearly the worst enemies of Islam. He had a little before this time raised to the dignity of Chief Mufti a man who would support him; and he determined to proceed in strict accordance with every recognised formality and law, so as to throw upon the Janissaries the odium of being the first to appeal to brute force. In a great council of Viziers and Ulemas, held in June, 1826, it was resolved that it was only by encountering the infidels with a regularly-disciplined army that it was possible for the Moslems to regain the advantage over them; and a Fetva was drawn up, and signed by all the members of the council, which ordered a certain number out of each Orta of the Janissaries to practise the requisite military exercises.* After some murmurings and partial tumults, the whole body of the Janissaries of the capital assembled on the 15th June, 1826, in the Etmeidan, overturned their camp-kettles (the well-known signal of revolt), and advanced upon the palace, with loud cries for the heads of the Sultan's chief ministers. But Mahmoud was fully prepared for them. He unfurled in person the Sacred Standard of the Prophet, and called on all True Believers to rally round their Padischah and their Caliph. The enthusiasm of the people was roused into action on his side; and he had ready the more effectual support of his artillerymen and Asiatic troops. As the Janissaries pressed forward through the narrow streets towards the Serail, "Black Hell" and his gunners showered grape on them, and

* Ranke, p. 369.

the round shot cut lanes through their struggling columns. They fell back on the Etmeidan, and defended themselves there with musketry for some time with great steadiness and courage. After many had perished, the remnant of the sons of Hadji Beytasch retired in good order to their barracks, which they barricaded, and they prepared themselves to offer the most desperate resistance to the anticipated assault. But Mahmoud and his officers risked no troops in such an encounter. The Sultan's artillery was drawn up before the barracks, and an incessant storm of shot and shell was poured in on the devoted mutineers. Some of the most daring of them sallied out, sabre in hand, but were all shot or cut down as they endeavoured to escape. Some few begged for mercy, which was sternly refused. The artillery of Kara Djehennem continued to thunder upon the buildings till they were set on fire and utterly destroyed; and the last of the Janissaries of Constantinople perished among the blazing and blood-stained ruins.

The number of those who fell on this memorable day has been variously estimated.* The most accurate calculation seems to be that which gives 4000 as the number of the Janissaries killed in the battle. Many thousands more were put to death afterwards in the various cities of the empire; for Mahmoud followed up his victory with unremitting vigour and severity. The Janissary force throughout the Ottoman dominions was abolished, their name was proscribed, their standards destroyed; and the assemblage of new troops, on a new system, was ordered; which were (in the words of the

* See Marshal Marmont's remarks on this, p. 77.

Sultan's proclamation), to sustain the cause of religion and of the Empire, under the designation of the "Victorious Mahometan Armies."

At this point in Sultan Mahmoud's career, it was not without reason that he was "aroused into courageous self-confidence, and animated with high and promising hopes." * The endurance, and the preparations of eighteen years had gained their reward. He had accomplished the task which had baffled so many of his predecessors; he had swept away the military tyranny under which the Empire had groaned for centuries. At last the Sultan felt real freedom for himself, and real sovereignty over his kingdom. He now formed an army of upwards of 40,000 men, clothed, armed, and disciplined after the European system. It was expected that this force would by degrees be raised to the number of 250,000. True it is, that Mahmoud found no adequate aid from among enlightened members of his own nation, that nearly everything had to be done "by the Sultan's own iron will." † But that will had already worked wonders; and each success gave him tenfold means for achieving others. In the provinces, the most formidable of the rebellious Pachas, who had set at nought the authority of the throne in the beginning of his reign, were now dead or deposed; and, above all, the head of Ali of Jannina had been shown by Mahmoud himself, in stern triumph, to his submissive Divan. The Wahabites were crushed, the Mamelukes exterminated. Mehemet Ali had hitherto committed no overt act of insubordination.

* Ranke, p. 371. † Möltke, p. 13.

Rebellion had been trodden out in Moldavia and Wallachia; and though it had blazed more fiercely and more enduringly in Greece, it seemed about to be extinguished there also by the victorious Turco-Egyptian forces of Ibrahim Pacha. All that Mahmoud now required from fortune, was immunity from attack by foreign powers during the period of transition through which it was necessary for Turkey to pass, between the abolished old, and the yet uncreated, or immature institutions, under which he designed her to flourish. It is the opinion of one of the ablest historians of Mahmoud's reign,* that, "if Turkey had enjoyed ten years of peace after the destruction of the Janissaries, Sultan Mahmoud's military reforms might in that time have gained some strength; and, supported by an army upon which he could depend, the Sultan might have carried out the needful reforms in the administration of his country, have infused new life into the dead branches of the Ottoman Empire, and made himself formidable to his neighbours. All this was prevented by Russia, which nipped the Sultan's military reforms in the bud." And the strongest possible proof of the wisdom with which Mahmoud's measures were planned, of the beneficial effects which they actually produced in Turkey, and far greater benefits which they would have conferred if Russia had not hastened to attack her while those measures had scarce begun to ripen, is to be found in the despatches of the chief statesmen of Russia during the war of 1828-29, in which they take credit for their sagacity in discerning in Mahmoud's reforms the

* Möltke, p. 456.

necessity for prompt hostilities on the part of Russia; and in which they own that Turkey had displayed, under the stern guidance of Mahmoud, a degree of energy and power higher than she had long previously possessed; and they felicitate themselves in not having waited until the new Turkish forces, which, even in their infancy, were so hard to conquer, had acquired consistency and mature strength.*

It was singularly unfortunate for Sultan Mahmoud, that only a few months before he struck the decisive blow, which destroyed the principal old military force of Turkey, there was a change of emperors at St. Petersburg. In Alexander I., the abhorrence of revolution had predominated over every other sentiment. He therefore kept aloof from aiding the Greek insurgents; and he was in the latter part of his life (which was clouded with melancholy and sickness) indisposed to the energetic action which wars of conquest require in a sovereign. But on the 24th of December, 1825, he was succeeded on the Russian throne by Nicholas, a prince of many high merits, but a genuine representative of Russian national feeling, and, as such, ready and willing for a war in support of the Christians of the Greek Church, against the "old arch-enemy" of Muscovy.† Moreover, the civil strife which had broken out at St. Petersburg on the accession of Nicholas, at the end of 1825, and the disquiet which had not ceased to pervade the Russian nation, and especially the army, made the

* See the Despatches of Count Pozzo di Borgo, and the Prince di Lieven, cited *infra* p. 426, note.

† Möltke, p. 3.

statesmen of St. Petersburg consider a Turkish war most desirable for their own empire's internal security.* The negociations which had been long pending between Russia and the Porte respecting Servia, the Principalities and other matters, were resumed in a far more peremptory tone by the ministers of Nicholas, than had previously been employed towards the Ottomans. In the August of 1826 (two months after the destruction of the Janissaries) the Russians insisted that the Porte should forthwith give up certain fortresses in Asia, which were alleged to have been ceded by the treaty of Bucharest; that the Moldavians and Wallachians should be restored to their full privileges, as before the revolt of 1821; and that the confirmation of the political rights of the Servians should be no longer delayed. The Turks at first received these demands with avowed indignation; but in the utterly unprepared state of Turkey at that crisis of internal change, the Sultan felt himself obliged to give way; and on the 7th of October, 1826 (the very last day which Russia had allowed for deliberation), the treaty or convention of Akkerman was signed.†

It ratified the treaty of Bucharest; and ordained that the Moldavians and Wallachians should thereafter enjoy all the privileges conferred by the fifth article of that treaty, and also those bestowed by the Hatti-scheriff of 1802. The future Hospodars of the provinces were to be elected by the Boyards from among their own body for a period of seven years. No Hospodar was to be deposed by the Porte without the consent of Russia.

* Möltke, p. 3. † See the Treaty in Appendix F.

The Moldavian Boyards, who had been implicated in the insurrection of 1821, and obliged to take refuge in Russia, were now to be at liberty to return, and to resume their rank, estates, and possessions. With respect to Servia, the Porte and a body of deputies from the Servian nation were to settle the necessary regulations for the future government of the province, which were to be forthwith published in an imperial Hatti-scheriff, and become part of the treaty between Russia and Turkey. It was stated that among the privileges of the Servians, which were to be thus guaranteed, were religious liberty, free choice of their chiefs, independent internal self-government, the re-union of the districts that had been detached from Servia, the consolidation of the various imposts in a single charge, freedom of commerce, the establishment of hospitals, schools, and printing-offices, and an edict that no Mahometan should be allowed to reside in Servia, except those belonging to the garrisons of the fortresses. The treaty of Akkerman contained many other stipulations, all to the disadvantage of Turkey; such as that the Porte should be obliged to indemnify Russian merchants for depredations committed by the Barbary corsairs; and that in granting the free navigation of the Black Sea to nations which had not yet obtained that right, the Porte would do so in such a manner as to cause no injury to Russian commerce.

Bitter as was the humiliation which the necessity of accepting the treaty of Akkerman imposed upon Mahmoud, he was soon to experience heavier blows from the same quarter, and also from powers which he had hitherto

regarded as sure friends. On the 6th of July, 1827, a treaty was signed between Russia, England, and France, the object of which was declared to be to stop the effusion of blood, and to effect the reconciliation of the Turks and the Greeks.

The mediation of the three high contracting Powers was offered for this purpose: and the basis of pacification was to be the practical independence of Greece; the Sultan retaining only a nominal sovereignty, and receiving a fixed annual tribute, to be collected by the Greeks themselves. An armistice was to be insisted on before the discussion of terms; and if the Porte rejected this intervention, the other Powers were to form international relations with the Greeks, by sending and receiving consuls, and thereby recognising the insurgent province as an independent state. The offer of these terms was eagerly accepted by the Greeks, then in their extreme distress, but indignantly rejected by Sultan Mahmoud. He stated that the country, which it was proposed to withdraw from his rule, had for centuries formed part of the Ottoman Empire; and that those, whom Powers professing friendship to the Porte, designed to treat with and recognise as a Greek government, were mere brigands and rebels to their lawful sovereign. The Sultan appealed to history as offering no example of such interference, in violation of all principles of legitimate authority; and also to the law of nations, by which every independent Power has a right to govern its own subjects without the intervention of any foreign Power whatever. He declared finally his inflexible resolution never to renounce his rights. It is

indeed difficult to see on what principle of international law* the intervention of the three Powers can be justified, except on the broad general principle that it is lawful and laudable to aid the oppressed against the oppressor. But statesmen and jurists shrink from admitting this into their code of the laws of nations. It is a convenient maxim for the strong, and so the Grand Vizier, Ahmed Kiuprili thought it, when in 1672 he employed it to justify the interference of Turkey in behalf of the Cossack subjects of the Polish republic.† It is a fearful principle for the dominant races of empires, whose strength has decayed, as the masters of India, of Algeria, and of Poland may hereafter discover.

This principle of intervention was very faintly and hesitatingly put forward by the diplomatists of the great Powers, in 1827. They did, indeed, state that one of the reasons for their proceedings was to stop the effusion of blood; but this might have been explained

* See Phillimore's International Law, vol. i. p. 444. The learned author defends the intervention, but admits it to be an exception to general rules. The national historian of modern Greece takes a natural pride in the peculiar circumstances under which the great Powers of Christendom saved his country. He boasts that their intervention put an end to the principle of the Holy Alliance, which condemned all political changes, if sought by revolt and force of arms; that it disturbed the balance of power in Europe; and that it tended to destroy an ancient empire, to which he, as might be expected, applies severe epithets :—

Τὰ ἀποτελέσματα τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπαναστάσεως ἐδείχθησαν γιγανταῖα καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον· διότι ἀνέτρεψαν τὰς πολυθρυλλήτους ἀρχὰς τῆς Ἱερᾶς Συμμαχίας, καταδικαζούσης πᾶσαν πολιτικὴν μεταβολὴν ἐνεργουμένην δι' ἀποστασιῶν καὶ δι' ὅπλων, διότι ἐτάραξαν τὸ πολυθρύλλητον σύστημα τῆς ἰσορροπίας, τὸ ὁποῖον περὶ πολλοῦ εἶχεν ἡ Εὐρωπαϊκὴ πολιτική, καὶ διότι, ἀνακαλέσαντα εἰς τὴν δόξαν καὶ εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν ζωὴν ἓν ἔθνος, τὸ ὁποῖον ἐρρίφθη πρὸ αἰώνων εἰς τὸν τάφον τῆς ἀδοξίας καὶ τῆς δουλείας, συνέτρεξαν καὶ εἰς τὸ νὰ διαλύσωσι μίαν μεγάλην καὶ παλαιὰν αὐτοκρατορίαν γεννηθεῖσαν, ἀνδρωθεῖσαν, γηράσασαν καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσαν ἀνεπιστήμονα ἀντικοινωνικὴν καὶ βάρβαρον.

† See p. 50, *supra*.

as being no more than a common formula of negociation. They appealed to another justification, which was the fact of their mediation having been solicited by one of the contending parties. But the request of one only of two disputants is no sufficient ground for interference, especially if that party consist of revolted subjects. The main ground on which the intervention was vindicated, was the alleged necessity of affording protection to the subjects of other Powers who navigated the seas of the Levant, in which for many years atrocious piracy had been exercised, while neither Turkey nor revolted Greece was, de facto, either able or willing to prevent the excesses springing out of this state of anarchy. But, unfortunately for the validity of this pretext, the three Powers intervened at the very crisis, when the Sultan had acquired a decided ascendancy in the war; and when it was clear that in a short time the contest would be over, and the condition of the Levant restored to what it had been for centuries. Moreover, if the suppression of piracy in the Turkish waters had been the genuine object of England, France, and Russia, they might have effected it with a tenth part of the force employed at Navarino; and, in order to effect it, there was not the least occasion for them to burn the Sultan's men-of-war, or to land troops to reduce his fortresses in the Morea.

On the 20th of October, 1827, the combined squadrons of England, France, and Russia, entered the Bay of Navarino, in which the Turco-Egyptian fleet was moored. The avowed object of the allies was to compel Ibrahim Pacha to desist from further hostilities

against the Greeks. Their force amounted to ten ships of the line, ten frigates, and some smaller vessels. It was much superior to that of the Sultan, which, though it comprised a large flotilla of small barks, and nineteen frigates, presented only five line-of-battle ships. It is probable that the ministers of England and France (who could have no wish to see Turkey weakened for purposes of Russian ambition) hoped to the very last, that such an imposing demonstration of force would awe the Sultan or his officers into submission, and that Greece might thus be saved without her old masters being further injured.* But the stern, unbending spirit that nerved Sultan Mahmoud, was fully shared by his admirals, the Kapitan Pacha, Tahir Pacha, and Moharem Bey. An engagement was the inevitable result of the entrance of the allied fleet into Navarino; an engagement in which the Turco-Egyptians fought for four hours with desperate valour, until the whole of the Sultan's magnificent armament was destroyed, except a few insignificant barks that were left stranded on the shore. The consequences of the battle were immense; far, indeed, beyond what the better part of the conquerors either designed or desired.* It was not merely that the Greek question was virtually decided by it; Ibrahim gladly retiring from the Morea to Egypt with the chief part of his army, and a division of French troops, under Marshal Maison, completing the deliverance of the Greek territory; but Turkey was by this "untoward event," as the Duke of Wellington truly termed it, left defenceless

* See Möltke, p. 6.

before Russia. Men said, that "the Sultan had destroyed his own army; and now his allies had destroyed his navy." * Still Mahmoud and his people would not bend to the stranger and to the rebel; nor would the Divan, even after Navarino, accept the treaty of London, which the ministers of the three Powers, especially of Russia, now pressed in more and more peremptory tone. But the Turkish statesmen knew their peril, and endeavoured to induce the ambassadors to remain at their posts, and to communicate to their respective courts the offers of the Porte respecting the future treatment of Greece. These were, a complete pardon and amnesty: a remission of all arrear of taxes and tribute: a restoration of confiscated property: a re-establishment of all privileges: and, finally, a pledge of milder government.† The ambassadors refused to accept any terms but those of the treaty, and on the 8th of December, left Constantinople. An attempt was made by the Reis Effendi to reopen negociations; but the Russian minister (to whom the communication was sent) returned no answer; and the preparations for war on the Russian frontier showed clearly that the design of the Emperor Nicholas was not to bring about a reconciliation, but to force a quarrel. Though Russia was nominally at peace with all the world (her Persian war having ended by a convention in November), she was calling out new levies of conscripts, concentrating troops in Bessarabia, and collecting military stores and transports in her harbours in the Black Sea in readiness for an invasion of the

* Möltke. † Chesney, p. 15.

Ottoman dominions. There were also many topics of dispute between the Sultan and the Czar as to certain Asiatic fortresses wrongfully retained by Russia, and those never-failing sources of difference, the affairs of the Principalities and of Servia. Convinced that his great enemy intended to attack him in the Spring, the Sultan took the bold step of being the first to declare war; and a Hatti-scheriff was issued on the 20th of December, in which, addressing the Pachas and Ayans of his empire, the Sultan recited the wrongs which he had endured from Russia, among which he classed the unjust extortion of the treaty of Akkerman; and he called on all true Mussulmans to show again the determined valour, with which the Ottomans had in ancient times established in the world the true religion, and to resist the foe, whose object was to annihilate Islamism, and tread the people of Mahomet under foot.

In the ensuing war, the vigour shown by Mahmoud astonished both friends and foes. Russia employed in the first campaign about 100,000 troops of all arms in European Turkey. The number might easily have been greater, but she judged it prudent to retain large armies in Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine; and a far less spirited resistance on the part of the Turks was expected, than that which was actually encountered. In Asia, her General, Count Paskievitsch, led an army 30,000 strong into the Turkish provinces, besides having reserve of 16,000 more. At sea her superiority was incontestable. She had sixteen line-of-battle ships in the Black Sea, besides frigates and smaller vessels;

and in the Archipelago she had the fleet which had aided in destroying the Turkish navy at Navarino. Throughout the war this command of the sea was of infinite importance to her; and in particular, the operations against Varna in 1828, and the decisive movements of Diebitsch in 1829, were only rendered possible by her uncontrolled possession of the Euxine. Mahmoud had only been able to collect an army of about 48,000 troops, trained on the new system. These were principally mere lads; who were selected in the hope that their prejudices against the Frankish innovations would not be so violent, as generally prevailed among the elder Turks. The Prussian General Baron Möltke who served with the Turks throughout the war, and our countryman, Colonel Chesney, describe vividly the disheartening spectacle, which this infant force presented, and its difference from the aspect of the old Ottoman troops. "The splendid appearance, the beautiful arms, the reckless bravery of the old Moslem horde had disappeared;" but the German writer adds, "yet this new army had one quality which placed it above the numerous host which in former times the Porte could summon to the field,—it obeyed." Besides these troops, the Sultan was obliged to call together the feudal and irregular forces of his empire, chiefly from Asia; for throughout European Turkey the deepest discontent with their sovereign's reforms prevailed among the Ottomans. Bosnia, a remarkably warlike and strongly Mahometan province, sent no troops at all; and many of the officers whom he was obliged to employ, were attached to the old order of

things, and were almost as bitter in their disaffection to the Sultan, as in their antipathy to the Russian Giaours. But the artillery force was numerous and loyal; and the armed Turkish inhabitants of the towns which the enemy assailed, showed as usual the greatest spirit in self-defence, and contributed greatly to the prolongation of the war, which was (in its first campaign, at least) principally a war of sieges.

In the operations of 1828, in Europe, the Russians occupied the Principalities with little opposition, and crossed the Danube early in June. Brailow (or Ibrail) was taken on the 15th of June, but not till after an unexpectedly long and obstinate defence, which cost the invaders 4000 men, and much valuable time. The Russians then advanced on Shumla and Varna. Before Shumla they gained no advantage; and suffered several severe blows. But Varna fell after a gallant defence, which was, however, ultimately tarnished by the treachery of Yussuf Pacha, the second in command, who went over to the enemy with nearly 5000 men. Silistria repulsed the Russian corps that besieged it; and altogether, at the close of the European campaign, the position of the combatants was such, that in the words of the ablest military critic of the war,* "If we consider the enormous sacrifices that the war cost the Russians in 1828, it is difficult to say whether they or the Turks won or lost it. It remained for a second campaign to decide the value of the first."

In Asia, the genius of Paskievitsch had gained far less chequered advantages for the Russian Emperor.

* Möltke.

Besides Anapa (which was captured by the Russian armament, which afterwards co-operated in the siege of Varna) the Turks lost in Asia during 1828, Kars, Akhalkhaliki, Hertwitz, Althatzhik, and other important fortresses. They were beaten also in a pitched battle; and Paskievitsch obtained an admirable position for an advance into Asia Minor in the following year. But it was to the Danube and the Balkan that the statesmen of Europe looked most attentively; and the general feeling (especially in Austria) was, that Russia had been overrated, that the Sultan was unexpectedly powerful, and that the war was likely to be prolonged without any heavy catastrophe to the Turkish empire. Russia herself felt keenly the need of recovering her prestige by more signal success in another campaign, which she resolved to make a decisive one. The Russian ministers at the courts of the other European powers watched anxiously the probabilities of any mediation being attempted. It was thought that France would be kept quiet through the well-known predilection of her king, Charles X., for Russia; and that the domestic troubles, which the Duke of Wellington, then Prime Minister of England, had to deal with in the Catholic question and other matters, diminished the risk of any activity in foreign politics on the part of England. Prussia was sure to be inactive. Austria was known to be more suspicious and jealous of Russia; but she was dull of discernment, and slow in action; and if the Russians could gain such a sudden superiority in the war over the Turks, as to force on and hurry to conclusion, a negociation between the two belligerent

powers only, the Russian court believed that the rest of Europe, however much it might dislike the terms of such a treaty, would not take up arms to set it aside.*

Accordingly, in 1829, more numerous and better appointed forces crossed the Danube, and they were led by Marshal Diebitsch, a general who thoroughly entered into the spirit in which his imperial master wished the war to be conducted and concluded. "He besieged one fortress, and fought one battle; but this brought him into the very heart of the hostile empire. He arrived there followed by the shadow of an army, but with the reputation of irresistible success." † Such is the expressive eulogy in which Baron Möltke epito-

* See the remarkable despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode of 28th Nov., 1828, and another from the Prince de Lieven of the 16th January, 1829. They are in the third volume of Murhard, Nouveau Supplement, pp. 340, 383. The following passage from Count Pozzo di Borgo's despatch is remarkable for the unintentional proof it gives in favour of Sultan Mahmoud's reforms, and for its avowal of the motives that made Russia force on the war:—

"Lorsque le cabinet impérial a examiné la question si le cas était arrivé de prendre les armes contre la Porte à la suite des provocations du Sultan, il aurait pu exister des doutes sur l'urgence de cette mesure aux yeux de ceux qui n'avaient pas assez medité sur les effets des réformes sanglantes que le chef de l'Empire Ottoman venait d'exécuter avec une force terrible, et sur l'intèrêt que la consolidation de cet empire inspirait aux cabinets de l'Europe en général, et notamment à ceux qui sont moins bien disposés envers la Russie; maintenant l'expérience que nous devons faire doit réunir toutes les opinions en faveur du parti qui a été adopté. L'Empereur a mis le système turc à l'épreuve, et sa Majesté l'a trouvé dans un commencement d'organisation phisique et morale qu'il n'avait pas jusqu'à présent. Si le Sultan a pu nous opposer une résistance plus vive et plus régulière, tandis qu'il avait à peine réuni les eléments de son nouveau plan de réforme et d'amélioration, combien l'aurions-nous trouvé formidable dans le cas ou il aurait eu le temps de lui donner plus de solidité et de rendre impenetrable cette barrière que nous avons tant de peine à franchir, quoique l'art ne soit encore venu qu' imparfaitement au secours de la nature."—Murhard, Nouv. Rec. de Traités, Nouv. Supp. iii. 342.

† Möltke, p. 476.

mises the Turkish campaign of Marshal Diebitsch, thence surnamed Sabalskanski, that is to say, the Crosser of the Balkan. In Asia the Emperor Nicholas was equally well served by the genius and bravery of Marshal Paskievitsch, the victor of the battle-field of Akhaltzikh, and the captor of Bayezid, Khart, and Erzerum.

The main Turkish army of Shumla, emboldened by the partial successes of the last year, commenced operations in 1829, by attempting (17th May) to recover Pravadi from the Russians. While the Grand Vizier's army was engaged in this enterprise (which was conducted with great valour but little skill, and admirably opposed by the Russian generals Roth and Rudiger), Marshal Diebitsch, who had commenced the siege of Silistria on the 18th of May, moved the greater part of the Russian force from before that fortress; and by a series of rapid and brilliant movements, placed himself in connexion with Roth and Rudiger in a position between Pravadi and Shumla. This brought on the battle of Kulewtsha, on the 11th of June; in which, after several fluctuations of fortune, the Turks were entirely defeated; but the Russian victory was far more due to the superiority of Diebitsch as a general to Redshid Pacha, the Turkish Grand Vizier, than to any inferiority of the Turkish troops to the Russians. The Grand Vizier reassembled some of the fugitives at Shumla, but his force there was, in his judgment, so inadequate to defend the place, that, in the belief that the Russian general designed to capture Shumla before attempting any forward movement, the Turkish

commander called in the greater part of the detachments which were watching the passes of the Balkan: a fatal error, which left Diebitsch at liberty to break through the hitherto impenetrable barrier. As soon as Silistria fell, which was on the 26th of June, Diebitsch was joined by the Russian corps, which had previously been detained before that important fortress, and he now prepared for the daring march which decided the war. But even with the advantages, which the Russian Marshal's generalship had secured, the march across the Balkan would not have been hazarded, if the Black Sea had not then been a Russian lake; and if friendly fleets had not been stationed both in that sea and in the Ægean, ready to cooperate with such troops as the generals of the Emperor Nicholas might lead across the mountains to either coast. Sizeboli on the western shore of the Euxine, and to the south of the Balkan chain, had been surprised and occupied by a Russian armament in February; and in July a squadron of the Czar's fleet, under Admiral Greig, with a great number of vessels carrying stores and provisions, cast anchor in the Bay of Bourgass; so that Diebitsch's army might move lightly equipped, and unincumbered by waggons through the mountains, and, when it came down from them, find all things that were necessary for its support, and a secure basis for further operations. The losses of the Russians during the campaign had been so enormous (far more perishing by privation and disease than in battle) that after leaving 10,000 men to watch the Grand Vizier in Shumla, Diebitsch could not muster more than 30,000 for his advance through the Balkan

on the Turkish capital. But he reckoned justly on the moral effect already caused by the battle of Kulewtsha, and the capture of Silistria, and on the still greater panic, which the sight of a Russian army to the south of the trusted barrier would produce. It was known that the greatest excitement and disaffection prevailed in Constantinople and the other great Turkish cities, and among the commanders of the troops in Albania and Roumelia. Emboldened by these considerations, Diebitsch suddenly and secretly moved his columns on the 11th of July from the neighbourhood of Shumla upon the gorges of the Balkan, and in nine days he reunited his force to the south of the mountains. The feeble Turkish detachments, which were encountered in the passes, offered but a desultory and trifling resistance. As the Russian soldiers came down from the heights of the eastern Balkan, and saw "the flags of their ships flying over the broad shining surface of the Bay of Bourgass," * a general shout of joy burst from the ranks. Their progress was now one continued triumph; but a triumph rendered awfully hazardous by the ravages of dysentery and plague, which the invaders brought along with them, and which reduced their numbers by hundreds and by thousands. But this weakness was unknown to the Turks, who believed that at least 100,000 men had crossed the Balkan, and that they must have destroyed the Grand Vizer's army before they left Shumla. An officer, whom the Pacha of Missivri sent forward to reconnoitre Diebitsch's force, came back with these words: "It were

* Möltke.

easier to count the leaves of the forest than the heads of the enemy." Missivri, Bourgass, and the important post of Aidos, were occupied by the Russians, almost without opposition. Striking inland towards Adrianople, Diebitsch pursued his resolute career, and on the 20th of August, the ancient capital of European Turkey capitulated to a pestilence-stricken and exhausted army of less than 20,000 Russians. With admirable judgment as well as humanity, Diebitsch, in his occupation of the Turkish cities, and throughout his march in Roumelia, took the most effectual measures for protecting the inhabitants from the slightest military violence. The Christian population received the Russians with enthusiasm; and even the Moslems returned to their peaceable occupations, when they found that there was full protection for property, person, and honour, and that neither their local self-government, nor their religious rites, were subjected to interruption or insult. Diebitsch thus saved his sickly and scanty army from being engaged in a Guerilla warfare, in which it must inevitably have been destroyed; and he continued to impose upon the terrified enemy by the appearance of strength, and by well-simulated confidence, amid rapidly increasing weakness, and the deepest and most serious alarm. He could not hope to keep up the delusion of his adversaries about the number of his army, if he advanced much nearer to the capital; and the amount of the Turkish troops now collected in Constantinople, the strength of the fortifications of that city, and the fanatic bravery of its armed population (which the appearance of a Russian army would be sure to rouse

into action), made all hope of an ultimate success by main force utterly chimerical. Moreover, in his rear, the Vizier's army, that held Shumla, was superior to the Russian corps of observation left in front in it; and on his flank there was Mustapha, the Pacha of Scodra, with 30,000 excellent Albanian troops. This officer had hitherto refused to obey orders from the Porte, but it was impossible for Diebitsch to reckon on the continuance of such insubordinate inactivity. The only alternative of Diebitsch was to obtain a peace, or to be destroyed; and in order for him to obtain peace, it was necessary to keep up the boldest semblance of waging war. Fortunately for him, not only were the panic and disorder at Constantinople extreme; but both the Turkish statesmen and the ministers of the European powers there, knew nothing of the real state of his army. An insurrection of the partisans of the Janissaries had been organised, but Sultan Mahmoud was beforehand with them; and it was suppressed by Chosreef Pacha, his chief of the Police, by a wholesale execution, with very little heed as to how many hundreds of innocent persons suffered, provided only the guilty did not escape.* But though discontent was thus silenced, it was known to be wide-spread and intense; and a general outbreak was daily expected, in which it was too probable that Constantinople would be destroyed by her own populace, aided by the mutinous bands of soldiery, who had escaped to the capital from the defeated armies and captured fortresses. Even the European ambassadors at Pera believed

* Möltke.

that Diebitsch was at the head of 60,000 efficient troops; and they joined the Sultan's ministers in urging him to save the empire from total destruction, by negociating instantly with the Russian General, and obtaining peace at almost any sacrifice. Mahmoud is said long to have resisted their pusillanimous advice; and well would it have been for him and his empire, if a single faithful friend had then been near him, to support his sovereign with manly counsel. At length the Sultan yielded to the importunities of all around him; and plenipotentiaries were sent to the Russian camp, who concluded with Marshal Diebitsch, on the 28th of August, 1829, the treaty of Adrianople.*

By this treaty Russia obtained the sovereignty of part of the left bank of the Lower Danube, and of the Sulina mouth of that river. She was thus enabled to control that important artery of the commerce of central Europe, especially of Austria. Her other European conquests were restored, and also those in Asia, with the material exception that the Russian Emperor retained as part of his dominions the important fortresses of Anapa, Akhaltzikh, Akhalkhaliki, and several valuable districts; and the treaty recognised, by way of recital, that "Georgia, Imeritia, Mingrelia, Gouriel, and *several other provinces of the Caucasus*, had long been annexed in perpetuity to the empire of Russia." A separate article (but declared to be read as part of the treaty) stipulated in favour of the Moldavians and Wallachians, that the Hospodars should be thenceforth elected for life; that no Turkish officer should interfere

* See the text of the treaty in Appendix G.

in their affairs, and that no Mussulman should be allowed to reside in any part of their territories. Nothing but a nominal sovereignty, and an annual tribute, was reserved to the Porte; and the tribute was not to be exacted for the two years following the war.

In behalf of the Servians, the 6th Article of the treaty of Adrianople provided, that all the clauses of the separate act of the Convention of Akkermann relative to Servia, should immediately be carried into effect, and ratified by a Hatti-scheriff of the Sultan, which was to be communicated to the court of St. Petersburgh within a month. The passage of the Dardanelles was to be open to Russian merchant-vessels; an indemnity amounting to 750*l*., for injuries done to Russian commerce, was to be paid in eighteen months; and another sum, amounting to nearly five millions sterling, was to be paid to the Russian Government, for the costs of the war. Moreover, by the 10th Article of the treaty, the Sultan declared his adhesion to the stipulations of the treaty of London, and of a subsequent convention of the Three Powers respecting Greece. The result of this branch of the negociations, was the erection of Greece into an independent kingdom, comprising all continental Greece south of a line drawn from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Volo, thus leaving Thessaly and Albania as the Sultan's frontier provinces. The islands of Eubœa, the northern Sporades, and the Cyclades, also became members of the new State; the Ionian Islands remaining under British Government, while Crete and the islands off the Thracian and Asiatic coasts, were still allowed to appertain to Turkey.

It is said that Sultan Mahmoud's wonted firmness failed him for a time, when he signed the treaty of Adrianople. He shed bitter tears, and for weeks shut himself up in his palace at Therapia, almost crushed in spirit.* His misery must have been severely augmented when he heard the truth as to the amount of force which his victors really possessed at Adrianople. So rapid had been the progress of disease among the Russian ranks, that at the moment when the peace was concluded, Diebitsch could not command more than from 15,000 to 17,000 bayonets ;† and at a grand review of the invading army in November, before they quitted Adrianople, scarcely 13,000 men of all arms could be brought together.‡ The mortality among the rest of the Russian forces employed in the European campaign of 1829 was almost equally terrible ; and it is computed that not more than 10,000 or 15,000 Russians ever recrossed the Pruth ; so that their army was in fact nearly destroyed during the second campaign.§ After the peace was concluded, the Pacha of Scodra, (who had been a Janissary, and vainly hoped that the Sultan's exigencies would make him beg aid from his subjects on condition of restoring the old abuses,) refused for a time to recognise the treaty ; and threatened the Russians with a force of 30,000 Albanians, which would have ensured their destruction if more speedily employed. Had this man been loyal, or if, even without a sabre having been raised against Diebitsch's army, no negociation had been opened, and

* Möltke, p. 770. † Col. Chesney, p. 255.
‡ Col. Chesney. He was present at the review.
§ Möltke, Appendix.

the Russians had been left to die of disease, the campaign must have closed more triumphantly for Turkey than even that of the Pruth. Invigorated by such success, she could (notwithstanding the Asiatic exploits of Paskievitsch) have maintained the struggle against Russia during 1830; and, before that year was over, the second French Revolution had broken out; Poland had risen against the Emperor Nicholas; and the obstinate struggle had commenced, in which Diebitsch perished, and in which the full power of Russia was taxed to the utmost, even by the unaided Poles. The whole current of the world's history would have been changed. Poland might now be an independent state; there would have been no Egyptian revolts; the name of Hunkiar Iskelessi would be unknown in the West; and France and England might never have been required to join in a Russian war, if a single messenger of truth from Adrianople could have been heard in the Divan, or at Pera, in the August of 1829; or, if Sultan Mahmoud, in happy obstinacy, had resisted a little longer the solicitations of those, who urged on him "Peace, peace," when there should have been no peace.

In the year after the treaty of Adrianople, the French seized and occupied Algiers (July 4, 1830), which, though practically independent, had still acknowledged the titular supremacy of the Sultan, and was governed by a Dey, who professed to be his officer. The injury which the conquest of a Mahometan province by the Frankish Giaours inflicted on the general authority of Mahmoud in the world of Islam, was increased

by the proclamation of the French General, Marshal Bourmont, who stated that he came to deliver Algeria from the yoke of the Turks. The Sultan was in no condition to interpose, or even to remonstrate; for far worse evils and convulsions in the integral parts of the Ottoman empire showed how violent was the shock which it had sustained from the Russian war, and how much the spirit of disaffection and revolt had been increased by the issue of that contest. The unfortunate are generally unpopular: and the very pride of the Turks made them impute the disasters of their sovereign to his Frankish innovations and abandonment of the old usages of the empire. The bonds of loyalty to the Head of the House of Othman grew weaker, in proportion to the strength of Mahometan feeling; and, of the numerous insurrections that broke out in 1830, and the two following years, in European Turkey, none were more violent, than those of the eminently warlike and fanatic Bosnians, and of the Mussulman tribes of Albania. They were quelled by the resolute spirit of Mahmoud, and the abilities of his Vizier, Redschid Pacha; but they exhausted more and more the resources of the heavily-burdened State. Asia was not much less mutinous; but it was in Egypt that the most deadly storm was gathering. Mehemet Ali had resolved on founding an hereditary dominion on the ruins of the apparently doomed empire of the Sultan. He had restored his navy after its destruction at Navarino; he possessed a veteran and admirably-disciplined army, chiefly officered by Frenchmen; and, above all, he had a general of science, experience, prudence, and energy,

in his son, the celebrated Ibrahim Pacha. He had obtained the Pachalic of Crete from the Porte, but had been refused that of Syria. He determined to take it by force. A personal quarrel with the Pacha of Acre gave him a pretext for attacking that officer. The command of the Sultan that this civil war between his servants should cease, was contemptuously disregarded; and Ibrahim besieged Acre with an army of 40,000 men, and a fleet of five ships of the line, and several frigates. The key of Syria was captured by him on the 27th of May, 1832, and for seven years Mehemet Ali was the real sovereign of that important country. The disaffected armies of raw recruits, badly officered, and worse generalled, which the Sultan sent against the rebel Egyptian chief, were beaten by Ibrahim in three great battles, at Ems, in Upper Syria, on July 6, 1832; at Beylan (in Cilicia, near the ancient battle-field of Issus), on the 29th of the same month; and at Konieh, in Asia Minor, on the 29th of October. The positions of these places indicate the rapid progress and bold designs of the Egyptian commander; who seemed to annex Asia Minor to Mehemet's dominions with the same ease as Syria; and whose advance upon Constantinople in the coming spring appeared to be inevitable and irresistible. In this agony of his House and empire, the Sultan sought aid first from England, but none unhappily was accorded. The execrable policy of paring down our military and naval forces, so as to effect the temporary saving of farthings, and to involve the ultimate expenditure of millions of pounds, besides sacrifices and risks of Imperial character for which no

money can compensate, was then prevalent in this country; and the answer returned to the Turkish application was, an expression of regret that England had not the means of supplying the required assistance. Russia was watching eagerly for the opportunity which English folly thus threw in her way. Her troops, and her transports, and her ships of war were ready at Sebastopol and Odessa; and when at last Mahmoud humbled himself to express to his ancient enemy a wish for a protecting force, prompt messengers were despatched to the great Crimean depot of Muscovite power, and a Russian squadron of four ships of the line set sail from Sebastopol, and landed 6000 of the Emperor's troops near the mouth of the Bosphorus, on February 20, 1833.

Meanwhile, the forward march of Ibrahim had been temporarily stayed by a messenger from Admiral Roussin, whom the French Government had sent with a fleet to aid the Sultan. A negociation was entered into, but broken off after a few days; and in the beginning of March Ibrahim again pointed his columns towards the Bosphorus. But a second Russian armament from Odessa now had reached those straits, and on the 5th of April, 12,000 soldiers of the Czar Nicholas were encamped on the Giant's Mountain, near Scutari. Ibrahim felt that any further advance on his part would be madness; and occupied himself in procuring the largest possible increase to his father's power in the negociations that followed, in which England and France (now thoroughly alarmed at the advantages gained by Russia) took part with anxious zeal.

The terms of compulsory reconciliation between the

Sultan and his over-powerful vassal were embodied in a Firman of May the 6th, 1833, by which the Porte confirmed Mehemet Ali in his governments of Crete and Egypt, and added to them those of Jerusalem, Tripoli, Aleppo, Damascus, and Adana. This was virtually a cession to the Egyptian of nearly all the countries which the victories of Selim I. had incorporated with Turkey, besides the important island of Candia, which it had cost the Porte a twenty years' war to wrest from Venice. At such a bitter cost was Mahmoud compelled to purchase the removal from Asia Minor of his insurgent Pacha; and before he could obtain the withdrawal of his equally formidable Russian friends, he was obliged to sign the treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi on the 8th of July, 1833, which, by its public articles, bound him to an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, and by a still more important secret article, provided that the Ottoman Porte should, when required by the Russian Emperor, close the straits of the Dardanelles against the armed vessels of all other foreign powers.*

It was the general opinion in Europe at this time, that Turkey was irretrievably ruined; and that the attempts of her reforming sovereign to resuscitate her power, had been the mere galvanising of a corpse. Many, indeed, thought that Mahmoud had accelerated the empire's downfall, by destroying the lingering sparks of vitality in the old system, without being able to replace them by new life. And, indeed, had Mahmoud not been a man of the noblest energy, and of high genius, he might well have despaired of his

* See the treaty in Appendix H.

country after such a Cannæ as Konieh. First, the foreign invader, and next, the home-rebel, had crushed his armies, had rent from him his dominions, and had bowed him beneath the humiliation of treaties, worse even than those of Carlowitz and Kainardjee. It might well have seemed, even to himself, that "he had failed in the object for which he had striven all his life. Rivers of blood had been shed, the old institutions and sacred traditions of his country had been destroyed, the faith and pride of his people had been undermined for the sake of reform, and that reform was condemned by the event." * But Mahmoud was one of the few really great men, whom disappointment in a well-judged enterprise unnerves not, but rather rouses to more vigorous exertion. He knew that the old path of the Turkish government was the sure path to destruction, and refused to consult his own repose by letting his ministers return to it. He knew, too, the resources of his empire. He discerned and appreciated even amid the general show of discontent, the deep layers of true allegiance, of bravery, and of national spirit, which the hearts of his Moslem subjects contained. He had also the wisdom and the magnanimity to value rightly the importance of conciliating the affections of the Rayas, by giving them equal and just laws, in defiance of the prejudices of his own, the long dominant race. The remedial measures which he introduced and prepared, and the general features of his administrative and social reforms, will be more conveniently discussed in the following chapter. Suffice

* Möltke, p. 451.

it for the present to observe that Sultan Mahmoud continued, amid good repute and evil repute, to re-organise the troops, the fleets, and the finances of his empire: to encourage education: to promote commerce: to give security for person and property: to repress intolerant distinctions; and to remove by degrees the most galling of the burdens and prohibitions, which pressed upon his Christian subjects. The strong, and almost unanimous testimony which English travellers from the East bore in favour of the policy of the Turkish Sultan, and their statements respecting the rapid improvement of the inhabitants of his empire, caused a marked reaction in the public feeling of England with respect to Turkey. When war broke out again in 1839, between the Sultan and the Egyptian Pacha, Turkey was supported by England, not only for the sake of English interests, but with the respectful cordiality, which is only felt towards those, who evince a sense of self-respect, and who prove that they are ready and willing to aid themselves. This new war was caused by the indignation of Mahmoud at the undisguised designs of Mehemet Ali, to convert the vast provinces which he governed, into an hereditary monarchy for his own family. Mehemet declined to continue the payment of tribute to the Porte; and his removal of the Turkish guards from the Prophet's tomb, and substitution of his own Arab soldiers, constituted a still more open denial of the sovereignty of the Sultan, as chief of Islam. Attempts at negociation only led to mutual complaints and recriminations; and the Sultan at last sent a final

summons to the Pacha, requiring him to re-establish the Turkish guards at the tomb of the Prophet, to pay regularly his arrears of tribute, and to renounce all sovereignty over Egypt, save so far as the Sultan might concede it to him. On obedience to this being refused, Mahmoud directed his generals and admirals to attack his refractory vassal. A numerous and well appointed Turkish army had been collected at Bir on the Euphrates; and by the strenuous exertions of many years, a well-disciplined and well-manned fleet of thirty-six vessels of different rates, twelve being ships of the line, had been formed and collected in the harbour of Constantinople. But venality and treachery baffled all the preparations of the Ottoman sovereign. When his army under Hafiz Pacha met the Egyptian under Ibrahim, at Nezib, on the 25th June, 1839, whole battalions and squadrons, whose officers had taken the gold of Egypt, deserted the Sultan's standard, and ranged themselves with the enemy. The remainder was hopelessly routed, with the total loss of artillery, camp, baggage, and military stores of every description. Still fouler was the fate of the fleet. The Kapitan Pacha, the infamous Achmet Fevzy, on the 8th of June knelt before his imperial benefactor, Mahmoud, received the Sultan's parting benediction, and with solemn oaths renewed his assurances of loyalty and devotion. On the 6th of July following, the imperial fleet was seen in full sail for Alexandria, and on the 13th the traitor who commanded it, brought it into the port of that city, and delivered it up to Mehemet Ali. It is some consolation to know that Sultan

Mahmoud was spared the anguish of hearing of these calamities, especially of Achmet Fevzy's ingratitude. His health had long been undermined by continued anxiety and toil. On the 1st of July, 1839, before the messenger from Nezib reached Constantinople, Sultan Mahmoud II. died: and as gallant a spirit left the earth, as ever strove against the spites of fortune,—as ever toiled for a nation's good in preparing benefits, the maturity of which it was not permitted to behold.*

Before we consider the personal qualities of his successor, Sultan Abdul Mejdid, and the constancy with which the reforming policy of Mahmoud has been maintained, it will be convenient first to trace rapidly to its conclusion the Egyptian war, which seemed to darken with such fatal disasters the opening of the young sovereign's reign. A difference of opinion as to the amount of power which should be secured to Mehemet Ali, existed for a time between France and the other great powers of Europe, which at one period threatened to cause a general war. England, France, and Austria, concurred as to the necessity of arranging the Turco-Egyptian question, and of not leaving to Russia an opportunity of sole intervention, such as that which she gained in 1833. But France was no party to the treaty of July 15, 1840, between Turkey, England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which defined the terms on which

* A report was industriously circulated in the East, and also in Europe, that Sultan Mahmoud's death was caused by habitual drunkenness. The official report of his regular medical attendants, Drs. Macarthy and Constantine Carathéodeori, completely refutes this calumny; and it contains strong incidental evidence of the Sultan's steady industry and high intellectual powers. See their Rélation Officielle de la Maladie, et de la mort du Sultan Mahmoud II. Paris, J. B. Baillière, 1841.

the disputes between the Pacha and his sovereign were to be arranged. Mehemet Ali (who probably expected aid from France), refused for some time to accede to the requisitions of Turkey and the Four Powers; and an English fleet, under Admirals Stopford and Napier, proceeded to wrest from him his strongholds on the Syrian coast. Beyrout was bombarded on the 29th of August, 1840; its Egyptian garrison was expelled, and the Turkish troops, which had been conveyed on board the English fleet, took possession of the ruins in the Sultan's name. By a still more splendid achievement of the British navy, Acre was bombarded and captured on the 3rd of November. The other Syrian fortresses fell rapidly; and, aided by the British seamen and marines, and also by the native populations (which had found their Egyptian bondage far more grievous than the old Turkish rule), the Sultan's forces were, by the close of November, completely masters of Syria. Menaced in Alexandria with the fate of Acre, the Pacha at last gave way. He restored the Sultan's fleet. He withdrew his forces from Candia, and from the few Asiatic districts which they still retained; and negociations, in which France (now directed by the wise statesmanship of M. Guizot) took part, were opened for the final settlement of these long continued dissensions. The Sultan's final Firman (Feb. 13, 1841) gave and confirmed to Mehemet Ali for himself and descendants in the direct line, the Pachalic of Egypt: one fourth of its revenues to be paid as tribute to the Porte, and certain naval and military contingents to be supplied on demand. In the summer of the same year,

a convention of great importance with regard to the right of Turkey to control the navigation of the Dardanelles, was agreed to by the representatives of England, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte. The first and second articles of this convention, which was signed at London on July 13, 1841, were as follows :—

ART I.—"His Highness, the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that so long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no foreign ship of war into the said Straits. II.—And their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared."

This formal recognition of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus being mere Turkish streams, and not highways for the fleets of all nations (as seas in general are), was and is of great value for Turkey. But, still, the convention of 1841 did not free the Porte from the chain by which the treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi had bound it to Russia. That liberation was not to be effected without the aid of the armed force as well as of the diplomacy of the Western powers. It was fortunate for the Ottoman Empire, that a pacific period of twelve years intervened before the struggle for that liberation commenced; and, that time was thus given for the development of those measures of internal reform, to which our attention is now to be directed.

CHAPTER XII.

REFORMS OF SULTANS MAHMOUD II. AND ABDUL MEJDID—ABOLITION OF THE COURT OF CONFISCATIONS—POWER OF LIFE AND DEATH TAKEN FROM THE PACHAS—THE VAKOUFS—THE TIMARS AND THE ZIAMETS ABOLISHED—THE DEREH-BEYS PUT DOWN—FINANCIAL REFORMS—EDICTS IN FAVOUR OF THE RAYAS—REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION—COSTUME—THE TANZIMAT—THE CONSTITUTIONAL FIRMAN OF THE PRESENT YEAR—EDUCATIONAL REFORMS—ANTI-SLAVERY MEASURES—THE NEW MILITARY SYSTEM—OMAR PACHA—INCREASED PROSPERITY OF TURKEY—ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA—THE DISTURBANCES OF 1848 IN THE PRINCIPALITIES—THE SULTAN PROTECTS THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES—ATTEMPTS OF THE CZAR TO MAKE ENGLAND JOIN HIM AGAINST TURKEY—THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS AND SIR HAMILTON SEYMOUR—THE HOLY PLACES—RUSSIA'S DEMAND OF PROTECTORATE—THE WAR—THE PEACE—WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE?

AMONG the many services rendered to his country by Sultan Mahmoud II., was his careful education of the young princes, who were likely to succeed him on the throne. The eldest survivor of these, at the time of Mahmoud's death, Prince Abdul Mejdid, was only sixteen years of age. But, providentially for Turkey, her youthful sovereign possessed not only eminent natural abilities, but a thoughtful earnestness of character beyond his years. The last charge of his father to him had been, that he should persevere in the

completion of those remedial measures, the principles and importance of which had been fully taught him, and in the enlightenment and amelioration of all classes of his subjects. Right in his father's steps has Sultan Abdul Mejdid trod. He has not been hardened by dire personal perils and direr necessities, like those amid which Mahmoud grew from boyhood to man's estate; and his general disposition is more mild and humane than that of his sire. But he also has the decision and firmness which his high and responsible station requires: as he has abundantly proved by his noble conduct when summoned by the Austrian and Russian Emperors in 1849 to surrender the Hungarian refugees; and by his demeanour throughout the trying circumstances, under which the present war with Russia was undertaken and maintained.

A detailed account of the various changes introduced into every part of the polity of the Turkish empire by Mahmoud and the present Sultan, would far exceed the due limits of this chapter.* But the main points of the more momentous measures may be advantageously surveyed together; and among the first in value as well

* Much information respecting them will be found in Ubicini's Lettres sur la Turquie; in the second volume of Sir G. Larpent's work on Turkey; in White's "Three Years in Constantinople;" in Ross's "Opinions on the Eastern Question," (an excellent volume, which comprises many important extracts from Turkish state papers); in the latter part of Col. Chesney's work; in Mr. Urquhart's "Turkey and her Resources;" in "The Frontier Lands of the Christian and the Turk;" in "Anadol," &c.; and in the recent works of Lord Carlisle and Mr. Danby Seymour. A flood of light has also been thrown on these subjects by the intelligent and energetic correspondents of our London press during the last two years. I have also learned much from personal friends who have been resident in the East, especially from Dr. P. Colquhoun, who was for many years representative of the Hanse Towns at Constantinople, and then plenipotentiary in those countries for the conclusion of commercial treaties.

as in date (next to the all-important army reforms, which will be separately considered), are the edicts, by which Sultan Mahmoud, soon after he was emancipated from the military tyranny of the Janissaries, closed the Court of Confiscations, and took away the power of life and death from the Pachas. Previously to the first of the Firmans, the property of all persons banished or condemned to death was forfeited to the crown; and a sordid motive for acts of cruelty was thus kept in perpetual operation, besides the encouragement of a host of Delators of the vilest kind. By the second, it was rendered no longer in the power of a Turkish governor to doom men to instant death by a mere wave of his hand; but the Pachas, the Agas, and other officers, were enjoined that "they should not presume to inflict themselves the punishment of death on any man, whether Raya or Turk, unless authorised by a legal sentence pronounced by the Cadi, and regularly signed by the judge." Even then an appeal was allowed to the criminal to one of the Kadiaskers of Asia or Europe, and finally to the Sultan himself, if the criminal chose to persist in his appeal.*

About the same time that Mahmoud ordained these just and humane changes, he set personally an example of reform, by regularly attending the Divan, instead of secluding himself from the labours of state, according to the evil practice, which had been introduced so long ago as the reign of Solyman Kanouni, and which had been assigned as one of the causes of the decline of the empire by a Turkish historian nearly two centuries

* Sir G. Larpent, vol. ii. p. 25.

before Mahmoud's time.* Mahmoud redressed some of the worst abuses connected with the Vakoufs,† by placing the revenues under the administration of the state; but he did not venture to apply this vast mass of property to the general purposes of the government. With the military fiefs, the Timars and the Ziamets, he dealt more boldly. These had long ceased to furnish the old effective military force, for the purpose of which they were instituted; and by attaching them to the public domains, Mahmoud materially strengthened the resources of the state, and put an end to a host of corruptions. One of the most resolute acts of his reign was his suppression of the Dereh Beys, the hereditary local chiefs (with power to nominate their successors in default of male heirs), who, by one of the worst abuses of the Turkish feudal system, had made themselves petty princes in almost every province of the empire. The reduction of these insubordinate feudatories was not effected at once, or without severe struggles and frequent insurrections. But Mahmoud steadily persevered in this great measure; and ultimately the island of Cyprus became the only part of the empire, in which power, not emanating from the Sultan, was allowed to be retained by Dereh Beys. In dealing with the complicated questions, caused by the embarrassed finances of his empire, and by the oppression and vexatiousness with which certain imposts pressed upon particular classes, Mahmoud showed the best spirit of the best of the Kiuprilis.‡ A Firman

* See vol. i. p. 337.

† See ibid. p. 337.

‡ See p. 79, *supra*.

of February 22, 1834, abolished the vexatious charges which public functionaries, when traversing the provinces, had long been accustomed to make on the inhabitants. By the same edict all collections of money, except at the two regular half-yearly periods, were denounced as abuses. "No one is ignorant," said Sultan Mahmoud, in this document, "that I am bound to afford support to all my subjects against vexatious proceedings; to endeavour unceasingly to lighten, instead of increasing, their burdens, and to insure their peace and tranquillity. Therefore, those acts of oppression are at once contrary to the will of God, and to my imperial orders."

The kharatch, or capitation-tax, though moderate in amount, and exempting those who paid it from military service,* had long been made an engine of gross tyranny, through the insolence and misconduct of the government collectors. The Firman of 1834 abolished the old mode of levying it, and ordained that in future it should be raised by a commission composed of the Cadi, the Mussulman governors, and the Ayans, or municipal chiefs of the Rayas of each district. Many other financial improvements were effected, the narration of which would be too long for introduction here. By another important series of measures, the central administrative government was simplified and strengthened; a large mass of sinecure offices was abolished, and the Sultan set a valuable personal example of good sense and

* The Greek Armatoli who rendered military service, did not pay the kharatch. On the other hand, the Turks of Volo and Baba, and some few other places, who by special custom did not serve as soldiers, paid the kharatch.

economy, by reorganising the imperial household, and mercilessly suppressing all titles without duties, and all salaried officials without useful functions. The changes of costume, which Mahmoud introduced, have been censured as needless annoyances to the Mussulman part of his subjects; but in the East, where distinctions of dress have been immemorially identified with distinctions of classes and rights, such changes are of the greatest importance; and the gradual disappearance of the old Turkish garb is material in promoting that abolition of all political distinctions among all classes of the Sultan's subjects, which it has been the great object of Mahmoud and Abdul Mejdid to realise.

Four months after the present Sultan came to the throne, he issued the great organic statute for the general government of his empire, which is commonly spoken of as the Tanzimat; and which was embodied in a royal edict, named after the imperial palace where it was first proclaimed, the Hatti-scheriff of Gülhanè. Like our own Magna Charta and Bill of Rights, this statute deserves that every word of it should be read and studied; and the same may be said of the Firman issued on the 21st of February in the present year, which establishes complete religious liberty and equality of civil rights for all classes of the Sultan's subjects, whatever be their race or creed. Strange as the term may sound, when we are speaking of a country, that has for centuries been the seat of an Oriental despotism, it is no misnomer to say that we see here a Constitution, which the sovereign of Turkey binds himself to respect, and by the very terms of

which his government has become that of a limited monarchy.. The Hatti-scheriff of Gülhanè is as follows :—

" It is well known that during the early ages of the Ottoman monarchy the glorious precepts of the Koran and the laws of the empire were ever held in honour. In consequence of this, the empire increased in strength and greatness, and all the population, without exception, acquired a high degree of welfare and prosperity.

" For 150 years a succession of incidents and various causes has checked this obedience to the sacred code of the law, and to the regulations which emanate from it; and the previous internal strength and prosperity have been converted into weakness and poverty; for in truth an empire loses all its stability when it ceases to observe its laws.

" These considerations have been ever present to our mind, and since the day of our accession to the throne, the thought of the public good, of the amelioration of the condition of the provinces, and the alleviation of the national burthens, has not ceased to claim our entire attention. If we take into consideration the geographical position of the Ottoman provinces, the fertility of the soil, and the aptness and intelligence of the inhabitants, we shall attain the conviction that, by applying ourselves to discover efficacious methods, the result which, with the aid of God, we hope to obtain, will be realised within a few years.

" Thus, then, full of confidence in the help of the Most High, supported by the intercession of our Prophet, we consider it advisable to attempt by new institutions to obtain for the provinces composing the Ottoman Empire the benefits of a good administration.

" These institutions will principally refer to these topics:—

" 1. The guarantees which will insure our subjects perfect security for their lives, their honour, and their property.

" 2. A regular method of establishing and collecting the taxes.

" 3. An equally regular method of recruiting, levying the army, and fixing duration of the service.

" In truth, are not life and honour the most precious blessings in existence? What man, whatever may be his detestation of

violence, could refrain from having recourse to it, and thereby injuring the government and his country, if his life and honour are exposed to danger? If, on the contrary, he enjoys perfect security in this respect, he will not forget his loyalty, and all his acts will conduce to the welfare of the government and his fellow-subjects.

"If there is no security for their fortune, all listen coldly to the voice of their Prince and country; none attend to the progress of the common weal, absorbed as they are in their own troubles. If, on the other hand, the citizen possesses in confidence his property, of whatever kind it may be, then, full of ardour for his own affairs, the sphere of which he strives to extend, in order to increase that of his own enjoyments, he daily feels the love for his Prince and his country growing more fervent in his heart. These sentiments become within him the source of the most laudable actions.

"It is of the highest importance to regulate the imposition of the taxes; as the State, which in the defence of its territory is forced into various expenses, cannot procure the money necessary for the army and other branches of the service, save by contributions levied on its subjects.

"Although, thanks to God, our subjects have been for some time delivered from the scourge of monopolies, falsely regarded hitherto as a source of revenue, a fatal practice still exists, although it can only have the most disastrous consequences; it is that of the venal concessions known by the name of *Iltizim*.

"Under this system, the civil and financial administration of a province is entrusted to the arbitrary will of an individual, that is, at times to the iron hand of the most violent and covetous passions, for, if the administrator is not good, he cares for nothing but his own advantage.

"It is therefore necessary that, in future, each member of the Ottoman society should be taxed in a ratio to his fortune and his ability, and that nothing further should be demanded from him.

"It is also necessary that special laws should fix and limit the expenses of our forces on land and sea.

"Although, as we have said, the defence of the country is a paramount consideration, and it is the duty of all the inhabitants to furnish soldiers for this end, it is necessary to establish laws

to regulate the contingent which each district should furnish according to the requirements of the moment, and to reduce the time of active military service to four or five years. For it is both committing an injustice and inflicting a deadly blow on the agriculture and industry of the country, to take, without regard to the respective population of the districts, more from one and less from another than they are able to furnish; at the same time, it is reducing the soldiers to despair, and contributing to the depopulation of the country, to retain them during their whole life in the service.

"In fine, without the various laws the necessity of which has been recognised, the empire can neither possess strength, nor wealth, nor prosperity, nor tranquillity: on the contrary, it may hope for them all from the existence of these new laws.

"For this reason, in future, the cause of every accused party will be tried publicly, in conformity with our divine law; and until a regular sentence has been pronounced, no one can put another to death, secretly or publicly, by poison, or any other form of punishment.

"No one will be permitted to assail the honour of any one, whosoever he may be.

"Every person will enjoy the possession of his property of every nature, and dispose of it with the most perfect liberty, without any one being able to impede him: thus, for example, the innocent heirs of a criminal will not be deprived of their legal rights, and the property of the criminal will not be confiscated.

"These imperial concessions extend to all our subjects, whatever religion or sect they may belong to; and they will enjoy them without any exception.

"Perfect security is, therefore, granted by us to the inhabitants of the empire, with regard to their life, their honour, and their fortune, as the sacred text of our law demands.

"With reference to the other points, as they must be regulated by the concurrence of enlightened opinions, our Council of Justice (augmented by as many new members as may be deemed necessary), to whom will be adjoined, on certain days which we shall appoint, our Ministers and the notables of the empire, will meet for the purpose of establishing the fundamental laws on those points relating to the security of life and property, and the

imposition of the taxes. Every one in these assemblies will state his ideas freely, and give his opinion.

"The laws relating to the regulations of the military service will be discussed by the Military Council, holding its meetings at the Palace of the Seraskier. As soon as a law is decided upon, it will be presented to us, and in order that it may be eternally valid and applicable we will confirm it by our sanction, written above it with our Imperial hand.

"*As these present institutions are solely intended for the regeneration of religion, Government, the nation, and the Empire, we engage to do nothing which may be opposed to them.*

"As a pledge for our promise, we intend, after having deposited this edict in the hall which contains the glorious relics of the Prophet, in the presence of all the Ulema and Grandees of the Empire, to take an oath in the name of the Almighty, and cause the Ulema and Grandees also to swear to that effect.

"After that, any one of the Ulema or Grandees or any other person whatsoever who violates these institutions, will undergo, without regard to rank, consideration, or credit, the punishment appointed for his guilt when proven. A penal code will be drawn up to this effect.

"As all the functionaries of the empire will receive from this day a suitable salary, and those whose functions are not at present sufficiently rewarded, will be advanced, a rigorous law will be passed against the traffic in favours and appointments, which the divine laws reprove, and which is one of the principal causes of the decay of the Empire.

"The enactments thus made, being a complete renovation and alteration in ancient usages, this Imperial rescript will be published at Constantinople and in all the towns of our empire, and will be officially communicated to all the Ambassadors of friendly Powers residing in Constantinople, in order that they may be witnesses of the concession of these institutions, which, with the favour of the Almighty, will endure for ever.

"May the All-powerful God have us all in His holy keeping!

"May those who commit any act contrary to the present institutions be the objects of the Divine malediction, and eternally deprived of every kind of happiness!"

The second of these two great fundamental statutes

of the Constitutional Government of the Turkish empire, was solemnly promulgated at the palace of the Porte, in the afternoon of the 21st of February, 1856, by the Sultan Abdul Mejdid (through his chief secretary in the office of the Grand Vizier, Habat Effendi) in the presence of all the Turkish ministers, all the members of the Council of State, the Mufti, and the Patriarchs, the Rabbis, and other heads of the various religious communities in the capital. It was accompanied by a prayer (no slight characteristic, itself, of the new spirit that rules the Turkish empire), which the Mufti, the Sheik-ul-Islam, pronounced, and in which all present joined; a prayer of appeal to the One God, who reigns over all and everywhere, and whom Mahometans, and Christians, and Jews equally adore, that He will please to bless and hallow the liberties and equal rights, which the Sultan then and there granted to all his people. In this firman, the Sultan Abdul Mejdid states (and all present knew the truth of the statement), that from the very commencement of his reign he had had but one object, which was the happiness of all classes of his subjects. He expresses his thanks to God for the success which has attended his efforts, as proved by the increasing prosperity of the country. He avers his wish to give greater force to his remedial measures, and proceeds then (speaking in the first person, and addressing himself immediately to the Grand Vizier, Mehmed Emir Aali Pacha) :—

"By the efforts of my subjects, and those of my allies, the external relations of my Government have acquired new force, and I wish now likewise to augment its strength in the interior,

and to make all my subjects happy, for, united as they are by their common sacrifices and their patriotism, they are all equal in my eyes; my will is therefore that the following points be rigorously enforced:—

"I confirm all the assurances given by the Hatti-scheriff of Gülhanè, as to the security of the lives, the property, and honour of all classes of my subjects, without distinction of rank or religion, and I will that these assurances be minutely observed.

"All the privileges and immunities, which have been given to the Christian and other communities which are under my sceptre, are again confirmed. A revision will be effected without delay of these privileges, and improvements will be made according to the spirit of the age and the actual state of society, and with my sovereign sanction. The councils which will be expressly established at the Patriarch's, under the inspection of the Sublime Porte, will have to discuss these improvements and submit them to my Government. The power given to the Patriarchs by Mahomet the Conqueror and my other glorious ancestors will be combined with this new position created for them by me, and when the mode of election of the Patriarch will have been ameliorated the Patriarch will be named by diploma for life.

"According to a method devised by the Sublime Porte, the Patriarch, and the chiefs of the Christian and other communities, the patriarchs, archbishops, vicars, bishops, and rabbis, will have to take an oath of allegiance.

"All contributions and casual profits levied by the clergy from the communities are forbidden. Fixed revenues will be assigned to the patriarchs, archbishops, vicars, and bishops, and a sufficient salary apportioned to the lower clergy, according to their rank and functions. The movable and immovable goods of the clergy will not be touched.

"A council chosen by the clergy and laity of the Christian and other communities will be intrusted with the direction of the national affairs of each community.

"No objection will be made to repairing the churches, schools, hospital, and cemeteries in the different towns, villages, and hamlets according to the original designs, which may still exist. If it becomes necessary to erect new ones, and the Patriarch or the chiefs of the communities approve it, the plan of each will be submitted to the Sublime Porte, in order that I may give my sovereign

approbation for its erection, or else that the objections to which it is open might be made against it.

"If in some places there is a community quite isolated,—that is to say, without people belonging to another religion,—such a community may celebrate publicly its religious ceremonies. But in the places inhabited by people belonging to different religions, each may in its own quarter, adapting itself to the abovenamed principle, repair its proper churches, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries.

"As to building a new edifice, the Patriarch and Synod will demand the permission of the Sublime Porte, which will be accorded, if there are no internal political considerations which prevent it. But whatever is done in these matters should be always done in a spirit of charity and tolerance.

"Energetic measures will be taken to insure the freest possible exercise of every religion.

"All epithets and distinctions, which could tend to show a difference between one class of my subjects as the lower, and another as the higher one, are for ever abolished from all the documents of my Imperial Chancery. It is likewise strictly forbidden to officials and private individuals to use offensive and dishonouring terms, and the offenders will be punished.

"As all religions can be exercised freely, no one will be molested on account of his religion, and no one forced to change his religion.

"As the choice of those employed depends on my Imperial will, all my subjects will be received for offices according to the existing regulations and according to their capacities; and if they satisfy the conditions demanded by the regulations of the Imperial schools—namely, if they are of the proper age, and pass the prescribed examinations,—they will be admitted likewise into the military offices.

"Besides, each community is free to erect schools for arts and sciences. Only the studies followed there and the choice of teachers will be subject to the inspection of a mixed commission named by the Sublime Porte.

"All commercial and criminal causes between the members of two different religious communities will be subject to a mixed court, whose sittings will be public. The accuser and accused will be confronted there, and the witnesses will take an oath, according to their religion, to tell the truth.

"Civil causes in the provinces and sandjaks will be examined in the mixed courts in the presence of the Vekeel and the Cadi. The sittings will be likewise public.

"Causes between two of the same community, or those relating to successions, will, according to the wish of the parties, be brought before the Patriarch or the Medjlis [the municipal councils].

"A commercial and criminal code, as well as regulations respecting the proceedings of the mixed courts, will be as soon as possible completed, and published, after being translated into all the languages which are used in my empire.

"In order to combine humanity with justice, the state of the prisons and other places of detention will be ameliorated, and regulations made as to the detention of those condemned for smaller crimes. With the exception of the police regulations of the Sublime Porte in this respect, all ill-treatment and corporal punishment or torture are completely abolished, and whoever should dare to inflict them will be severely punished.

"The police in Constantinople, as well as in the provinces, must be so established as to protect most efficiently life and property.

"As equality of taxation will be introduced, it will be justice that the Christian and other subjects should furnish, as well as the Mussulmans, their contingent of troops; they must therefore submit to the decision which has been lately taken in this respect. But in these questions the system will be followed of allowing an equivalent in money—that is, to give money, and be thereby exempt from active service.

"Regulations will be made shortly for employing all the subjects in the ranks of the army, besides the Mussulmans, and when made these regulations will be published.

"The Medjlis [the municipal councils] will be reformed in the provinces, in order to place the election of Mussulmans and non-Mussulmans on a good footing, and to insure the free and true manifestation of opinion; and energetic measures will be taken that the Sublime Porte may know the result of these opinions, and on which side the right is.

"As in commercial affairs, and as regards the possession of landed property, the laws are equal for all my subjects, when the Sublime Porte shall have made an arrangement with the foreign Powers, to the effect that foreigners should submit in this respect

to the laws of the country, and pay imposts at the same rate as the natives, the right to possess landed property will be conceded to foreigners.

"As the taxes are levied equally on all subjects, one must think of the means to prevent the abuses in the collection of these taxes, especially of the tithes, and to establish, as far as it is possible, a direct system of collection, instead of the system of farming the revenue now pursued. In the meantime, any public functionary who should let such revenues at a public auction, or even take a share in it, will be severely punished.

"The local taxes must, as much as possible, be distributed so as not to do harm to the production and to the development of commerce.

"Imposts will be levied in the provinces for generally useful purposes, which will be applied for the benefit of those provinces, which will have the advantage of the roads for their communication inland and their connexion with the sea.

"As the Sublime Porte has lately made a budget of its revenues and expenses, this budget must be followed up and developed.

"The pay of each public functionary ought to be fixed.

"An officer will be appointed for every Christian and other community, in order to take care of the affairs which concern the generality of my subjects, and to assist at the State Council. These officers are expressly taken from the Ministry of the Grand Vizier; they are named for a year, and have to take an oath before they enter on their functions.

"The members of the State Council will be free to manifest their opinions in the ordinary and extraordinary sittings, and will not be molested for so doing.

"The laws against corruption will be executed against all my subjects without distinction, and to whatever class or rank they may belong.

"The Sublime Porte will do its best to establish a good system of credit, and favour all things tending to raise it, as, for instance, a bank, for which the necessary capital will be procured.

"The Sublime Porte will construct roads and canals for the transport of produce, and will give facilities for the extension of agriculture by removing all impediments."

Such is the new, the present constitution, which the unremitted labours of her late and of her present Sultan have given to Turkey: and when the circumstances under which Mahmoud and Abdul Mejdid have been obliged to act, are borne in mind, we may safely assert that the world's history cannot produce an example of nobler and more beneficial legislation.

There are some other subjects to which also the "amending hand" has been directed by these sovereigns, which must not be wholly passed over, though our space may not permit any details. The advancement and improvement of public instruction have been the objects of many Firmans, especially of the important edicts in 1846, which instituted a Council of Public Instruction, decreed the formation of a new University, overthrew the old monopoly of education possessed by the Ulema, and made the Mektebs (the schools universally attached to mosques, and therefore almost universal in the Turkish empire) primary public schools, where useful knowledge is taught gratuitously.* This great educational reform has met with many obstacles from the bigoted prejudices, and opposition of those, who considered that they had vested interests under the old system. Its effects cannot be expected to be immediately visible; but there can be no doubt of its beneficial character, or of its sure though gradual development among future generations of the inhabitants of the Turkish empire. Another important subject is that of slavery and the slave trade in Turkey. Without attempting their sudden abolition,

* See Larpent, vol. ii. p. 151.

(which would have been impracticable as to the object, and highly mischievous as to the effort) the Porte has, by various regulations respecting the slave-market, made this traffic more and more difficult and rare: and the edict, by which Sultan Abdul Mejdid last year prohibited the importation of slaves into his dominions, must, if vigorously enforced, cause the gradual extinction, not only of the slave trade, but of slavery in Turkey; inasmuch as the emancipation of slaves after a few years' servitude has long been customary: and neither by captives in war, nor by imported supplies, can the consequent diminution of the slave population be any longer prevented.*

There yet remains another head of reforms to be considered, which is in one sense the most material of all, as without it none of the others could have been effected. This is the new military system of Turkey. We have already examined the causes and the manner of the destruction of the old force; and we have seen that Sultan Mahmoud was obliged to wage his Russian and Egyptian wars with hasty levies of compulsory recruits, taken from among the younger parts of the Moslem population. After the promulgation of the Hatti-scheriff of Gülhanè, a regular system of recruiting the army was established; but it was in 1843, when

* "Male slaves are rarely retained in bondage more than seven or nine years, unless when purchased in infancy, or born in slavery. Exceptions occur, but are declared reprehensible in a religious sense. The great majority of masters liberate their slaves at the specified time. If they are well-conducted, they are recommended as in or out-door servants. If they have learned a trade, their master either employs them as shopmen or journeymen, or else places them with other masters, where their success depends on their industry."—Larpent's Turkey, vol. ii. p. 84.

Riza Pacha was Seraskier or commander-in-chief, that the remodelling of the military force of the empire was completed. The army was divided into the troops in active service, called the Nizam, and into those who had fulfilled their terms of active service, and thenceforth formed a reserve, called the Redif. A specified number of troops is required from each district; and this is filled up partly by volunteers, partly by conscription, to which all young men of twenty or upwards are liable. The period of active service in the Nizam is five years. After that, the soldier is permitted to return home, but is then incorporated for seven years longer in the Redif of his district. This force is summoned together for drill and exercise at stated periods, and is liable to be embodied for service in case of war or other emergency. All writers on Turkish subjects concur in eulogising the sobriety, patience, obedience, and bravery of the Turkish common soldiers; and in censuring the venality and incompetency which are frequent among the officers. But these are evils which a wise administration could gradually remedy; for, when bravery and aptitude for military discipline are general national qualities, and where the state provides schools of military education (both of which requisites already exist among the Ottomans), there must be an abundant material for good officers. All that is needed, is that the higher authorities shall watch carefully for intelligence and merit; and shall reward those qualities, when found, by prompt and liberal promotion. Hitherto, the conscription has pressed severely on the Ottoman part of

the population, which alone has supplied the armies. An edict, which was issued a few years ago, authorising the military service of the Christians, has up to this time had little practical operation ; but the clauses of the great Firman of last February on the subject (which have been already cited) show the fixed determination of the Sultan and his advisers to equalise among all classes the burden, the honour, and the numerous contingent advantages of forming portions of the armed defenders of their common country.

Sultan Abdul Mejdid has in two important points been more fortunate than his father Mahmoud. He has found in Omar Pacha an excellent general, who has put down the various insurrections, that were attempted against the Sultan's reforms in Albania, Kurdistan, and Bosnia, and other provinces ; and in the suppression of those movements Omar has showed not only valour and military skill, but also humanity and sound judgment. And the present sovereign of Turkey, during the years which intervened between the conclusion of the Egyptian war in 1841, and the outbreak of the Russian war in 1853, obtained that necessary period of quiet for the "strengthening of his military creations, and carrying out needful reforms," which, as we have seen,* was denied to his predecessor. During this period of twelve years, the advancement of the commercial and general prosperity of the empire was marked and rapid. A similar amelioration had been visible even to foreign statesmen during the latter part of Sultan Mahmoud's reign ; and in 1853, Lord Palmerston, in the British House of

* See p. 413, *supra*.

Commons, bore the most emphatic testimony in favour of the two reforming Sultans, by declaring that Turkey had made more progress and improvement during the last twenty years than any other country.

Other and less friendly eyes were watching the revival of strength in the Ottoman Empire. But the prudence of Abdul Mejdid's government gave Russia no occasion for quarrel; and when the revolutionary fervour of 1848 extended to Moldavia and Wallachia, the moderation and fairness with which the Porte acted towards the malcontents, presented a striking contrast to the eagerness with which a Russian army was marched across the Pruth. The forces of the Emperor Nicholas, to the number of between 40,000 and 50,000, continued to occupy the Principalities till 1850, when they were withdrawn, after lengthened negotiations on the subject with both the Turkish and British cabinets. But while the Porte was thus wisely pacific and conciliatory in its general conduct towards foreign powers, a memorable and noble proof was given in 1849, that the present Sultan has not degenerated from the high honour and chivalrous generosity of the ancient race of Othman and of Ertoghrul, "the Right-hearted Man."* When the united forces of Russia and Austria put an end to the Hungarian war of Independence, many of the chiefs, who had been most active in the Magyar cause, escaped into Turkey, and received hospitable shelter in the Sultan's dominions. The Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg peremptorily demanded, first, their extradition, and afterwards their expulsion from Turkey.

* See vol. i. p. 1.

Sultan Abdul Mejdid met these demands and the threats with which they were accompanied, with a dignified and firm refusal to violate the laws of hospitality, and betray the old principles of his race and creed. The two Emperors menaced more and more loudly, but in vain. Diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey were suspended; and, for a time, war seemed certain: but England showed her intention to aid the Ottoman Empire, if thus attacked; and the British fleet, under Sir William Parker, was ordered to Beshika Bay in October, and in the next month entered the Dardanelles. Russia and Austria thought it prudent to abstain from hostilities; and the diplomatic relations which had been broken off were renewed. True to the old policy of Potemkin, that Russia's conquest of Turkey must be effected with the acquiescence of England,* the Emperor Nicholas sought more than once to induce the English Cabinet to participate in his schemes. Some overtures of this kind were made by him during his visit to this country in 1844; but the most remarkable proof of the continual designs of Russia for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, is to be found in the well-known conversations of the Emperor Nicholas with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the early part of 1853.† In those strange dialogues the sovereign of Russia invited the representative of this country to discuss with him the partition of Turkey, offering Egypt and Crete to England.

* See p. 272, *supra*.

† See Eastern Papers, part v., laid before the Houses of Parliament in 1854 — House of Commons' Papers, No. 88.

"The Principalities," said the Czar, "are, in fact, an independent state under my protection: this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government: so again with Bulgaria." In another part of the same conversation the Emperor referred to the possession of Constantinople as the most difficult question to settle. He disclaimed any design that it should be permanently held by Russia, though he said that circumstances might cause its temporary occupation by his troops. He stated his fixed resolution that that city should never be held by the English, or French, or any other great nation. "Again," said he, "I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state: still less will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe: rather than submit to any of these arrangements, I would go to war, and would carry it on as long as I have a man and a musket left." The Czar spoke of Austria as identified in interest with Russia, and in a manner which seemed to infer that he regarded her as entirely subservient to his policy. He professed indifference as to what part France might think fit to take in Eastern affairs, so that there was a good understanding between Russia and England. Turkey was treated by him throughout these conversations as an expiring empire; and he assured the British minister, that his Government must have been deceived if it had been led to believe that Turkey retained any elements of existence. "The sick

man is dying. We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man, and he may suddenly die on our hands." Such was his reiterated expression : and the sum and substance of his revelations and hints may be fairly characterised as a proposal, that the two strongest neighbours of the sick man should walk into his house and strangle him, and forthwith divide his goods and chattels between themselves. These overtures were properly met by the ambassador and ministers of England with sincere disclaimers of any desire to participate in the spoils of the Ottomans, and with an expression of belief that "the sick man" was not dying; that (in the words of Lord Clarendon's despatch of March 23, 1853) "Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its allies, and a determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence of the Sultan—that friendly support, in short, which among states as well as individuals the weak are entitled to expect from the strong—in order not only to prolong its existence, but to remove all cause of alarm respecting its dissolution." It is impossible to read the narrative of these communications between the Russian Emperor and the English Statesmen, without being convinced that Sir Hamilton Seymour judged rightly, when he stated to his Court that "It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign, who insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring state, must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not *of* its dissolution, at all events *for* its dissolution, must be at hand." And, could there have been any doubt in the beginning of 1853, that the Czar designed an attack

on Turkey, that doubt must have been removed by the full knowledge which since has been obtained of the immensity of the Russian stores and preparations in their great arsenals in the Crimea, far exceeding anything which purposes of defence or precaution could require, and evidently collected in readiness for a sudden and overwhelming assault on the heart of the Turkish Empire.*

Of the war which actually broke out in 1853, and of which the happy and glorious termination may, we trust, now be deemed complete, it would be useless and unbecoming to attempt a formal narrative with the very limited time and space now before me. And its spirit-stirring events are too fresh in the memory of us all, to need more than the briefest allusion here. The immediate pretext for it was caught from a revival of the old dispute between the Latin and Greek Christians in

* The following remarkable proof of the designs of Russia against Turkey about fifteen years ago, and of her oppressive influence on the Sultan's Government, has been communicated to me by Dr. P. Colquhoun, who was resident at Constantinople, as representative of the Hanse Towns, at the time in question :—

"Two artillery officers were sent out by the English Government in 1840 with an artificer of Congreve rockets and other projectiles, a bombardier, and some workmen, to assist the Porte in fortifying the Bosphorus. But the Russian envoy, M. Titow, interfered to prevent the execution of the works which those officers designed; and such was the influence of Russia in the Divan, that the Porte dared not fortify the passage from the Black Sea to the Turkish capital, against the will of the Emperor Nicholas. The English officers and engineers remained for five years at Constantinople, during which time repeated attempts were made by them and the British Ambassador to cause their plans to be carried out. At last, one of these officers returned to England with the engineering staff and the unused designs, and the other was employed on the Turco-Persian frontier. Every one in Constantinople, down to the smallest merchant, knew at that time the object of Russia in keeping the Bosphorus unfortified, and was aware that the Porte was obliged to obey her commands."

Palestine, respecting the custody of the Holy Places.* An interposition of the French Emperor, on behalf of the Roman Catholic subjects of France resident in the East, was at one time misconstrued into a general claim of protection for all members of the Latin Church, but such an assumption was promptly and explicitly disavowed by M. Drouyn de Lluys, the French Minister. But this was made a handle for the interference of Russia, and for a demand (among others) which her envôy, Prince Menschikoff, preferred in the most arrogant and domineering manner—a demand of a general protectorate by Russia of all inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, who profess the creed of the Greek Church. This is the same requisition which Russia had twice made before, but to which the Porte, even under the pressure of the greatest calamities, had never yielded. It had been preferred in the negotiations of 1773, before the conclusion of the peace of Kainardji.† It had been again pressed on Sultan Selim in 1805, a little time before the Russian general, Michelson, occupied the Principalities. All that had ever been admitted into the treaties between the two empires, amounts (as well stated by an eminent jurist, Dr. Phillimore) to no more than—

"1. That pilgrims, ecclesiastics, and travellers may visit, safely and untaxed, Jerusalem and the holy places.

"2. That certain new chapels may be built in a particular quarter

* Very full and clear information on this subject, and on the various treaties made by various Christian Powers (especially France) with the Porte as to the Holy Places, will be found in Phillimore's International Law, vol. i. p. 577 *et seq.*

† See p. 252, *supra.*

of Constantinople—*à l'exemple des autres puissances*—besides the Ambassadorial Chapel, then existing. There is a similar provision in the French Treaty of 1740.

"3. That the Sublime Porte, not the Emperor of Russia, shall continue to protect the Christian religion; the interference of *the Emperor* being in the same clause limited to the making representations in favour of a particular church and its clergy, to which the Porte, on the ground of friendship alone, engages to listen."

On the refusal of Sultan Abdul Mejdid to transfer the sovereignty over thirteen millions of his subjects to the Emperor Nicholas, the armies of Russia (3rd July, 1853,) passed the Pruth, and occupied Moldavia and Wallachia, "as a material guarantee" for the fulfilment of the Czar's demands. On the 9th of the same month, a manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas to the Russian nation appeared, in which he stated to his subjects that the solemn oath of the Sultan had been perfidiously broken, and appealed to their religious feelings against their old Mahometan adversary. On the 1st of October, the Porte declared war, which was carried on during the ensuing winter on the banks of the Danube by the Turkish army under Omar Pacha, with remarkable spirit and success. Instead of waiting, as in former wars, to be attacked, the Turks crossed the river, and gained victories at Oltenitza (November 4) and at Citate (November 5). The loss on either side in these actions was not heavy; but they were of incalculable importance in demonstrating to Turkey, to Russia, and to Europe, the reality of the improvement which had been effected in the Ottoman military system; and they tended materially to augment, in the Turkish

ranks, that self-confidence and self-respect which are material elements of success in war. The aid of France and England was, from the very commencement of the war, given frankly and zealously to the Sultan. Their fleets entered the Dardanelles in September; and in the spring of the next year, each of the great European nations of the West had landed auxiliary armies in European Turkey, and had occupied the Baltic as well as the Euxine with its navy; thus compelling Russia to retain large portions of her force in the north-west for home defence against the allies of the Porte. In Turkey, the great feature of the war during the first half of the year 1854 was the siege of Silistria by the main Russian army, under the command first of General Schilders, and afterwards of Marshal Paskievitsch. The defence of that fortress by the Ottomans under Moussa Pacha (who was killed near the end of the siege), and two English officers, named Butler and Nasmyth, is one of the noblest examples of heroic valour and endurance that are recorded in military history. The Russians were repeatedly repulsed in a series of desperate and murderous assaults; and finally recrossed the Danube on the 15th of June, with immense loss of men and military stores of every description. The Turks passed the Danube in pursuit of the retreating Russians, and had gained further advantages, when hostilities in Moldavia and Wallachia were checked by Austria marching her troops into those Principalities, and by the belligerents acquiescing in a convention for their being left in her temporary occupation. The French and English armies, that had been hitherto prepared to

defend Varna if Silistria fell, now assumed the offensive; and, in September, the memorable expedition to the Crimea was undertaken.

That Peninsula became now the region, to which the anxious interest of all Europe was for more than a twelvemonth directed. The allied armies landed near Eupatoria, and took possession of that city on September 14, and on the 20th the victory of the Alma opened to them the road to Sebastopol. The siege of that renowned stronghold began in the same month, and was prolonged with almost unexampled bravery and resolution on both sides until the 8th of September, 1855, when the victorious assault was delivered, in which the French column captured the long-coveted Malakoff Tower, and on the following day the city was in the possession of the allies.

In Asia, the incompetency of the Turkish commanders gave several easy triumphs to the Russians; but the important city of Kars was nobly defended by the garrison and armed citizens under their English leaders, Williams and Teesdale, and the Hungarian, Kmety. On the 29th of September, they gained a signal victory over the Russian army under General Mouravieff; but they were unable to break the blockade: no relief came from without, and at last, on the 25th of November, the worn and wasted band of heroes was starved into surrender.

It was expected that the war, "which for a space did fail" during the winter, would be renewed with tenfold fury in the present year. The preparations of the allies, and especially of England, were gigantic.

But offers of mediation at last found welcome at St. Petersburg. The accession of Alexander II. in the room of the stern and haughty Nicholas, had greatly favoured the progress of more pacific policy. Negotiations were opened, on the intervention of Austria, early in the present year, and the Russian Court consented that the following five propositions should be taken as the basis of a pacification :—

1. *Danubian Principalities.*—Complete abolition of the Russian protectorate. The Danubian Principalities shall receive an organisation conformable to their wishes, to their wants, to their interests; and this new organisation, respecting which the population itself will be consulted, shall be recognised by the contracting Powers and sanctioned by the Sultan as emanating from his sovereign initiative. No state shall be able, under any pretext whatever, under any form of protectorate, to interfere in the question of the internal administration of the Principalities; they shall adopt a definitive permanent system demanded by their geographical position; and no impediment shall be made to their fortifying, in the interest of their safety, in such manner as they may deem advisable, their territory against foreign aggression.

"In exchange for the strong places and territories occupied by the Allied armies, Russia consents to a rectification of her frontier with Turkey in Europe. It would commence in the vicinity of Chotym, follow the line of the mountains, which extend in a South-easterly direction, and terminate at Lake Sasik. The line (*trace*) shall be definitively regulated by the general treaty; and the conceded territory would return to the Principalities and to the suzerainty of the Porte.

2. *The Danube.*—The freedom of the Danube and of its mouths shall be efficaciously assured by European institutions, in which the contracting Powers shall be equally represented, except the particular positions of the lords of the soil on the banks (*des riverains*) which shall be regulated upon the principles established by the act of the Congress of Vienna as regards the navigation of rivers. Each of the contracting Powers shall have the right to keep one or two small vessels stationed at the mouths of the river,

destined to assure the execution of the regulations relative to the freedom of the Danube.

3. *Neutralisation of the Black Sea.*—This sea shall be open to merchant vessels, closed to war navies (*marines militaires*); consequently, no naval military arsenals shall be created or maintained there. The protection of the commercial and maritime interests of all nations shall be assured in the respective ports of the Black Sea by the establishment of institutions conformable to international law, and to the customs sanctioned in such matters. The two Powers which hold the coast engage themselves to maintain only the number of light vessels, of a fixed force, necessary for their coast service. This convention, concluded separately between these two Powers, shall form part as an annex of the general treaty after receiving the approval of the contracting parties. This separate convention cannot be annulled or modified without the consent of the signataries of the general treaty. The closing of the Straits will admit the exception applicable to the stationary vessels mentioned in the preceding article.

4. *Christian Subjects of the Porte.*—The immunities of the Rayah subjects of the Porte shall be religiously preserved, without infringement on the independence and dignity of the Sultan's crown. As deliberations are taking place between Austria, France, Great Britain, and the Sublime Porte, to assure to the Christian subjects of the Sultan their religious and political rights, Russia shall be invited, when peace is made, to associate herself thereto.

5. The belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right which appertains to them of producing in an European interest special conditions over and above the four guarantees.

Paris was selected as the place for the conferences; and there accordingly assembled the Plenipotentiaries of France, England, Russia, Turkey, and Sardinia, which last-mentioned country had, during the latter part of the war, co-operated gallantly with the two Great Powers of the West in the common cause of national justice and national independence. Austria, as the mediating power, took part by her diplomatic representatives in the whole proceedings of the Congress. Prussia, which

had selfishly stood aloof, was invited, at the end of the discussions, to become a party to the terms on which the others had debated and resolved. At last, on Sunday the 30th of March, 1856, a treaty, framed in accordance with the propositions that have been cited, was signed by the Ministers of the Seven powers, and Peace was restored (and we may trust was assured for many years) to the Eastern hemisphere of the World.*

Here, then, for the present, we may take fitting leave of our subject, the History of the Ottoman Turks. We have traced it to a crisis, which is now actually before our eyes—a crisis which must ere long bring about the utter dissolution of their empire, if the present attempts to reconstruct it fail; or must cause it to assume a new character, under which it may yet see many centuries of prosperity and glory. Henceforth (if it survives) it will no longer be the empire of the Ottoman Turks as the dominant, the sole imperial race. But it will be the empire of a great composite people, inhabiting one country; of a people into which many races, now alien to each other, may and must blend, before they can acquire a common nationality, and before their children can regard the territory of the Sultan as their common fatherland. Hitherto the Ottomans in Turkey have been like the Norman Conquerors in England during the century immediately subsequent to the Conquest. Whether they can be fused with the Rayas, as the Anglo-Norman blended ultimately with the Anglo-Saxon, is the great problem

* The text of the Treaty, as soon as known, will be published as a Supplement to this Volume.

which remains to be solved. All that we can safely affirm, is, that the attempt is noble, and that the Prince and the statesmen who voluntarily give up exclusive power and privileges for the sake of making it, deserve our respectful admiration, whether they succeed or fail. The difficulties are great; one obvious and enormous one, is the diversity of creeds. But the present reformers of Turkey have advantages, which never could before have been brought to bear on similar measures. The events of the war have not only secured Turkey, for many years at least, from further invasive attacks by Russia, but they have destroyed the slavish wonderment and awe, with which Russia had hitherto been regarded in the East; and the Rayas will no longer look to St. Petersburg for their natural and predestined lord and master. The general admission of the Christian subjects of the Sultan to civil and military offices, will not only multiply the number of efficient native servants of the State, but will render the employment of intelligent foreigners more frequent and more beneficial.* The material resources of the empire are boundless. There is probably no part of the world so prodigally gifted with fertility of soil, with forests,

* Russia after her reform by Peter the Great was long officered almost entirely by foreigners in all important civil as well as military and naval functions, though it was in the army that the value of them was most felt. It is curious to read in General Manstein's Memoirs, written a century ago, a description of the Russian private soldier, and of the benefit of placing foreign officers over him, which with the mere change of name, might be applied literally to the Turkish troops at the present moment. He says (at p. 250 of his Memoirs):—

"Les Russes, lorsqu'ils ont de bons chefs, sont capables de tout faire et de tout entreprendre; mais il leur faut beaucoup d'officiers étrangers, parceque les soldats y ont plus de confiance qu'en ceux de leur propre nation."

Manstein was himself a Russian by birth, so that his testimony is on this point unexceptionable.

minerals, harbours, temperate climate, and advantages of situation for traffic with other countries, as are Asia Minor and the adjacent Thracian coasts. Constantinople is an empire in itself. Unexplored or long neglected as many of these sources of national wealth have been, they cannot long remain so, after the influx of European activity, which the war has brought to the Sultan's dominions, and the revelations which the curiosity of Western Europe has obtained. With improved internal government, and with increased security for person and property, European capital will be poured into Turkey, and will enrich the land where it is employed, even more than the hands by which it is invested. The soldiers and the standards of France and England may disappear from the Sultan's dominions, but not their artificers, their navigators, their miners; nor will the flags of their merchant-ships cease to thicken over the ports of the Levant. The sounds of Frankish warfare may be heard there no more, but the busy hum of European industry will increase, and will find innumerable echoes. The rail-road, the canal, the steam-ship, the electric telegraph, are the great implements of the civilisation, which the Ottoman Empire requires; and these, once introduced, though for military objects, will be retained and multiplied for purposes of human welfare. Twice blessed will be the blood, which France and England have poured forth during the last three years in the cause of the Independence of Nations, if their exertions and example shall have not only rescued Turkey from the foreign invader, but shall have taught her how to strengthen, and how to elevate herself.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

TREATY OF THE PRUTH.

Traité de Paix entre sa Majesté Czarienne Pierre Alexiowitz, et Achmet Han, Sultan des Turcs, par lequel la Forteresse de Azof doit estre rendue à la Porte Ottomane, avec démolition de quelques autres places et forts. Fait au Camp des Turcs près de la Rivière de Pruth le 6 *de la Lune Gemaiel-Achir l'an de l'Hegire* 1123, *et le* 21 *Juillet* 1711. [*Sur une copie envoyée de Constantinople par un Ministre public*].

La raison de cet écrit auquel on doit ajouter foi est: Que par la Grace de Dieu, la victorieuse Arme Musulmanne, ayant etroitement resserré le Czar de Muscovie avec toute son Armée dans le voisinage de la Rivière de Pruth, il a lui-même demandé la Paix, et sur ses instances, les Traitez et Articles ont été reglés et accordez en la manière qui suit:

1. Qu'il rendra la Forteresse d'Azoph avec son Territoire et ses dépendances, dans le même état où elle étoit quand il la prit.

2. Que Taganrock, Kamenki, et le nouveau Fort, construit sur la Rivière de Samari, seront entièrement démolis, sans que jamais on puisse faire bâtir d'autres Forts au même lieu; et que le Canon avec les Munitions du Fort Kamenki, seront laissez à la Sublime Porte.

3. Que le Czar ne se mêlera plus des Polonois ni des Cosaques qui dépendent d'eux, et qu'on apelle Barabasci et Potcati, non plus que de ceux qui dépendent du très heureux Han-Doulet-Gherai, mais qu'il les laissera sur l'ancien pied et qu'il retirera tout ses forces de leur Païs.

4. Que les Marchands pourront venir avec leurs Marchandises sous la Domination bien gardée; mais que personne ne pourra resider à la Haute Porte en qualité de Ambassadeur.

5. Que tous les Musulmans qui ont été faits Prisonniers, ou Esclaves par les Moscovites, avant ou pendant cette Guerre, seront remis en liberté.

6. Que le Roi de Suéde s'etant rangé sous les Ailes de la puissante protection de la Haute Porte, aura un libre et sûr passage pour s'en retourner, sans pouvoir y être empêché, ou retenu en aucune manière par les Moscovites; et que le Paix se fasse entr'eux, s'ils sont inclinez à la faire, et s'ils peuvent s'entendre entr'eux.

7. Et à l'avenir il ne sera fait aucun tort ou dommage par la Porte aux Moscovites, comme pareillement ceux ci n'on feront point aux Sujets et Dépendans de la Haute Porte.

La Bonté Royale et infinie de mon tres-puissant et gracieux Seigneur et Empereur est supplée qu'il lui plaise de ratifier les susdits Articles; et d'oublier le précédente mauvaise conduite du Czar.

C'est en la manière ci-dessus exprimée, qu'en vertu du Plene-Pouvoir qui m'en a été donné, j'ai fait la Paix avec lui, et lui en ai consigné l'Instrument. Nous conviendrons aussi des Otages qui seront donnez par le Czar, pour l'accomplissement des Articles qu'il contient. Pareillement les Traitez de Paix appellez Temeruki seront échangez de part et d'autre; et ensuite l'Armée du Czar pourra s'en aller librement en son Païs, par le plus court chemin; sans qu'il lui soit fait aucun empêchement par l'Armée victorieuse, ni par les Tartares, ni par d'autres. Tous les Articles ci-dessus seront éxécutez, et la Capitulation echangée des deux côtez; ensuite de quoi, et après que tout aura été à efet, nous donnerons congé aux deux Otages qui se trouvent présentement dans l'Armée victorieuse, savoir le Renommé entre les Grands de la Nation du Messie le Chancelier Prive, Baron Pierre Schaphirof, et le petit fils de Czeremet Michel de Boriz, desquels la fin soit heureuse; et nous leur permettrons aussitôt de retourner en leur Païs. En foi de quoi, le présent Instrument a été signé au susdit Camp le 6 de la Lune Gemaiel-Achir de l'an 1123; ou le 21 de Juillet 1711.

Autre Copie du même Traité signée des seuls Ministres de sa Majesté Czarienne. Au Camp le 12 *Juillet, vieux stile,* 1711. [*Sur une Copie qu'on dit avoir été communiquée à leurs Hautes Puissances les Seigneurs États Généraux des Provinces—Unies par l'Ambassadeur de sa Maj. Czarienne.*]

Divina favente gratiâ Serenissimi ac Potentissimi Magni Domini Czari et Magni Ducis Petri Alexiowitz totius Russiæ Autocratoris, nos infra scripti nominati Plenipotentiarii hisce notum facimus, Nos cum Serenissimi ac Potentissimi Domini Sultani Achmetis Chami Illustrissimo Magno Viziro Machmete Bassia, post exortum inter utriusque Imperium bellum, sequentem de æterna pace Tractatum conclusisse.

1. Postquam Pax inter Czaream Majestatem et Sultaneam Majestatem quæ jam antea intercessit rupta esset, utriusque Exercitus etiam jam manus conseruissent, ulteriorem et omnimodam tanti humani sanguinis effusionem prævertendi animo, de restaurandâ pace consilium initum æternumque duratura Pax sequentibus sub conditionibus inita fuit et conclusa. Utpote restituantur Turcis occupatæ ab illis Urbes, et noviter extructæ iterum destruantur; utrâque ex parte vacuæ relinquantur; tormenta omnia et res tormentaria commeatusque bellici, et alia ex illis abducta Czareæ Majestati permaneant, exceptis in Camemnon Tolin existentibus tormentis, quæ Turcis tradantur.

2. Utrique parti Polonorum rebus sese immiscere vel illorum subditos et terras sibi arrogare non sit liberum.

3. Mercatores tam Czareæ Majestatis subditi in Imperium Turcicum quam Sultaneæ Majestatis in Imperium Ruthenicum iter facere, redire, et commercia agere, omni libertate gaudeant.

4. Quia Rex Sueciæ protectioni Sultaneæ Majestatis se commisit, idcirco Czarea Majestas, Sultaneæ Majestatis amicitiæ gratiâ, se illi liberum secu-

rumque reditum et transitum in ipsius terras concessuram promittit, et, si invicem convenire possunt, Pacem cum illo inituram.

5. Utriusque partis tam Russicæ quam Turcicæ subditis in posterum damnum vel detrimentum aliquod a nemine inferatur.

6. Vigore Tractatûs hujus omnia antecedentia commissa acta hostilia oblivioni tradantur; et factâ Exemplarium permutatione (ad quem actum nos sufficienti Plenipotentiâ instructi sumus) utriusque partis Exercitus recedant, neque in itinere alter alteri impedimentum afferat vel damnum.

7. Captivi Turci quotquot illorum in Imperio Czareæ Majestatis et præsentes hic in castris reperiuntur libertate donabuntur; similiter ex parte Sultaneæ Majestatis omnes post ruptam Pacem in captivitatem abducti subditi Ruthieni dimittentur et pristinâ libertate gaudebunt.

In quorum fidem nos hunc Tractatum propriis manibus subscripsimus, sigilloque notavimus, et cum Illustrissimo Magno Vizirio Exemplaria permutavimus. Datum in Castris Turcicis, stilo veteri die 12 Julii, 1711.

Imperii Vice-Cancellarius, BARO PETRUS SCHAFFIROUW.
Generalis Major, COMES MICHEL SCHEREMETOUW.

[Both the above are taken from Dumont's "Corps Diplomatique," tome vii. p. 275.]

APPENDIX B.

TREATY OF BELGRADE.

Traité de Paix, entre la Russie et la Porte.

Au Nom du Seigneur Dieu, Createur du Ciel et de la Terre, et Source de toute félicite, Une guerre cruelle et ruineuse s'etant élevée entre la Sérénissime et très Puissante Princesse Anne, Impératrice et Autocratrice de toutes les Russies, &c. &c., d'une part; et le Sérénissime et très puissant Prince, Sultan, Mahmout-Kan, fils de Sultan Mustapha-Kan, &c., &c., de l'autre part; lesquels cédant ensuit au desir de la réconciliation qui est si agréable à Dieu, ont jugé d'un commun accord devoir mettre fin à cette effusion de sang, et en terminant toutes les contestations, retablir une parfaite tranquillité, suivant les loix de l'ancienne amitié et du bon voisinage entre les Domaines, Terres, et Sujets des deux Parties, par le moyen d'une paix sincère, sûre et constante, et lieu perpétual d'amitié en faveur et pour la félicité des deux Nations: c'est pourquoi avec l'aide et volonté de Dieu Suprème, et par la médiation de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne, l'affaire a été amenée au point, que par le moyen des Ministres accrédités des deux parts pour cette œuvre salutaire, et munis de pleins pouvoirs convenables et suffisants, scavoir de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies, l'illustrissime et excellentissime Seigneur, Marquis de Villeneuve, Conseiller d'État de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne et son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire près la

Sublime Porte; et de la parte de ladite Sublime Port Ottomane, l'excellentissime et magnifique Elvias Méhémet, Bacha, Grand Visir de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de la pleine et libre puissance qu'il tient de son ministère, après plusieurs conférences tenues entre ledit Seigneur Ambassadeur et les Ministres de la Porte, la présente paix a été conclue et établie inviolable et constante, aux conditions et articles suivants:

ARTICLE I. — Que dès aujourd'hui toute hostilité et inimitié entre les deux Parties, reste suspendue et annullée pour toujours: que toutes les hostilités et contrariétés commisés par l'une ou l'autre des Parties à force ouverte ou autrement, soient mises dans un oubli perpétuel, et qu'on ne cherche en aucune manière à en tirer vengeance: qu'au contraire la paix soit maintenue perpétuelle, constante et inviolable sur terre et sur mer: que la sincère harmonie soit conservée, que l'amitié demeure inaltérable par l'accomplissement très exact de ces articles et conditions stipulées entre les deux suprémes Parties contractantes, Sa Majesté Impériale et Sa Majesté Sultane, leurs Héritiers et Successeurs, et de même entre les Empires, Domaines, Terres, Sujets, et Habitans des deux Nations, de manière qu' à l'avenir les deux Parties évitent nonseulement de se faire aucune hostilité et contrariété publique ou secrette, mais au contraire qu'elles conservent entr'elles une fidelle amitié et une sincère paix, en se souhaitant et se procurant reciproquement toute sorte de prospérité et de bonheur, afin que la paix et la tranquillité restent inviolablement conservées pour le bien et l'accroissement des deux Empires et de leurs Sujets.

ARTICLE II.—Et comme des deux parts on est sincèrement intentionné d'établir entre les deux Empires une paix durable et constante, afin que les Sujets respectifs en puissent profiter et vivre en toute heureuse tranquillité, et afin que tout sujet de contestation et de discussion soit parfaitement levé et aboli, il a été convenu pour cet effet d'un commun accord, que les limites des deux Empires seront les mêmes qui avoient été établies par les traités antérieurs, et précisément comme elles seront clairement expliquées dans une convention qui sera faite en conséquence de ce traité.

ARTICLE III.—La Forteresse d'Azoph sera entièrement demolie et pour assurer la paix d'une manière plus solide et plus durable, le territoire de ladite Forteresse, selon les limites fixées par le traité de 1700, restera désert et servira de barrière entre les deux Empires. En equivalent de ce, il sera permis à la Russie de faire construire une nouvelle Forteresse au voisinage de l'Isle Ciacasse vers Azoph, laquelle Isle située sur le fleuve Tanais, est l'ancienne frontière de la Russie; et également de la part de l'Empire Ottoman, il sera permis de construire une Forteresse sur la frontière du Cuban vers Azoph, suivant la détérmination qui sera faite de la situation des deux susdites Forteresses, par les Commissaires nommés des deux parts, à l'equité et la discretion desquels on remettra la décision; et encore avec la condition que l'ancienne Forteresse de Taganrhock déjà démolie, ne soit point rétablie, et *que la Russie ne pourra ni sur la Mer de Zabache,* ni sur la Mer Noire, construire et avoir de flotte et d'autres navires.*

* The Sea of Zabache means the Sea of Azof. Azof was sometimes called Azak, whence came the Italian corruption into Zabache. See "Annali Musulmani di Rampoldi," vol. xi. p. 471.

ARTICLE IV.—Et afin que les Sujets des deux Empires soient plus positivement instruits des limites que seront determinées, aussitôt après la confirmation du présent traité de paix, les deux Empires nommeront et expedieront les susdits Commissaires ayant la capacité requise, et munis de pleins pouvoirs et d'instructions suffisantes, pour que leur commission ne soit sujette à aucune vaine difficulté, et que venant à se rassembler en vertu du présent traité, ils marquent sans délai les limites entre les deux Empires, et après avoir mis dans les lieux convenables, les bornes et signaux qui doivent servir désormais et toujours, ils confirment avec les instrumens et écritures accoutumées, toutes lesdites limites, en y spécifiant toutes les particularités concernant lesdites limites; lesquels Commissaires devront avoir rempli et parachevé leur commission dans l'espace de six mois, à compter du jour de l'échange des ratifications du présent traité.

ARTICLE V.—Les Cosaques et Calmoukes, Sujets de Sa Majesté Impériale et de l'Empire des Russies, ainsi que toute autre Nation sujette dudit Empire, n'entreprendont aucune invasion et ne commettront aucune hostilité contre les Tartares de Crimée, Sujets de l'Empire Ottoman, ainsi que contre les autres Nations et Tartares, Sujets du même Empire, et ne leur feront aucun mal ou dommage, les Sujets s'abstiendront de toute pareille entreprise, et de toute autre contrariété à cette sainte paix; et si effectivement ils viennent à commettre quelque sorte de témérité, en tel cas ils seront punis rigoureusement, de même les Sujets de l'Empire Ottoman, les Tartares de Crimée, généralement tous les autres Sujets de la Porte Ottomane, de quelque nom et qualité qu'ils puissent être, n'entreprendront aucune invasion et ne commettront aucune hostilité contre les Villes, Bourges, et lieux du Domaine de Sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Russies, ainsi que contre ses Sujets, tant de la grande que de la petite Russie, et contre les Villes des Cosaques, Sujets de Sa Majesté Impériale, et leurs habitations situées sur le Boristhène, le Tanais et ailleurs ni contre les petites Forteresses, Villages et leurs Habitans, en deçà des limites de l'Empire de toutes les Russies, telles qu'elles seront convenues et fixées; ils ne commettront aucune hostilité et éviteront de faire aucun dommage secrètement, comme à découvert, en faisant des Esclaves, en emmenant les bestiaux, ou en les inquiétant de quelque autre manière. Et s'ils osent en quelque manière que ce soit faire tort ou dommage, ou agir hostilement contre les Sujets ou Vassaux de Sa Majesté Impériale, ils ne seront point protégés; mais selon les Loix Divines, le droit de la Justice et l'enormité du delit, ils seront rigoureusement punis, on recherchera tout ce qui pourroit avoir été violemment enlevé de part et d'autre et on le restituera aux Propriétaires.

ARTICLE VI.—Quant aux deux Cabardies grande et petite, et les Nations qui les habitent, il est convenu des deux parts, que ces deux Cabardies resteront libres, et ne seront soumisés à aucun des deux Empires, mais serviront de barrière entr'eux; et que, de la part de la Sublime Porte, ni les Turcs, ni les Tartares, ne s'ingéreront dans ces pays et ne les inquieteront; et de même que, de la part de l'Empire des Russies, ils ne seront point molestés; mais que toutefois, selon l'ancienne coutume, l'Empire des Russies prendra des otages des deux Cabardies, pour le seul motif de maintenir la tranquillité étant libre à la Porte Ottomane d'en user de même pour la même fin; et au

cas que les susdits peuples des Cabardies donnent sujet de plainte à l'une des deux Puissances, il sera permis à chacune de les châtier et de les punir.

ARTICLE VII.—Tous les Prisonniers et Esclaves faits, soit avant, soit depuis la guerre, en quelque occasion et pour quelque motif que ce soit, détenus jusqu'à présent dans les deux Empires, soit Militaires ou de toute autre condition, (excepté ceux qui, dans l'Empire des Russies, auroient embrassé la Réligion Chrétienne, et ceux qui, dans l'Empire Ottoman, auroient embrassé le Mahometisime) sans delai, après la ratification de ce présent traité de paix, sans échange et rançon, tous sans exception aucune, tant qu'il s'en trouvera pour le présent ou à l'avenir dans les deux Empires, seront aussitôt delivrés et renvoyés; et au sujet de la liberté des dits Prisonniers, on publiera les ordres les plus exprès dans toutes les Villes et Provinces des deux Empires, afin que leur affranchissement et congé soit effectivement accordé sans difficulté ou tergiversation aucune. Et tous les Esclaves qui, depuis la conclusion de ce traité ou durant cette paix, auront été faits furtivement dans les États de Sa Majesté Impériale conduits en captivité, et se trouveront dans la Crimée, le Budgiack, le Cuban, ou ailleurs parmi les Turcs, Tartares, et autres Sujets de la Sublime Porte, seront delivrés et rendus sans rançon: et à toutes les personnes qui, avec des Passeports de Sa Majesté Impériale, iront dans ces Contrées pour délivrer les Esclaves Russes, pourvù qu'elles se bornent à exécuter tranquillement leur commission, il ne sera fait aucune violence ni à l'aller, ni au retour; et tous ceux qui, contre la Loi Divine, leur feront violence, ou leur causeront quelque dommage, seront punis.

ARTICLE VIII.—Si, après la conclusion et ratification du présent traité de paix, quelqu'un des sujets des deux puissances ayant commis quelque delit, desobeissance ou trahison, se retire et se réfugie dans un des deux Empires, il ne poura en aucune manière être recu ou protégé; mais il sera incontinent rendu, ou du moins, chassé hors des terres de l'Empire ou il se trouvera; afin que par de tels hommes infames, il ne s'excite aucun refroidissement ou contestation entre des deux Empires; excepté seulement, ceux qui dans l'Empire des Russies se seront faits Chrétiens, et ceux qui dans l'Empire Ottoman se seront faits Mahométans; et dorénavant, si quelque Sujet de la Russie s'enfuit dans les États de la Porte Ottomane, ou si quelque Sujet de la Porte s'enfuit en Russie, lorsqu'il sera réclamé et demande d'une part ou de l'autre, il sera réciproquement rendu.

ARTICLE IX.—Le Commerce étant le fruit de la paix qui procure aux états et aux peuples toute sorte d'abondance, sera permis aux Marchands, Sujets de la Sublime Porte, qui pourront l'exercer librement dans toutes les Russies, de la même manière qu'il est permis aux marchands des autres Puissances et en payant les mêmes droits, et reciproquement il sera permis à tous les Marchands, Sujets de l'Empire des Russies, d'exercer aussi librement le Commerce dans les États de la Porte Ottomane. *Mais pour ce qui regarde le Commerce des Russes sur la Mer Noire, il sera fait sur des bâtimens appartenants aux Turcs.*

ARTICLE X.—Si durant cette paix, il survient entre les Sujets des deux Empires des différends et dissensions, en ce cas les gouverneurs et commandants des frontières feront avec tout sorte de droiture les recherches necessaires; et ces contestations tractes entre les deux Empires, feront ter-

minées par tous moyens convenables, pour mieux assurer le conservation de la paix et l'amitié; et à l'occasion de ces disputes entre les Sujets limitrophes, il ne s'entreprendra point d'hostilité d'aucune part; mais on procurera de part et d'autre, avec toute sorte d'attention et d'une manière amiable, le maintien inaltérable de la tranquillité.

ARTICLE XI.—Il sera permis soit aux Séculiers, soit aux Ecclesiastiques Russes, d'aller librement visiter, soit la Sainte Cité de Jérusalem, soit les autres lieux qui meritent d'être visités; et il ne sera exigé de ces passagers, ou pélerins à Jérusalem ou ailleurs, aucun tribut ou payement par les Sujets de l'Empire Ottoman; on leur donnera les passeports nécessaires, comme la Sublime Porte a coutume de les donner aux nations amies de l'Empire Ottoman; de plus, on ne sera aucun tort ou violence, selon la Loi Divine, aux Ecclésiastiques Russes, tout le temps qu'ils seront sur les terres de la domination Ottomane.

ARTICLE XII.—Quant au titre Impérial dont il a été fait mention de la part de Sa Majesté de toutes les Russies, on en traitera incessamment à l'amiable, et on en conviendra à la satisfaction des deux parties, selon que le requiert la convenance et la suprême dignité et puissance de Sa Majesté Impériale.

ARTICLE XIII.—Pour affirmer encore d'avantage la paix entre les deux Empires, et la surété des articles du présent traité, et de tout ce qu' exigeront les affaires des Sujets respectifs, la residence des Ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale est permise à la Porte, avec le caractère que sadite Majesté jugera convenable; et lesdits Ministres avec toute leur maison, relativement aux priviléges, franchises, comme on tout le reste, seront maintenus et respectés, comme les Ministres des autres Puissances les plus distinguées.

ARTICLE XIV.—Et afin que la présente paix et bonne amitié entre les deux Empires, soit encore mieux établié et affermié, des deux parts on enverra des Ambassadeurs extraordinaires dans le temps qui sera determiné ci après, et fixé du consentement de deux Cours; lesquels Ambassadeurs seront avec égalité échangés sur la frontière, reçus, honorés et traités avec les mêmes cérémonies, et en la même forme et manière qui se pratique pour les Ambassadeurs reciproques entres les Puissances le plus distinguées et la Porte Ottomane, et ces Ambassadeurs seront chargés en signe de amitié, de porter des présens mutuels, convenables à la dignité de leurs Majestés Impériales.

ARTICLE XV.—Il a été convenu de plus, que dans trois mois à compter du jour de la signature du présent traité les instrumens de ratification d'icelui seront échangés par l'entremise de l'illustrissime et excellentissime Seigneur l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté, Très-Chrétienne Médiatrice de la présent paix. Et finalement pour plus grand eclaircissement des articles ci-dessus, on déclare, qu'ayant été convenu dans l'Article IV., qu'il sera nommé des Commissaires pour le réglement des limites; et pour l'execution de la convention qui sera faite concernant lesdites limites, les Commissaires nommés par la Sublime Porte seront subordonnés au Kam de Crimée; et si de la part de l'un ou de l'autre Empire, il survenoit des choses non comprises dans les articles du présent traité de paix, qui seroient capables d'altérer la paix, en ce cas, il y sera incontinent remédié de part et d'autre avec justice et équité. Et afin que les conditions de cette paix contenues dans les quinze articles ci-dessus, soient des deux côtés exécutées à l'avenir et maintenues inviolables comme

elles doivent l'être, on declare, qu'en vertu de ce présent traité, tous les traités antérieurs resteront pour toujours sans aucune force et validité, à la réserve des limites que sont à déterminer.

Et dans le même temps que l'excellentissime et magnifique suprême Visir, en vertu de la susdite pleine puissance, a consigné à l'illustrissime et excellentissime Seigneur, l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne, l'instrument de la présent paix écrit en Turc, le susdit illustrissime et excellentissime Seigneur Ambassadeur de France, en vertu de son plein pouvoir ci-devant communiqué, a egalement consigné au susdit suprême Visir, le même instrument écrit en Italien, avec la condition que ce présent traité venant à être ratifié, la garantie de Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne sera donnée.

Le Projet de traité de paix ci-dessus ayant été examiné et approuvé dans différentes conférences tenues avec les Ministres de la Porte :

Nous Louis Sauveur, Marquis de Villeneuve, Conseiller d'Etat et Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiare de' Empereur de France á la Porte Ottomane, en vertu des pleins-pouvoirs qui nous ont été donnés par Sa Majesté de toutes les Russies, que nous avons communiqués à la Porte, declarons être convenus, au nom de sadite Majesté de toutes les Russies, avec le Magnifique Seigneur, Elvias Méhémet, Bacha, Grand-Visir de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu du plein et absolu pouvoir que lui donné son Ministere, des conditions contenues dans les articles ci-dessus; et en ayant recu l'instrument authentique écrit en langue Turque, signé et scellé par le susdit Grand-Visir de l'Empire Ottoman, nous lui avons remis le présent instrument écrit en Italien et souscrit par nous en François, et scellé du cachet de nos armes, nous réservant neanmoins la ratification de Sa Majesté de toutes les Russies, et au cas qu'elle soit donnée, nous promettons de garantir ledit traité, pour et au nom de l'Empereur de France, saufs et réserves neanmoins ses droits et pre-eminences auxquels nous n'entendons qu'il soit dérogé.

Fait au camp de Belgrade, sous les tentes du Congrés, le 18 Septembre, 1739.

[This copy of the Peace of Belgrade is taken from Langier. Histoire de la Paix de Belgrade.]

APPENDIX C.

THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI.

*Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship, between the Empire of Russia and the Ottoman Porte, concluded on the 10th of July, 1774, in the tent of the Commander-in-chief, Field-Marshal Count de Roumanzow, near the village of Kutschouc-Kainardji, upon the right bank of the Danube, by the Plenipotentiaries named by him and the Grand Vizier; confirmed by the two Chiefs on the 15th of the same month, and approved and ratified by His Highness at Constantinople on the 10th of January, 1775.**

In the name of Almighty God.

The Sovereigns of the two belligerent Empires, that of all the Russias and that of the Ottoman Porte, mutually wishing and desiring to put an end to the war which has lasted up to the present time between the two States, and to succeed in re-establishing peace by means of persons of confidence respectively empowered for that purpose, have nominated and furnished with their effective full powers for negotiating, agreeing upon, concluding, and signing the treaty of peace between the two high Empires, viz., Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias, Count Peter de Roumanzow, Field-Marshal General, Commander of her army, Governor-General of Little Russia, President of the College of Little Russia, and Knight of the Orders of St. Andrew, St. George, St. Alexander Newski, and St. Anne; and his Highness the Grand Vizier of the Sublime Porte, Mousson Zadé Mechmet Bacha.

In consequence, these two Commanders of the armies, the Field-Marshal Count Peter de Roumanzow and the Grand Vizier Mousson Zadé Mechmet Bacha, in order to conform to the wishes of their Courts, have devoted all their attention to this matter, and the Plenipotentiaries, Nischandgi Resmi Achmet Effendi and Ibraim Munib Reis Effendi, sent, on the 5th of July, 1774, by the Grand Vizier on the part of the Sublime Porte, have conjointly with the Plenipotentiary named by the said Field-Marshal, the Prince Nicholas Repnin, Lieutenant-General, Knight of the Order of St. George, of the Grand Cross, of St. Alexander Newski, of the White Eagle of Poland, &c., of St. Anne of Holstein, drawn up, agreed upon, concluded, signed, and sealed with the seal of their coat-of-arms, in presence of Field-Marshal General Count de Roumanzow, in his tent, the following articles of the perpetual peace between the Empire of all the Russias and the Ottoman Porte:

ART. I. From the present time all the hostilities and enmities which have hitherto prevailed shall cease for ever, and all hostile acts and enterprises committed on either side, whether by force of arms or in any other manner, shall be buried in an eternal oblivion, without vengeance being taken for them

* From an impression published in French at St. Petersburgh, 1775.

in any way whatever; but, on the contrary, there shall always be a perpetual, constant, and inviolable peace, as well by sea as by land. In like manner there shall be cultivated between the two high contracting parties, Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias and His Highness, their successors and heirs, as well as between the two Empires, their states, territories, subjects, and inhabitants, a sincere union and a perpetual and inviolable friendship, with a careful accomplishment and maintenance of these articles; so that neither of the two parties shall, in future, undertake with respect to the other any hostile act or design whatsoever, either secretly or openly. And in consequence of the renewal of so sincere a friendship, the two contracting parties grant respectively an amnesty and general pardon to all such of their subjects, without distinction, who may have been guilty of any crime against one or other of the two parties; delivering and setting at liberty those who are in the galleys or in prison; permitting all banished persons or exiles to return home, and promising to restore to them, after the peace, all the honours and property which they before enjoyed, and not to subject them, nor allow others to subject them, with impunity, to any insult, loss, or injury under any pretext whatsoever; but that each and every of them may live under the safeguard and protection of the laws and customs of his native country in the same manner as his native fellow-countrymen.

II. If, after the conclusion of the treaty and the exchange of the ratifications, any subjects of the two Empires, having committed any capital offence, or having been guilty of disobedience or of treason, should endeavour to conceal themselves, or seek an asylum in the territories of one of the two Powers, they must not be received or sheltered there under any pretext, but must be immediately delivered up, or at least expelled, from the States of the Power whither they had escaped, in order that, on account of such criminals, there should not arise any coolness or useless dispute between the two Empires, with the exception, however, of those who, in the Empire of Russia, shall have embraced the Christian religion, and, in the Ottoman Empire, the Mahometan religion. In like manner should any subjects of the two Empires, whether Christians or Mahometans, having committed any crime or offence, or for any reason whatsoever, pass from one Empire into the other, they shall be immediately delivered up, so soon as a requisition to that effect is made.

III. All the Tartar peoples—those of the Crimea, of the Budjiac, of the Kuban, the Edissans, Geambouiluks and Editschkuls—shall, without any exception, be acknowledged by the two Empires as free nations, and entirely independent of every foreign power, governed by their own Sovereign, of the race of Ghengis Khan, elected and raised to the throne by all the Tartar peoples; which Sovereign shall govern them according to their ancient laws and usages, being responsible to no foreign Power whatsoever: for which reason, neither the Court of Russia nor the Ottoman Porte shall interfere, under any pretext whatever, with the election of the said Khan, or in the domestic, political, civil and internal affairs of the same; but, on the contrary, they shall acknowledge and consider the said Tartar nation, in its political and civil state, upon the same footing as the other powers who are governed by themselves, and are dependent upon God alone. As to the ceremonies of

religion, as the Tartars profess the same faith as the Mahometans, they shall regulate themselves, with respect to His Highness, in his capacity of Grand Caliph of Mahometanism, according to the precepts prescribed to them by their law, without compromising, nevertheless, the stability of their political and civil liberty. Russia leaves to this Tartar nation, with the exception of the fortresses of Kertsch and Jenicale (with their districts and ports, which Russia retains for herself), all the towns, fortresses, dwellings, territories, and ports which it has conquered in Crimea and in Kuban; the country situated between the rivers Berda, Konskie, Vodi, and the Dnieper, as well as all that situated as far as the frontier of Poland between the Boug and the Dniester, excepting the fortress of Oczakow, with its ancient territory, which shall belong, as heretofore, to the Sublime Porte; and it promises to withdraw its troops from their possessions immediately after the conclusion and exchange of the treaty of peace. The Sublime Ottoman Porte engages, in like manner, on its part, to abandon all right whatsoever which it might have over the fortresses, towns, habitations, &c., in Crimea, in Kuban, and in the island of Taman; to maintain in those places no garrison nor other armed forces, ceding these States to the Tartars in the same manner as the Court of Russia has done, that is to say, in full power and in absolute and independent sovereignty. In like manner the Sublime Porte engages, in the most solemn manner, and promises neither to introduce nor maintain in future, any garrison or armed forces whatsoever in the above-mentioned towns, fortresses, lands, and habitations, nor, in the interior of those States, any intendant or military agent, of whatsoever denomination, but to leave all the Tartars in the same perfect liberty and independence in which the Empire of Russia leaves them.

IV. It is conformable to the natural right of every power to make, in its own country, such dispositions as it may consider to be expedient: in consequence whereof, there is respectively reserved to the two Empires a perfect and unrestricted liberty of constructing anew in their respective States, and within their frontiers, in such localities as shall be deemed advisable, every kind of fortresses, towns, habitations, edifices, and dwellings, as well as of repairing and rebuilding the old fortresses, towns, habitations, &c.

V. After the conclusion of this happy peace, and the renewal of a sincere and neighbourly friendship, the imperial court of Russia shall always have, henceforth, at the Sublime Porte, a minister of the second rank, that is to say, an envoy or minister plenipotentiary; the Sublime Porte shall show to him, in his official character, all the attentions and respect which are observed towards the ministers of the most distinguished powers; and upon all public occasions the said minister shall immediately follow the emperor's minister, if he be of the same rank as the latter; but if he be of a different rank, that is to say, either superior or inferior, then the Russian minister shall immediately follow the ambassador of Holland, and, in his absence, that of Venice.

VI. If any individual in the actual service of the Russian minister during his stay at the Sublime Porte, having been guilty of theft or having committed any crime or act liable to punishment, should, for the purpose of escaping the penalty of the law, become Turk; although he cannot be

prevented from so doing, yet after he has undergone the punishment he deserves, all the articles stolen shall be restored *in toto*, according to the specification of the minister. But those who, being intoxicated, might be desirous of adopting the turban, must not be allowed so to do until after their fit of drunkenness is over, and they have come to their right senses; and even then, their final declaration shall not be taken, unless in the presence of an interpreter sent by the minister, and of some Mussulman free from the suspicion of partiality.

VII. The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it also allows the ministers of the imperial court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in article XIV. as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power.

VIII. The subjects of the Russian empire, as well laymen as ecclesiastics, shall have full liberty and permission to visit the holy city of Jerusalem, and other places deserving of attention. No charatsch, contribution, duty, or other tax, shall be exacted from those pilgrims and travellers by any one whomsoever, either at Jerusalem or elsewhere, or on the road; but they shall be provided with such passports and firmans as are given to the subjects of the other friendly powers. During their sojourn in the Ottoman empire, they shall not suffer the least wrong or injury; but, on the contrary, shall be under the strictest protection of the laws.

IX. The interpreters attached to the Russian ministers resident at Constantinople, of whatever nation they may be, being employed upon state affairs, and consequently in the service of both empires, must be regarded and treated with every degree of kindness; and they shall be subjected to no ill-treatment on account of the business with which they may be entrusted by their principals.

X. If between the signing of these articles of peace and the orders which shall thereupon be despatched by the commanders of the two respective armies, an engagement should anywhere take place, neither party shall be offended thereat, nor shall it be productive of any consequences, every acquisition made thereby being restored, and no advantage shall accrue therefrom to one party or the other.

XI. For the convenience and advantage of the two empires, there shall be a free and unimpeded navigation for the merchant-ships belonging to the two contracting powers, in all the seas which wash their shores; the Sublime Porte grants to Russian merchant-vessels, namely, such as are universally employed by the other powers for commerce and in the ports, a free passage from the Black Sea into the White Sea, and reciprocally from the White Sea into the Black Sea, as also the power of entering all the ports and harbours situated either on the sea-coasts, or in the passages and channels which join those seas. In like manner, the Sublime Porte allows Russian subjects to trade in its states by land as well as by water and upon the Danube in their ships, in conformity with what has been specified above in this article, with all the same privileges and advantages as are enjoyed in its states by the most

friendly nations, whom the Sublime Porte favours most in trade, such as the French and the English; and the capitulations of those two nations and others shall, just as if they were here inserted word for word, serve as a rule, under all circumstances, and in every place, for whatever concerns commerce as well as Russian merchants, who upon paying the same duties may import and export all kinds of goods, and disembark their merchandise at every port and harbour as well upon the Black as upon the other seas, Constantinople being expressly included in the number.

While granting in the above manner to the respective subjects the freedom of commerce and navigation upon all waters without exception, the two empires, at the same time, allow merchants to stop within their territories for as long a time as their affairs require, and promise them the same security and liberty as are enjoyed by the subjects of other friendly courts. And in order to be consistent throughout, the Sublime Porte also allows the residence of consuls and vice-consuls in every place where the court of Russia may consider it expedient to establish them, and they shall be treated upon a perfect footing of equality with the consuls of the other friendly powers. It permits them to have interpreters called Baratli, that is, those who have patents, providing them with imperial patents, and causing them to enjoy the same prerogatives as those in the service of the said French, English, and other nations.

Similarly, Russia permits the subjects of the Sublime Porte to trade in its dominions, by sea and by land, with the same prerogatives and advantages as are enjoyed by the most friendly nations, and upon paying the accustomed duties. In case of accident happening to the vessels, the two empires are bound respectively to render them the same assistance as is given in similar cases to other friendly nations; and all necessary things shall be furnished to them at the ordinary prices.

XII. When the imperial court of Russia shall have the intention of making any commercial treaty with the regencies of Africa, as Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, the Sublime Porte engages to employ its power and influence in order to accomplish the views of the above-named court in this respect, and to guarantee, as regards those regencies, all the conditions which shall have been stipulated in those treaties.

XIII. The Sublime Porte promises to employ the sacred title of the Empress of all the Russias in all public acts and letters, as well as in all other cases, in the Turkish language, that is to say, "Temamen Roussielerin Padischag."

XIV. After the manner of the other powers, permission is given to the high court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the minister's residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglu, a public church of the Greek ritual, which shall always be under the protection of the ministers of that empire, and secure from all coercion and outrage.

XV. Although, according to the manner in which the boundaries of the two contracting powers are arranged, there is every reason to hope that the respective subjects shall no longer find any occasion for serious differences and disputes amongst themselves, nevertheless, at all events to guard against whatever might occasion a coolness or cause a misunderstanding, the two empires mutually agree that all such cases of disagreement shall be investigated

by the governors and commanders of the frontiers, or by commissioners appointed for that purpose, who shall be bound, after making the necessary inquiries, to render justice where it is due, without the least loss of time: with the express condition that events of this nature shall never serve as a pretext for the slightest alteration in the friendship and good feeling re-established by this treaty.

XVI. The empire of Russia restores to the Sublime Porte the whole of Bessarabia, with the cities of Ackermann, Kilija, Ismail, together with the towns and villages, and all contained in that province; in like manner it restores to it the fortress of Bender. Similarly the empire of Russia restores to the Sublime Porte the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, together with all the fortresses, cities, towns, villages, and all which they contain, and the Sublime Porte receives them upon the following conditions, solemnly promising to keep them religiously:

1. To observe, with respect to all the inhabitants of these principalities, of whatever rank, dignity, state, calling, and extraction they may be, without the least exception, the absolute amnesty and eternal oblivion stipulated in Article I. of the treaty, in favour of all those who shall have actually committed any crime, or who shall have been suspected of having had the intention of doing injury to the interests of the Sublime Porte, re-establishing them in their former dignities, ranks, and possessions, and restoring to them the property which they were in the enjoyment of previously to the present war.

2. To obstruct in no manner whatsoever the free exercise of the Christian religion, and to interpose no obstacle to the erection of new churches and to the repairing of the old ones, as has been done heretofore.

3. To restore to the convents and to other individuals the lands and possessions formerly belonging to them, which have been taken from them contrary to all justice, and which are situated in the environs of Brahilow, Choczim, Bender, &c., now called Rai.

4. To entertain for ecclesiastics the particular respect due to their calling.

5. To grant to families who shall be desirous to quit their country in order to establish themselves elsewhere, a free egress with all their property; and, in order that such families may duly arrange their affairs, to allow them the term of one year for this free emigration from their country, reckoning from the day on which the present treaty shall be exchanged.

6. Not to demand or exact any payment for old accounts, of whatever nature they may be.

7. Not to require from these people any contribution or payment for all the time of the duration of the war; and even, on account of the devastations to which they have been exposed, to relieve them from all taxes for the space of two years, reckoning from the day on which the present treaty shall be exchanged.

8. At the expiration of the above-mentioned term, the Porte promises to treat them with all possible humanity and generosity in the monetary taxes which it shall impose upon them, and to receive them by means of deputies, who shall be sent to it every two years; and after the payment of these taxes no bacha, governor, nor any other person whatsoever shall molest them, or

exact from them any other payments or taxes of what description soever, but they shall possess all the advantages which they enjoyed during the reign of the late sultan.

9. The Porte allows each of the princes of these two states to have accredited to it a chargé d'affaires, selected from among the Christians of the Greek communion, who shall watch over the affairs of the said principalities, be treated with kindness by the Porte, and who, notwithstanding their comparative want of importance, shall be considered as persons who enjoy the rights of nations, that is to say, who are protected from every kind of violence.

10. The Porte likewise permits that, according as the circumstances of these two principalities may require, the ministers of the imperial court of Russia resident at Constantinople may remonstrate in their favour; and promises to listen to them with all the attention which is due to friendly and respected powers.

XVII. The empire of Russia restores to the Sublime Porte all the islands of the Archipelago which are under its dependence; and the Sublime Porte, on its part, promises:

1. To observe religiously, with respect to the inhabitants of these islands, the conditions stipulated in Article I., concerning the general amnesty and the eternal oblivion of all crimes whatsoever, committed or suspected to have been committed to the prejudice of the interests of the Sublime Porte.

2. That the Christian religion shall not be exposed to the least oppression any more than its churches, and that no obstacle shall be opposed to the erection or repair of them; and also that the officiating ministers shall neither be oppressed nor insulted.

3. That there shall not be exacted from these islands any payment of the annual taxes to which they were subjected, namely, since the time that they have been under the dependence of the empire of Russia; and that, moreover, in consideration of the great losses which they have suffered during the war, they shall be exempt from any taxes for two years more, reckoning from the time of their restoration to the Sublime Porte.

4. To permit the families who might wish to quit their country, and establish themselves elsewhere, free egress with their property; and, in order that such families may arrange their affairs with all due convenience, the term of one year is allowed them for this free emigration, reckoning from the day of the exchange of the present treaty.

5. In case the Russian fleet, at the time of its departure, which must take place within three months, reckoning from the day on which the present treaty is exchanged, should be in need of anything, the Sublime Porte promises to provide it, as far as possible, with all that may be necessary.

XVIII. The castle of Kinburn, situated at the mouth of the Dnieper, with a proportionate district along the left bank of the Dnieper, and the corner which forms the desert between the Bug and the Dnieper, remains under the full, perpetual, and incontestable dominion of the empire of Russia.

XIX. The fortresses of Jenicalé and Kertsch, situated in the peninsula of Crimea, with their ports and all therein contained, and moreover with their districts, commencing from the Black Sea, and following the ancient frontier

of Kertsch as far as the place called Bugak, and from Bugak ascending in a direct line as far as the Sea of Azow, shall remain under the full, perpetual, and incontestable dominion of the empire of Russia.

XX. The city of Azow, with its district, and the boundaries laid down in the conventions made in 1700, that is to say in 1113, between the Governor Tolstoi and Hassan Bacha, governor of Atschug, shall belong in perpetuity to the empire of Russia.

XXI. The two Cabardes, namely, the Great and Little, on account of their proximity to the Tartars, are more nearly connected with the khans of Crimea; for which reason it must remain with the khan of Crimea to consent, in concert with his council and the ancients of the Tartar nation, to these countries becoming subject to the imperial court of Russia.

XXII. The two empires have agreed to annihilate and leave in an eternal oblivion all the treaties and conventions heretofore made between the two states, including therein the convention of Belgrade, with all those subsequent to it; and never to put forth any claim grounded upon the said conventions, excepting, however, the one made in 1700 between Governor Tolstoi and Hassan Bacha, governor of Atschug, on the subject of the boundaries of the district of Azow and of the line of demarcation of the frontier of Kuban, which shall remain invariably such as it has heretofore been.

XXIII. The fortresses which are standing in a part of Georgia and of Mingrelia, as Bagdadgick, Kutatis, and Scheherban, conquered by the Russian armies, shall be considered by Russia as belonging to those on whom they were formerly dependent; so that if, in ancient times, or for a very long period, they have actually been under the dominion of the Sublime Porte, they shall be considered as belonging to it; and after the exchange of the present treaty the Russian troops shall, at the time agreed upon, quit the said provinces of Georgia and Mingrelia. On its part, the Sublime Porte engages, conformably to the contents of the present article, to grant a general amnesty to all those in the said countries who, in the course of the present war, shall have offended it in any manner whatsoever. It renounces solemnly and for ever to exact tributes of children, male and female, and every other kind of tax. It engages to consider such of these people only as its subjects as shall have belonged to it from all antiquity; to leave and restore all the castles and fortified places which have been under the dominion of the Georgians and Mingrelians, to their own exclusive custody and government; as also not to molest in any manner the religion, monasteries, and churches; not to hinder the repairing of dilapidated ones, nor the building of new ones; and it promises that these people shall not be oppressed on the part of the governor of Tschildirsk, and other chiefs and officers, by exactions which despoil them of their property. But as the said people are subjects of the Sublime Porte, Russia must not, in future, intermeddle in any manner in their affairs, nor molest them in any way.

XXIV. Immediately upon the signing and confirmation of these articles, all the Russian troops which are in Bulgaria on the right bank of the Danube shall withdraw, and within one month, reckoning from the day of the signature, they shall cross to the other side of the river. When all the troops shall have passed the Danube, the castle of Hirsow shall be delivered up to

the Turks, the said castle being evacuated to them when all the Russian troops shall have completely passed over to the left bank of that river. After which, the evacuation of Wallachia and Bessarabia shall be effected simultaneously, the term of two months being allowed for that operation. After all the Russian troops shall have quitted these two provinces, the fortresses of Giurgewo and afterwards Brahilow on the one side (of the river) and on the other, the town of Ismail and the fortresses of Kilia and Akkerman, shall be delivered up to the Turkish troops, from all which places the Russian garrisons shall withdraw for the purpose of following the other troops, so that for the complete evacuation of the said provinces the term of three months shall be assigned. Lastly, the Imperial troops of Russia shall, two months afterwards, withdraw from Moldavia, and shall pass over to the left bank of the Dniester; thus, the evacuation of all the aforesaid countries shall be effected within five months, reckoning from the above-mentioned signing of the treaty of perpetual peace between the two contracting Empires. When all the Russian troops shall have passed to the left bank of the Dniester, the fortresses of Chotzum and of Bender shall be given up to the Turkish troops; upon this condition, however, that the castle of Kinburn with the district belonging to it, and the desert situated between the Dnieper and the Boug, shall have been already restored in full, perpetual, and incontestable sovereignty to the Empire of Russia, conformably to Article XVIII. of the treaty of perpetual peace between the two Empires.

As to the islands of the Archipelago, they shall be left, as heretofore, under the legitimate dominion of the Ottoman Porte, by the fleet and the Imperial troops of Russia, as soon as the arrangements and peculiar necessities of the fleet shall permit, with regard to which it is not possible to assign here the precise time. And the Sublime Porte, in order to accelerate as much as possible the departure of the said fleet, already engages, as a friendly power, to furnish it, as far as it can, with every necessary of which it may be in need.

During the stay of the Imperial troops of Russia in the provinces to be restored to the Sublime Porte, the government and police shall remain there in the same vigour as at present and since the conquest, and the Porte must take no part whatever therein, during the whole of this time, nor until the entire withdrawal of all the troops. Up to the last day of their quitting these countries, the Russian troops shall be provided with all necessaries, as well provisions as other articles, in the same manner as they have hitherto been furnished with them.

The troops of the Sublime Porte must not enter the fortresses which shall be restored to it, nor shall that power commence to exercise its authority in the countries which shall be given up to it, until at each place or country which shall have been evacuated by the Russian troops, the commander of those troops shall have given notice thereof to the officer appointed for that purpose on the part of the Ottoman Porte.

The Russian troops may, at their pleasure, empty their magazines of ammunition and provisions which are in the fortresses, towns and wherever else they may be, and they shall leave nothing in the fortresses restored to the Sublime Porte but such Turkish artillery as is actually found there. The

inhabitants in all the countries restored to the Sublime Porte, of whatever state and condition they may be, and who are in the Imperial service of Russia, have the liberty, besides the term allowed of one year, as assigned in the Articles XVI. and XVII. of the Treaty of Peace, of quitting the country and withdrawing with their families and property in the rear of the Russian troops; and conformably to the above-mentioned articles, the Sublime Porte engages not to oppose their departure, neither then nor during the entire term of one year.

XXV. All the prisoners of war and slaves in the two Empires, men and women, of whatever rank and dignity they may be, with the exception of those who, in the Empire of Russia shall have voluntarily quitted Mahometanism in order to embrace the Christian religion, or in the Ottoman Empire shall have voluntarily abandoned Christianity in order to embrace the Mahometan faith, shall, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, and without any excuse whatever, be set at liberty on either side, and restored and delivered up without ransom or redemption money; in like manner, all the Christians fallen into slavery, such as Poles, Moldavians, Wallachians, Peloponnesians, inhabitants of the islands, and Georgians, all, without the least exception, must be set at liberty without ransom or redemption money. Similarly all Russian subjects who, since the conclusion of this happy peace, shall by any accident have fallen into slavery, and who shall be found in the Ottoman Empire, must be set at liberty and restored in like manner; all which the Empire of Russia promises also to observe, on its part, towards the Ottoman Porte and its subjects.

XXVI. After having received in Crimea and in Oczakow intelligence of the signature of these articles, the commander of the Russian army in Crimea, and the Governor of Oczakow must immediately communicate with each on the subject, and within two months after the signing of the treaty send, respectively, persons duly accredited for effecting, on the one hand, the cession, and on the other the taking possession, of the Castle of Kinburn, with the desert, as stipulated in Article XVIII. above; and this the said Commissioners must absolutely effect within two months from the day of their meeting, in order that within four months, or even sooner, reckoning from the signing of the treaty, the whole of this business be accomplished, and immediately after the said execution thereof, notice of the same shall be given to their Excellencies the Field-Marshal and the Grand Vizier.

XXVII. But in order that the present peace and sincere friendship between the two Empires be so much the more strongly and authentically sealed and confirmed, there shall be sent on both sides solemn and extraordinary embassies with the imperial ratifications signed, confirmatory of the treaty of peace, at such time as shall be agreed upon by both the high contracting parties. The ambassadors shall be met on the frontiers in the same manner, and they shall be received and treated with the same honours and ceremonies as are observed in the respective embassies between the Ottoman Porte and the most respectable powers. And as a testimonial of friendship, there shall be mutually sent through the medium of the said ambassadors presents which shall be proportionate to the dignity of their Imperial Majesties.

XXVIII. After these articles of the perpetual peace shall have been signed by the said plenipotentiaries, the Lieutenant-General Prince Repnin, and on the part of the Sublime Porte the Nischandgi Resmi Achmet Effendi and Ibrahim Munib Effendi, all hostilities are to cease between the principal as well as between the separate corps, both by land and by sea, so soon as orders to that effect shall have been received from the commanders of the two armies. For this purpose, couriers must first of all be dispatched on the part of the Field-Marshal and the Grand Vizier into the Archipelago, to the fleet which is in the Black Sea, opposite to the Crimea, and to all the places where hostilities are being mutually carried on, in order that by virtue of the concluded peace all warfare and hostile operations may cease and determine; and these couriers shall be provided with orders on the part of the Field-Marshal, and of the Grand Vizier, in such wise, that should the Russian courier arrive first at the quarters of the commander to whom he is sent, he may, through his means, transmit to the Turkish commander the orders of the Grand Vizier; and in like manner, if the courier of the latter should be the first to arrive, then the Turkish Commander may transmit to the Russian Commander the orders of the Field-Marshal.

And as the negotiation and accomplishment of this peace have been confided by the sovereigns of the respective empires to the care of the Commanders-in-chief of their armies, namely, the Field-Marshal Count Pierre de Roumanzow, and the Grand Vizier of the Sublime Porte, Mousson Zade Mechmet Bacha, the said Field-Marshal and Grand Vizier must, by virtue of the full power given to each of them by their sovereigns, confirm all the said articles of the perpetual peace as they are herein expressed, and with the same force as if they had been drawn up in their presence, sign them with the seal of their coat-of-arms, observe and faithfully and inviolably accomplish all that has been there stipulated and promised, do nothing, nor suffer anything whatsoever to be done in contravention of the said treaty, and the copies, in every respect similar to the present one, signed by them, and having their seals attached, on the part of the Grand Vizier in the Turkish and Italian language, and on the part of the Field-Marshal in Russian and Italian, as well as the full powers to them given by their sovereigns, shall be respectively exchanged by the same persons above-mentioned, who have been sent, on the part of the Sublime Porte, to the Field-Marshal, within five days without fail, reckoning from the day of the signing of the present treaty, and sooner if it be possible; it being, from this present time, determined that they shall receive the said copies from the Field-Marshal as soon as they shall have notified that those of the Grand Vizier have reached them.

This 10*th July*, 1774.

(L.S.) COUNT PIERRE DE ROUMANZOW.
PRINCE NICHOLAS REPNIN.

(L.S.) MOUSSON ZADE MECHMET BACHA.
RESMI ACHMET EFFENDI.
IRRAIM MUNIB EFFENDI.

This is the copy laid before the House of Commons in 1854, but there were two secret additional articles to this treaty, which are given in Martens'

Rècueil des Traités, t. 11, p. 287, and in Hellert's notes to his translation of Von Hammer. They are as follows :—

ARTICLE I.—Par cet article séparé, il est arrêté que la Sublime Porte s'engage à payer à la Russie pour les frais de guerre quinze mille bourses, c'est-à-dire, sept millions et demi de piastres, qui d'après le cours de la monnaie russe forment la somme de quatre millions de roubles. Cette somme sera payée en entier dans trois ans et dans les trois termes suivans : le premier au 1er janvier 1775; le second au 1er janvier 1776, et le troisième au 1er janvier 1777; chaque paiement se composera de cinq mille bourses qui seront reçues par l'ambassadeur russe. Si la cour de Russie demandait au sujet du paiement de cette somme une garantie quelconque, la Sublime Porte la contentera aussi sous ce rapport et lui donnera la sûreté demandée. La Sublime Porte s'engage par la présente, d'observer cet article comme s'il avait été inséré mot à mot dans le traité conclu entre les deux cours. En foi de quoi nous avons apposé notre signature et notre sceau : le 11 (21) juillet 1774, à Kaïnardjé.

ARTICLE II.—Bien qu'il ait été convenu dans l'article XVII. du traité de paix signé aujourd'hui, que la flotte russe devra évacuer les îles de l'Archipel dans l'espace de trois mois, les deux puissances contractantes ont arrêté d'un common accord que, puisqu'il n'est pas question d'un ajournement dans l'article XXIV., on se tiendra de part et d'autre au sens de cet article XXIV. d'après lequel la flotte russe doit quitter au plus tôt l'Archipel, et que, pour accélérer le départ de ladite flotte, la Sublime Porte promet de lui fournir tout ce dont elle aura besoin et autant qu'elle le pourra. Cet article est obligatoire comme s'il avait été inséré dans le traité lui-même. En foi de quoi nous avons apposé notre signature et notre sceau; le 10 (21) juillet 1774, à Kaïnardjé.

APPENDIX D.

TREATY OF JASSY.

Traité définitif de paix entre Sa Majesté l'Imperatrice de Russie et la Porte Ottomane, signé à Jassy, le 29 *Décembre* 1791, (9 *Janvier* 1792).

AU NOM DE DIEU TOUT-PUISSANT.

Sa Majesté l'impératrice et autocrate de toutes les Russies et Sa Hautesse le sublime empereur de Turquie, animés de part et d'autre du désir sincère de rétablir la paix qui a été interrompue par quelques faibles circonstances, de terminer la guerre qui a eu lieu jusqu'à présent dans leurs deux empires respectifs, et de rétablir la paix, l'amitié, et la bonne intelligence sur des bases immuables, ont jugé convenable de confier cette œuvre bonne et salutaire au zèle et aux bons sentimens de leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs; du côté de Sa Majesté l'empereur ottoman, Son Altesse Joussouf pacha, grand visir de la Haute Porte ottomane; et de la part de Sa Majesté impériale de Russie, Son Altesse et Excellence Alexandre comte de Besborodko, conseiller intime ordi-

naire, chevalier des ordres de sa souveraine; et pour que ces préliminaires de paix puissent être établis par des personnes respectivement choisies, nommées à ce sujet et pourvues des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires, pour conclure et signer le présent traité, on a choisi, nommé et muni, de la part de la Porte ottomane, les Excellens et très-honorables le reïs effendi, Eyseid Abdallah Birri, Ordu Cadissi, revêtu du caractère d'effendi de Constantinople, Seid Ibrahim Ismet bey, et Rusnamadzii Ervel Mahomet Durri effondi; et de la part de l'empire russe, les Excellens et très-honorables Alexandre de Samoilof, lieutenant-général des armées de S. M. l'impératrice, son chambellan et directeur de la chancellerie du Sénat-Dirigeant et chevalier de divers ordres; Joseph de Ribas major-géneral des armées, commandant de la flotte à Racues, chevalier de plusieurs ordres, et Sergius de Lascarof, conseiller d'État et chevalier, lesquels se sont réunis à Yassy pour établir une paix durable entre les deux empires et sont convenus de part et d'autre des articles suivans:

ARTICLE PREMIER.—Dès à présent et pour toujours, toutes hostilités et mésintelligence cesseront pour être ensevelies dans un oubli éternel, entre Leurs Majestés le grand-seigneur et l'impératrice de toutes les Russies, ainsi qu'entre leurs héritiers et successeurs, entre leurs empires et sujets; une paix durable et solide régenera entre eux sur terre et sur mer, ainsi qu'une amitié constante et la bonne harmonie. On exécutera de part et d'autre avec franchise et sincérité les articles du présent traité, de sorte qu'aucune des deux parties contractantes n'entreprendra soit ouvertement soit secrètement aucune expédition ou tentative contre l'autre. Par suite du renouvellement d'une si franche amitié, les deux parties contractantes accordent de part et d'autre une amnistie et un pardon général à tous ceux de leurs sujets, sans la moindre exception, qui auraient manqué envers l'une ou l'autre des deux parties contractantes, rendent la liberté à ceux qui se trouvent dans les galères ou dans les prisons; permettant à tous ceux qui ont émigré ou qui ont été bannis, de rentrer dans leurs foyers avec la promesse qu'on les laissera jouir, après la paix, de tous leurs honneurs et biens qu'ils possédaient antérieurement, sans leur faire la moindre injure, tort ou offense, et qu'ils seront tous sous la sauve-garde et la protection des lois et usages de leur pays, comme leurs autres compatriotes.

ARTICLE II.—Le traité de paix conclu le 10 Juillet 1774, ou bien dans l'année de l'Hégire 1188, le 14 du mois zemaziel evel, la convention explicative conclue le 20 zemaziel akir ou bien le 10 Mars 1779, le traité de commerce du 20 du mois Ridzel 1197, c'est-à-dire du 10 Juin 1783, et l'acte qui, au sujet de la réunion de la Crimée et de Taman à l'empire russe, assigne pour limite le fleuve Kuban, et qui a été conclu le 15 Saffer 1198, ou bien le 28 Décembre 1783;* tous ces traités sont maintenus dans tous leurs articles et à l'exception

* Cet acte contient les dispositions suivantes:—

ARTICLE I. La traité de paix de 1774, la convention de 1775, touchant les limites, la convention explicatoire de 1779, et le traité de commerce de 1783, continueront d'être strictement et inviolablement observés de part et d'autre dans tous leurs points et articles, à l'exception de l'article III. du traité de 1774 et des articles II. III. et IV. de la convention explicatoire de 1779; les-

de ceux auxquels il est dérogé par le présent traité ou ceux qui l'ont précédé, et les deux hautes parties contractantes s'obligent à les observer religieusement et inviolablement et de les accomplir avec fidélité et exactitude.

ARTICLE III.—Par suite du dixième article des préliminaires, dans lequel il est déterminé que *le Dniester doit toujours servir de limite entre les deux empires et que les limites de l'empire russe doivent s'étendre dans la suite jusqu'audit fleuve;* les deux hautes parties contractantes conviennent de part et d'autre, que le Dniester formera toujours la limite entre la Sublime-Porte et l'empire russe, de manière que tout le pays situé sur la rive droite sera rendu et restera toujours sous la domination pleine et entière de la Sublime-Porte, et tout le territoire situé sur la rive gauche du même fleuve doit toujours rester sous la domination de l'empire de Russie.

ARTICLE IV.—Par suite de la fixation des limites entre les deux empires et per suite du quatrième article des préliminaires, par lequel il a été décidé *que toutes les autres limites doivent rester dans le même état dans lequel elles étaient au commencement de la guerre, et que les pays occupés pendant la guerre par les troupes de l'empire russe doivent être rendus à la Sublime Porte avec les forteresses qui s'y trouvent et dans leur état actuel;* Sa Majesté impériale rend à la Sublime-Porte la Bessarabie avec les places fortes de Bender, d'Akermann, Kilia et Ismaïl, ainsi que les bourgs et villages que cette province contient; de plus, Sa Majesté impériale rend la province de Moldavie avec toutes ses villes et villages et tout ce qu'elle renferme; et la Sublime-Porte les reçoit sous les conditions suivantes qu'elle promet d'accomplir entièrement :

1° D'observer et de remplir religieusement tout ce qui a été fait d'avantageux pour les deux provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie dans le traité de paix qui a été conclu dans l'année de l'Hégire 1188, le 14 du mois de zemaziel evel, c'est-à-dire le 10 Juillet 1774; de plus ce qui a été déterminé dans la convention du 28 zemaziel akir 1193, c'est-à-dire le 10 Mai 1779, et dans l'acte du 15 du mois saffer 1198, c'est-à-dire le 28 Décembre 1783, que le grand visir a conclu au nom de la Sublime-Porte;

2° De ne demander ou exiger de ces pays le remboursement d'aucunes dettes arriérées de quelque nature qu'elles puissent être;

3° De ne prélever aucune contribution pour toute la durée de la guerre et

---

quels articles ne seront plus d'aucune valeur ni force obligatoire pour les deux empires; mais comme dans le susdit article III. du traité sus-mentionné de 1774, se trouve l'expression que la forteresse d'Oczakow et son ancien territoire appartiendrait comme ci-devant à la Porte, cette expression aura sa valeur et sera observée telle qu'elle est.

ARTICLE II.—La cour impériale de Russie ne fera jamais valoir les droits que les khans des Tartares avaient formés sur le territoire de la forterresse Soudjak-Calessi et par conséquent elle la reconnait appartenir en toute souveraineté à la Porte.

ARTICLE III.—En admettant pour frontière dans le Kuban la rivière de Kuban, ladite cour de Russie renonce en même temps a toutes les nations tartares qui sont en deça de ladite rivière, c'est-à-dire entre la rivière Kuban et la mer Noire.

de les affranchir au contraire pendant deux années de toutes les contributions et charges à compter du jour de la ratification du présent traité, afin de les dédommager des pertes immenses en dévastations, qu'elles ont souffertes pendant la durée de la guerre;

4° D'accorder la permission de quitter le pays avec toute leur fortune, aux familles qui le desireraient, pour aller s'établir ailleurs; et pour que ces familles aient tout le temps suffisant de pouvoir en donner connaissance à leurs parens sujets de la Sublime-Porte, et de vendre leurs biens meubles ou immeubles à des sujets du même empire, et de prendre enfin tous les arrangemens, on leur accordera pour cette émigration un terme de quatorze mois, à comter de l'échange des ratifications du présent traité.

ARTICLE V.—Pour preuve de la franchise avec laquelle les deux hautes parties contractantes cherchent à rétablir la bonne harmonie, non seulement pour le moment, mais encore pour la suite, avec l'éloignement de tout ce qui pourrait donner le moindre prétexte de différends et de mésintelligence entre les deux empires, la Sublime-Porte promet, en renouvelant le firman qui a déjà été donné précédemment, d'adresser des ordres au commandant supérieur des frontières, le pacha d'Ahltzik ou Achiska, et de lui défendre dès à présent, de la manière la plus sévère, d'inquiéter ou de surcharger sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, secrètement ou ouvertement, les pays et les habitans qui se trouvent sous la domination du czar de Tiflis ou Cartalinien, avec l'ordre exprès de ne point troubler le bon voisinage.

ARTICLE VI.—D'après le deuxième article du présent traité, et entre autres conventions, celle du 28 Décembre 1783, à l'égard de la réunion de la Crimée et de Taman à l'empire russe avec le fleuve de Kuban pour frontière entre les deux États, la Sublime-Porte promet solennellement, pour prouver la franchise qui l'anime, d'éloigner dès à présent tout ce qui pourrait troubler la paix, la tranquillité, et l'harmonie entre les deux États, et d'employer ses bons offices et son influence pour entretenir les peuples limitrophes de la rive gauche du Kuban dans le bon ordre et la tranquillité, d'empêcher qu'ils ne fassent des incursions dans l'empire russe, et de ne causer aucun dommage aux sujets russes au à leurs habitations et au pays en général, en secret ou ouvertement et sous aucun pretexte que ce puisse être; et pour qu'ils ne puissent pas enlever d'esclaves, la Sublime-Porte adressera à qui de droit les ordres les plus sévères et le leur défendra sous menace des peines les plus fortes; elle s'engagera en outre à publier ses ordres dans ses mêmes lieux après la ratification du présent traité. Dans le cas cependant où, après la publication des susdites défenses et ordres, quelqu'un se permettrait la moindre infraction au présent traité, en violant le territoire russe pour y causer le moindre dommage, en y enlevant des bestiaux ou autres objets, ou bien encore des sujets russes pour les réduire en esclavage, aussitôt les plaintes portées, la justice la plus rigoureuse sera rendu sans délai et les objets volés rendus: il ne doit surtout être fait aucune difficulté pour la recherche et la remise des sujets russes qui pourraient avoir été enlevés; les frais que cela pourrait occasionner seront remboursés et les coupables punis sévèrement, en présence des commissaires russes nommés pour cet objet par le commandant supérieur des frontières. Si, contre toute attente, dans l'espace de six mois on ne rendait aucune satisfaction à compter du jour où la plainte aura été faite, la Sublime-Porte s'engage

à rembourser tous les frais dans l'espace d'un mois après la réclamation faite par le ministre russe. Bien entendu que les châtimens mentionnés plus haut et dus à l'infraction et au trouble occasionnés, seront infligés dans le moindre délai.

ARTICLE VII.—Comme le commerce est le lien le plus intime de l'harmonie des deux pays, la Sublime-Porte, pour prouver sa franchise et combien elle désire établir un commerce avantageux et sûr entre les deux États, au moment du renouvellement de la paix et de l'amitié avec l'empire russe, stipule le maintien et l'exécution du traité de commerce avec la Russie concernant les corsaires d'Alger, de Tunis et de Tripoli, et spécialement que si un sujet russe est enlevé par un corsaire de ces divers États, ou bien si les forbans s'emparent d'un vaisseau ou d'une marchandise quelconque appartenant à des commerçans russes, la Porte ottomane s'engage en pareil cas à employer tous ses moyens auprès desdites puissances, pour faire rendre les sujets russes qu'ils auront pu traîner en esclavage, de leur restituer le vaisseau, leurs marchandises et autres biens qui leur auraient été enlevés, et de les faire dédommager des pertes qu'ils auront pu en éprouver; et si l'on acquérait la certitude que ses firmans n'ont pas été mis en exécution par lesdites puissances d'Alger, de Tunis et de Tripoli, la Porte s'engage de rembourser de son propre trésor lesdites sommes dans le délai de deux mois ou plutôt s'il est possible, sur la réclamation du ministre de Russie ou chargé d'affaires.

ARTICLE VIII.—Les prisonniers de guerre et autres esclaves des deux sexes, de quelque condition qu'ils soient, et qui se trouvent dans l'un ou l'autre État, à l'exception toutefois de ceux qui dans l'empire ottoman ont passé de la religion chrétienne au musulmanisme, seront rendus immédiatement après la ratification du présent traité et mis en parfaite liberté de part et d'autre sans aucune rançon; de même tous les autres chrétiens qui se trouvent en esclavage, tels que Polonais, Moldaves, Valaques, habitans du Péloponèse et des îles, de la Géorgie, et tous autres sans exception, seront mis en liberté sans aucune rançon. Ceci s'étend également à tous les sujets russes qui, après la conclusion de la paix, se trouveraient en esclavage par quelque circonstance que ce puisse être, et la Russie promet de son côté une parfaite réciprocité à l'égard de la Porte ottomane et de ses sujets.

ARTICLE IX.—Pour qu'il n'y ait point de mésentendu à l'égard d'opérations hostiles après que les armes auront été posées, le grand visir d'une part et le plénipotentiaire et conseiller privé de l'impératrice de Russie, feront connaître aux généraux en chef de leurs armées et flottes respectives, que la paix et la bonne intelligence sont rétablies entre les deux empires.

ARTICLE X.—Pour mieux consolider cette paix heureuse et la sincère amitié entre les deux cours, il sera envoyé solennellement, de part et d'autre, des ambassadeurs extraordinaires à des époques qui seront déterminées par les deux cours; les ambassadeurs respectifs seront reçus sur la frontière avec les mêmes étiquettes, honneurs, et cérémonies qui sont d'usage dans les ambassades que s'envoient les puissances les plus considérées par les deux empires, et des présens dignes des deux souverains seront échangés par les ambassadeurs respectifs.

ARTICLE XI.—Après la conclusion du traité de paix entre les deux empires et la ratification des souverains, les troupes et la flotte russe de Racues com-

menceront à évacuer le territoire ottoman; mais, vu les empêchemens que présente la saison, il est nécessaire de prolonger le temps de l'évacuation. Les deux parties contractantes sont convenues de fixer pour terme définitif le 15 Mai ancien style de l'année 1792, époque à laquelle toutes les troupes de Sa Majesté se retireront le long de la rive gauche du Dniester et toute la flotte de Racues quittera l'embouchure du Danube. Pendant tout le temps de l'occupation de l'armée russe dans les provinces et les forteresses qui, par suite du traité de paix actuel, sont rendues à la Sublime-Porte, l'administration des affaires doit rester telle qu'elle est sous cette première puissance, et la Porte ottomane ne pourra en prendre soin qu'à l'époque fixée pour l'entière évacuation de l'armée. Les troupes impériales russes recevront leurs vivres et munitions jusqu'au dernier jour de leur occupation, comme elles les ont eus jusqu'à présent aux frais du pays.

ARTICLE XII.—Après la signature du présent traité de paix par les plénipotentiaires respectifs réunis à Yassy, le grand visir de la part de la Sublime Porte et le conseiller intime et premier plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'impératrice autocrate de toutes les Russies, échangeront dans le délai de quinze jours, et plutôt si cela est possible, par les mains de ces mêmes plénipotentiaires, les actes respectifs par lesquels le présent traité de paix recevra toute sa force.

ARTICLE XIII.—Le présent et heureux traité d'une paix éternelle sera confirmé solennellement par la propre signature de Sa Majesté le grand-seigneur et de Sa Majesté l'impératrice de toutes les Russies; et cette ratification sera échangée dans le délai de cinq semaines, à partir de la conclusion du traité, et plutôt si faire se peut, par les mêmes plénipotentiaires qui l'ont conclu, lesquels plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé, scellé de leur sceau et échangé le présent traité.

Donné à Yassy, le 29 *Décembre* 1791 (9 Janvier 1792), ou bien 1206, le 15 du mois de zemadziel evel.

Signé: ALEXANDRE DE SAMOILOF.
JOSEPH RIBAS.
SERGE LASCAROF.

[This is taken from the Appendix to Alix. "Précis de l'Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman," vol. iii.; it has been verified by comparison with the German version in Martens.]

APPENDIX E.

TREATY OF BUCHAREST.

Traité de paix entre S. M. Impériale de toutes les Russies et la Porte, signé à Bukarest le 28 *Mai* 1812.

AU NOM DU TRÈS-HAUT.

Sa Majesté le magnanime et très-puissant empereur de toutes les Russies et Sa Hautesse le fort et sublime empereur des Ottomans, animés d'un désir mutuel de mettre un terme à la guerre qui les divise depuis long-temps et de

rétablir entre eux l'amitié, la bonne harmonie, et une paix durable, ont daigné confier cette mission humaine et salutaire aux soins et aux bons sentimens de leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs,

Pour S. M. l'empereur de Russie, Son Excellence le comte *Michel Golenitschef Kutusow*, général d'infanterie, général en chef de ses armées, chevalier de tous les ordres russes, grand'croix de l'ordre impérial de Marie-Thérèse et de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem ; pour S. H. l'empereur de Turquie, l'illustre *Achmet Pacha*, grand visir et généralissime des armées de la Sublime-Porte ;

Afin que les conditions de cette paix salutaire puissent être réglées, le traité conclu et signé par les personnes désignées par les deux plénipotentiaires.

En conséquence, du côté de la cour impériale de Russie, ont été nommés et pourvus des pouvoirs nécessaires :

MM. *André Italinski*, conseiller privé de la cour de Russie, chambellan de S. M., chevalier des ordres de Saint-Wladimir et de Sainte-Anne de deuxième classe ;

Sabanief, major-général des armées impériales, colonel d'un régiment de la grande armée sur le Danube, chevalier des ordres de Saint-Wladimir et de Saint-Georges de deuxième classe et de Sainte-Anne de première classe ;

Et enfin M. *Joseph Fonton*, conseiller d'État de S. M. impériale et chevalier des ordres de Saint-Wladimir de troisième classe et de Sainte-Anne de deuxième classe.

Du côté de la Sublime Porte ottomane ont été nommés, leurs Excellences :

Seyd Mohammed Galib effendi, kiaïa bey de la Sublime Porte ;

Mastar Zadé Ibrahim effendi, Caziasker, et juge supérieur de l'armée ottomane en orient ;

Et enfin *Abdul Halip effendi*, chancelier des janissaires ;

Lesquels s'étant réunis, et après avoir échangé leurs pouvoirs, sont convenus des articles suivans :

ARTICLE PREMIER. *Paix et amitié.*—Les hostilités et différends qui ont jusqu'à ce jour régné entre les deux États, cesseront, en vertu de ce traité, dès à présent et à jamais sur terre et sur mer.

Paix éternelle, amitié et bonne intelligence régneront entre S. M. impériale l'empereur autocrate de toutes les Russies et S. M. l'empereur des Ottomans, entre leurs descendans et successeurs, et leurs deux empires respectifs. Les deux hautes parties contractantes sont animées du désir sincère d'éloigner tout ce qui pourrait donner lieu à quelque mésintelligence entres leurs sujets respectifs. Elles exécuteront fidèlement tout ce qui est arrêté dans la présente convention et empêcheront surtout que dans la suite, d'un côté comme de l'autre, il puisse être entrepris, ouvertement ou secrètement, quelque chose de contraire à ce traité.

ARTICLE II. *Amnistie.*—Les deux hautes parties contractantes ainsi réconcilées promettent, après le rétablissement de la paix et de l'amitié, une amnistie complète et un pardon général à tous leurs sujets qui, dans le cours de cette guerre, ont pris part à des opérations militaires ou qui ont, de quelque manière que ce soit, agi dans un sens contraire aux intérêts de leur souverain ou de leur pays. Par suite de cette amnistie, non seulement personne ne pourra être ni inquiété, ni recherché, mais encore quiconque rentrera dans ses foyers

jouira, comme les autres sujets, sous la protection des lois, de ses droits antérieurs.

ARTICLE III. *Confirmation des traités.*—Tous les traités et conventions qui, dans plusieurs traités de paix antérieurs, ont été conclus et reconnus aussi-bien par la cour impériale de Russie que par la Porte ottomane, sont maintenus et conservent toute leur force, à l'exception des articles dans lesquels le temps a amené quelques changemens. Les deux hautes parties contractantes aujourd'hui réconciliées, promettent réciproquement de regarder commes sacrés et inviolables non seulement le traité actuel, mais encore ceux mentionnés ci-dessus.

ARTICLE IV. *Limites.*—Dans le premier article des préliminaires, il a été arrêté que le Pruth, à partir de son entrée en Moldavie, jusqu'à son embouchure dans le Danube; de là, la rive gauche de ce dernier fleuve jusqu'à Kilia et son embouchure dans la mer Noire, seront les limites entre les deux puissances. La navigation sera commune aux des États; les petites îles du Danube, situées au-delà d'Ismaïl jusqu'à Kilia et qui avant que la guerre éclatât étaient restées désertes, dépendront de la Russie en tant qu'elles se rapprocheront plus de la rive gauche que de la rive droite. Néanmoins elles ne seront gouvernées par aucune des deux puissances. Il n'y sera élevé aucune espèce de fortifications ou de retranchemens. Elles resteront inhabitées. Il sera cependant permis aux sujets des deux empires d'y pêcher et d'y faire du bois. Les grandes îles situées à l'opposite d'Ismaïl et de Kilia, resteront également inhabitées à une lieue du point le plus rapproché de la rive gauche du Danube et qui sera déterminé d'avance. Les établissemens, tels que le *Vieux-Kilia*, qui existaient avant la guerre, ne sont point compris dans cette ligne de démarcation. Dans le reste de cet article, la Sublime-Porte ottomane cède et abandonne à la cour impériale de Russie, le terrain situé sur la rive gauche du Pruth avec toutes les forteresses, villes et habitations qui s'y trouvent, ainsi que la moitié de ce fleuve qui sert de limite aux deux empires. Les bâtimens marchands des deux cours peuvent remonter et descendre ce bras du fleuve près de Kilia et naviguer sur tout le Danube. Quant aux vaisseaux de guerre russes, ils ne pourront remonter le Danube que jusqu'à l'embouchure du Pruth.

ARTICLE V. *Restitution de la part de la Russie en Moldavie.*—Sa Majesté l'empereur de toutes les Russies cède et restitue à la Sublime-Porte ottomane la partie de la Moldavie située sur la rive droite du Pruth, ainsi que la grande et la petite Valachie avec toutes les forteresses dans l'état où elles se trouvent; les villes, bourgs, villages et autres établissemens, comme aussi tout ce qui se trouve dans lesdites provinces, avec les îles du Danube, à l'exception néanmoins de ce qui est mentionné dans l'article IV. du présent traité.

Les contrats et conventions comptés au nombre des privilèges de la Moldavie, seront confirmés en prenant pour base l'article V. des préliminaires. Les conventions particulières et celles qui sont stipulées dans le quatrième article du traité d'Yassy, resteront également en vigueur. Il ne sera par conséquent exigé aucune indemnité pour les revenus passés; aucun impôt ne sera levé pour toute la durée de la guerre; les habitans de ces deux provinces seront pendant deux ans, à dater de l'échange des ratifications, exempts de tout impôt et il leur sera accordé un terme raisonnable pour émigrer, s'il leur

plaît, dans d'autres États. Ce terme sera de quatre mois; et la Sublime-Porte promettra de n'établir sur la Moldavie que des impôts calculés sur sa grandeur actuelle.

ARTICLE VI. *Restitution des conquêtes.*—Les limites vers l'Asie et des autres côtés resteront telles qu'elles étaient avant la guerre à l'exception de celle du Pruth, et la cour impériale de Russie, conformément à l'article III. des préliminaires, rend à la Sublime Porte ottomane toutes les forteresses et châteaux forts conquis en deçà de ces limites, dans l'état où ils se trouvent actuellement, avec toutes les villes, bourgs, villages et habitations et tout ce qui s'y trouve compris.

ARTICLE VII. *Émigration.*—Ceux des sujets ottomans qui, après l'ouverture des hostilités, ou pendant la durée de la guerre, sont restés, ou se sont retirés dans les provinces actuellement cédées à la Russie, pourront rentrer avec leurs familles et leurs biens sur le territoire de la Sublime-Porte et s'y fixer sans qu'on puisse les gêner en rien. Il leur sera également permis de céder leurs propriétés à l'un ou l'autre des habitans de leur résidence et de se retirer avec ce qu'ils voudront emporter dans les États ottomans. Cette permission s'étendra même aux personnes nées dans les territoires cédés, qui y ont quelques propriétés, mais qui résident aujourd'hui dans les États ottomans. Pour qu'ils puissent régler leurs intérêts, il leur sera accordé, à eux aussi-bien qu'à ceux dont il a été ci-dessus question, un terme de dix-huit mois, à partir du jour de l'échange des ratifications du présent traité. Par la même raison, les Tartares qui, pendant la guerre, ont passé de Bessarabie en Russie, pourront à leur gré rentrer en Turquie, sous la condition néanmoins que la Sublime-Porte s'engagera à tenir compte à la cour impériale de Rússie des frais d'établissement et d'entretien de ces Tartares. De même les chrétiens nés dans les pays actuellement cédés à la Russie, qui y ont des propriétés et résident néanmoins dans d'autres parties de la domination ottomane, pourront, à leur gré, rentrer dans ces pays, s'y établir avec leurs familles et leurs biens sans qu'on puisse les en empêcher. Il leur sera également permis de céder aux sujets ottomans les propriétés qu'ils peuvent avoir dans les États de la Sublime-Porte et d'en apporter la valeur en numéraire dans le territoire russe. Il leur sera aussi accordé comme aux précédens un délai de dix-huit mois, à partir de l'échange des ratifications.

ARTICLE VIII. *Serviens.*—En exécution de l'article IV. des préliminaires, quoiqu'on ne puisse douter que la Sublime Porte n'agisse, suivant ses principes, avec douceur et magnanimité envers les Serviens, comme envers un peuple depuis long-temps soumis à sa domination et son tributaire, néanmoins, en considération de la part que les Serviens ont prise à cette guerre, on a cru juste de stipuler d'une manière solennelle la sûreté de ce peuple. En conséquence, la Sublime-Porte promet aux Serviens une amnistie complète et il ne sera, pour le passé, porté aucune atteinte à leur repos et à leur tranquillité. Les forteresses qu'ils ont, à cause de la guerre, élevées dans leur pays et qui n'existaient pas auparavant, seront rasées, dans le cas où on ne les jugerait plus nécessaires, et la Sublime-Porte rétablira son autorité dans les forteresses, châteaux forts et autres établissemens fortifiés précédemment existans.

Elle les garnira d'artillerie et de toutes autres munitions de guerre et y mettra des garnisons à son gré. Mais, afin que ces garnisons n'exercent pas

d'injustes violences envers les Serviens, la Sublime-Porte, animée de sentimens de compassion pour ce peuple, agira avec toute la modération nécessaire pour assurer leur sûreté. En outre, la Sublime-Porte, ayant égard aux prières des Serviens, leur assurera les mêmes avantages dont jouissent ses autres sujets des îles de l'Archipel et autres pays. Elle leur donnera même une preuve de sa magnanimité en leur abandonnant le soin de leur organisation intérieure, leur imposera de modiques tributs, les percevra directement d'eux-mêmes, et elle concertera avec la nation des Serviens les moyens de parvenir à ce but.

ARTICLE IX. *Prisonniers.*—Tous les prisonniers des deux sexes, actuellement détenus dans les deux empires, de quelque nation ou de quelque état qu'ils soient, seront rendus sans rançon immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications du présent traité. Sont néanmoins exceptés les chrétiens qui, de leur propre mouvement, ont embrassé la religion mahométane dans les États de la Sublime-Porte, et les mahométans qui, librement aussi, ont embrassé la religion chrétienne dans les pays soumis à la domination russe. Jouiront des mêmes priviléges tous les sujets russes qui, après la signature de ce traité de paix, seront de quelque manière que ce soit faits prisonniers et se trouveront sur le territoire de la Sublime-Porte. De son côté, la cour de Russie s'engage à en agir de même envers tous les sujets de la Sublime-Porte. Aucune des deux hautes parties contractantes ne pourra élever de réclamation au sujet des sommes employées à l'entretien des prisonniers. En outre, de part et d'autre, les prisonniers seront pourvus de tout ce qui leur sera nécessaire jusqu'aux frontières, où ils seront échangés par les commissaires respectifs des deux nations.

ARTICLE X. *Justice. Dettes.*—Toutes les actions et procès entre sujets des deux nations, que les embarras de la guerre n'ont pas permis de terminer, ne sont pas regardés comme éteints, mais ne pourront être décidés par voie de justice qu'après la conclusion de la paix.

Toutes les dettes contractées par les sujets des deux empires, ainsi que les droits du trésor, seront acquittés complètement et sans retard.

ARTICLE XI. *Évacuations.*—Après la conclusion du traité de paix entre les deux puissans monarques, l'échange et la ratification préalable des deux souverains, les armées de terre et les flottes de la cour impériale de Russie évacueront les États et les mers de la Sublime-Porte; ce qui néanmoins ne peut se faire que lentement à cause de l'éloignement et autres obstacles. Les deux hautes parties contractantes sont donc convenues de fixer un terme de trois mois, à dater de l'échange des ratifications du traité, pour opérer l'entière évacuation des provinces d'Europe et d'Asie. Pendant ce délai, qui finira au jour précité, l'armée impériale de Russie évacuera entièrement, conformément à ce traité, tous les territoires européens et asiatiques de la Sublime-Porte. Les flottes et autres bâtimens de guerre sortiront également dès aux ottomanes; les lieux et forteresses de la domination ottomane, dans lesquels l'armée russe attendra le commencement du terme fixé, resteront, jusqu'à l'évacuation, soumis à l'administration de la cour de Russie, sans que la Sublime-Porte puisse y prendre la moindre part jusqu'à l'expiration du terme et l'évacuation totale des troupes, qui, jusqu'au jour de leur départ, s'y approvisionneront de tous les vivres, fourrages et autres munitions nécessaires.

ARTICLE XII. *Indemnités pour les rapines des Barbaresques.*—Dans le cas où

le ministre ou fondé de pouvoirs de la cour impériale de Russie, résidant à Constantinople, demanderait par écrit, en vertu de l'article VII. du traité d'Yassy, des indemnités pour des vexations exercées sur des sujets ou marchands de la cour impériale de Russie par les corsaires des États d'Alger, Tunis et Tripoli, ou s'il avait à faire quelque protestation dans des affaires relatives au traité de commerce existant et qui pourraient donner lieu à des discussions et à des plaintes, la Sublime-Porte veillera chaque fois à ce que les traités soient exécutés et cherchera à lever et aplanir les difficultés, sans néanmoins porter atteinte aux ordonnances et instructions à ce relatives. De son côté, la cour impériale de Russie en agira de même, conformément aux traités de commerce existans.

ARTICLE XIII. *Bons offices de la Porte en faveur de la Perse.*—Ce traité conclu, la cour impériale de Russie consent à ce que la Sublime-Porte ottomane, dirigée par la conformité des croyances, interpose ses bons offices entre le royaume de Perse et la cour impériale de Russie, de manière à mettre un terme à la guerre et à établir des négotiations pour amener la conclusion de la paix.

ARTICLE XIV. *Cessation des hostilités.*—Aussitôt après l'échange des ratifications du présent traité de paix, les généraux en chef des armées des deux empires donneront l'ordre aux commandans des différens corps, de cesser les hostilités sur terre et sur mer. Si cependant après la signature de ce traité il se commettait encore quelques hostilités, elles seront regardées comme nulles et ne pourront donner lieu à aucune modification dans les articles du présent traité. Tout ce qui, dans cet intervalle, aura pu être pris par l'une ou l'autre des deux hautes parties contractantes, sera aussitôt restitué.

ARTICLE XV. *Confirmation.*—Après la signature de ce traité de paix par les fondés de pouvoirs des deux États, le premier plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté impériale l'empereur de Russie et le grand visir de la Sublime-Porte ottomane le confirmeront, et dix jours après la signature, ou plutôt si faire se peut, les actes en seront échangés par les mêmes plenipotentiaires.

ARTICLE XVI. *Ratifications.*—Le présent traité d'une paix éternelle entre Sa Majesté l'empereur et autocrate de toutes les Russies, et Sa Hautesse le grand sultan et empereur des Ottomans, sera solennellement confirmé et ratifié par les signatures de la propre main des deux monarques et échangé par les plénipotentiaires respectifs dans la même ville où il a été conclu, dans l'espace d'un mois, à partir de la date du présent traité et plutôt s'il est possible.

Le présent traité de paix en seize articles, qui sera en vigueur immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications, a été par nous signé et scellé de notre sceau en vertu de nos pouvoirs, et nous l'avons échangé contre un autre acte de même teneur, signé et scellé des mandataires de la Sublime-Porte ottomane ci-dessus nommés.

Fait à Bukarest, le 16 (28) Mai 1812. *Signé,* ANDREAS ITALINSKI.
JOHANN SABANEJEW.
JOSEPH FONTON.

La ratification de la part de la Russie est datée du 11 (23) Juin 1812; la publication en a été faite à Saint Pétersbourg le 5 (17) Août 1812.

[This is also taken from Alix, and verified by other authorities].

APPENDIX F.

TREATY OF AKKERMAN.

Convention entre la Porte Ottomane et la Russie, pour fixer le mode d'exécution des articles du Traité de Bucharest, non exécutés par la Porte depuis l'année 1812; assurer l'état de possession territoriale de la Russie sur les côtés de la Mer Noire, et remettre en vigueur tous les priviléges dont la Moldavie, la Valachie, et la Servie doivent jouir sous l'influence tutélaire du cabinet de Saint Petersbourg; signée à Ackerman, le $\frac{25\ Septembre}{7\ Octobre}$ 1826.

ARTICLE I.—Toutes les clauses et stipulations du traité paix conclu à Bucharest le 16 Mai 1812, (17e jour de la lune de Djemaziul ewel de l'an de l'Hégire 1227,) sont confirmées dans toute leur force et valeur par la présente convention, comme si le traité de Bucharest s'y trouvait inséré mot pour mot, les eclaircissements qui font l'objet de la présente convention ne devant servir qu'à déterminer le sens précis et à corroborer la teneur des articles dudit traité.

ARTICLE II.—L'article IV. du traité de Bucharest ayant stipulé pour les deux grandes îles du Danube, situées vis-à-vis d'Ismail et Kilia, lesquelles, tout en demeurant propriété de la Porte Ottomane, doivent rester en parties désertis et inhabitées, un mode de délimitation dont l'exécution a été reconnue impossible, vu les inconvénients qu'entrainent les fréquents débordements du fleuve, et l'expérience ayant demontré en outre la necessité d'établir une séparation fixe et suffisamment étendue entre les riverains respectifs, pour leur ôter tout point de contact et pour faire cesser par la même les différends et les troubles continuels qui en resultent, la Sublime-Porte ottomane voulant donner à la cour impériale de Russie une preuve non équivoque de son désir sincère de cimenter les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage entre les deux États, s'engage à exécuter et à maintenir l'arrangement qui a été convenu à cet égard à Constantinople, entre l'envoyé de Russie et les ministres de la Sublime-Porte, dans la conférence tenué le 21 Août 1817, conformément aux dispositions consignées au protocole de cette conférence. En conséquence, le dispositions énoncées dans ce protocole à l'objet en question, seront considérées comme faisant partie intégrante de la présente convention.

ARTICLE III.—Les traités et actes relatifs aux privilèges dont jouissent la Moldavie et la Valachie, ayant été confirmés par une clause expressé de l'article V. du Traité de Bucharest, la Sublime-Porte s'engage solennellement à observer lesdits priviléges, traités et actes en toute occasion, avec fidélité la plus scrupuleuse, et promet de renouveler, dans l'espace de six mois après la ratification de la présente convention, les hatti-cherifs de 1802, qui ont specifié et garanti ces mêmes priviléges. En outre, vu les malheurs qu'ont essuyés ces provinces par suite des derniers événements, vu le choix fait de

Bojars, Valaques et Moldaves pour être hospodars des deux Principautés, et vu que la cour impériale de Russie a donné son assentiment à cette mésure, il a été reconnu, tant par la Sublime-Porte que par la cour de Russie, que les hatti-cherifs ci-dessus mentionnés de l'année 1802,. devaient indispensablement être complètes au moyen des clauses consignées dans l'acte séparé ci-joint, qui a été convenu entre les plénipotentiaires respectifs, et qui est et sera considéré comme faisant partie intégrante de la présénte convention.

ARTICLE IV.—Il à été stipulé par l'article VI. du Traité de Bucharest, que du côté de l'Asie, la frontière entre les deux Empires serait retablie comme elle était anciennement avant la guerre, et que la cour impériale de Russie restituerait à la Sublime-Porte ottomane les forteresses et châteaux situés dans l'intérieur de cette frontière et conquis par ses armes. En conséquence de cette stipulation, et vu que la cour impériale de Russie a évacué et restitué immédiatement après la paix, celles de ces forteresses qui avaient été prises seulement pendant la guerre sur les troupes de la Sublime-Porte, il est convenu de part et d'autre, que désormais les frontières asiatiques entre les deux Empires demeureront telles qu'elles existent aujourd'hui, et qu'un terme de deux ans est fixé afin d'aviser reciproquement aux moyens les plus propres à maintenir la tranquillité et la sûreté des sujets respectifs.

ARTICLE V.—La Sublime-Porte ottomane, désirant donner à la cour impériale de Russie un témoignage éclatant de ses dispositions amicales, et de sa scrupuleuse attention à remplir en entier les conditions du Traité de Bucharest, mettra immédiatement à exécution toutes les clauses de l'article VIII. de ce traité relatives à la nation servienne, laquelle étant ab antiquo sujette et tributaire de la Sublime-Porte, devra éprouver en toute occasion les effets de sa clémence et de sa générosité. En conséquence, la Sublime-Porte réglera avec les députes de la nation servienne les mésures qui seront jugées les plus convenables pour lui assurer les avantages stipulés en sa faveur, avantages dont la jouissance sera tout à la fois la juste récompense, et le meilleur gage de la fidélité dont cette nation à donné des preuves à l'Empire Ottoman. Comme un terme de dixhuit mois est jugé nécessaire pour procéder aux vérifications qu'exige cet objet, conformément à l'acte séparé ci-joint, convenu entre les pléuipotentiaires respectifs, lesdites mésures seront reglées et arrêtées de concert avec la députation servienne à Constantinople, et consignées en detail dans un firman suprême revêtu du hatti-cherif, lequel sera mis en vigueur dans le plus court délai possible et au plus tard à la cour impériale de Russie et considéré dès lors comme faisant partie intégrante de la présente convention.

ARTICLE VI.—En vertu des stipulations expressés de l'article X. du Traité de Bucharest, toutes les affaires et réclamations des sujets respectifs, lesquelles avaient été suspendues par l'événement de la guerre, devant été reprises et terminées de même, les créances que les sujets respectifs pouvaint avoir les uns contre les autres, ainsi que sur le fisc, devant être examinées et réglées en toute justice, et promptement et entièrement liquidées, il est convenu que toutes les affaires et réclamations des sujets russes, à l'occasion des pertes qu'ils ont essuyées par les déprédations des pirates barbaresques, les confiscations faites au moment de la rupture entre les deux cours en 1806, et autres actes de même nature, y compris ceux qui ont lieu depuis l'année 1821, don-

neront lieu à une liquidation et à un dédommagement équitables. A cet effet, il sera nommé sans délai, de part et d'autre, des commissaires qui vérifieront les états des pertes et fixeront le montant d'un dédommagement. Tous les travaux de ces commissaires seront terminées, et la somme à laquelle s'élevera le dédommagement ci-dessus mentionné sera remise en bloc à la Légation Impériale de Russie à Constantinople, dans un terme de dix-huit mois, à dater de la ratification de la présente convention, il sera aussi observé une égale reciprocité envers les sujets de la Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE VII.—La réparation des dommages causés aux sujets et négociants de la Cour Impériale de Russie par les corsaires des régences d'Alger, de Tunis, et de Tripoli, et la pleine et entière exécution des stipulations du Traité de Commerce, et de l'article VII. du Traité de Jassy, étant d'une stricte obligation pour la Sublime Porte, en vertu des clauses expresses de l'article XII. du Traité de Bucharest, lequel conjointement avec l'article III. rappelle et confirme toutes les transactions antérieures, la Sublime Porte réitère solennellement la promesse de remplir désormais avec la plus scrupuleuse fidélité tous ses engagements à cet égard. En conséquence:

1826. 1°.—La Sublime Porte mettra tous ses soins à empêcher que les corsaires des régences barbaresques ne puissent, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, inquiéter le commerce ou la navigation Russe, et en cas de déprédation de leur part, dès qu'elle en sera instruite, elle s'engage itérativement à faire restituer sans nul retard toutes les prises faites par lesdites corsaires, à faire dédommager les sujets Russes des pertes qu'ils auraient essuyées, à adresser à cette fin un firman rigoureux aux régences barbaresques, de manière à ce qu'il ne soit plus nécessaire de la réitérer une seconde fois; et dans le cas où ce firman n'aurait pas été exécuté, à payer le montant de l'indemnité, de son trésor Impérial, dans le terme de deux mois, spécifiés en l'article VII. du Traité de Jassy, à dater du jour de la réclamation qui aura été presentée á cet égard par le ministre de Russie sur la vérification qu'il en aura faite.

2°.—La Sublime Porte promet d'observer rigoureusement toutes les conditions dudit Traité de Commerce, de lever toutes les prohibitions contraires à la teneur expresse de ces stipulations, de ne mettre aucune entrave à la libre navigation des navires marchands sous pavillion Russe dans toutes les mers et eaux de l'Empire Ottoman, sans aucune exception; en un mot, de faire jouir les marchands, les capitaines, et tous les sujets Russes en général, des avantages et prérogatives, comme de l'entière liberté de commerce, qui sont formellement stipulés par les traités existants entre les deux capitaines.

3°.—Conformement à l'article I. du Traité de Commerce qui stipule en faveur de tous les sujets Russes en général, la liberté de navigation et de commerce dans tous les états de la Sublime Porte, tant sur terre que sur mer, et partout où la navigation et le commerce pourront convenir aux sujets Russes: et en vertu des clauses des articles XXXI. et XXXV. du dit traité, qui assurent le libre passage par le canal de Constantinople des navires marchands Russes, chargés de vivres ou autres marchandises et productions de la Russie, ou d'autres états non soumis à l'Empire Ottoman, ainsi que la libre disposition de ces vivres marchandises et productions, la Sublime Porte promet de n'apporter aucun obstacle ni empêchement à ce que les bâtiments

Russes, chargés de blés et autres vivres, à leur arrivée dans le canal de Constantinople le cas de besoin échéant, puissent transborder leur cargaison sur d'autres bâtiments, soit Russes soit d'autre nation étrangère, pour être transportée hors des états de la Sublime Porte.

4th.—La Sublime Porte acceptera les bons offices de la Cour Impériale de Russie à l'effet d'accorder, d'après les exemples précédents, l'entrée de la mer Noire aux bâtiments des puissances amies du gouvernement Ottoman, qui n'ont pas encore obtenu ce privilege, de manière à ce que le commerce d'importation en Russie par le moyen de ces bâtiments, et l'exportation des produits Russes à leur bord, ne puissent essuyer aucune entrave.

ARTICLE VIII.—La présente convention, servant d'éclaircissement et de complément au Traité de Bucharest sera ratifiée par S. M. l'Empereur et Padischah de toutes les Russies, et S. M. l'Empereur et Padischah des Ottomans, au moyen de ratifications solennelles munies de leur propre signature suivant l'usage, qui seront échangées par les plénipotentiaires respectifs, dans le terme de quatre semaines, ou plus tôt s'il est possible, à compter du jour de la conclusion de la présente convention.

Fait à Ackerman, le $\frac{25 \text{ Septembre}}{7 \text{ Octobre}}$ 1826.

Acte séparé relatif aux Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie.

Les Hospodars de Moldavie et de Valachie étant choisis parmi les Bojars indigènes, leur élection sera désormais faite dans chacune de ces provinces d'après le consentement et la volonté de la Sublime Porte, par l'assemblée générale du Divan, conformément à l'ancien usage du pays.

Les Bojars du Divan de chaque province, comme corps du pays et avec l'accord général des habitans, feront choix pour la dignité de Hospodar, d'un des Bojars les plus anciens et les plus capables de la bien remplir, et ils présenteront à la Sublime Porte, par une requête (Arz. Mahsar) le candidat élu, lequel, s'il est agrée par la Sublime Porte, sera nommé Hospodar et recevra son investiture. Si par des raisons graves la nomination du candidat élu ne se trouvait point conforme au désir de la Sublime Porte, dans ce cas, après que ces raisons graves auront été avérées par les deux Cours, il sera permis de recommander aux dits Bojars de procéder à l'élection d'une autre personne convenable.

La durée de l'administration des Hospodars restera toujours fixées, comme par le passé, à sept années complètes et entières, à dater du jour de leur nomination, et ils ne pourront être destitués avant ce terme. Si pendant la durée de leur administration, ils commettent quelque délit, la Sublime Porte en informerait le Ministre de Russie, et lorsqu' après vérification faite de part et d'autre, il sera constaté que le Hospodar s'est effectivement rendu coupable d' un délit, sa destitution sera permise dans ce cas seulement.

1826. Les Hospodars qui auront achevé leur terme de sept années, sans avoir donné, soit aux deux Cours, soit au pays, aucun sujet de plainte légitime et grave, seront nommés de nouveau pour sept autres années si la demande en est faite à la Sublime Porte par les Divans des provinces, et si le consentement général des habitans se manifeste à leur égard.

S'il arrive qu'un des Hospodars abdique avant l'accomplissement du terme

de sept années, pour cause de vieillesse, de maladie ou par toute raison, la Sublime Porte en donnera connaissance à la Cour de Russie, et l'abdication pourra avoir lieu d'après un accord préalable des deux Cours.

Tout Hospodar qui aurait été destitué après avoir fini son terme ou qui aurait abdiqué, encourra la déchéance de son titre et pourra rentrer dans la classe des Bojars à condition de rester paisible et tranquille, mais sans pouvoir ni redevenir membre du Divan ni remplir aucune fonction publique, et sans pouvoir être réélu Hospodar.

Les fils des Hospodars destitués ou abdicataires conserveront le qualité de Bojars, pourront occuper les charges du pays et être élus Hospodars.

En cas de destitution, d'abdication, ou de mort d'un Hospodar, et jusqu'à ce qu'il lui soit donné un successeur, l'administration de la principauté sera confiée à des Kaïmacans nommés par le Divan de ladite principauté.

Le Hatti Chérif de 1802, ayant ordonné l'abolition des impôts, redevances, et requisitions introduites depuis l'année 1198 (1783), les Hospodars avec les Bojars des Divans respectifs détermineront et fixeront les impôts et les charges annuelles de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, en prenant pour base les réglements qui ont été établis à la suite du Hatti Cherif de 1802 ; les Hospodars ne pourront dans aucun cas manquer au strict accomplissement de cette disposition, ils auront égard aux représentations du Ministre de Sa Majesté Impériale et à celles que les Consuls de Russie leur adresseront d'après ses ordres, tant sur cet objet, que sur le maintien des privilèges du pays, et spécialement sur l'observation des clauses et articles insérés dans le présente acte.

Les Hospodars, de concert avec les Divans respectifs, fixeront dans chaque province le nombre des beschlis d'après celui qui existait avant les troubles de 1821. Ce nombre une fois fixé ne pourra être augmenté sous aucun prétexte, à moins que l'urgente nécessité n'en soit reconnue de part et d'autre, et il est bien entendu que les beschlis continueront à être formés et organisés comme ils l'étaient avant les troubles de 1821 ; que les agas continueront d'être choisis et nommés d'après le mode suivi avant ladite époque, et qu' enfin les beschlis et leurs agas ne rempliront jamais que les fonctions pour lesquelles ils ont été originairement institués, sans pouvoir se mêler des affaires du pays, ni se permettre aucune autre action.

Les usurpations faites sur le territoire de la Valachie du côté d'Ibrail, Ghierghiova et de Coule, et au dela de l'Olta, seront restituées aux propriétaires, et il sera fixé pour ladite restitution un terme dans les firmans y relatifs, lesquels seront adressés à qui il appartient.

Ceux des Bojars Moldaves qui uniquement par suite des derniers troubles se sont vus forcés de quitter leur patrie, pourront y revenir librement, sans être inquiétés par qui que ce soit, et rentreront dans la pleine et entière jouissance de leurs droits, prérogatives, biens, et propriétés comme par le passé.

La Sublime Porte, en égard aux malheurs qui ont pesé sur les Principautés de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, par suite des derniers troubles, leur accordera deux années d'exemption des tributs et redevances qu'elles sont tenues de lui payer ; à l'expiration du terme de l'exemption ci-dessus mentionnée, lesdits tributs et redevances seront acquittés au taux fixé par le Hatti Cherif de 1802, et ne pourront être augmentés dans aucun cas ; la Sublime Porte accordera

également aux habitants des deux principautés la liberté de commerce pour toutes les productions de leur sol et de leur industrie, dont ils pourront disposer comme bon leur semblera, sauf les restrictions exigées d' un côté par les fournitures dues annuellement à la Sublime Porte, dont ces provinces sont comme les greniers, de l'autre par l'approvisionnement du pays. Toutes les dispositions du Hatti Cherif de 1802, relatives à ces fournitures, à leur acquittement régulier aux prix courants, d'après lesquels elles doivent être soldées et dont la fixation appartiendra, en cas de litige, aux Divans respectifs, seront remises en vigueur et observées à l'avenir avec une scrupuleuse exactitude.

Les Bojars seront tenus d'exécuter les ordres des Hospodars et de rester envers eux dans les bornes d'une parfaite soumission. De leur côté, les Hospodars ne pourront sévir arbitrairement contre les Bojars, ni leur faire subir des punitions non méritées et sans qu'ils aient commis quelque faute avérée, et les derniers ne subiront de peine qu'après avoir été jugés conformément aux lois et usages du pays.

Les troubles, survenus dans les dernières années en Moldavie et en Valachie, ayant porte la plus grave atteinte à l'ordre dans les diverses branches de l'administration intérieure, les Hospodars seront tenus de s'occuper sans le moindre délai, avec les Divans respectifs, des mésures nécessaires pour améliorer la situation des principautés confiées à leurs soins, et ces mésures feront l'objet d'un réglement général pour chaque province, lequel sera mis immédiatement à exécution.

Tous les autres droits et privilèges des principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, et tous les Hatti Cherifs qui les concernent, seront maintenus et observés, en tant qu'ils ne seront pas modifiés par le présent acte.

C'est pourquoi, nous soussignés, Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Padischah de toutes les Russies, munis des pleins pouvoirs souverains, de concert avec les Plénipotentiaires de la Sublime Porte ottomane, avons arrêté et réglé à l'égard de la Moldavie et de la Valachie les points ci-dessus, lesquels sont la conséquence de l'article II. de la Convention explicative et confirmative du Traité de Bucharest, conclué en huit articles, dans les Conférences à Ackerman entre nous et les Plénipotentiaires ottomans.

En conséquence, etc.

Acte séparé relatif à la Servie.

La Sublime Porte, dans l'unique intention de remplir fidèlement les stipulations de l'article VIII. du Traité de Bucharest ayant précédemment permis aux députés Serviens à Constantinople de lui présenter les demandes de leur nation, sur les objets les plus convenables pour consolider la sûreté et le bien être du pays, ces députés avaient précédemment exposé dans leur requête le vœu de la nation relativement à quelques-uns de ces objets, tel que la liberté du culte, le choix de ces chefs, l'indépendance de son administration intérieure, la réunion des districts détachés de la Servie, la réunion des différents impôts en un seul, l'abandon aux Serviens de la règle des biens appartenants à des Musulmans, à charge d'en payer le revenu ensemble avec le tribut, la liberté de commerce, la permission aux négociants Serviens de voyager dans les États ottomans avec leurs propres passeports, l'établisse-

ment d' hôpitaux, écoles et imprimériés, et enfin la défense aux Musulmans, autres que ceux appartenants aux garnisons de s'établir en Servie. Tandis que l'on s'occupait à vérifier et à régler les articles ci-dessus specifiés, certains empêchements survenus en motiveront l'ajournement. Mais la Sublime Porte persistant aujourd'hui encore dans la ferme résolution d'accorder à la nation Servienne les avantages stipulés dans l'article VIII. du Traité de Bucharest, elle réglera, de concert avec les députés Serviens à Constantinople, les demandes ci-dessus mentionnées de cette nation fidèle et soumise, comme aussi toutes les autres qui lui seraient présentées par la députation Servienne, et qui ne seront point contraires à la qualité de sujets de l'Empire ottoman.

La Sublime Porte informera la Cour Impériale de Russie de l'exécution qu'aura reçue l'article VIII. du Traité de Bucharest, et lui communiquera le firman revêtu du Hatti Cherif, par lequel les susdits avantages seront accordés.

C'est pourquoi, nous soussignés Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Padischah de toutes les Russies, munis des pleins pouvoirs souverains, de concert avec les Plénipotentiaires de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, avons arrêté et règle à l'égard des Serviens les points ci-dessus lesquels sont la conséquence de l'article V. de la convention explicative et confirmative du Traité de Bucharest, conclué en huit articles dans les Conférences d'Ackerman entre nous et les Plenipotentiaires ottomans.

En conséquence, etc.

[Copied from Martens et Cussy' "Recueil de Traités," &c. tom. vi. p. 33.]

APPENDIX G.

TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE.

No. II.—*Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. Signed at Adrianople, September* 14, 1829.

In the name of Almighty God.

His Imperial Majesty the very high and very powerful Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, and his Highness the very high and very powerful Emperor of the Ottomans, animated by an equal desire of putting an end to the calamities of war, and of re-establishing peace, friendship, and good harmony between their empires, upon solid and immutable bases, have resolved, by mutual consent, to confide this salutary work to the care and management of their respective plenipotentiaries; that is to say: his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias to the most illustrious and most excellent Count de Diebitsch, &c., who, by virtue of the supreme full powers with which he is furnished, has delegated and nominated as plenipotentiaries on the part of the Imperial Court of Russia, the most excellent and most honourable Count Alexis Orloff, &c., and Count Frederick Pahlen, &c.; and his majesty the Emperor

of the Ottomans, the most excellent and most honourable Mehemmed Sadik Effendi, Acting Grand Defterdar of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, and Abdoul-Kadir-Bey, Cazi-Asker of Anatolia; who, having assembled in the city of Adrianople, after having exchanged their full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:

ART. I. All hostility and dissension which, up to the present time, have existed between the two empires shall cease from the date hereof, as well by land as by sea, and there shall be perpetual peace, amity, and good intelligence between his majesty the Emperor and Padisha of all the Russias, and his highness the Emperor and Padisha of the Ottomans, their heirs and successors to the throne, as well as between their respective empires. The two high contracting powers will employ a special attention for preventing all that may cause the renewal of any misunderstanding between their respective subjects. They will scrupulously fulfil all the conditions of the present treaty of peace, and will use all their vigilance to prevent its being contravened in any manner, either directly or indirectly.

II. His majesty the Emperor and Padisha of all the Russias, desirous of giving his highness the Emperor and Padisha of the Ottomans a proof of the sincerity of his amicable disposition, restores to the Sublime Porte the principality of Moldavia, with the same limits which that principality had before the commencement of the war which has just been terminated by the present treaty. His imperial majesty likewise restores the principality of Wallachia, the Banat of Crajova, without any exception whatsoever, Bulgaria and the country of Dobridgia, from the Danube as far as to the sea, together with Silistria, Hirchova, Matchin, Issactchi, Toultcha, Baba-dagh, Bazardjik, Varna, Pravadi, and other cities, towns, and villages which it contains, the whole extent of the Balkan from Emineh-Bournou as far as Kazan, and all the country from the Balkans as far as to the sea, together with Selimno, Ianboli, Aïdos, Carnabat, Messembria, Ahioli, Bourgas, Sizeboli, Kirk-Klissa, the city of Adrianople, Lulé-Bourgas, and lastly, all the cities, towns, and villages, and, in general, all the places which the Russian troops have occupied in Roumelia.

III. The Pruth shall continue to form the boundary of the two empires, from the point where that river touches the territory of Moldavia as far as its confluence with the Danube. From this place the frontier line shall follow the course of the Danube as far as the embouchure of St. George, so that while leaving all the islands formed by the different branches of this river in the possession of Russia, the right bank will remain, as heretofore, in that of the Ottoman Porte. It is, nevertheless, agreed that this right bank, commencing from the point where the St. George branch separates from that of Souline, shall remain uninhabited, to the distance of two hours from the river, and that no establishment of any kind whatsoever shall be formed thereon, and that in like manner it shall not be permitted to make any establishment or construct any fortification upon the islands which shall remain in the possession of the Court of Russia, excepting always the quarantines which shall be thereon established. The merchant-vessels of the two powers shall be competent to navigate the Danube throughout its whole course, and those which bear the Ottoman flag may freely enter the Kili and Souline

embouchures, that of St. George remaining common to the war and merchant flags of the two contracting powers. But the Russian ships of war must not, in sailing up the Danube, go beyond the place of its junction with the Pruth.

IV. Georgia, Imeritia, Mingrelia, Gouriel, and several other provinces of the Caucasus, having been for a long time and in perpetuity annexed to the Empire of Russia, and this empire having moreover acquired by the treaty concluded with Persia at Tourkmantchaï, on the 10th of February, 1828, the Khanates of Erivan and Naktchivan, the two high contracting powers have been convinced of the necessity of establishing between their respective states, throughout the whole of this line, a well-defined frontier and such as shall prevent all future misunderstanding. They have likewise taken into consideration the necessary means for opposing insurmountable obstacles to the incursions and depredations which, up to the present time, have been practised by the frontier tribes, and which have so often compromised the relations of amity and good fellowship between the two empires. In consequence whereof it has been agreed to recognise henceforth for the frontier between the states of the Imperial Court of Russia and those of the Sublime Ottoman Porte in Asia, the line which, following the present boundary of the province of Gouriel, from the Black Sea, ascends to that of Imeritia, and thence in the most direct line to the point where the frontiers of the Pashalics of of Akhaltzik and of Kars unite with those of Georgia, leaving, in this manner, to the north and within this line the city of Akhaltzik and the fort of Akhalkhaliki, at a distance which must not be less than two hours. All the countries situated to the south and west of this line of demarcation towards the Pashalics of Kars and of Trebizond, together with the greater part of the Pashalik of Akhaltzik, shall remain in perpetuity under the dominion of the Sublime Porte, whilst those which are situated to the north and east of the said line, towards Georgia, Imeritia, and Gouriel, as well as the whole of the coast of the Black Sea, from the mouth of the Kouban as far as the port of St. Nicholas inclusively, shall remain in perpetuity under the dominion of the Empire of Russia. In consequence of which the imperial court of Russia gives up and restores to the Sublime Porte the remaining portion of the Pashalic of Akhaltzik, the city and the Pashalic of Kars, the city and the Pashalic of Bayazid, the city and the Pashalic of Erzeroum, as well as all the places occupied by the Russian troops, and which are situated without the above-mentioned line.

V. The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia having been in consequence of a capitulation placed under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, and Russia having guaranteed their prosperity, it is understood that they shall preserve all the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them either by their capitulations, or by the treaties concluded between the two empires, or by the hatti-cherifs promulgated at different times. In consequence whereof, they shall enjoy the free exercise of their worship, perfect security, an independent national government, and full liberty of commerce. The additional clauses to the preceding stipulations, clauses which are judged to be necessary in order to secure to these two provinces the enjoyment of their rights, are consigned to the separate act hereunto annexed (1),

which is and shall be considered as forming an integral part of the present treaty.

VI. The circumstances which have occurred since the conclusion of the convention of Ackermann, not having allowed the Sublime Porte to occupy itself immediately with the carrying into execution the clauses of the separate act relative to Servia, and annexed to Article V. of the said convention; it undertakes in the most solemn manner to fulfil them without the least delay, and with the most scrupulous exactitude, and to proceed especially to the immediate restitution of the six districts detached from Servia, so as to secure for ever the tranquillity and welfare of that faithful and devoted nation. The firman furnished with the hatti-cherif commanding the execution of the said clauses shall be delivered and officially communicated to the Imperial Court of Russia within the term of one month, reckoning from the signature of the present treaty of peace.

VII. Russian subjects shall enjoy, throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land as by sea, the full and entire freedom of trade secured to them by the treaties concluded heretofore between the two high contracting powers. This freedom of trade shall not be molested in any way, nor shall it be fettered in any case, or under any pretext, by any prohibition or restriction whatsoever, nor in consequence of any regulation or measure, whether of public government or internal legislation. Russian subjects, ships, and merchandise, shall be protected from all violence and imposition. The first shall remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Russian minister and consuls; Russian ships shall never be subjected to any search on the part of the Ottoman authorities, neither out at sea nor in any of the ports or roadsteads under the dominion of the Sublime Porte; and all merchandise or goods belonging to a Russian subject may, after payment of the Custom-house dues imposed by the tariffs, be freely sold, deposited on land in the warehouses of the owner or consignee, or transshipped on board another vessel of any nation whatsoever, without the Russian subject being required, in this case, to give notice of the same to any of the local authorities, and much less to ask their permission so to do. It is expressly agreed that the different kinds of wheat coming from Russia shall partake of the same privileges, and that their free transit shall never, under any pretext, suffer the least difficulty or hindrance.

The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take especial care that the trade and navigation of the Black Sea particularly, shall be impeded in no manner whatsoever. For this purpose it admits and declares the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles to be entirely free and open to Russian vessels under the merchant flag, laden or in ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea for the purpose of entering the Mediterranean, or whether, coming from the Mediterranean, they wish to enter the Black Sea: such vessels, provided they be merchant ships, whatever their size and tonnage, shall be exposed to no hindrance or annoyance of any kind, as above provided. The two courts shall agree upon the most fitting means for preventing all delay in issuing the necessary instructions. In virtue of the same principle, the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles is declared free and open to all the merchant ships

of powers who are at peace with the Sublime Porte, whether going into the Russian ports of the Black Sea, or coming from them, laden or in ballast, upon the same conditions which are stipulated for vessels under the Russian flag.

Lastly, the Sublime Porte, recognising in the Imperial Court of Russia the right of securing the necessary guarantees for this full freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea, declares solemnly, that on its part not the least obstacle shall ever, under any pretext whatsoever, be opposed to it. Above all it promises never to allow itself henceforth to stop or detain vessels laden or in ballast, whether Russian or belonging to nations with whom the Ottoman Porte should not be in a state of declared war, which vessels shall be passing through the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles, on their way from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Mediterranean into the Russian ports of the Black Sea. And if, which God forbid, any one of the stipulations contained in the present article should be infringed, and the remonstrances of the Russian minister thereupon should fail in obtaining a full and prompt redress, the Sublime Porte recognises beforehand in the Imperial Court of Russia the right of considering such an infraction as an act of hostility, and of immediately having recourse to reprisals against the Ottoman Empire.

VIII. The arrangements formerly stipulated by Article VI. of the Convention of Ackermann, for the purpose of regulating and liquidating the claims of the respective subjects and merchants relatively to the indemnification for the losses incurred at various times since the war of 1806, not having been carried into execution, and the Russian trade having, since the conclusion of the aforesaid convention of Ackermann, suffered fresh injury to a considerable extent, in consequence of the measures adopted with respect to the navigation of the Bosphorus, it is agreed and determined that the Sublime Porte, by way of reparation for these losses and injuries, shall pay to the Imperial Court of Russia, within the course of eighteen months, at periods which shall hereafter be agreed upon, the sum of 1,500,000 ducats of Holland; so that the payment of this sum shall put an end to every reciprocal demand or claim of the two contracting powers, on the score of the circumstances above mentioned.

IX. The prolongation of the war to which the present treaty of peace happily puts an end, having occasioned the imperial court considerable expenses, the Sublime Porte acknowledges the necessity of offering it a suitable indemnification. Therefore, independently of the cession of a small portion of territory in Asia, stipulated in Article IV., which the Court of Russia consents to receive in part of the said indemnity, the Sublime Porte engages to pay it a sum of money, the amount of which shall be fixed by mutual agreement.

X. In declaring its entire adhesion to the stipulations of the treaty concluded at London on the $\frac{24 \text{ June}}{6 \text{ July}}$ 1827, between Russia, Great Britain, and France, the Sublime Porte equally accedes to the act entered into on the $\frac{10}{22}$ of March, 1829, with common consent, between those same powers upon the bases of the said treaty, and containing the arrangements of detail relating to its definitive execution. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifica-

tions of the present treaty of peace, the Sublime Porte will appoint plenipotentiaries for the purpose of agreeing with those of the Imperial Court of Russia, and of the Courts of England and of France, upon the carrying into execution the said stipulation and arrangements.

XI. Immediately after the signing of the present treaty of peace between the two empires, and the exchange of the ratifications of the two sovereigns, the Sublime Porte shall take the necessary measures for the prompt and scrupulous execution of the stipulations contained therein, and especially of the Articles III. and IV., relative to the boundaries which are to separate the two empires, as well in Europe as in Asia, and of the Articles V. and VI., concerning the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as Servia: and from the moment when these different articles may be considered as having been executed, the Imperial Court of Russia will proceed to the evacuation of the territory of the Ottoman Empire, conformably to the principles established by a separate act (2), which forms an integral part of the present treaty of peace.

Until the complete evacuation of the countries occupied, the administration and order of things which are there now established under the influence of the Imperial Court of Russia, shall be maintained, nor can the Sublime Porte interfere therein in any manner whatsoever.

XII. Immediately after the signature of the present treaty of peace, orders shall be issued to the commanders of the respective forces, as well on land as on sea, to cease from all hostilities; such as shall have been committed after the signature of the present treaty shall be considered as not having occurred, and shall produce no change in the stipulations therein contained. In like manner, whatever conquests which, during this interval, shall have been made by the troops of either of the high contracting powers, must be restored without the least delay.

XIII. The high contracting powers, upon re-establishing between themselves the relations of a sincere friendship, grant a general pardon and a full and complete amnesty to all such of their subjects, of whatever condition they may be, who, during the continuance of the war now happily terminated, shall have taken part in the military operations, or have shown, either by their conduct or their opinions, their attachment to one or other of the two contracting powers. In consequence whereof, none of these individuals shall be molested or prosecuted, either in person or property, on account of their past conduct, and each of them, recovering the landed property which he before possessed, shall have the peaceable enjoyment of the same under the protection of the laws, or else shall be at liberty to dispose thereof within the space of eighteen months, in order to transfer himself, together with his family and his moveable property, into any country which he may select; and this without undergoing any molestation, or being opposed by any obstacle whatsoever.

There shall, moreover, be granted to the respective subjects, established in the countries restored to the Sublime Porte, or ceded to the Imperial Court of Russia, the same term of eighteen months, to be reckoned from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty of peace, for the purpose, should they think fit so to do, of disposing of their landed property, acquired

either before or since the war; and of retiring with their assets and their moveable property from the states of one of the contracting powers into those of the other, and reciprocally.

XIV. All the prisoners of war, of whatsoever nation, condition, and sex they may be, who are in the two empires, must, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty of peace, be delivered up and restored without the least ransom or payment. Exception is made in favour of the Christians who, of their own free will, have embraced the Mahometan religion, in the states of the Sublime Porte, and of the Mahometans, who, in like manner, of their own free will, have embraced the Christian religion in the states of the empire of Russia.

The same shall be observed with respect to the Russian subjects, who, after the signing of the present treaty of peace, may have, in any manner, fallen into captivity, and who are in the states of the Sublime Porte. The Imperial Court of Russia promises, on its part, to act in the same manner towards the subjects of the Sublime Porte.

No reimbursement of the sums which have been expended by the high contracting powers for the maintenance of the prisoners of war, shall be required. Each of them shall provide all that is necessary for them during their journey to the frontier, where they will be exchanged by commissioners appointed respectively.

XV. All the treaties, conventions, and stipulations, entered into and concluded at different epochs, between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, excepting the articles which have been modified or changed by the present treaty of peace, are confirmed in all their force and integrity, and the two high contracting powers engage to observe them religiously and inviolably.

XVI. The present treaty of peace shall be ratified by the two high contracting powers, and the exchange of the ratifications between the respective plenipotentiaries shall be effected within the space of six weeks, or sooner if possible.

The present document of peace, containing sixteen articles, and which shall be completed by the exchange of the respective ratifications, has been, in virtue of our full powers, signed and sealed by us, and exchanged against a similar one, signed by the undermentioned plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, and sealed with their seals.

Done at Adrianople, the $\frac{2}{14}$ September, 1829.

(L.S.) SADIK EFFENDI. (L.S.) COUNT ALEXIS ORLOFF.
(L.S. ABDOUL KADIR BEY. (L.S.) COUNT F. PAHLEN.

[This is taken from the copy laid before the House of Commons in 1854.]

No. III.—*Separate acts annexed to the treaty signed at Adrianople, September* 14, 1829.

Separate act (1) *relative to the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.*

In the name of Almighty God.

THE two high contracting powers, at the same time that they confirm all that has been stipulated by the separate act of the convention of Ackermann, relative to the mode of electing the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, have been convinced of the necessity of imparting to the government of those provinces a basis more stable and better adapted to the real interests of the two countries. For this purpose it has been definitively agreed upon and determined, that the duration of the government of the hospodars should no longer be limited to seven years, as heretofore, but that they should henceforth be invested with that dignity for life, excepting in cases of voluntary abdication, or of deprivation by reason of criminality, foreseen by the said separate act.

The hospodars shall have full liberty in the management of the internal affairs of their provinces, after consulting their respective divans, without, however, the power of injuring in any degree the rights guaranteed to the two countries by treaties or hatti-sheriffs, and they shall not be disturbed in their internal administration by any order contrary to those rights.

The Sublime Porte promises and engages to take especial care that the privileges granted to Moldavia and Wallachia be not in any manner infringed upon by its officers commanding in the adjoining provinces, and not to allow any interference on their part in the affairs of the two provinces, as well as to prevent all inroads of the inhabitants of the right bank of the Danube upon the Wallachian or Moldavian territory.

All the islands belonging to the left bank of the Danube shall be considered as forming an integral part of this territory, and the stream (Thalweg) of this river shall form the boundary of the two principalities, from its entrance into the Ottoman states as far as its confluence with the Pruth.

For the better securing the inviolability of the Moldavian and Wallachian territory, the Sublime Porte engages not to retain any fortified point, nor to allow any establishment whatsoever of its Mussulman subjects on the left bank of the Danube. In consequence whereof it is permanently ordained, that upon the whole of that bank in Great and Little Wallachia, as well as in Moldavia, no Mussulman can ever establish his residence, and that the only Mahometans who can be admitted therein are merchants provided with firmans, whose object in repairing thither is to purchase, on their own account in the principalities, the goods necessary for the consumption of Constantinople, or other articles.

The Turkish towns situated upon the left bank of the Danube shall, as well as their territories (rayahs), be restored to Wallachia, in order to be henceforward united to that principality, and the fortifications heretofore

standing upon that bank can never be rebuilt. Such Mussulmans as possess landed estates not unjustly obtained from private individuals, whether situated in these same towns, or upon any other point of the left bank of the Danube, shall be required to sell them to natives within the space of eighteen months.

The government of the two principalities, possessing all the privileges of an independent internal administration, is at liberty to establish sanitary cordons and quarantines along the course of the Danube, and elsewhere in the country where they shall be needed, without the strangers who arrive there, as well Mussulmans as Christians, being allowed to exempt themselves from the exact observance of the sanitary regulations. For the quarantine service, as well as for watching over the security of the frontiers, for the maintenance of good order in the towns and country places, and for the execution of the laws and regulations, the government of each principality may keep in pay such a number of armed guards as shall be strictly necessary for these different duties. The number and maintenance of this militia shall be regulated by the hospodars, in concert with their respective divans, the examples of former times forming the bases of these arrangements.

The Sublime Porte, animated by the sincere desire of insuring to the two principalities all the welfare of which they were susceptible, and being informed of the abuses and annoyances to which they were subjected on account of the supplies required for the consumption of Constantinople, the provisioning of the fortresses situated upon the Danube, and the requisitions of the arsenal, fully and entirely relinquishes in their favour its right in this respect. Wallachia and Moldavia shall, in consequence, be for ever dispensed from furnishing grains and other commodities, sheep, and building timber, all of which they were formerly required to supply. In like manner, these provinces shall never be compelled, under any circumstances, to provide workmen for the erection of fortresses, nor for any other public works of whatever kind. But in order to indemnify the imperial treasury for the losses which this total cession of its rights might cause it, independently of the annual tribute which the two principalities are bound to pay to the Sublime Porte, under the denominations of "haratch," "idige," and "kekiabiye" (according to the tenour of the hatti-sheriffs of 1802), Moldavia and Wallachia shall each pay annually to the Sublime Porte, by way of compensation, a sum of money, the amount of which shall be determined hereafter by common consent. Besides which, at each reappointment of the hospodars, whether in consequence of decease, abdication, or legal deprivation of the titularies, the principality in which the circumstance shall have taken place shall be bound to pay to the Sublime Porte a sum equivalent to the annual tribute of the province as fixed by the hatti-sheriffs. With the exception of these sums, there shall never be exacted from the country, nor from the hospodars, any other tribute, contribution, or gift, under any pretext whatsoever.

By virtue of the abolishment of the supplies above mentioned, the inhabitants of the two principalities shall enjoy the full liberty of trade for all the productions of their soil and of their industry, stipulated by the separate act of the convention of Ackermann, without any restrictions save those which

the hospodars, in concert with their respective divans, may consider it expedient to establish, in order to insure the supply of provisions for the country. They may freely navigate the Danube with their own ships, provided with passports from their government, and carry on trade in the other towns or ports of the Sublime Porte, without being molested by the collectors of the "haratch," or being exposed to any other annoyance.

Moreover, the Sublime Porte, considering all the calamities which Moldavia and Wallachia have had to undergo, and moved by an especial sentiment of benevolence, consents to exempt the inhabitants of these provinces for the space of two years, reckoning from the day in which the principalities shall have been entirely evacuated by the Russian troops, from the payment of the annual taxes paid into its treasury.

Lastly, the Sublime Porte, desirous of securing, by every means, the future prosperity of the two principalities, solemnly promises to confirm the administrative regulations which, during the occupation of these two provinces by the armies of the imperial court, have been made in consequence of the wish expressed by the assemblies of the most influential inhabitants of the country, and which shall, in future, serve as bases for the internal government of the two provinces, with the full understanding, however, that the said regulations shall in no way compromise the rights of sovereignty of the Sublime Porte.

In consequence whereof we, the undersigned, plenipotentiaries of his majesty the Emperor and Padisha of all the Russias, in concert with the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, have agreed upon and determined with respect to Moldavia and Wallachia the above dispositions, which are the sequel of Article V. of the treaty of peace concluded at Adrianople between ourselves and the Ottoman plenipotentiaries. In pursuance of which the present separate act has been drawn up, subscribed by us, sealed with our seals, and delivered into the hands of the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte.

Done at Adrianople, the $\frac{2}{14}$ September, 1829.

(L.S.) SADIK EFFENDI. (L.S.) COUNT ALEXIS ORLOFF.
(L.S.) ABDOUL KADIR BEY. (L.S.) COUNT F. PAHLEN.

Separate act (2) *relative to the indemnifications for losses in trade, to those for the war expenses, and to the evacuation.*

In the name of Almighty God.

As the peace so happily concluded between the imperial court of Russia and the Sublime Ottoman Porte must be maintained perpetually between the two high empires, it has been judged necessary, for the purpose of preventing every possible subject of dispute in future, to regulate, by a separate act, all that relates to the indemnification for losses in trade, to those for the war expenses, and to the evacuation, by means of the following articles:

ARTICLE I. In one of the paragraphs of the separate act relative to the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and annexed to Article V. of the treaty of peace, it is stipulated that "the Turkish towns situated upon the left

bank of the Danube shall, as well as their territories (rayahs), be restored to Wallachia, in order to be henceforward united to that principality, and that the fortifications heretofore standing upon that bank can never be rebuilt," &c.

In consequence of this stipulation, the fortress of Giurgevo, which is still occupied by the troops of the Sublime Porte, must be evacuated and delivered up to the Russian troops, and its fortifications demolished. This evacuation shall be effected within the space of fifteen days after the signing of the treaty of peace. The Turkish troops shall retire to Rustchuk, taking with them all the artillery, ammunition, their property and effects. In like manner, the Mussulman inhabitants shall be equally empowered to carry away with them their property and goods.

II. By Article VIII. of the treaty of peace, it is stipulated that "the Sublime Porte, by way of reparation for the losses and injuries suffered by Russian subjects and merchants at various times since the year 1806, shall pay to the imperial court of Russia, within the course of eighteen months, at periods which shall be assigned further down, the sum of 1,500,000 ducats of Holland."

In consequence of this stipulation it is agreed, that upon the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of peace, the Ottoman Porte shall pay 100,000 ducats; that within the term of six months after the exchange of the ratifications, it shall pay 400,000 ducats; that in the six months following it shall pay 500,000 ducats; and lastly, that in the other six months it shall pay the remaining 500,000 ducats, which will complete the entire payment of the said sum of 1,500,000 ducats, within the term of eighteen months.

III. It is stipulated in Article IX. of the treaty of peace, that "the Sublime Porte engages to pay to the Imperial Court of Russia, by way of indemnification for the expenses of the war, a sum of money, the amount of which shall be fixed by mutual agreement."

In consequence of this stipulation, it is agreed and determined that the said indemnity shall be fixed at 10,000,000 of ducats of Holland, and the Sublime Porte promises to pay the said sum of money according to the mode of payment which shall be determined by his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, relying, as the Sublime Porte does, upon his generosity and magnanimity.

Moreover, in order to alleviate, as much as possible, the onus of this payment in specie, and to allow every facility necessary for that purpose, it is agreed that the imperial court of Russia shall consent to receive on account of the sum above-mentioned compensations in kind, in articles which shall, by mutual consent, be considered as receivable in part payment of the said indemnity.

IV. It is stipulated in Article XI. of the treaty of peace that "the imperial court of Russia will proceed to the evacuation of the territory of the Ottoman empire, conformably to the principles established by a separate act which shall form an integral part of the treaty of peace."

In consequence of this stipulation it is agreed and determined, that as soon as the 100,000 ducats, in part payment of the stipulated indemnity for the losses of Russian subjects and merchants shall have been paid in the manner agreed upon above in Article II. of the present separate act; that as soon as

Article VI. of the treaty of peace relative to Servia shall have been completely executed; and that the evacuation and delivery up of Giurgevo to the Russian troops shall have been effected in the manner specified above in Article I. of the present act, then and within the term of one month after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of peace, the Russian army shall evacuate the city of Adrianople, Kirk-Klissa, Lulé-Bougas, Midiah, and Iniada, and other places, which shall be immediately given up to the authorities empowered by the Ottoman Porte to receive them. Immediately after the payment of the 400,000 ducats of the said indemnity for the losses of Russian subjects and merchants shall have been exactly effected, that is to say, six months after the exchange of the ratifications, the Russian troops shall evacuate, within the space of one month, the whole extent of the country from the Balkan as far as the sea and the Gulf of Bourgas, so that all the cities, towns, and villages shall be delivered up to the authorities empowered by the Ottomon Porte to receive them, and the Russian troops shall retire and pass over on the other side of the Balkan into Bulgaria and the country of Dobridzia.

When the payment of the 500,000 ducats of the said indemnity for the losses of Russian subjects and merchants shall have been effected in the manner above specified, in the space of the other six months, then the Russian troops shall entirely evacuate and deliver up to the authorities of the Porte the whole of Bulgaria and the country of Dobridzia, with all the cities, towns, and villages therein comprised, from the Danube as far as the Black Sea.

The other remaining 500,000 ducats shall be paid within the term of other six months, that is to say, eighteen months after the exchange of the ratifications. And as to the evacuation above mentioned, the town of Silistria and the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia shall be exempted from it, and shall be kept as a security by the Imperial Court of Russia until the entire discharge of the sum which the Ottoman Porte has engaged itself to pay as an indemnification for the war expenses, as has been stipulated in Article III. of the present act; so that immediately upon the full payment of the above sum, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the town of Silistria shall be evacuated within two months by the Russian troops, and be formally given up to the authorities of the Ottoman Porte.

With respect to the evacuation by the Russian troops of the countries which, on the Asiatic side, are to be restored to the Ottoman Porte conformably to Article IV. of the treaty of peace, it is agreed that this evacuation shall commence three months after the exchange of the ratifications, and this shall be done by virtue of a particular convention, which the general-in-chief, count Paskewitch d'Erivan, shall conclude with the commanders of the Ottoman Porte in those countries, in such manner, however, that the entire evacuation of the countries restored to the Ottoman empire may be effected within the term of eight months after the exchange of the ratifications.

In consequence whereof, the present explanatory act, consisting of four Articles, has been drawn up, signed by us, sealed with our seals, and delivered into the hands of the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte, and the ratifi-

cations of the same shall be exchanged, together with those of the treaty of peace, of which it forms an integral part.

Done at Adrianople, the $\frac{2}{14}$ September, 1829.

(L.S.) SADIK EFFENDI. (L.S.) COUNT ALEXIS ORLOFF.
(L.S.) ABDOUL KADIR BEY. (L.S.) COUNT F. PAHLEN.

By virtue of supreme full powers I accept and confirm the conditions contained in the preceding treaty and separate acts.

COUNT J. DIEBITSCH ZABALKANSKY.

[These are taken from the copy laid before the House of Commons in 1854.]

APPENDIX H.

TREATY OF UNKIAR-SKELESSI.

No. IV.—*Treaty of defensive alliance (called that of Unkiar-Skelessi) between Russia and Turkey. Signed at Constantinople, July* 8, 1833.

In the name of Almighty God.

His Imperial Majesty, the most high and most mighty Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, and his Highness and most high and most mighty Emperor of the Ottomans, being equally animated with the sincere desire of maintaining the system of peace and good harmony happily established between the two empires, have resolved to extend and strengthen the perfect friendship and confidence which reign between them by the conclusion of a treaty of defensive alliance.

Their majesties have accordingly chosen and named as their plenipotentiaries; that is to say, his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the most excellent and most honourable Alexis Count Orloff, his extraordinary ambassador at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, and the most excellent and most honourable Apollinaire Bouténeff, his envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, &c.;

And his highness the Sultan of the Ottomans, the most illustrious and most excellent, the most ancient of his Viziers, Hosrew Mehemet Pasha, Seraskier, commander-in-chief of the regular troops of the line, and governor-general of Constantinople, &c., and the most excellent and most honourable Ferzi Akhmet Pacha, mouchir and commander of the guard of his highness, &c., and the most excellent and most honourable Hadgi Mehmet Akiff Reis Effendi, actual Reis Effendi, &c.;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I. There shall be for ever peace, amity and alliance between his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and his majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, their empires and their subjects, as well by land as by sea. This alliance having solely for its object the common defence of their dominions

against all attack, their majesties engage to come to an unreserved understanding with each other upon all the matters which concern their respective tranquillity and safety, and to afford to each other mutually for this purpose substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance.

II. The treaty of peace concluded at Adrianople on the 2nd of September, 1829, as well as all the other treaties comprised therein, as also the convention signed at St. Petersburgh on the 14th of April, 1830, and the arrangement relating to Greece, concluded at Constantinople on the 9th and 21st of July, 1832, are fully confirmed by the present treaty of defensive alliance, in the same manner as if the said transactions had been inserted in it word for word.

III. In consequence of the principle of conservation and mutual defence, which is the basis of the present treaty of alliance, and by reason of a most sincere desire of securing the permanence, maintenance and entire independence of the Sublime Porte, his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in the event of circumstances occurring which should again determine the Sublime Porte to call for the naval and military assistance of Russia, although, if it please God, that case is by no means likely to happen, engages to furnish, by land and by sea, as many troops and forces as the two high contracting parties may deem necessary. It is accordingly agreed, that in this case the land and sea forces, whose aid the Sublime Porte may call for, shall be held at its disposal.

IV. In conformity with what is above stated, in the event of one of the two powers requesting the assistance of the other, the expense only of provisioning the land and the sea forces which may be furnished, shall fall to the charge of the power who shall have applied for the aid.

V. Although the high contracting parties sincerely intend to maintain this engagement to the most distant period of time, yet, as it is possible that in process of time circumstances may require that some changes should be made in this treaty, it has been agreed to fix its duration at eight years from the day of the exchange of the imperial ratifications. The two parties, previously to the expiration of that term, will concert together, according to the state of affairs at that time, as to the renewal of the said treaty.

VI. The present treaty of defensive alliance shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Constantinople within the space of two months, or sooner if possible.

The present instrument, consisting of six articles, and to be finally completed by the exchange of the respective ratifications, having been agreed upon between us, we have signed it, and sealed it with our seals, in virtue of our full powers, and have delivered it to the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Ottoman Porte in exchange for a similar instrument.

Done at Constantinople, the $\frac{26\text{ June}}{8\text{ July}}$ 1833 (the 20th of the moon Safer, in the 1249th year of the Hegira).

CTE. ALEXIS ORLOFF.
A. BOUTENEFF.

Separate Article.

In virtue of one of the clauses of the first Article of the patent treaty of defensive alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, as his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the patent treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.

The present separate and secret article shall have the same force and value as if it was inserted word for word in the treaty of alliance of this day.

Done at Constantinople, $\frac{26 \text{ June}}{8 \text{ July}}$ 1833 (the 20th of the moon of Safer, in the 1249th year of the Hegira).

CTE. ALEXIS ORLOFF.
A. BOUTENEFF.

[This is taken from the copy laid before the House of Commons in 1854.]

INDEX.

A.

Abaza, revolt of, i. 391; insurrection quelled, i. 403; appointed Aga of the Janissaries, *ib.*; put to death by Amurath, *ib.*

Abdi, Turkish historian, ii. 70.

Abdoulhamid, revolts against the Porte, i. 380.

Abdul Hamid succeeds as Sultan, ii. 255; proclaims a holy war against Russia, ii. 284; recalls Gazi Hassan from Egypt to take the command of his troops, *ib.*; death, ii. 293.

Abdul Mejdid succeeds as sultan at the age of sixteen, ii. 446; firmness of character and abilities, ii. 447; issues the Hatti-scheriff of Gülhanè, ii. 451; makes further reforms, ii. 461; proclaims war with Russia in 1853, ii. 469.

Abdul Wahab, founder of the sect called Wahabites, ii. 201; his birth and education, *ib.*

Abdul-Zaziz proclaims to Ibrahim I. that he is deposed, ii. 18.

Aboukir, action at, ii. 341.

Achmet I., accession of, i. 381; boyhood promises a vigorous reign, *ib.*; weakness of maturer years, i. 382; makes peace with Austria, i. 383; no great European power attacks his dominions, i. 384; war with Persia continued, i. 386; his death, i. 387; tobacco introduced into Turkey in his reign, see note, *ib.*

Achmet II. proclaimed Sultan, ii. 86; confirms Kiuprili in his dignity of Vizier, *ib.*; wars unsuccessfully with the Imperialists, ii. 88; dies, *ib.*

Achmet III., accession of, ii. 107; complains to the Czar Peter of his warlike preparations, ii. 110; affords hospitality to Charles XII. of Sweden, ii. 111; makes Nououman Kiuprili Grand Vizier, ii. 113; declares war against Russia, ii. 116; reduces the Russians to great extremity, ii. 121; makes a treaty of peace with them, ii. 122; again prepares for war with the Czar, ii. 130; draws up another treaty through the intervention of the English and Dutch, *ib.*; gives the Vizierate to Damad Ali, his favourite son-in-law, ii. 131; war against the Venetians in the Morea, ii. 133; successes there, *ib.*; war declared against Austria, ii. 134; loss of Belgrade, ii. 149; seeks for peace with Austria, *ib.*; concludes a solemn treaty of eternal peace with Russia, ii. 152; assists the Czar against Persia, *ib.*; disorders and revolts of his frontier provinces, ii. 154; he is deposed, ii. 155; remarks on his reign, ii. 156.

Achmet Fevzy betrays the Sultan Mahmoud's fleet into the hands of Mehemet Ali, ii. 443.

Acre, bombardment of, ii. 444.

Adair, Sir Robert, concludes the treaty of the Dardanelles, ii. 380.

Adam Villiers de Lisle, grand master of Rhodes, i. 259; his valour, i. 260; surrenders, i. 261.

Adjé-Bey, celebrated Turkish captain, captures Gallipoli, i. 32.

Adorno, Genoese commandant, i. 95.

Adrianople captured by Amurath, i. 35; treaty of, ii. 432.

Agas, military and civil, i. 159.

Ahmed Kiuprili becomes Grand Vizier, ii. 33; abilities as ruler, *ib.*; noble rebuke to the chief of the Ulema, ii. 34: heads the Ottoman armies in the war with Austria, *ib.*; brilliant achievements, ii. 35; disposition of his forces at the battle of St.

Gothard, ii. 38; first attack against the Imperialists fails, ii. 42; he is defeated, ii. 44; plans the reduction of Candia, ii. 46; takes the city, ii. 47, 48; assists the Cossacks against Poland, ii. 49; his conquests in Podolia, ii. 51; he is routed near Khoczim, *ib.*; death and character, ii. 52, 53.
Ahmed, Prince, shows designs of striving for the throne, i. 207; is defeated in a pitched battle, i. 210.
Aidos, ii. 430.
Akbar, Great Mogul, i. 254.
Akhalkali, ii. 425.
Akhioli, i. 199.
Akindji, Turkish light horsemen, i. 5; dreaded in Christendom, i. 26; they sweep round the walls of Vienna, i. 268.
Alaeddin, Sultan of Seljukian Turks, i. 4.
Alaeddin, son of Othman, i. 16; Vizier to Orchan, i. 19; introduces laws, i. 20; creates a standing army, *ib.*
Alaeddin, eldest son of Amurath II., i. 107.
Aleppo, battle near, i. 229.
Alexander the Great, passage of the Balkan, i. 103.
Alexander, Emperor of Russia, orders an attack upon Turkey, ii. 366; requires the annexation of the Danubian provinces to his empire, ii. 387.
Alexis Michaelowicz, Czar, ii. 21.
Algiers seized by the French, ii. 435.
Alliance, unholy, of 1764, ii. 209.
Ali Coumourgi, ii. 131.
Ali Moldowandji raised from the rank of gardener to the Sultan to the Grand Vizierate, ii. 220.
Ali Pacha, general of Amurath's army, i. 45.
Ali Pacha, birth and character of, ii. 402; rebellion against the Sultan, ii. 404; death, ii. 405.
Althatzhik, ii. 425.
Amassia, i. 207.
Amber tax, when created, ii. 9.
Amurath I., his wars and conquests, i. 34-37; marries the daughter of Sisvan, i. 37; conduct during peace, *ib.*; marriage of his son Bajazet, i. 38; quells an insurrection, i. 39; extent of his dominions in Europe, i. 42; powers allied against him to seize his European conquests, *ib.*; crosses the Hellespont to meet his foes, i. 45; defeats the King of Servia on the plains of Kossova, i. 46-50; mortally wounded by Milosch, i. 50.
Amurath II. recognised as Sultan, i. 94; defeats the pretender Mustapha, i. 95; besieges Constantinople, i. 95-97; raises the siege, i. 97; civil war, i. 98; treaty with Greek emperor, i. 99; captures Thessalonica, *ib.*; repulsed from Belgrade, i. 101; struggle with the Western powers, i. 102; crosses the Balkan, i. 103; anxious for tranquillity in his European dominions, makes a treaty of peace, i. 106; domestic qualities, i. 107; abdicates in favour of his son Mahomet, *ib.*; treaty of peace broken by the Christian powers, i. 108; emerges from retirement to meet his foes, i. 110; battle of Varna, i. 111, 112; he is victorious, i. 113; abdicates a second time, i. 114; again called to the head of the empire, i. 115; enterprises against the Peloponnesus, i. 116; defeats Hunyades at Kossova, *ib.*; seizes Scanderbeg's patrimony, *ib.*; long war with him, i. 117; dies at Adrianople, i. 118; buried at Brusa, *ib.*; what the historian Knolles says of his sepulchre, i. 118, 119.
Amurath III., accession of, i. 359; first act of his reign, *ib.*; chief ladies who influenced him, i. 360; war with Persia, i. 361; most remarkable episode of it, i. 362; peace with Persia, *ib.*; war declared against Austria, i. 363; England sends merchants to the Porte, *ib.*; Queen Elizabeth's object in sending an ambassador to the Ottoman court, *ib.*; general prevalence of venality and corruption in Amurath's reign, i. 365; the armies infected with the taint, i. 366; his death, i. 367.
Amurath IV. ascends the throne, i. 391; symptoms of the downfal of Turkey, i. 391, 392; misery of the empire, i. 394; formidable mutiny of the Spahis, i. 395; obliged to sacrifice the life of his Grand Vizier, i. 388-399; his skill in reducing the mutinous troops to order, i. 399-401; severity and cruelty, i. 401-404; puts the chief Mufti to death, i. 407; conquers the city of Eriwan, i. 407; commences the siege of Bagdad, i. 409; sets an example of patient energy and courage, *ib.*; takes the city, i. 410; massacre of the inhabitants,

ib.; makes a triumphal entry into Constantinople, i. 411; peace with Persia, i. 412; his death, *ib.*
Anapa, ii. 425.
Andronicus, Emperor, friendly relations between him and Orchan, i. 28.
Andronicus, son of John Palæologus, i. 39; his revolt, *ib.*; punishment, i. 40.
Angelo, St., castle of, i. 306.
Angora, battle of, i. 76-79.
Anne, Empress of Russia, ii. 171; prepares for war with Turkey, *ib.*; adopts the Oriental project, ii. 195.
Apicidion, i. 39.
Araxes, ii. 152.
Arnold, remarks of, on the character of Sylla, see note, i. 138.
Arta, gulf of, ii. 433.
Asia Minor, i. 4; solidity of the power established there, i. 27, 28.
Athens, surrender of, ii. 406.
Aubusson, Peter d', defends Rhodes, i. 149; unknightly conduct, i. 189.
Austria joins Russia against Turkey, ii. 168.
Azerbijan, i. 220.
Azof, siege of, ii. 20, taken possession of by the Russians, ii. 97.
Azoph, sea of, i. 344.

B

Bagration, Prince, ii. 385.
Bahory, Stephen, perished at Varna, i. 113.
Bajazet I., marriage of, i. 38; valour, i. 41; conquers Lazarus, King of Servia, i. 50; succeeds his father Amurath, *ib.*; orders his brother to be killed, *ib.*; enters into a treaty with Lasarevich and marries his sister, i. 51; defeats the king of Hungary, i. 52; takes the title of Sultan, i. 53; falls into excesses, *ib.*; startled from his revels by a crusade against him, i. 55; capture of some of his towns, i. 58; meets and defeats his foes, i. 59-62; cruelty to his prisoners, i. 62-64; allows the Count of Nevers to be ransomed, i. 66; leave-taking between him and the Christian lords, i. 66-69; further conquests, i. 69; takes Athens in 1397, i. 70; prepares to besiege Constantinople, *ib.*; Timour assails him, i. 74; he is taken prisoner, i. 79; Timour's treatment of him and his death, *ib.*; buried at Brusa, i. 80.
Bajazet II. struggles for the sovereignty with his brother Djem, i. 183; civil wars follow, i. 185; he is victorious, *ib.*; pays an annual tribute towards keeping his brother in captivity, i. 189; rise of Turkish navy in his reign, i. 195; his dreamy disposition renders him unfit for war, i. 196; domestic dissensions, i. 197; engages his rebellious son Selim with regret, i. 199; defeats him, *ib.*; obliged to abdicate in his favour, i. 201; begs to retire to Demotika, *ib.*; dies before he gets there, i. 202; remarks on his reign, *ib.*
Bajazet, Prince, son of Solyman I. i. 297.
Bakcheserai, ancient residence of the Khans of the Crimea, taken and pillaged, ii. 179.
Balkan mountains, i. 45; passage of, i. 103.
Baltadji Mehemet Pacha, Grand Vizier to Achmet III., marches against Peter the Great of Russia, ii. 119; crosses the Danube and is joined by the Khan of the Crimea, ii. 120; consents to draw up a treaty of peace, ii. 122; deposed from his office, ii. 130.
Baphæum, i. 16.
Barbarossa, history of, and his naval achievements, i. 281-286.
Battin, Turkish army defeated at, ii. 386.
Bedreddin, organiser of Dervish revolt, i. 90.
Belgrade, Amurath repulsed from, i. 101; besieged by Mahomet II., i. 143; defended by Hunyades who defeats Mahomet, i. 144, 145; taken by Solyman I., i. 258; sacred standard unfurled there, ii. 35; taken by the Austrians, ii. 74; recovered by the Turks, ii. 85; treaty concluded at, ii. 199.
Bey, rank of, i. 166.
Bey Khair, betrayer of Touman Bey, i. 230; styled governor of Egypt, i. 240.
Bey Kourt, noble fearlessness before Selim, i. 232-234.
Beylan, ii. 437.
Beylerbey, rank of, i. 166.
Beyrout, bombardment of, ii. 444.
Beys, Sandjak, i. 224.
Bey Touman, Sultan of Egypt, i. 229;

bravery, i. 231; betrayed to the Turks, i. 235; is killed, *ib.*
Biledjik, i. 66.
Black Mourad, colonel of the Janissaries, ii. 10; Chief conspirator against Ibrahim, ii. 12.
Bokhari Seid, renowned saint, i. 96.
Boniface IX. preaches a crusade against the Ottomans, i. 55.
Borgia, Alexander, i. 192-194.
Bosnia annexed to the Ottoman Empire, i. 114.
Bosriak Aga, Turkish commander, ii. 386.
Boug river, ii. 55.
Bourg, massive towers of, i. 307.
Bourgass, bay of, ii. 428.
Bragadino, Venetian commandant at Famagosta, i. 348.
Brailow, or Ibrail, ii. 232; taken by the Russians, ii. 424.
Brancovan, hospodar of Wallachia, ii. 119.
Brankovich, George, lord of Servia, i. 100.
Brenner, general, taken prisoner by the Turks near Carlowitz, ii. 143.
Brusa, battle at, i. 5; surrenders to the Ottomans in 1326, i. 16; Othman buried there, i. 17.
Bucharest, i. 371.
Butler, English officer killed at the siege of Silistria, ii. 472.

C

Calderan, valley of, i. 222.
Caliphs, their temporal power overthrown, i. 241.
Candelissa, Greek renegade, i. 307.
Candia, war of, ii. 20.
Cantacuzene, Emperor of the Greeks, i. 29; severely pressed by John Palæologus, i. 31; implores Orchan's aid, *ib.*; offers Solyman a large sum to retire from Tzympé, *ib.*; terrible earthquake which frightens the Greeks, *ib.*; Turks take advantage of their terror, i. 32.
Cantemir, hospodar of Moldavia, ii. 119; proclaimed prince of that province by General Münnich, ii. 196.
Capistran, John, heads the crusaders at the siege of Belgrade, i. 144; his death and canonisation, i. 145.
Caramania, Prince of, marries Nifisay, i. 38; is defeated at Iconium, i. 41; submits to the Ottomans, i. 53; besieges Brusa, i. 88; sues for peace, i. 89; his perfidy, *ib.*; again sues for peace, *ib.*
Carlowitz, peace concluded at, ii. 104.
Castriot, John, father of Scanderbeg. i. 116.
Catherine of Russia extricates the Czar and his army from destruction, ii. 121; solemnly crowned, ii. 126.
Catherine II., Czarina of Russia, ii. 207; concludes a treaty with Frederick II. of Prussia, ii. 208; sends a fleet to attack the Sultan, ii. 222; her generals conquer the Crimea, ii. 233; announces her intention of making the Crimea independent of Turkey, ii. 240; lays before the Austrian government a written scheme for dismembering the Ottoman Empire, ii. 240; makes a triumphal progress to her new Taurian province, ii. 231; invites Greece to co-operate with her in destroying the Turkish power, ii. 298; concludes the peace of Jassy, ii. 310; her death, ii. 311.
Caulaincourt, French ambassador at the Porte, ii. 379.
Cehzrym, ii. 35.
Cerestes, battle at, i. 377.
Cervantes wounded at Lepanto, i. 354.
Chamurli, plain of, i. 85.
Charles VI. of France, i. 44.
Charles VIII. of France, i. 189.
Charles V., Emperor of Germany, i. 254; reverse at Algiers, i. 285.
Charles XII. of Sweden, ii. 110; takes refuge in Turkey after his defeat at Pultowa, ii. 111; shows reluctance to leave Turkey, ii. 113.
Choiseul, the French minister, endeavours to lay before the whole of Europe the ambition of Russia, ii. 213.
Christian children formed into an army, i. 21; last levy made, ii. 63.
Cicala, Pacha, i. 374.
Cicala, Scipio, i. 375.
Cilly, Count Herman de, i. 57.
Citate, ii. 471.
Comines, historian, i. 101.
Conrad, i. 43.
Constantinople, Emperor of, summoned to surrender to Bajazet, i. 70.
Constantine XI., i. 121; his imprudence, i. 122; prepares for the defence of Constantinople, i. 124; gallant action of four of his ships, i. 128; summoned to surrender and refuses,

i. 131, 132; prepares for death as a Christian soldier, i. 133; is killed in battle, i. 135.
Copts, i. 240.
Corinth, siege of, ii. 133.
Corfu, island of, attacked by the Ottomans, ii. 134.
Coron, ii. 225.
Cossacks, state of the, in the reign of Mahomet IV., ii. 48.
Crete, ii. 434. See *Candia*.
Crimea, subjugation of the, i. 146; great value as a possession, *ib.*; formally annexed to the Russian dominions, ii. 272.
Cunibert, Servian statesman and historian, ii. 389.
Cyclades, ii. 434.
Cyprus, Isle of, subdued by the Turks, i. 348.
Cyzicus, i. 30.

D

Daghistan, ii. 152.
Dahis, title of, assumed, ii. 349; they massacre the Rayas, ii. 351.
Damad Ali, raised to the dignity of Grand Vizier, ii. 131; abilities as statesman, *ib.*; heads an army against the Venetians in the Morea, ii. 133; anxious for war with Austria, ii. 134; commands the army against the Austrians in person, ii. 141; defeats them near Carlowitz, ii. 143; mortally wounded and his troops defeated fighting against Prince Eugene, ii. 145.
Daoud Pacha, strangles Othman, i. 390.
Dardanelles, treaty of, ii. 380.
Defterdar, Mustapha, i. 396.
Demotika, Bajazet born at, i. 201.
Derbend, ii. 152.
Derkos, i. 99.
Dervishes, revolt of, i. 90; form a forlorn hope, i. 97.
Dewlet Ghirai, Khan of the Crimea, promotes hostilities between Turkey and Russia, ii. 115; summoned to a conference with the Sultan, ii. 116; prevails on him to declare war, *ib.*
Deys, origin of the title, ii. 66.
Diarbekir, i. 220.
Diebitsch, Marshal, leads the forces of the Emperor Nicholas into the Danubian principalities, ii. 426; commences the siege of Silistria, ii. 427; gains that important post, ii. 428; takes Adrianople, ii. 430.
Divan, explanation of, i. 158.
Djem, Prince, i. 183; struggles for the sovereignty, *ib.*; civil wars in consequence, i. 185; his captivity, i. 186; transferred by Charles VIII. of France to the custody of the Pope, i. 189; again transferred to the French king, i. 193; murdered by the Pope, i. 194; buried at Brusa, *ib.*
Djemali Mufti, his influence over Selim I., i. 246.
Djerbè, Isle of, i. 289.
Djezzar, Pacha, takes the command of the Syrian forces against the French, ii. 337; revolts from the Porte, ii. 346.
Djourneid, governor of Smyrna, i. 87; revolts from Mahomet I., *ib.*
Dniester, ii. 55.
Dolgorouki, General, forces the Turkish garrison at Arkadia to surrender, ii. 225; obtains possession of the Crimea, ii. 234; installs Schahin Ghirai as Khan, ii. 235.
Don, proposal to unite that river with the Volga, i. 344.
Dorescensko, Hetman of the Cossacks, ii. 49.
Doria, Admiral, i. 289.
Dorylæum, i. 6.
Dragut, Turkish admiral, i. 288; mortally wounded, i. 306.
Drakul, Prince of Wallachia, i. 109.
Duckworth, Admiral, ordered to attack the Turkish fleet, ii. 367; is obliged to withdraw, ii. 368.
Dugdale, Lieutenant, steers alone the fire-ship destined to destroy the Turkish fleet, ii. 227.
Dundar, son of Soliman Shah, i. 2.
Dushan, Stephen, i. 42.

E

Edebali, celebrated for learning and piety, i. 7.
Edward I. i. 43.
Egervar, capture of, ii. 36.
Egypt, wrested from the French under Abercrombie and Hutchinson, ii. 343.
Eilau, Bishop of, perished at Varna, i. 113.
Elhadj, Mohammed, takes the command against the Imperialists, ii. 196.
Elizabeth, Queen, sends an ambassador to Turkey, i. 363.
Elmo Fort, i. 303.

Elphinstone, Admiral, ii. 223; blockades the Turkish ships, ii. 227.
Emalthea, i. 116.
Emir, Mohammed, shows himself wholly unqualified for the office of Grand Vizier, ii. 218; recalled from the command of the army and beheaded, ii. 220.
Epoch, importance of the, of Solyman's reign, i. 250.254.
Erlau, city of, surrenders, ii. 74.
Erizzo, Anne, her fate, i. 147.
Erizzo, Paul, Venetian commander, i. 147.
Ermeni mountains, i. 3.
Ertoghrul, leader of the Oghouz Turks, i. 1; succours Alaeddin, i. 2; his successes and tactics, i. 5; gains a battle between Brusa and Yenischeer, *ib.*
Ertoghrul, Prince, son of Bajazet I., killed at Sivas, i. 74.
Erzerum, ii. 427.
Eskischeer, celebrated in the history of the crusades under the name of Dorylæum, i. 6.
Eubœa, ii. 433.
Eugene, Prince, heads the Imperialists against the Turks, ii. 73; defeats the Ottomans at Zenta, ii. 94; gains a great battle over Damad Ali, ii. 144, 145; gets possession of Temeswar, ii. 146; invests Belgrade, ii. 147; surrender of the city, ii. 149.
Eugenius, Pope, i. 102.
Eupatoria captured by the Russians, ii. 235.
Evliya, Turkish historian, i. 394.

F.

Famagosta, i. 348.
Ferdinand of Austria claims the crown of Hungary, i. 266; does not obtain it, i. 267; Hungary divided between him and Zapolya, i. 275; he claims the whole, i. 277; makes overtures for peace with Solyman, *ib.*
Firdousi, Persian poet, i. 137.
Folard, Chevalier, remarks of, respecting the defeats of the Turkish armies in the eighteenth century, ii. 167.
Fondi, Giulia Gonzaga, of, i. 284.
Foscolo, Venetian ambassador, i. 206.
Fox opposes Pitt's policy respecting Russia, ii. 307.
Francis I. of France, i. 254.
Fratricide, imperial, legalised by Mahomet II., i. 182.
Frederick of Prussia anxious for a peace between Russia and Turkey, ii. 240.
Friuli, i. 147.
Fur tax, origin of, ii. 9.

G.

Galata, European suburb of Constantinople, i. 30.
Gallipoli, town of, occupied by Adjé-Bey and Ghasi Fasil, i. 32: fortifications repaired, *ib.*
Galitzin attempts to invade the Crimea, ii. 75.
Gallitzin, Prince, ordered to occupy Moldavia, ii. 217; makes an unsuccessful attempt upon Khoczin, ii. 218.
Ghasi Fasil, Turkish general, i. 32.
Ghawri Kanssou, Sultan of Egypt, i. 228; engages the Turks near Aleppo, i. 229.
Ghazali, traitor, i. 230; attempts to make himself independent, i. 256.
Ghilan, ii. 152.
Ghoureba, or foreign horse, i. 25.
Giaours, campaign against the, i. 258.
Giustiniani, John, Genoese commander, i. 125; bravery and skill, i. 128; particularly distinguishes himself, i. 133; mortally wounded, i. 134.
Golden Horn, i. 127.
Gothard, St. convent of, ii. 38; gives name to a memorable battle between the Turks and Austrians, ii. 38.
Goundonroulp, brother of Othman, i. 8.
Gradisca, city of, captured, ii. 74.
Gran, town of, i. 371.
Gregg, Captain, an English officer in the service of Catherine of Russia, ii. 223; directs the cannonade at Tchesmé, ii. 227.
Gritti, Andrea, i. 254.
Grosswardein, Bishop of, fell at Varna, i. 113.
Gülhanè, Hatti-scheriff of, ii. 451.
Gustavus Adolphus, ii. 40.

H.

Hadji Beytarch, i. 22; names the corps of Christian children, i. 23.
Hafiz, Grand Vizier, i. 396; death, i. 398.
Hamadan, ii. 152.
Hamilcar, Barcas, i. 41.

Hanefizade, ii. 16.
Hannibal, i. 41.
Hanway, English traveller, ii. 159; his biography of Topal Osman, ii. 160-163.
Hasandschan, father of Seaded-din, i. 244; inseparable companion of Selim, i. 246.
Hassau, Aga of the Janissaries, i. 85.
Hassan of Algiers, ii. 226; desperate bravery, ii. 227; offers to raise the siege of Lemnos, ii. 229; gains a victory over Orloff, near Monderos, ii. 230; endeavours to restore the Empire, ii. 266; recovers the Morea, ii. 270; heads the Turkish army against the Austrians and Russians, ii. 295; being unsuccessful, he is put to death, ii. 296.
Henry VIII. of England, i. 254.
Herennius Pontius, advice of, ii. 129.
Hermanstadt, i. 101; ii. 293.
Hertwitz, ii. 425.
Heteria, origin of the, ii. 400.
Heyducs, ii. 352.
Horn, Golden, i. 127.
Housein Kiuprili raised to the dignity of Grand Vizier, if. 95; takes advantage of a general peace to check disorders and tumults, ii. 106; retires from office and dies, ii. 107.
Houlogou, Khan, destroyer of the temporal power of the Caliphs, i. 24.
Hungary in peril, i. 36; fate decided at the battle of Mohacz, i. 265; open country of Hungary overrun by Kiuprili, ii. 35.
Hunyades the Great, birth of, i. 52; opponent of Amurath II., i. 99; marches to the relief of Hermanstadt, i. 101; routs the Turks at Vasag, i. 102; leads the Western powers against the Ottomans, i. 103; captures city of Sophia, *ib.*; campaign of the Balkan, i. 104, 105; comparison between Hunyades and Diebitsch, i. 105; breaks the treaty made with Amurath II., and encounters him at Varna, i. 110-113; flies from the field, i. 113; defeated at Kossova, i. 116; makes a truce for three years with Mahomet II., i. 123; defends Belgrade, i. 164; dies there, i. 145.

I.

Ibrahim, Grand Vizier, sent to resettle the administration of Egypt, i. 263; his tragical end, i. 291, 292.
Ibrahim of Aleppo, compiler of the great code of Ottoman law, i. 331.
Ibrahim I. taken from prison to be Sultan, ii. 4; excesses and bad government, *ib.*; orders his Vizier to be strangled, ii. 7; sells all the offices of state to supply his prodigality, ii. 9; creates new taxes, *ib.*; fresh excesses, ii. 11; conspiracy against him, ii. 12; demands of the conspirators, ii. 14; deposition of Ibrahim, ii. 17; he is put to death, ii. 19; principal events of his reign, ii. 20-26.
Ibrahim, Grand Vizier to Achmet III., ii. 154; his abilities for government productive of internal peace in the empire, *ib.*
Ibrahim Pacha, defeats the rebellious Greeks, ii. 406; besieges Acre, ii. 437.
Ibrahim Scheitan, conquers Podolia, ii. 52.
Iconium, battle at, i. 41; total defeat of Caramanian prince, i. 41.
Idris historian, i. 206; risks his life by interceding for the Egyptians, i. 236.
Imerita, ii. 153.
Inæni, i. 6; Lord of, refuses to give up Othman, i. 8.
Innocent VIII., Pope, i. 192.
Interregnum between the death of Bajazet I., and accession of his son Mahomet I., i. 82-85.
Ipsilanti organises the Greek revolution, ii. 405.
Isidore, Cardinal, i. 125.
Iskenderbeg, name of, i. 116.
Isladi, defile of, i. 104.
Islam Pacha, commander of the Turkish garrison in the city of Azof, ii. 21.
Ismail Schah, Prince of Persia, i. 208.
Ismail, town of, i. 371; surrenders to the Russians, ii. 232; siege of, by Suwarrow, ii. 299-300.
Issa, Prince, son of Bajazet I., escapes after the battle of Angora, i. 79; wages war against his brother Mahomet, and is defeated, i. 83.
Italinsky, ambassador from Russia to the Porte, ii. 359.
Itbourni, i. 7.
Ivan III., i. 203.
Ivan the Terrible, i. 341; valour of his generals, i. 345.

J.

Jahia, Mufti, i. 396.
Janissaries, corps of, formed, i. 20; main strength of the Turkish armies, i. 161.
Jassipede, ii. 219.
Jassy, Peter the Great halts at, ii. 119; treaty of, ii. 310.
Jean, Nicodeme, physician to Topal Osman, ii. 164.
John, Don, of Austria, i. 349; commands the confederate fleets against the naval forces of Turkey, i. 350; defeats them, i. 353; captures Tunis, i. 356; loses possession of it, *ib.*
Joseph, Emperor of Austria, signal defeat near Slatina, ii. 289-291.
Julian, Cardinal, i. 102; causes King Ladislaus to break the treaty made with Amurath II., i. 108; perishes at Varna, i. 113.

K.

Kabilovitsch Milosch stabs Amurath, i. 50.
Kaffa, i. 146; opens its gates to the Russians, ii. 234.
Kainardji, treaty of, ii. 257.
Kalemberg mountains, ii. 58.
Kalismene, roads of, ii. 23.
Kaminiec, siege of, ii. 51.
Kapitan Pacha, ii. 420.
Kapitan Pacha Hosameddin, engages the Russian fleet off Scios, ii. 226.
Kara George, commander-in-chief of the Servians, ii. 352; sends a deputation to St. Petersburg, ii. 357; despatches an embassy to Constantinople, *ib.*; completes the independence of Servia, ii. 363; deserts his trust, ii. 395; returns to his country and is shot, ii. 396.
Kara Moustafa, Grand Vizier to Ibrahim, ii. 4; base device to ruin his foe, Youssouf Pacha, ii. 6; death, ii. 7.
Kara Mustapha, Vizier to Mahomet IV., ii. 54; unsuccessful war with Russia, ii. 55; fatal enterprise against Vienna, *ib.*; weakness of his plans, ii. 59; rout of his army, ii. 60; executed by the Sultan's order, *ib.*
Karansebes, valley of, ii. 289.
Karasi, Prince of, defeated, i. 26; his capital annexed to Orchan's dominions, *ib.*
Karpos, execution of, ii. 84.
Kars, ii. 425; noble defence of, ii. 473; garrison, worn out by starvation, surrender to the Russians, ii. 473.
Kasimir, Prince, i. 92.
Kaundjik, i. 109.
Kedük Ahmed, i. 146; subjugates the Crimea, *ib.*; effects a landing in Italy, i. 150.
Kemal Reis. See *Reis Kemal.*
Kemankesh, Pacha, makes the first attack on the Austrians at Salankeman, ii. 87.
Kertch, city of, ii. 100; surrenders to the Russians, ii. 234.
Khair Bey. See *Bey Khair.*
Khaireddin Pacha, better known as Barbarossa. See *Barbarossa.*
Khalil, Grand Vizier, i. 122.
Khalil Pacha engages the Russians near Kartal, ii. 231.
Khamlepe, ii. 219.
Khirenkia, i. 8.
Khiri Khodja, i. 112; kills King Ladislaus at Varna, *ib.*
Khoczim, defeat of the Turks near, ii. 51.
Khourrem, i. 292.
Kilia, ii. 232.
Kipornak, ii. 36.
Kiuprili Zadè Mustapha, created Grand Vizier, ii. 77; wisdom of his government, *ib.*; conduct towards the Rayas, ii. 79-81; killed in battle fighting against the Austrians, ii. 87.
Kléber defeats the Turks at Heliopolis, ii. 343.
Klephts, Greek robbers, ii. 398.
Knolles, historian, i. 118.
Kœprihissar, Greek fortress, attacked by Othman, i. 15.
Koniah, the old Iconium, i. 4.
Koran, noblest of the War Hymns from the, ii. 135, 141.
Korkoud, Prince, endeavours to win over the Janissaries, i. 209; his plans detected, and himself slain, *ib.*
Koslof, better known as Eupatoria, ii. 179.
Kossova, fate of Servia decided at, i. 47; Hunyades defeated there in 1448, i. 116.
Kourdistan, i. 220.
Koyounhissar, important battle at, i. 16.
Krim Ghirai, the Tartar Khan, sweeps over southern Russia, ii. 215; discipline of his troops, ii. 216; death, ii. 217.
Krotzka, battle of, ii. 198.

Kuban, Russia gains permission to erect a fortress there, ii. 199.
Kulewtsha, battle of, ii. 427.
Kur, ii. 152.

L.

ADISLAUS, accession of, to the crown of Hungary, i. 101; joins Hunyades, i. 103; makes peace with Amurath II., i. 106; breaks the treaty, i. 108; killed at Varna, i. 112.
Lalaschachin, i. 36.
Lambro Canzani captures many Turkish vessels, ii. 298; defeated by the Turks, ii. 299.
Lasarevich, Stephen, King of Servia, i. 51; gives his sister in marriage to Bajazet I., *ib.*; fights for him at Angora, i. 78.
Lascy, General, ii. 173; ordered to renew the invasion of the Crimea, ii. 186; defeats the Tartars there, and devastates the country, ii. 189.
Laudohn, Marshal, ii. 289; commands the Austrian forces, ii. 295.
Laufritz, ii. 37.
Lazarus, King of Servia, i. 46; challenges Amurath to a decisive battle, *ib.*; is defeated and executed, i. 50.
Leitau, defeat of the Persians near, ii. 165.
Lemberg, fall of, ii. 51.
Leo X., Pope, i. 254.
Leontiew, General, ii. 172; attacks Kilburn, ii. 177.
Leopold, Emperor of Austria, attacked by the Turks, seeks aid from Sobieski, King of Poland, ii. 56; desires peace, ii. 98.
Lepanto, battle of, i. 351.
Lissa, i. 118.
Loredano, Admiral, i. 90.
Lorraine, Duke of, captures nearly all the places held by the Turks in Hungary, ii. 61.
Louis I., i. 43.
Louis II., King of Hungary, draws upon himself Solyman's vengeance by killing his ambassador, i. 257; perishes in the battle of Mohacz, i. 205.
Louis of Baden, ii. 73; heads the Imperialists against the Turks, ii. 74; is victorious, ii. 88.
Louis XIV. sends an ambassador to the Porte to encourage hostilities against the Austrians, ii. 84.

M.

MAGNESIA, i. 108.
Mahmoud I., ii. 158; continues the war with Persia, ii. 159; makes peace with the dreaded Nadir, ii. 165; proclaims war against Russia, ii. 170; sustains losses in the Crimea, ii. 174, 181; anxious for peace with Russia, ii. 182; rejects the terms offered, ii. 183; distributes honours and rewards to the officers and soldiers who distinguished themselves in the campaign against the Austrians, ii. 192; concludes the peace of Belgrade, ii. 200; latter part of his reign remarkable by the rise of the sect called Wahabites, ii. 201; dies in 1754, ii. 203.
Mahmoud II. proclaimed Sultan, ii. 374; refuses to give up the Danubian provinces to Russia, ii. 387; character of Mahmoud, ii. 390, 391; war with Ali Pacha, ii. 401; puts him to death, ii. 405; summons the forces of Mehemet Ali to Greece, ii. 406; destroys the Janissaries, ii. 410-412; signs the treaty of Akkerman, ii. 415; refuses to recognise the independence of the Greeks, ii. 417; declares war with Russia, ii. 422; signs the treaty of Adrianople, ii. 432; his grief after the signature, ii. 434; vainly endeavours to crush the power of Mehemet Ali, ii. 437; applies to England for aid, which is not granted, *ib.*; has recourse to Russia, ii. 438; treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, ii. 439; fresh war with Mehemet Ali, ii. 441; worn down by anxiety he dies, ii. 443; sketch of his various reforms, ii. 447, 451.
Mahomet I., son of Bajazet I., escapes after the battle of Angora, i. 79; quarrels between him and his brothers, i. 83-85; succeeds as Sultan, i. 86; makes a treaty with the Venetians, i. 87; compels Djouneid to beg for peace, i. 88; conduct to the Prince of Caramania, i. 89; war with the Venetians, i. 90; revolt of the Dervishes, *ib.*; defeats the impostor who personated his brother Mustapha, i. 91; conduct towards his brother Kasimir, i. 92; his death, i. 93; buried at Brusa, *ib.*; character, i. 94.
Mahomet II., accession of, i. 120; character, i. 121; prepares for the siege of Constantinople, i. 123;

arrives before the city, i. 126; plan of attack, i. 127; commences the siege, i. 128; brilliant exploit of Christian ships, i. 128, 129; cruelty of Mahomet towards Baltaoghli, i. 129; summons Constantine to surrender, i. 132; he refuses, *ib.*; the assault begins, May 29, 1453, i. 134; capture of the city, i. 135; his conduct after victory, i. 135, 136; takes possession of the Imperial palace, i. 137; cruelty to Notaras and his family, i. 139; proclaims himself protector of the Greek Church, i. 140; mode of replenishing his new capital, i. 140; comparison between Mahomet's conquests and those of Alexander and Napoleon, i. 142; besieges Belgrade, i. 143; is defeated, i. 145; successes in Asia, i. 146; conquers Eubœa, i. 147; merciless cruelty to the Venetian commander, i. 147; overpowers Scanderbeg, i. 147; attacks the eastern coasts of the Adriatic, i. 148; makes peace with Venice, *ib.*; prepares to subjugate Italy, *ib.*; attacks Rhodes, i. 149; raises the siege, i. 150; secures an entrance for his armies into Italy, *ib.*; dies, i. 151.

Mahomet III., accession of, i. 368; kills his nineteen brothers, *ib.*; his armies in Wallachia and Hungary meet with disasters, i. 371; resolves to head his troops, i. 372; unfurls the sacred standard, i. 373; captures Erlau, i. 377; battle of Cerestes, *ib.*; brilliant charge of Cicala, i. 378; returns to Constantinople, i. 379; spends the rest of his reign in inglorious indolence, i. 380; death, i. 381.

Mahomet IV., proclaimed Sultan at the age of seven, ii. 17; factions during his minority, ii. 26; his empire increases in importance under the stern rule of Mohammed Kiuprili, ii. 32; advances towards manhood, ii. 33; places implicit confidence in Amed Kiuprili, *ib.*; marches with his troops as far as Adrianople, ii. 35; places the sacred standard in Kiuprili's hands, *ib.*; Kiuprili loses the battle of St. Gothard, ii. 44; truce for twenty years follows, ii. 45; expedition against Candia planned, which the Sultan proposes to head in person, ii. 46; shrinks from his proposal, *ib.*; accompanies his army to the siege of Kaminiec, ii. 51; makes peace with Poland, and returns in triumph to Adrianople, *ib.*; inglorious war with Russia, ii. 55; unsuccessful siege of Vienna, *ib.*; orders Kara Mustapha to be executed, ii. 60; is deposed, ii. 61; character and sketch of the principal events of his reign, ii. 61-70.

Mahpeikar Sultana, i. 394; talent and energy, i. 395.

Malkatoon, i. 8; dies before Othman, leaving two sons, i. 16.

Malta besieged by Solyman I., i. 300; saved by the heroism of its defenders, i. 308.

Mamelukes, origin of, i. 226; they conquer Egypt and Syria, i. 227; war between them and the Ottoman Turks, i. 228; their final defeat, i. 231; massacre of eight hundred of their number, i. 232.

Marizza, i. 36.

Marmarice, Bay of, i. 259.

Martinengo, celebrated engineer, i. 260.

Mavrocordato, Prince, ii. 102.

Mazanderad, ii. 152.

Maximilian, Emperor, armistice concluded with, i. 340; takes many districts from the Turks, i. 371; defeated at Cerestes, i. 378.

Meadia, ii. 191.

Mediterranean, description of the system of warfare in the, see note, i. 280.

Mehdi, religious impostor in Kurdistan, ii. 67.

Mehemet Ali, ii. 392; orders the massacre of the Mamelukes, *ib.*; overthrows the power of the Wahabites, ii. 393; becomes master of Syria, ii. 437; compels the Sultan to confirm him in his different governments, ii. 439; new war against the Sultan, ii. 441; the Pachalic of Egypt confirmed to him and his descendants, ii. 445.

Mehmed Emir Aali Pacha, Vizier to Abdul Mejdid, ii. 456.

Mesih Pacha sent to capture Rhodes, and fails, i. 149, 150.

Michael of the Peaked Beard, i. 8; friend of Othman, i. 9.

Michael of Poland, ii. 51.

Milosch Obrenowitch, preserves Servia, ii. 395.

Mirza Sultan Ali, i. 224; devoted gallantry, *ib.*

Missolonghi, fall of, ii. 406.

Modon, ii. 225.
Moggersdorf, ii. 39.
Mohacz, at the battle of, the fate of Hungary was decided, i. 265.
Mohammed Ghirao, ii. 20.
Mohammed Tchelebi, judge of Galata, ii. 10.
Moharem Bey, Turkish admiral, ii. 420.
Möltke, Baron, remarks of, ii. 423.
Monezinade Ali, commander of the Ottoman fleet at the battle of Lepanto, i. 350; death, i. 353.
Montecuculi, ii. 2; meets the whole Ottoman force, ii. 36, 37; changes the balance of superiority, ii. 38.
Morava, i. 103.
Morosini, commander of the city of Candia, ii. 49; conquers the Morea, ii. 75.
Morsiney, Elizabeth, mother of Hunyades the Great, i. 101.
Mouhiuzadi, Grand Vizier, ii. 244; abilities and sagacity, ii. 245.
Mouslihеddin, colonel of the Janissaries, ii. 12; harangues the Sultan's master of the horse, ii. 13; has an audience with the Sultana Validé, ii. 15.
Moussa Pacha killed at Silistria, ii. 472.
Mousa Pacha rebels against Selim III., ii. 370.
Mufti Djemali. See *Djemali*.
Münnich, General, commander of the Russian armies, ii. 168; makes preparations for a campaign against Turkey, ii. 171; invests Azof, ii. 172; invades the Crimea, ii. 173; halts at Perekop, ii. 174; storms the lines, *ib.*; orders the attack on Kilburn, ii. 177; continues his progress through the Crimea, ii. 178; takes Koslof, ii. 179; captures Bakcheserai, *ib.*; takes Simpheropolis, *ib.*; sufferings of his troops, ii. 179, 180; evacuates the Crimea, ii. 180; again takes the field, ii. 185; severity to his soldiers, *ib.*; encamps before Oczakow, ii. 186; returns to the Ukraine, ii. 193; employs all his influence at the Russian court to continue the war, ii. 194; prepares to march against Constantinople, ii. 195; proclaims Cantemir Prince of Moldavia, ii. 196; takes Jassy, *ib.*; receives the intelligence of peace being made with the Porte with great indignation, ii. 199; encourages Catherine to renew the Oriental project, ii. 222.
Musa, Prince, son of Bajazet I., taken prisoner at Angora, i. 79; restored to liberty, i. 80.
Mustapha I., i. 387; deposed, *ib.*; reinstalled, i. 390; deposed a second time, i. 391.
Mustapha II., succeeds Achmet II., ii. 88; proclaims his intention to combat his enemies in person, ii. 89; demands the opinion of the Divan, ii. 90; the Divan oppose his heading the troops, *ib.*; he persists in his resolution, *ib.*; gains some important fortresses, *ib.*; hopes of Turkey begin to revive, ii. 91; meets Prince Eugene at Zenta, ii. 93; completely defeated by him, ii. 94; retires to Constantinople, ii. 95; insurrection against him, which obliges him to abdicate, ii. 107.
Mustapha III., accession of, ii. 204; first years of his reign not unpromising, *ib.*; governs for himself, ii. 207; protests against the occupation of Poland by Russian and Prussian troops, ii. 209; declares war against Russia, ii. 212; issues a fetva commanding an attack on Poland, ii. 220; orders the slaughter of all the Moldavians and Wallachians, who submit to Russia, ii. 221; orders the Dardanelles to be defended, ii. 228; loses the Crimea, ii. 233; offers Russia a large sum to forego the possession of Kertch and Yenikalé, ii. 243; laconic letter to Ibrahim Pacha, ii. 249; death, ii. 254.
Mustapha IV., made Padischah, ii. 372; deposed, ii. 374.
Mustapha Bairactar, endeavours to reinstate Selim III., ii. 372-374; assumes the Vizierate under Mahmoud II., ii. 374.
Mustapha, Lala, commands the expedition against Cyprus, i. 348.
Mustapha Pacha, defeated at Aboukir by Napoleon, ii. 341-342.
Mustapha, Pretender, i. 91; put to death, i. 95.
Mustapha, Prince, son of Bajazet I., taken prisoner at Angora, i. 79; restored to liberty, i. 80.
Mustapha, Prince, son of Solyman I., i. 293-296.
Myrtché, Prince of Wallachia, submits to Bajazet I., i. 52; joins Sigismund in his attack on the Ottoman Power, i. 57.

N

Nadir Derbend; mountain pass, i. 46.
Nadir Kouli Khan, exploits of, against the Ottomans, ii. 155; besieges Bagdad, ii. 159; defeated by Topal Osman, ii. 163; gains repeated victories over the Ottomans, who gladly make peace with him, ii. 165.
Naima, Turkish historian, i. 382.
Napier, Admiral, ii. 444.
Napoleon Bonaparte attacks Egypt, ii. 336; massacres the Turks at Jaffa, ii. 339; besieges Acre, *ib.*; gains the battle of Aboukir, ii. 342; leaves Egypt, *ib.*; acknowledges the sovereignty of the Porte over Egypt, ii. 345.
Nasmyth, English officer, killed at Silistria, ii. 472.
Nauplia, ii. 61.
Navarino, ii. 61; battle of, ii. 420.
Neipperg endeavours to obtain terms of pacification from the Porte, ii. 198.
Neuhausel captured by the Turks, ii. 339.
Nezib Mahmoud, his army meets that of Ibrahim, ii. 442.
Nice, i. 188.
Nicholas I. ascends the throne of Russia, ii. 414; procures the signing of the treaty of Akkerman, ii. 415; war with Turkey, ii. 422; his armies cross the Pruth, ii. 470.
Nicopolis, i. 58.
Nicomedia, captured in 1326, i. 26.
Nimirof, congress opened at, ii. 183.
Nissa, captured by the Turks, i. 37: evacuated by them, ii. 74; again conquered by the Ottomans, ii. 85; captured by the Austrians, ii. 190; recovered by the Turks, ii. 191.
Nizami Djidid, ii. 80.
Nossolitof, Russian ambassador to the Porte, i. 346.
Notaras, Grand Duke, i. 125; taken prisoner at the capture of Constantinople, i. 136; put to death, i. 139.
Nououman Kiuprili raised to the Vizierate, ii. 113; faults of his government, *ib.*; dismissed from his office, ii. 114.
Novoberda, mines of, i. 127.

O

Obresskoff, sent prisoner to the Seven Towers, ii. 212.
Oczakow, Charles XII. takes refuge at, ii. 111; Russians encamp before, under Münnich, ii. 186; conflagration, ii. 187; taken by the Russians, ii. 188; siege and merciless slaughter, ii. 291, 292.
Ofen, same as Buda, i. 266.
Oghouz, tribe of Turks, i. 2.
Oltenitza, ii. 471.
Omar Effendi, draws up the treaty of the Pruth, ii. 122.
Omar Pacha, ii. 464; commands the Turkish forces, ii. 471.
Orchan, son and successor of Othman, i. 16; makes his brother Alaeddin Vizier, i. 19; captures Nicomedia, i. 26; takes Nice, *ib.*; obtains possession of nearly the whole of the north-west of Asia Minor, i. 27: conduct during peace, *ib.*; marriage with Theodora, i. 29; bold stroke of Solyman Pacha, Orchan's son, in behalf of his own race, i. 30, 31; Orchan sends Solyman to assist Cantacuzene, i. 31; death of Solyman before that of his father, i. 33; death of Orchan, *ib.*
Orel, ii. 215.
Orkhan, descendant of Solyman, son of Bajazet I., i. 122.
Orloff, Count Alexif, high admiral of the Russian fleet, ii. 223; lands among the Mainotes, who rise against the Turks, ii. 225; slaughter of the Turks at Misitra, *ib.*; engages the Turkish fleet off Scios, ii. 226; burns their vessels in the port of Tchesmé, ii. 227; besieges the Castle of Lemnos, ii. 228; endeavours to sustain rebellions against the Porte, ii. 230.
Orsova, i. 58; besieged by the Turks, ii. 191; yields, ii. 192.
Osmanlis, the only national appellation the Turks recognise, i. 7.
Osman Pacha, march of, i. 362.
Othman I., son of Ertoghrul, i. 2; Turks take their name from him, *ib.*; waged war as an independent potentate, i. 7; seeks the daughter of Edebali in marriage, i. 8; is refused, *ib.*; gains a strong supporter in Michael of the Peaked Beard, i. 9; constancy to Malkatoon, i. 9; wonderful dream, *ib.*; marriage, i. 11; conquests and personal appearance, i. 12; triumphs over the Greeks, i. 14; kills his uncle, i. 15; death and advice to his son, i. 16, 17; character, i. 18.
Othman II., proclaimed Sultan, i. 387;

makes peace with Persia, i. 388; makes war with Poland, i. 389; plot for the overthrow of the Janissaries discovered, *ib.*
Othman III., accession of, ii. 203; preserves peace during his short reign, *ib.*
Otranto, i. 150.
Otrar, i. 81.
Ouloudj Ali, Turkish admiral at the battle of Lepanto, i. 350; bravery, i. 353; recompensed for his zeal, i. 355; constructs a new fleet, *ib.*; captures Tunis, i. 356.
Ouloufedji, or paid horsemen, i. 25.
Ouskoup, ii. 83.

P

Pacha, title of, i. 159.
Padischah, meaning of the title, i. 156.
Paget, Lord, urges the necessity of making peace with Turkey, ii. 98.
Palæologus, John, son-in-law to Cantacuzene, i. 30; hates Amurath, i. 38.
Palæologus, Manuel, i. 84.
Palgrave, Philip, nominal superior of the Christian defenders of Vienna, i. 270.
Panagia, or Holy Virgin, i. 97.
Parma, Prince of, i. 351.
Pascha Bajezid, famous general, i. 89; killed, i. 95.
Pascha Schehabeddin, Turkish commander, i. 102.
Paschazadé Kemel, historiographer, i. 206.
Paskievitsch, Count, general of Russian troops in Asia, ii. 422.
Passarowitz, negotiations for peace opened at, ii. 150; terms of treaty, *ib.*
Passwan-Oglou, rebels against the Sultan, ii. 346; invades Servia, ii. 348.
Patras, Gulf of, i. 351.
Patrona Khalil, heads a riot of the Janissaries, ii. 155; killed in the Sultan's presence, ii. 159.
Pehlevan, surname given to Mahomet I., i. 86.
Perekop, isthmus of, ii. 75; stormed by General Münnich, ii. 174-176.
Pesth, i. 266.
Peter the Great, Czar of Russia, ii. 96; attacks Azof, ii. 97; disinclined to make peace with Turkey, ii. 100; concludes the treaty of Carlowitz, ii. 104; struggle between Peter and Charles XII. of Sweden, ii. 110; menaces the Crimea, ii. 115; solemnly proclaims war against the Porte, ii. 117; endeavours to secure the co-operation of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, ii. 118; marches against the Turks, ii. 119; completely blockaded, ii. 121; saved by the address of his wife Catherine, *ib.*; retreats, ii. 124; noble self-sacrifice for the benefit of his empire, ii. 125, 126: causes Catherine to be crowned, ii. 126.
Peterwaradin secured by Prince Eugene against attack, ii. 93.
Pezech, i. 109.
Philip Augustus, i. 43.
Philoppolis, i. 35; Solyman II. retreats there, ii. 75.
Piale, Turkish admiral, i. 288-290.
Piri Reis, Turkish admiral, i. 287.
Pirizadi Osman Effendi, endeavours to excite the Sultan to a general massacre of all the Christians in his empire, ii. 221.
Pitt, prime minister of England, ii. 305; policy respecting Russia, ii. 307.
Plettscheieff, Michael, first Russian ambassador to Constantinople, i. 203.
Podolia, ii. 217.
Poniatowsky, Count, agent of the King of Sweden, protests against terms being granted by Turkey to Russia, ii. 122.
Potemkin, Prince, forms a plan for aiding England against the American Colonists, ii. 272.
Presburgh, treaty of, ii. 364.
Prussia signs a treaty with the Porte, ii. 206.
Pruth, treaty of the, ii. 122; made the boundary between Russia and Turkey, ii. 388.
Ptolemy Ceraunus, i. 41.
Putrid Sea, ii. 174.

R

Raab River, ii. 36.
Raco taken by assault, i. 58.
Raghib Pacha, Grand Vizier to Mustapha III., ii. 204; strengthens Turkey by alliances with other states, ii. 205; death, ii. 206.
Ragusa, i. 87.
Raschid, Turkish historian, ii. 145.
Redjib Pacha, promoter of the meeting

of the Spahis, i. 397; secretly put to death, i. 399.
Redshid Pacha, Grand Vizier to Mahmoud III., ii. 427.
Reis-Kemal, Admiral of the Turks, i. 195.
Reningen, Austrian envoy, makes overtures to the Turks, ii. 38.
Repnin, General, exercises a dictatorship at Warsaw, ii. 209.
Rhiga, Greek poet, ii. 400.
Rhodes, Island of, attacked by Mahomet II., i. 149; conquered by Solyman I., i. 261.
Richard II., i. 44.
Richard Cœur de Lion, i. 43.
Ridania, i. 230.
Rimnik, ii. 296.
Roe, Sir Thomas, English ambassador at the Porte, i. 389; remarks respecting the state of Turkey, i. 392.
Romanus, gate of, i. 133; Mahomet rides through the breach of, i. 135.
Romanzoff, General, ii. 217; takes the chief command of the Russian army, ii. 220; advances into Moldavia, ii. 231; storms Silistria, ii. 249; repulsed, ii. 250.
Roumelia, i. 42.
Russia, name of, first occurs in Turkish history, i. 203; state of Russia in the sixteenth century, i. 340.
Rustchuk, i. 371.

S

Sabandja, Lake of, ii. 204.
Sabbathai Levi, asserts himself to be the Messiah, ii. 67; denounced as an impostor, ii. 68; compelled to become a Moslem, ii. 69.
Sægud, the tomb of Ertoghrul near, i. 6; Othman dies there, i. 16.
Safiyé Sultana, influence over Amurath, i. 360; rules in the court of her son Mahomet, i. 370.
Sagræ, i. 35.
Saguta, i. 3.
Sakaria, i. 3.
Salonica, i. 91.
Salm, Count of, director of the siege of Vienna, i. 270; wounded, i. 272.
Samandjik, ii. 115.
Samara, ii. 115.
Samarcand, i. 71.
Saoudji, eldest son of Amurath I., i. 39; revolt, *ib.*; death, i. 40.
Sari Amed takes the command of the army, ii. 146; put to death, *ib.*
Saroukhan, province of, i. 255.
Scanderbeg, opponent of Amurath II., i. 99; parentage, i. 116; patrimony usurped, *ib.*; conduct in consequence, i. 116, 117; holds out gallantly against Mahomet II., i. 143; overpowered, i. 147.
Scerberras Mount, i. 303.
Schaffiroff, Chancellor, ii. 121; given up to the Ottomans as a hostage, ii. 124.
Schemsi Pacha, i. 365; revenge, *ib.*
Schenkendorf, General, ii. 85; driven from his lines at Dragoman, *ib.*
Scheremetoff, General, ii. 120; delivered to the Turks as a hostage, ii. 124.
Schinitza, i. 47.
Schiis, their tenets, i. 209.
Schumla, i. 46; ii. 245.
Scutari, i. 29.
Seaeddin, historian, i. 36; influence over Mahomet III., i. 372.
Sebastopol, ii. 282.
Seckendorf, Field-marshal, ii. 190.
Sehira, Turkish politician, i. 94.
Seleucus Nicator, i. 344.
Selim I., youngest son of Bajazet II., i. 197; rebels against his father, i. 197-199; retires to the Crimea, i. 199; recalled by his father, who abdicates in his favour, i. 200, 201; character, i. 204; devoted to war, i. 205; honours men of learning, i. 206; brother Ahmed rebels, i. 207; cruelty of Selim to his nephews, i. 208; revolt and death of Prince Korkoud, i. 209; death of Prince Ahmed, i. 210; massacre of the Schiis, i. 212; war with Persia in consequence, i. 213; Turkish army musters in the plain of Yenischeer, i. 213; Selim's letter to Ismail, i. 214-218; Ismail's reply, i. 219; Ottoman army advances upon Tabriz, i. 220; tumult of the Janissaries, i. 221; engagement with the Persian army, i. 222-224; victory of Selim, i. 224; enters Tabriz in triumph, i. 225; Syria and Egypt become objects of his ambition, i. 226; places himself at the head of his army, i. 229; occupies several of the Syrian cities, i. 230; marches towards Cairo, *ib.*; fights a battle at Ridania, a village near Cairo, and is victorious, *ib.*; valour of the Mamelukes in defence of Cairo, i. 232; treachery of Selim to them, *ib.*; noble and fearless bravery of Kourt Bey, i. 232-234; Selim

orders the death of Touman Bey, i. 235; becomes complete master of Egypt, *ib.*; cruel government there, i. 236; shows his sense of literary merit, i. 237; abandons the idea of conquests beyond the cataracts of the Nile, i. 238; punishment of Younis Pacha, *ib.*; government of Egypt a source of great anxiety to him, *ib.*; resolves to divide the authority among the different races of the country, i. 239; obtains the Caliphate from the conquest of Egypt, i. 241; authority much augmented by that circumstance, i. 242; returns to Syria, i. 243; gets back to Constantinople, *ib.*; directs his attention to his navy, i. 244; prepares for some great expedition, *ib.*; approaches of death, i. 245; death, i. 246; remarks on his reign, and influence of the Mufti Djemali over him, i. 246-249.

Selim II., accession of, i. 339; degeneracy, *ib.*; order preserved during the beginning of his reign by his father's statesmen and generals, i. 340; concludes a peace with Austria, *ib.*; great foreign events of his reign, *ib.*; sketch of the state of Russia at that period, i. 341; project of the Vizier Sokolli respecting Russia, i. 343-345. The Czar Ivan sends an ambassador to Constantinople, who is favourably received, i. 346; resolves on the conquest of Cyprus, i. 347; gains possession of the island, i. 348; battle of Lepanto, i. 351; defeat of the Turks, i. 353; peace with Venice, i. 356; death and character, i. 357.

Selim III. succeeds as Sultan, ii. 293; opening of his reign marked with calamity, ii. 295; orders Gazi Hassan to be put to death, ii. 296; sketch of the Turkish empire before his intended reforms, ii. 314-330; applies himself to the internal reform of his dominions, ii. 331; creates new troops, ii. 334; declares war with Napoleon, who attacks Egypt, ii. 337; repose of his empire disturbed, ii. 346; determines to act vigorously against the rebels in Servia, ii. 348; sorrow on hearing that Russia required the protectorate of all his subjects who professed the Greek faith, ii. 360; attacks Servia with two armies, ii. 363; concedes the title of Emperor to Napoleon Bonaparte, ii. 365; declares war against Russia, ii. 366; compelled to abdicate, ii. 372; strangled, ii. 373.

Selim Ghirai, abandons the Crimea to the Russians, ii. 234.

Seljukian Turks, their power, i. 3.

Selnaya Dolina, ii. 174.

Selymbria, i. 99.

Semendra, i. 103.

Seribinoff, Prince, routs the Turks near Azoph, i. 345.

Serivar, captured by the Turks, ii. 36.

Servia, the Turkish Sultan resigns all claims to, i. 106; reconquered, i. 113.

Siavoush Pacha, murdered, ii. 72.

Sidi Ali, Turkish admiral and poet, i. 287.

Sigismund attacks Bajazet I., i. 52; appeals to France for aid, i. 56; takes several Turkish towns, i. 58; defeated by Bajazet, i. 62.

Silikdars, i. 25.

Silistria ceded to Amurath, i. 46; defended by the Turks against Russia, ii. 472.

Simmering, i. 269.

Simpheropolis, ii. 179.

Sinan, celebrated physician, i. 89.

Sinan Pacha, killed at Ridania, i. 231.

Sinope, i. 146; devastated by the Cossacks, i. 386.

Siropulo, Greek physician, supposed to have poisoned Krim Ghirai, ii. 217.

Sisvan, King of the Bulgarians, gives his daughter in marriage to Amurath, i. 37; attacks his son-in-law's armies, i. 45; sues for peace, i. 46.

Sitvatorok, treaty concluded at, i. 383.

Sivas, i. 73; siege and fall, i. 74.

Slaves, state of, foreign and domestic, in Turkey, i. 172-174.

Slobosia, treaty of, ii. 370.

Smyrna, i. 87.

Sobieski, ii. 2; breaks the treaty made with the Turks, ii. 51; defeats them near Khoczim, *ib.*; aids King Leopold against the Turks, ii. 56; completely routs them, ii. 60.

Sofia, ii. 74.

Sokolli, Grand Vizier to Solyman I., i. 315; proposes to unite the Don and Volga by a canal, i. 344.

Solakzade, Turkish historian, i. 299.

Solyman I., titles of, i. 254; great men of his age, *ib.*; first acts of his reign, i. 255; military abilities, i. 256; takes Belgrade, ii. 258; prepares

for the siege of Rhodes, i. 259; siege begins, i. 260; offers terms of capitulation, i. 261; honourable conduct towards the Knights of St. John, i. 262; sensible of the necessity of keeping the turbulent Janissaries constantly engaged in warfare, i. 263; goes to Adrianople, i. 264; Janissaries rebel, *ib.*; returns to quell the storm, *ib.*; fate of Hungary decided, i. 265; conduct towards Ferdinand of Austria and Zapolya, rival claimants for the crown of Hungary, i. 266-268; takes Ofen and installs Zapolya, i. 268; commences the siege of Vienna, *ib.*; valour of the besieged, i. 270-272; obliged to draw off his troops, *ib.*; savage behaviour of his soldiery, i. 273; repulse from Vienna, a critical epoch, i. 274; leads his armies into Persia, i. 276; effects many important conquests, *ib.*; fresh wars in Hungary, i. 277; makes an advantageous treaty of peace, i. 278; turns his attention to his navy, i. 279; brilliant exploits of his admirals, i. 281-290; domestic tragedies, i. 291-299; failure of the expedition against Malta, i. 300-309; new struggle with Austria, i. 309; feeble state of his health, *ib.*; encamps before Szigeth, i. 310; dies there, i. 311; death kept secret, i. 312; Szigeth taken, i. 314; death revealed, i. 315, 316; immense extent of his empire, i. 317; his division of it into governments, i. 318; number of races he ruled over, i. 320-322; his military force, i. 323; organisation of the feudal system, i. 326; laws, i. 331: splendour of his public buildings, i. 335; his literary attainments, i. 336.

Solyman II., succeeds as Sultan, ii. 71; insurrections and outrages in the beginning of his reign, ii. 72; marches towards the Hungarian frontier, ii. 73; proceeds as far as the city of Sofia, ii. 74; retreats to Philippolis, ii. 75; gains advantages over the Russians, *ib.*; convenes an extraordinary Divan, ii. 76; makes Kiuprili Zadè Mustapha Grand Vizier, ii. 77; dies, ii. 86.

Sophia captured, i. 103.

Souleimaniye, i. 316.

Soulfikar, chief executioner of Constantinople, ii. 31.

Soulourderbend, defile of, i. 104.

Spahis, Royal horse-guards, i. 25; formidable mutiny, i. 395.

Spiridoff, Admiral, ii. 223.

Sporades, ii. 433.

Spork, John, Imperialist general of cavalry, ii. 43.

Stahremberg, Count, ii. 57.

Stanislaus Poniatowski, ii. 209.

Stopford, Admiral, ii. 444.

Strania, i. 99.

Sultan-Œni, or Sultan's front, i. 6.

Sultanzade Pacha, Grand Vizier to Ibrahim, ii. 7; baseness, ii. 8; put to death, ii. 14.

Sutton, Sir Robert, ii. 109.

Suwarrow, ii. 218; attacks the Turks at Koylidje, ii. 255; defeats the Turks at Kilburn, ii. 285; invests Oczakow, ii. 291; gains a victory over the Turks near the river Rimnik, ii. 296; captures Ismail, ii. 299.

Szegeddin, treaty concluded at, i. 106.

Szigeth, i. 310.

T

Tabriz, i. 220.

Tagaurok, ii. 115.

Tahia Pacha, Turkish admiral, ii. 420.

Tahmash, Shah of Persia, ii. 152.

Taman, ii. 100.

Tarkhan Sultana, ii. 26.

Tchernaya Dolina, ii. 174.

Tekeli, Count, heads a Hungarian revolt, ii. 55; defeats the Imperialists in Transylvania, ii. 85; conquered by them, ii. 88.

Temeswar, ii. 75; feeble attempts of the Turks to relieve, ii. 146; fall, *ib.*

Theiss, ii. 92.

Thornton, remarks of, on the treaty of the Pruth, ii. 124.

Thrace, i. 42.

Thugut, Austrian representative at Constantinople, ii. 238.

Tiflis, ii. 217.

Tilly, ii. 40.

Timars, i. 26; fully described, i. 163-165.

Timour the Tartar, i. 70; unparalleled as a conqueror, i. 72; assails Sivas, i. 73; puts Prince Erteghrul to the sword, i. 74; besieges Angora, i. 76; takes Bajazet prisoner, i. 79; dies at Otrar, i. 81.

Timourtash puts the Prince of Caramania to death, i. 53.

Tirlak, apostate Jew, i. 90,

Todleben, General, ordered to Tiflis, ii. 217.
Topal Osman, Grand Vizier to Mahmoud I., ii. 159; superseded in his office, ii. 163; sent into Asia as generalissimo of the Turkish forces, ii. 163.
Torches, Battle of the, i. 375.
Torstenston, ii. 40.
Tott, Baron de, assists Krim Ghirai against the Turks, ii. 215.
Touroud Dervise, i. 11.
Treaty between Russia, England, and France, to effect a reconciliation of the Greeks and Turks, ii. 417.
Trebizond, i. 146.
Tschendereli-Kara-Khalil, counsellor to Orchan, i. 21.
Tschelebi, title conferred on Mahomet I., i. 86.
Tschuli Ali, Grand Vizier to Achmet III., opposes the demands of Charles XII. of Sweden, ii. 112; deprived of office, ii. 113.
Tunis, i. 356.
Turenne, ii. 40.
Turkish Empire, internal organisation of, i. 152-182.
Tzympé, Castle of, i. 31.

U

Ukraine, sovereignty of the Czar recognised, ii. 55.
Ulema, order of men learned in the law, i. 169; co-operate with the soldiery, ii. 12.
Ungern, General, repulsed at Varna, ii. 253.
Unkiar Skelessi, treaty of, ii. 439.
Urban V. preaches a crusade against the Turks, i. 36.
Urban, Hungarian engineer, i. 124.

V

Valette, La, Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, i. 300; noble heroism during the siege of Malta, i. 304-309.
Validé Sultana, signifies dowager Sultana, i. 360.
Varna, siege of, i. 110; surrenders to Hunyades, *ib.*; retaken by Amurath, II., i. 113; importance as a military post, ii. 247; taken by the Russians, ii. 424.
Vasag, i. 102.
Venetians, war with the, called the war of Candia, ii. 20; siege of Candia begun, ii. 25.
Venice menaced by Mahomet II., i. 148; yields all claim to the Morea, ii. 150.
Veniero, Admiral, joins Don John of Austria against the Turks, i. 350.
Veterani, General, defeated near Lugos, ii. 90.
Vienna, siege of, i. 268-272; saved by the heroism of her defenders, i. 272; besieged a second time by the Turks, ii. 57; they are completely routed, ii. 60; consequences of their defeat, ii. 60, 61.
Volo, Gulf of, ii. 433.

W

Wahabites, origin of the sect called, ii. 201; capture the cities of Mecca and Medina, ii. 346.
Wallenstein, ii. 40.
Wallis, Marshal, marches towards Orsova, ii. 197; engages the Turks near Krotzka, *ib.*; defeated, ii. 198.
Waradein, Great, ii. 75.
Wassif, Turkish historian, ii. 218.
Weissman, General, ii. 218.
Wenceslaus, St., on the eve of, Soliman appears beneath Vienna, i. 269.
Widdin, surrenders to Sigismund, i. 58; conquered by the Imperialists, ii. 75; regained by the Turks, ii. 85.
Winceslaus, Emperor of Germany, i. 44.
Windischdorf, ii. 38.
Wissgrad, i. 371.
Woniaks, or camp-followers, i. 37.

Y.

Yakoub, son of Amurath, i. 49.
Yanaka, Hospodar of Moldavia, ii. 158; put to death, ii. 159.
Yaya, or Piadé corps of paid infantry, i. 21.
Yegen Mahommed Pacha, heads the Ottoman forces against the Austrians, ii. 191.

Yegen Osman sets fire to Belgrade, ii. 74.
Yeni, Tscheri, i. 22.
Yenikalé surrenders to the Russians, ii. 234.
Yenischeer, battle near, under Ertoghrul, i. 5; Turkish army musters there under Selim I., i. 213.
Yilderim, surname of Bajazet, i. 41.
Yoglan Bey, commander of Turkish garrison at Nicopolis, i. 58.
Younis Pacha, i. 238.
Youssouf Pacha, ii. 6.

Z.

Zapolya claims the crown of Hungary, i. 266; installed king, i. 268.
Zaritsinka, ii. 173.
Zeitoun, i. 99.
Zenta, ii. 94.
Ziamets, i. 26; fully described, i. 163, 165.
Zriny, Count, heroic governor of Szigeth, i. 310; prepares for death, i. 312; killed, i. 313.
Zurawna, peace of, ii. 52.

THE END.

BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.

Lon. Jan. Richard Bentley 1854

00142049

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 15 June, 2016